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ABSTRACT

CONTESTED MAJORITY: THE REPRESENTATION OF THE WHITE WORKING
CLASS IN US POLITICS FROM THE 1930s TO THE 1990s
Christopher Cimaglio
Carolyn Marvin
This dissertation examines the representation of the white working class in US politics
from the 1930s to the 1990s: how politicians, journalists, pollsters, pundits, political
commentators, social movement groups, and others have studied, written about, and
claimed to speak for white working class people and how this work has shaped American
politics. Most existing literature on the role of the white working class in American
politics has examined political opinion and political identity formation among white
working class people, too often treating the “white working class” as a homogenous
group with uniform political views. This project takes a different approach, focused on
elite engagement with the white working class as a social and political category. It traces
how prominent elite-level understandings of white working class identity, politics, and
culture—from progressive workers combating economic elites to culturally conservative
“Middle Americans” opposed to liberalism—emerged and impacted political
contestation. In doing so, it stresses the importance of the white working class as a
political symbol, one that has consistently been at the center of conflict around
fundamental issues in US politics, including the nature of privilege and disadvantage,
challenges to racial, gender, and class inequality, the state’s sphere of responsibility, and
the contours of national identity.
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Introduction
On November 8, 2016, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States,
an outcome that came as a shock for most professional political observers. The dominant
explanation for Trump’s win focused on his appeal to one specific group: the white
working class. “Working-class whites give Trump the White House,” read a CNN
chyron. For ABC News, “A revolution against politics shook the country, [with] working
class whites venting their economic and cultural frustration by lifting…Trump to the
presidency.”1 By November, this frame was nothing new; for most of the campaign,
Trump supporters and Trump opponents with almost nothing in common could agree that
Trump’s candidacy was a bottom-up revolt of blue-collar whites against the political
establishment. One prominent Democrat called Trump the “staunchest champion of the
white working class that American politics has seen in decades.”2 Signs reading “The
Silent Majority Stands With Trump” were fixtures at campaign rallies. Trump
championed coal miners, factory workers, and cities and towns harmed by trade deals. “I
am your voice,” he promised “the forgotten men and women of our country.”3
Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency was unique in recent American political
history. The symbolism around the white working class that accompanied it was deeply
rooted in that history. Trump’s promise to restore high-wage manufacturing jobs tapped

1

“Working-Class Whites Give Trump the White House,” as featured on “The Lead with Jake Tapper,”
CNN, November 9, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2016/11/09/donald-trump-white-voters-whitehouse-2016-president-tapper-dnt-lead.cnn; Gary Langer et al., “Huge Margin Among Working-Class
Whites Lifts Trump to a Stunning Election Upset,” ABC News, November 9, 2016,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/huge-margin-working-class-whites-lifts-trumpstunning/story?id=43411948.
2
William Galston, “Trump Rides a Blue-Collar Wave,” Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2015.
3
Donald Trump, address accepting the Republican Party nomination for president, Cleveland, Ohio, July
21, 2016, transcript at http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/22/politics/donald-trump-rnc-speech-text/index.html.
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cultural memory of the period between the 1950s and 1970s, when a (usually white,
male) worker with a high school education could securely support a family on a single
wage. “Forgotten Americans” is a longstanding trope invoked by politicians as diverse as
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Richard Nixon (the Trump campaign’s most obvious inspiration),
and Bill Clinton. Observers on the left and right have, over many decades, condemned
journalists and political elites as out of touch with the (white) working class. Present-day
elite observers commenting on the political importance of working class whites tend to
see their arguments as novel responses to the urgency of the moment. From a historical
perspective, patterns are very clear.
White workers have long been central to elite political contestation in the United
States. Liberals have invoked them as chief beneficiaries of a liberal agenda, as the
backbone of the liberal coalition, and (in more recent decades) as those voters most
responsible for the rise of conservatism. Conservatives have figured them as dupes of
liberal elites and (in more recent decades) as the mass base for populist resistance to
liberalism. White workers have been, as consistently as any other social group, identified
as “average Americans” and as representative of the “public.” They have also been, more
than any other group, symbolic of racism, nativism, and unease about modernity and
social change. In sum, representations of working class whites among US elites have
been complex and ambivalent, marked by ascriptions of both normativity and inferiority.
Even deeply negative representations have been often tinged with normativity, though,
and positive ones with condescension.

2

Most existing literature on the role of the white working class in American
politics has examined political opinion and political identity formation among white
working class people. Here, I take a different approach, focused on elite engagement
with the white working class as a social and political category. This dissertation
examines the representation of the white working class in US politics from the 1930s to
the 1990s: how politicians, journalists, pollsters, pundits, social movement groups, and
others have studied, written about, and claimed to speak for white working class people
and how this work has shaped American politics. The project traces how prominent elitelevel understandings of white working class identity, politics, and culture emerged and
impacted political contestation. In doing so, it stresses the importance of the white
working class as a political symbol, one that has consistently been at the center of conflict
around fundamental issues in US politics. Talk about working class whites has been a
medium through which elites have grappled with and debated large questions about their
own positions in society, the nature of privilege and disadvantage, challenges to racial,
gender, and class inequality, the state’s sphere of responsibility, the legitimacy of
capitalism, and more.
This introduction lays the groundwork for the study and is divided into three
parts. First, a literature review details existing historical, ethnographic, and quantitative
literature on white working class politics and frames my intervention in that context. Part
Two outlines the theoretical framework for the project. It introduces Pierre Bourdieu’s
work on class formation (the centerpiece of that framework), discusses how “white
working class” is conceptualized in the context of this project, defines the key concept of
3

“elite public discourse,” and details how that concept was operationalized via the study’s
methods. Finally, Part Three provides a road map of the chapters to follow and a
summary of the dissertation’s broad narrative.

I. Literature Review
This literature review outlines existing work focused on the white working class
in American politics. It is divided into two broad sections: a discussion of research
focused on understanding the political and social views of white working class people
and a discussion of predominant themes in existing writing about the representation of
the white working class. The central enduring theme in existing literature is the extent to
which unease with cultural change, especially gains for people of color, drives the
politics of a broadly drawn white working class. Though scholars’ treatment of this
theme has become more nuanced over time, the question of why white working class
voters support conservative politics remains dominant in the literature. There are clear
limits to what research oriented around this question can explain, and a focus on how
elites have talked about the white working class can open up new dimensions for
analysis. In existing work on the representation of the white working class, I argue
below, there are two predominant themes—normative constructions of white workers
defined against people of color and stigmatizing constructions of white workers on the
part of white elites. In existing writing, these perspectives sometimes appear opposed to
one another, but they do not need to be: a synthesis of the two is both important and very
achievable.
4

Research focused on the political and social views of white working class people
Any understanding of existing work on the white working class in American
politics starts with the concept of “backlash.” In simplest terms, the backlash frame
posits that white working class voters support a conservative agenda because of anxiety
about or opposition to cultural change, particularly the advancement of people of color.
Over many years, the concept of backlash has undergirded both historical analysis and
analysis of contemporary politics.
According to a longstanding narrative, political shifts among working class
whites—to the left in the 1930s and to the right, as part of a backlash beginning in the
1960s—explain a great deal of the political history of the twentieth-century US. “The
backbone of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal Democratic coalition, working whites put
Ronald Reagan in the White House,” one historian writes.4 In this narrative, the gains
liberals made during the 1930s and 1940s were made possible by progressive views and
political unity among working class voters. Workers underwent a “gradual shift in
attitudes and behavior” in which they rejected the individualistic ideology of the business
class and placed their trust in an activist government responsible for its citizens’
security.5 They also united in a multiracial, multiethnic political majority, as the forces
pushing them toward common ground, including the “culture of unity” cultivated by the
industrial union movement, made possible collective action that overcame the racial

4

Kenneth Durr, Behind the Backlash: White Working-Class Politics in Baltimore, 1940-1980 (Chapel Hill
and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 1.
5
Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), 5. For strong and representative academic accounts, see Steve Fraser and Gary
Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989);
Jefferson Cowie, The Great Exception: The New Deal and the Limits of American Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2016).
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divisions exploited by employers. The New Deal coalition (African Americans, the
Northern white ethnic working class, the white South, and professional-class white
liberals) made Democrats the dominant force in American politics for thirty years.
One of the most influential understandings of why the New Deal coalition
collapsed, both inside and outside the academy, is what’s often called the “backlash
narrative.” The key period in most backlash accounts is the 1960s, when white working
class voters left the Democrats as part of a reaction against the civil rights movement, the
counterculture and radical left, and Democrats’ association with both. The old
Democratic coalition split into two opposing factions—“a coalition of blacks and middleclass whites committed to an agenda of racial and sexual equality, social welfare, and
moral modernism” and a group of “working-class and lower-middle-class
whites…calling for a reassertion of such traditional values as patriarchy, patriotism, law
and order, hard work, and self-help.”6 By exploiting the backlash and adopting “a
populist stance around the issues of race and taxes,” Republicans were able to “persuade
working and lower-middle-class [white] voters to join in an alliance with business
interests and the affluent.”7 The result was a period of conservative dominance. In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, as scholars sought to understand the decline of liberalism and
6

Fraser and Gerstle, introduction to The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, xxi.
Thomas and Mary Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 13. Chain Reaction was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize and had a
substantial influence on both the elite-level political debate and the scholarly literature. It remains the most
important articulation of the backlash narrative. See also the essays in Fraser and Gerstle, eds., The Rise
and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980, especially Jonathan Rieder, “The Rise of the ‘Silent
Majority,’” 243-268; Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, The Origins of the New
Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Allen
Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper & Row,
1984); William C. Berman, America’s Right Turn: From Nixon to Clinton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1998). In the last fifteen years, the best-known text in the backlash tradition is Thomas
Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America (New York: Henry
Holt, 2004).
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the rise of conservatism in the late twentieth century, this narrative became central to the
academic literature. Works in this backlash tradition largely took a top-down approach
and stressed conservative politicians’ use of racially charged rhetoric to attract white
voters, typically assuming a uniform reception.
Importantly, the backlash frame has been applied consistently in reference to
periods other than the 1960s, and it remains central to journalists’ and liberal pundits’
work on the white working class. What specifically is understood to have alienated
working class whites has changed over time as issues enter and exit the discourse—
busing, Vietnam, affirmative action, illegal immigration, “God, guns, and gays,”
transgender rights—but the argument remains basically the same: appeals to racial and/or
cultural identity push lower and middle-income whites towards conservatism. The basic
claims of the backlash narrative—that racial/cultural grievances altered the trajectory of
American politics and pushed whites to the right—are clearly persuasive. Because of its
one-dimensional causal mechanism, in which non-elite white sentiment is almost wholly
responsible for the rise of conservatism (or, in some cases, neoliberalism or mass
incarceration), it cannot stand as a comprehensive explanation of any of these
developments. Rather, the backlash narrative’s ubiquity in elite public discourse owes to
the fact that it can support inflections acceptable to both liberals and conservatives.
Because it frames conservatism as driven by a bottom-up revolt against elite liberals, it
can mesh with anti-elite populist conservative frames. When it understands conservatism
as driven above all by racism and cultural bigotry, it accords well with liberal criticism.

7

In journalism and political commentary, the backlash narrative remains
hegemonic; in the scholarly literature, its position is more complex. It remains
influential, and scholars continue to center it in their literature reviews—sometimes to
define their work against it (as I am doing here).8 However, academic analysis over the
last twenty years has pushed back on or superseded significant elements of the backlash
narrative, without transcending its basic role in the symbolic construction of the white
working class. Recent academic literature on white working class politics can be divided
into three broad categories—historical work, primarily within the field of history;
quantitative studies looking at voting and party affiliation, primarily in political science;
and ethnographic and interview-based studies, primarily in sociology.
A recent quantitative literature on white working class politics in political science
and political sociology has primarily focused on testing central claims of the backlash
narrative: whether the white working class supports the Republicans and whether social
or economic issues primarily explain that support. Several of the most notable academic
critiques of the backlash narrative have come out of this literature: scholars (most notably
Larry Bartels) have argued that Democratic support among working class whites outside
the South has been flat or has even increased since the 1950s, with the decline in
Democratic support within the white working class attributable to the breakup of the oneparty South. It is important to stress, though, that Bartels’ argument relies on an overly
narrow definition of the white working class: whites in the bottom third of the income
8

Joseph Lowndes, From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern Origins of Modern
Conservatism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), 3-5; Naomi Murakawa, The First
Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 7-8; Kim
Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2009), x, 323ff; Vesla Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the Development of
Punitive Crime Policy,” Studies in American Political Development 21, no. 2 (2007): 238.
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distribution. More broadly, most of the debate in the quantitative literature on white
working class politics rests on how the “white working class” is defined statistically: by
income, education, occupation, self-identification as “working class,” or a combination of
the above.9 An income-based definition yields the most progressive “white working
class”; all other approaches suggest some degree of shift to the Republicans. An
education-based definition (whites without a four-year college degree, the metric most
commonly used by journalists and pollsters) yields the most conservative “white working
class.”

9

For the income-based approach, see Larry Bartels, “What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with
Kansas?,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 2005; Bartels, “What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with
Kansas?,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1, no. 2 (2006): 201-226; Bartels, Unequal Democracy:
The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), chapter 3;
Jeffrey Stonecash, Class and Party in American Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000); Stonecash,
“Scaring the Democrats: What’s the Matter with Thomas Frank’s Argument?,” The Forum 3, no. 3 (2005):
1-5. For education and occupation-based approaches, Alan Abramowitz and Ruy Teixeira, “The Decline of
the White Working Class and the Rise of a Mass Upper-Middle Class,” Political Science Quarterly 124,
no. 3 (2009): 391-420, gives the best sense of the conventional wisdom among political strategists; see also
Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks, Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party
Coalitions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); John McTague, “Contested Populism: The CrossPressured White Working Class in American Politics” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, 2010);
David Brady, Benjamin Sosnaud, and Steven Frenk, “The Shifting and Diverging White Working Class in
US Presidential Elections, 1972-2004,” Social Science Research 38, no. 1 (2009): 118-133. A useful
treatment incorporating multiple definitions of the “white working class” can be found in Lane Kenworthy,
Sondra Barringer, Daniel Duerr, and Garrett Schneider, “The Democrats and Working-Class Whites”
(unpublished paper, Penn State University, June 10, 2007), available at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.361.1778&rep=rep1&type=pdf. For public
policy- or strategy-oriented treatments, see Ruy Teixeira and Joel Rogers, America’s Forgotten Majority:
Why the White Working Class Still Matters (New York: Basic Books, 2001); Elizabeth Jacobs,
“Understanding America’s White Working Class: Their Politics, Voting Habits, and Policy Priorities,”
Governance Studies at Brookings, November 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/05-america-white-working-class-jacobs.pdf; Robert P. Jones and Daniel Cox,
“Beyond Guns and God: Understanding the Complexities of the White Working Class in America,” Public
Religion Research Institute, September 20, 2012, https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/WWCReport-For-Web-Final-1.pdf; Andrew Levison, The White Working Class Today (Washington, D.C.: The
Democratic Strategist Press, 2013); Daniel Cox, Rachel Lienesch, and Robert P. Jones, “Beyond
Economics: Fears of Cultural Displacement Pushed the White Working Class to Trump,” PRRI/The
Atlantic Report, May 9, 2017, https://www.prri.org/research/white-working-class-attitudes-economy-tradeimmigration-election-donald-trump/; Liz Hamel, Elise Sugarman, and Mollyann Brody, Kaiser Family
Foundation/CNN Working-Class Whites Poll, September 23, 2016, available at
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Kaiser-Family-Foundation-CNN-Working-Class-Whites-Poll.
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Scholars looking at significantly different populations, though, all generalize to
the “white working class.” Their investment in doing so suggests the high stakes and
considerable meaning attached to the category, but it also illustrates the conceptual
problems posed by treating a unitary category as the focus of research. Studies whose
findings do not actually conflict with each other are opposed to one another in literature
reviews10, and it is necessary to read against the grain to get a sense of variation within
the group. The picture that emerges from considering the literature as a whole is more
complex than the backlash narrative. It suggests a decline in white working class support
for Democrats large enough to be impactful but not large enough to support the thesis
that the white working class “abandon[ed]” the party.11 The turn to the Republican Party
appears to be larger in the South, among relatively high-income individuals without
college degrees, among men, and among individuals working in traditional blue-collar
occupations. That trend is smaller among Northerners, relatively low-income people, and
women. Several studies suggest that a preference for Republicans’ managing of the
economy has driven the conservative trend (an argument that has seldom appeared in
journalism and punditry), while others emphasize race. The importance some backlash

10

“On one hand, there is evidence that the White working class has shifted to vote Republican, and on the
other hand, there is evidence that the White working class continues to vote Democratic.” Brady, Sosnaud,
and Frenk, “The Shifting and Diverging White Working Class,” 119. It should be noted that studies’
divergent findings are also partly explained by the years that they choose as starting points—starting in
1964, an artificial high point for white support for Democrats due to Lyndon Johnson’s landslide, yields a
much more dramatic decline than 1952, perhaps a low point, although Democrats did not win a majority of
the white vote in 1952, 1956, or 1960. African American voters were crucial to Democratic electoral
success from the New Deal through the 1960s as well as from the 1960s to the present day.
11
As Kenworthy et al. convincingly suggest, identification with the Democratic Party declined among
working class whites from approximately 60% to 40% from 1970 to the early 2000s, a finding that holds
across multiple measures of “white working class.” Kenworthy et al, “The Democrats and Working-Class
Whites,” 6. For the “abandon[ed]” claim, Abramowitz and Teixeira, “The Decline of the White Working
Class.”
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accounts afford to “social issues” such as abortion has not fared as well in this
literature.12
Within the historical literature, the backlash narrative has been substantially
decentered. The basic construction of a unitary, anxious white working class has not
been sufficiently problematized, though, and there has been relatively little emphasis on
the white working class as a political symbol deployed by elites. The literature on
conservatism has grown a great deal since the key backlash works appeared in the late
1980s and early 1990s. It contains major strands that deemphasize working class whites
and emphasize the efforts of professional- and upper class conservative social movement
activists, religious conservatives, and business elites.13 However secure liberalism
appeared from the 1930s to the 1960s, much of this work stresses, a significant
countermobilization among powerful adversaries was taking shape. Other more recent
studies share the backlash narrative’s emphasis on white working class discontent as a
key force behind the success of conservatism, but they argue that this began much earlier
than the 1960s and that it is best understood as a local politics rooted in urban and
suburban space. In other words, white workers’ turn to the right was not a product of
1960s liberalism’s strong association with African Americans; the same racial politics
was evident on the local level decades earlier. Homeownership and neighborhood,
central to white working class identity for these studies, encouraged an ideology centered
on maintaining segregated neighborhoods and schools, protecting property values, and
12

Morris Fiorina et al., Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (New York: Pearson Longman,
2005); Andrew Gelman, Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They
Do (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Bartels, “What’s the Matter,” Quarterly Journal of
Political Science.
13
This discussion draws on Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” Journal of American
History 98, no. 3 (2011): 723-743.
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keeping taxes low.14 These essential studies take a nuanced and empirically grounded
approach, moving past the model of isolated voters responding to conservative rhetoric to
portray a bottom-up populist conservative politics.
The literature over the last twenty years also includes a number of ethnographic
and interview-based studies of white working class politics, primarily in sociology.15
Consistent themes in these studies include the importance of homeownership,
neighborhood, community, and work in shaping white working class people’s political
14
Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996); Sugrue, “Crabgrass-Roots Politics: Race, Rights, and the Reaction
against Liberalism in the Urban North, 1940-1964,” Journal of American History 82, no. 2 (1995): 551578; Robert Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2003); Becky Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class
Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920-1965 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Kenneth
Durr, Behind the Backlash: White Working-Class Politics in Baltimore, 1940-1980 (Chapel Hill and
London: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); see also Arnold Hirsh, Making the Second Ghetto:
Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Amanda
Seligman, Block by Block: Neighborhoods and Public Policy on Chicago’s West Side (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2005). Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), though its primary focus is not on working class whites,
makes a related argument about homeownership-based politics.
15
Classic studies include David Halle, America’s Working Man: Work, Home, and Politics among Blue
Collar Property Owners (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Jonathan Rieder, Canarsie: The
Jews and Italians of Brooklyn Against Liberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); Lillian
Rubin, Worlds of Pain: Life in the Working-Class Family (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Lillian Rubin,
Families on the Fault Line: America’s Working Class Speaks about the Family, the Economy, Race, and
Ethnicity (New York: Harper Collins, 1994). More recent studies include Justin Gest, The New Minority:
White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2016); Arlie Russell Hochschild, Strangers in their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the
American Right (New York: The New Press, 2016); Katherine Cramer, The Politics of Resentment: Rural
Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016);
Monica Prasad, Steve Hoffman, and Kieran Bezila, “Walking the Line,” Politics & Society 44, no. 2
(2016): 281-304; Michèle Lamont, The Dignity of Working Men (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2000); Maria Kefalas, Working-Class Heroes: Protecting Home, Community, and Nation in a Chicago
Neighborhood (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Lois Weis, Class Reunion: The Remaking
of the American White Working Class (New York: Psychology Press, 2004); Lois Weis, Working Class
without Work: High School Students in a De-Industrializing Economy (New York: Routledge, 2013);
Michelle Fine, Lois Weis, Judi Addelston, and Julia Marusza, “Secure Times: Constructing White
Working-Class Masculinities in the Late 20th Century,” Gender & Society 11, no. 1 (1997): 52-68; Kris
Paap, Working Construction: Why White Working-Class Men Put Themselves—and the Labor Movement—
in Harm’s Way (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); for journalistic explorations, J. Anthony Lukas,
Common Ground (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); Samuel Freedman, The Inheritance: How Three
Families and America Moved from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1996); Barbara Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America (New York: Metropolitan
Books, 2001); Joan Walsh, What’s the Matter with White People (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012).
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identities; the stress many white working class people place on morality and personal
responsibility; resentment of and lack of trust in government and elite institutions; and
the frequency with which white workers define themselves against African Americans,
immigrants, Muslims, and other whites they consider dangerous or less deserving. These
studies underscore the extent to which economic and cultural issues are intertwined in
political consciousness, with economic views informed by cultural constructions of the
groups benefitting from government programs. Broadly, studies differ less in their
characterizations of white working class cultures than the tone they take to describe
them—in other words, how sympathetically scholars treat the grievances they describe.
Two recent studies—both cited by journalists and elite commentators as insightful
in explaining the Trump phenomenon—give a good sense of the current dominant
scholarly view of the white working class. For sociologist Justin Gest, writing in 2016:
I find that white working class people’s rebellion is driven by a sense of
deprivation—the discrepancy between individuals’ expectations of power and
social centrality, and their perceptions of fulfillment. More specifically, white
working class people are consumed by their loss of social and political status in
social hierarchies, particularly in relation to immigrant and minority reference
groups. Their politics are motivated and pervaded by a nostalgia that reveres, and
seeks to reinstate, a bygone era.16
For sociologist Arlie Hochschild, also writing in 2016:
You’ve suffered long hours, layoffs, and exposure to dangerous chemicals at
work, and received reduced pensions. You have shown moral character through
trial by fire, and the American Dream of prosperity and security is a reward for all
of this, showing who you have been and are—a badge of honor…Look! You see
people cutting in line ahead of you! You’re following the rules. They aren’t. As
they cut in, it feels like you are being moved back. How can they just do that?
Who are they? Some are black. Through affirmative action plans, pushed by the
federal government, they are being given preference for places in colleges and
universities, apprenticeships, jobs, welfare payments, and free lunches…Blacks,
16
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women, immigrants, refugees…all have cut ahead of you in line. But it’s people
like you who have made this country great…You’ve suffered a good deal
yourself, but you aren’t complaining about it.17
In the most common view, the politics of the white working class is backward-looking,
moralistic, and founded on a sense of unjustly lost normativity.
Taken as a whole, existing work is very strong in documenting the existence and
significance of white working class conservatism and capturing how conservative views
arise among whites of modest means. In existing literature, however, broad and rigid
understandings of white working class identity and culture are asked to carry a heavy
conceptual load, to the detriment of the analysis. Take the following two representative
claims in existing scholarly literature: “In the aftermath of the [1960s], white working
people felt themselves to be coughing up their taxes to support the poor minority”…“The
conservatism of America’s working people leads them to reject a social democracy in
order to vote for officials whose policies favor laissez-faire economics and corporate
interests.”18 These characterizations are certainly true—at least in broad strokes—of
some portion of the group. As even the authors would certainly concede, they cannot
possibly be true of the entire group, but the language used implies it.19 To be sure,
categorization is fundamental to scholarship, and there is no alternative. It is also
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important to avoid losing grasp on the power of race to shape perception and experience
in consistent and identifiable ways. But the suggestion that these views were shared
universally within the group and are particular to, reflective of, or explained by white
working class-ness (as opposed to, for instance, whiteness) works against well-rounded
analysis.
To be very clear, my intention is not to argue that these studies’ arguments are
“wrong,” or that anti-liberal, conservative, nativist, and racist views are not prominent
among white working class people. They are, and they are prominent among Americans
generally, especially white Americans—it is irresponsible to suggest otherwise. This is
not intended to be glib or dismissive of the consequences of those views, which are
severe. It is important to ask, though, how well the dominant approach to understanding
the politics of the white working class situates them within a broader analytical picture.
“Backlash encourages certain analytical practices of ‘finding’ racial power in a post-civil
rights context,” Naomi Murakawa writes.20 It places the emphasis on conservatism rather
than liberalism, on non-elite rather than elite whites, and on electoral politics rather than a
broader structural view. There are clear limits to what research oriented around
understanding white working class conservatism can explain.
That basic research question—why white working class people gravitate to rightwing views—has likely been so common because the seeming incongruity of white
working class conservatism calls out to researchers as a puzzle in need of investigation.
Arlie Hochschild frames her recent study around what she calls the “Great Paradox”:
anti-statism within struggling areas where “one might expect people to welcome federal
20
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help.”21 “Why is it that many low-income voters who might benefit from more
government redistribution continue to vote against it?” asks political scientist Katherine
Cramer.22 New studies of the political views of white working class people, taking
particular interest in their support for politicians like Trump, will likely emerge in the
coming years. A continued focus on different iterations of the same research question—
why (why are they alienated? why do they support conservatives?)—will likely yield
results consistent with existing literature. Put differently, the patterns in existing
academic and nonacademic literature on the white working class encourage a circular or
cyclical dynamic: research periodically finds the same attitudes within the white working
class, prompting similar debates about how to respond to those attitudes. In order to
move the conversation forward, it is necessary to ask different questions.
“Contested Majority” foregrounds one set of alternative questions, focused on
how elites have talked about working class whites and what the white working class as a
political symbol has meant within elite-level political and media discourse. This
approach opens up additional dimensions for the study of white working class politics.
First, it brings a focus on media and communication into a literature where they are rarely
present. Work in political and labor history has not placed very much emphasis on
media23, and the media history literature known to communication scholars remains too
siloed from mainstream historiography. As John Nerone argues, part of the value of
communication history (and of other historical work conducted outside of the field of
21
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history) lies in its ability to bring a different perspective to familiar material.24 My
project reengages a familiar historical narrative—the rise and fall of New Deal
liberalism—and places communication at the center of it. In doing so, it seeks to
contribute to an interdisciplinary communication history research agenda.
Second, this approach sheds light on the importance of the white working class as
a political symbol—to invoke an academic cliché, what political observers talk about
when they talk about the white working class. Elite-level debates about how to
understand or appeal to the white working class generate so much conflict and attention
because they are only partly (and often superficially) about the white working class.
They have consistently touched on large, fundamental, and controversial issues: who has
power in society and who is victimized; what responsibility the state has in combating
inequality; what makes a good citizen. These discussions are also very often about the
responsibilities and failures of elites—to maintain prosperity, to show fairness, to
demonstrate awareness of and regard for non-elite groups.
To my knowledge, there are not any book- or dissertation-length studies looking
at the representation of the white working class over the full period this project covers.
There is little work in this vein within the field of communication, though there are small
literatures looking at representations of unions in news media, representations of workers
in film and popular culture, and unions’ strategic uses of media.25 However, this is a
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topic and a theme that has been the subject of important and pointed analysis within and
outside the academy. I am certainly not the first to emphasize the significance of white
working class representation or to problematize elite constructions of a homogenous
white working class.
Existing perspectives on representations of the white working class
Two predominant points of emphasis are most evident in existing writing focused
on elite representations of the white working class. One centers on the normativity tied
up in representations of white workers, the other on stigmatizing views of white workers.
Both are prominent in the present day, but both also have longer roots. What follows is
my work of synthesis; it should be read as an effort to capture two enduring lenses rather
than as a straightforward presentation of the view of any specific scholar or group of
scholars.
One perspective, which might be called white working class normativity,
emphasizes the valorization of white workers, especially at the expense of workers of
color. In this framework, white elites have accorded white workers and their grievances a
level of respect and legitimacy deeply tied up in the interpenetration of whiteness with
Glende, “Labor Makes the News: Newspapers, Journalism, and Organized Labor, 1933-1955” (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2010); on film and popular culture, see Steven Ross,
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understandings of the democratic majority. American history has seen a consistent
“juxtaposition between the valid and even virtuous interests of the ‘working class’ and
the invalid and pathological interests of black Americans,” Ta-Nehisi Coates argues in a
2017 essay. Where white workers were figured as “virtuous and just, worthy of
citizenship, progeny of Jefferson and, later, Jackson,” black workers were figured as
“servile and parasitic, dim-witted and lazy, the children of African savagery…The
dignity accorded to white labor was situational, dependent on the scorn heaped upon
black labor.”26 In the period between the 1930s and the 1990s, this dynamic manifests
particularly clearly in the normative contrast drawn between a white working class
culture centered on family, stability, hard work, and close-knit community and a
“subculture…of the Negro American” marked by sexual pathology and dysfunctional
family life.27
Scholars root the valorization and recognition white workers have received from
elites in the context of a bargain central to the history of race in America. In a pattern
beginning as early as the eighteenth century and repeating consistently thereafter, elites
retained social control and staved off interracial working class revolt through a tacit
contract with white workers: Working whites would never fall to the level of the “Negro”

26

Ta-Nehisi Coates, “The First White President,” The Atlantic, October 2017.
A particularly well-known example is the Moynihan Report, which made these kinds of claims about the
“subculture…of the Negro American”: Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for
National Action (Office of Policy Planning and Research, United States Department of Labor, March
1965). On normative treatments of white workers in the context of post-civil rights and post-feminist
politics, Matthew Frye Jacobson, Roots Too: White Ethnic Revival in Post-Civil Rights America
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), especially chapter 4; Micaela Di Leonardo, “White
Ethnicities, Identity Politics, and Baby Bear’s Chair,” Social Text 41 (1994): 165-191; Sally Robinson,
Marked Men: White Masculinity in Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Hamilton
Carroll, Affirmative Reaction: New Formations of White Masculinity (Durham: Duke University Press,
2011).
27

19

and would be accorded respect as full members of the polity.28 W. E. B. Du Bois’ canonic
formulation of the “public and psychological wage” received by white workers, for
instance, centers partly on how elites talked publicly about working whites: “Their vote
selected public officials, and while this had small effect upon the economic situation, it
had great effect upon their personal treatment and the deference shown them…The
newspapers specialized in news that flattered the poor whites and almost utterly ignored
the Negro except in crime and ridicule.”29 Scholars and writers in this tradition stress that
the bargain is ultimately a bad one for white workers, morally and materially, and whites
in the power structure gain the most. The bargain provides working class whites with
real gains, however, from access to better jobs and housing to a sense of personhood. By
far, those harmed most by this treatment of working class whites are workers of color.
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A second perspective stresses the persistent stigmatization of the white working
class on the part of white elites and professionals. From a longer historical standpoint, in
this framework, negative representations of laboring whites have served to prop up the
political economic status quo by naturalizing inequality: Nancy Isenberg’s recent
account, for instance, situates the classification of “poor whites…as a distinct breed” in
the context of an enduring need to explain away class disadvantage in an ostensibly
egalitarian society.30 Scholars and writers focused on stigmatization in recent decades
have emphasized the construction of “the white working class as a discrete bigot class
responsible for America’s social and political ills.”31 The majority of existing work on
the representation of the white working class, often coming from scholars and writers on
the labor/social-democratic left and in the field of working class studies, has focused on
historicizing and critiquing representations of a racist, nativist, and/or conservative white
working class, particularly among professional-class liberals.32 The historical narrative
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that emerges from this work is one of decline: Professional-class (white) liberals who
valued (white) workers’ contributions to society in the 1930s and 1940s turned during the
1950s and 1960s to an image of these workers as affluent, bigoted, and unconcerned.
In this framework, only white elites and professionals gain from the dominant
cultural construction of the white working class. There is nothing positive in it for white
workers, who are subject to immense condescension and classism. By emphasizing white
working class bigotry, “elite whites” are able to “displac[e] the blame for racism” (or
sexism or homophobia) onto the white working class, as “professional-class racism slides
conveniently out of sight.”33 Put differently, by defining themselves against a retrograde
white working class, white professionals enjoy all the privileges of whiteness without
being marked as racists. By attributing white workers’ disadvantage to moral and
intellectual shortcomings, others stress, elites avoid placing scrutiny on capitalism or
their own position within the status quo.
As primary analytic frames, white working class normativity and stigmatization
can yield very different and seemingly opposing takes. One clear example comes from
present-day politics: the vast journalistic and pundit literature on white workers produced
during and after the 2016 election. For those who emphasize stigmatization, media
coverage of white working class voters evinced the “moral superiority affluent
Americans often pin upon themselves,” as it “routinely conflated” notions of “poor
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whiteness and poor character.”34 “For the national news media, the working class hordes
who were Trump’s base of support were a kind of malignancy, not a constituency,” one
journalist writes. “They were racists. Jerks. An oddity, the Other, their problems to be
examined with disdain.”35 For those focused on normativity, the problem was not that
(predominantly white professional-class) pundits were unfair to working class whites, but
that these pundits were too sympathetic and attentive to white workers, unjustly
foregrounding white workers’ pain. Articles “tell[ing women and people of color] to stop
being terrified about the very sanctity of our bodies and listen to the plaintive whines of
the white working class,” one observer contended, amounted to “telling the
disenfranchised to pay more attention to the over-franchised.”36 In this view, liberals
who took themselves to task for elitism falsely suggested that “Donald Trump is not the
product of white supremacy so much as the product of a backlash against contempt for
white working-class people”37; constant invocations of the white working class were a
means through which concerns around race, gender, and sexuality could be dismissed as
“identity politics” and decentered as progressive priorities.
The tension between normativity and stigmatization in analysis of white working
class representation reflects distinct views of white workers’ position within the social
hierarchy: For some observers, what is most important is the status of white workers
(especially white working class men) as junior members of dominant groups; for others,
34
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what is most important is their status as members of a clear subordinate group, the
working class. The proper weight to give to distinct but intersecting vectors of power and
marginalization has been and will continue to be the subject of intense, controversial, and
difficult debate. For the purposes of a study of white working class representation, it is
important to stress that these two primary perspectives—white working class normativity
and stigmatization—are compatible. Both perspectives capture key pieces of the work
done by representations of white workers. Neither alone is sufficient for a
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon, but they are complementary—in the
sense that each tends to miss what the other emphasizes. As a political symbol, the white
working class has been positioned in multiple overlapping and conflicting ways, figured
as normative and inferior (sometimes at the same time). One of the primary goals of this
project is to accomplish a synthesis of these themes in a nuanced, balanced, and
comprehensive account.

II. Theoretical Framework and Methods
Part Two lays out the fundamentals of the theoretical framework and methods
employed in this study. It begins (in a section designated #1 below) by stressing the
importance of the representation of non-elite groups in elite-level politics and outlining
the major theoretical model that guides the analysis, Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of
“classification struggles.” Next (2), I define the “white working class” for the purposes
of this project—a social category that actors can speak for or speak about and that has
meaning within this discourse, independent of the actions of the people it designates. The
24

next-to-last section (3) defines the key concept of “elite public discourse”—a mediated
space of representation where elites discuss and debate politics for an audience imagined
as comprised of elites and professionals. The final section (4) details the methods for the
study, focusing in particular on how texts were selected for analysis.

1. Representing the White Working Class: An Alternative Framework
How does political opinion and political identity formation among white working
class people matter politically? While this question is often not explicitly addressed in
existing literature, the guiding presumptions can be usefully understood through an
opposition between elite-level and grassroots-level politics. Frameworks like
micropolitics, infrapolitics, and the “grassroots” capture the political significance of
everyday, informal, interpersonal interactions.38 This realm comprises family life, social
relationships, the workplace (for non-elite workers), neighborhood, the day-to-day
experience of being in the world. At the other end of the spectrum is what might be
called macropolitics, elite-level politics, or national politics: “the dimension of political
life where the powerful are most dominant, and where the expression of politics in its
institutional forms is most prevalent.”39 The realm of macropolitics includes the White
House, Congress, the courts, major political parties, national media, and the apparatus of
lobbying firms, advocacy groups, and think tanks seeking to influence elite actors. For
the purposes of this project, “elites” are those whose decisions impact the lives of a
38
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significant number of people; those who can consistently communicate their views
widely or to a select, powerful audience; and/or those with significant power, wealth, or
professional credentials.
In much of the existing literature on white working class politics, the connection
between elite and non-elite realms is assumed to be straightforward and direct. The
conventional narrative of the rise and fall of New Deal liberalism accords non-elite
whites substantial national-level political power. They exercise that power through their
vote—selecting candidates who speak to and represent their identity and political views.
Public opinion places clear boundaries around what elites are able to achieve.40 In the
less nuanced backlash texts, elite political rhetoric directly shapes white working class
identity. In many of the best studies of political identity formation among white workers,
an identity primarily formed at the grassroots translates straightforwardly to how workeractors engage in national politics.
At the other end of the spectrum is the enduring argument that there is very little
connection between mass and elite-level politics. In Walter Lippmann’s classic account,
the voter “lives in a world which he cannot see, does not understand and is unable to
direct.”41 As an extensive literature has documented, most voters do not consistently
40
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follow elite political discourse, do not have well-defined opinions on many political
issues, and do not understand politics using the same frameworks that elites use.42 A
recent literature also suggests that public opinion, for all income groups but the most
affluent, has little to no influence on policy.43 Here recent American political history
becomes, as Larry Bartels argues, “a story of powerful public officials pursuing their own
ideological impulses, ignorant or heedless of the public sentiment.”44
The framework that guides my analysis maintains a conceptual opposition
between elite-level and micro-level politics while admitting a connection between the
two realms. Each can and in many ways does strongly shape the other, but there is often
a profound divide between the two. The connection between them requires work to build
and maintain; it is not frictionless or assured. For instance, political elites frequently
invoke group identity with the aim of mobilizing mass support around it. However, as
Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper argue, scholars cannot assume that elite
identification “will necessarily result in the internal sameness, the distinctiveness, the
bounded group-ness that political entrepreneurs may seek to achieve.” A great deal of
what happens in elite-level politics does not involve the input of non-elites in any
meaningful way, and identity claims can have meaningful effects at the elite level
independent of their reception within the broader public. “Self-identification takes place
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in dialectical interplay with external identification, and the two need not converge,”
Brubaker and Cooper note.45 Similarly, the fact that a set of political views or social
distinctions exists at the micro level is not in itself sufficient to bring attention to them at
the macropolitical level. There are a far greater number of subject positions than there
are political identities deemed meaningful in national politics.46 Walter Lippmann’s
classic depictions of the political world as distant and murky aptly capture the way many
elites perceive the non-elite realm. The evidence they have to work with—public opinion
research, journalistic profiles of voters, election returns—is imperfect and subject to
multiple interpretations and confirmation bias.
This project understands the work of representation in this context: of making
something outside elite-level politics present within it. In order to shape elite behavior
and elite-level discourse, non-elite opinion must be communicated, represented, or made
binding in a way that is meaningful for that audience. I mean representation in the double
sense of speaking for and speaking about, delegation and depiction. First, representation
(speaking for) refers to political actors who claim to speak in elite spaces, or are
designated to speak in elite spaces, on behalf of broader constituencies outside those
spaces.47 Representatives in this sense include elected members of Congress, advocacy
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groups, or labor leaders. Second, representation (speaking about) in this project also
refers to the work of actors who seek to understand and portray a non-elite
constituency.48 Journalists, pollsters, strategists, and others engage in this work.
This work of representation shapes the dominant view of the social and political
world, including the nature of the groups that make up that world, their similarities and
differences, what they seek to achieve, what alliances and coalitions are possible, and
more. While it is not the primary goal of this project to make strong arguments about
what causes historical change, the representation of non-elite groups can motivate or
shape elite actions—the policies candidates or parties adopt, the constituencies they
choose to pursue—as elites respond to prevailing constructions of the political world.
Even when it does not directly shape decision-making, this work of representation
matters very deeply on a symbolic level—shaping how events are narrated and
understood and which claims are recognized as true or legitimate.
I want to suggest that a particularly productive approach for understanding group
representation in elite political spaces can be found in the work of Pierre Bourdieu,
specifically Bourdieu’s concept of “classification struggles.”49 While much of
Bourdieu’s analysis of class (such as habitus) is at the level of everyday practice, this
concept is focused at the level of production. It’s important to note up front that
Bourdieu’s analysis has clear limitations—it works based on the assumption that class is
48
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the only major vector of stratification, does not adequately address race or gender, and
does not adequately capture the way identity is marked on the body. It is very useful,
though, for analysis of group representation in elite spaces. The analysis gets at three
guiding principles for this project: First, understanding the construction of and
contestation around social categories is fundamental to politics. Second, elite claims to
speak for or speak about broader constituencies have an importance independent of their
reception among non-elites. Third, these claims can be understood in the context of
political contestation among elites in the spaces where elites work.
Bourdieu and classification
For Bourdieu, classification is a fundamentally political act and an extremely
important form of political power. “Knowledge of the social world and, more precisely,
the categories that make it possible, are the stakes, par excellence, of political struggle,”
he writes.50 In democratic societies, multiple political actors compete for what is
variously phrased as the power to “make groups by making the common sense, the
explicit consensus, of the whole group,” “the power to make people see and believe, to
get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the division of the
social world,” “symbolic power as worldmaking power,” a “struggle to impose the
legitimate view of the social world,” a “symbolic struggle over the production of
common sense, or, more precisely, for the monopoly of legitimate naming,” a “struggle
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for the monopoly of the legitimate expression of the truth of the social world.”51
Classification struggles are contests in which opposing groups seek this power.
This framework maps well onto established themes in analysis of media and
journalism. Media power can be understood as the “power to define, allocate, and
display” the “scarce resource” of “reality,” as James Carey writes.52 Journalism, perhaps
more than any other field, claims a monopoly on the legitimate expression of the truth of
the social world.53 The news media serve as the chief arena where competing political
actors seek to raise their constructions of reality to dominant status. Investigative
reporters, experts quoted in news stories, opinion writers, and critics of media bias or
“fake news” are all engaged in promoting or contesting constructions of reality.
Journalists can be said to “play a double role as purveyors of meaning in their own right
and as gatekeepers who grant access or withhold it from other speakers.”54
Actors who compete in classification struggles and seek visibility for their
perspectives in media do not compete on an equal playing field. While classification in
democratic societies is subject to competition, it is strongly shaped by existing power
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relations. Existing power relations bear on the resources groups have to contend, and
they bear on the way political actors see the world in the first place. First, actors’
perceptions of the world stem from their positions in social space, even (or especially) in
the case of those whose expertise gives them a claim to the universal—intellectuals,
academics, or journalists.55 Second, groups are “very unequally armed in the fight to
impose their truth,” and so actors who possess more capital have an advantage.56
Typically (as a large literature in critical media studies suggests) “those who occupy the
dominated positions within the social space are also located in dominated positions in the
field of symbolic production.”57 While outcomes are not preordained, they are
constrained by a basic paradox at the heart of any attempt to address structural power
through mass communication—the distribution of the power to communicate depends on
“the very structures of economic and political power that democratic processes of debate
were intended to control.”58
It’s important to stress that the concept of classification struggles focuses not only
on meaning generally, but specifically on the existence and the nature of groups. Groups
are “made” through classification struggles, rather than simply existing prior to them;
these are “not merely struggles between existing groups over how to interpret the social
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world, but struggles that help form groups in the first place.”59 Groups (“real” or
mobilized groups, as Bourdieu describes them) are formed when mass support coalesces
around an identity. Groups can also be formed, in this framework, in a manner more
disconnected from non-elite opinion.
First, when elite political actors make an appeal to or interpellate a certain
political identity, they provide a language that others can use as a basis for selfidentification and mobilization. Any system of classification draws boundaries of affinity
and difference in certain ways, so drawing those lines in a different way can open up new
possibilities for movement- or coalition-building. In this line of reasoning, the power of
classification is akin to
the evocative power of an utterance which puts things in a different light…or
which modifies the schemes of perception, shows something else, other
properties, previously unnoticed or relegated to the background (such as common
interests hitherto masked by ethnic or national differences); [or] a separative
power…drawing discrete units out of indivisible continuity, difference out of the
undifferentiated.60
Difference can be both produced and muted as part of this process.
Second, one of the major strengths of Bourdieu’s framework for the purposes of
this project is its understanding of how individuals or institutions can claim to speak for
groups independent of extensive mass support or mobilization. This is aptly captured in
Bourdieu’s detailed discussion, over the course of several articles, of whether (more
appropriately, how) “the working class” exists. The crux of the argument is as follows:
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The mode of existence of what is nowadays called, in many societies (with
variations, of course), “the working class,” is entirely paradoxical: it is a sort of
existence in thought, an existence in the thinking of a large proportion of those
whom the taxonomies designate as workers, but also in the thinking of the
occupants of the positions remotest from the workers in the social space. This
almost universally recognized existence is itself based on the existence of a
working class in representation, i.e., of political and trade-union apparatuses and
professional spokespersons vitally interested in believing that it exists and in
having this believed both by those who identify with it and those who exclude
themselves from it, and capable of making the “working class” speak.61
At its most basic, this is a simple constructivist argument—the working class exists
because large numbers of people believe it exists. It does not exist in the sense an
orthodox Marxist might dream—a homogenous, fully unified group—but it is “no less
real.” What I want to draw out, though, is the concept of the “working class in
representation,” produced by a long history of intellectual work and political mobilization
(an “immense historical labor of theoretical and practical invention”) and “endlessly recreated through the countless, constantly renewed, efforts and energies that are needed to
produce and reproduce belief.”62
The work involved in creating and maintaining a “working class in
representation” takes several forms. One is ascribing agency to the group in discourse:
“Any predicative proposition having ‘the working class’ as its subject disguises an
existential proposition (there is a working class).” A second is “demonstration, a sort of
theatrical deployment of the class-in-representation.”63 This implies real bodies in real
space whose identification with the group is conveyed in a ritualistic fashion; an example
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in the US context is an early twentieth-century Labor Day parade, with workers carrying
flags and banners that underscore their affiliation.
The most important work in creating a group-in-representation, in this framework,
is performed by institutions or individuals who are understood to speak for the group as a
whole. The working class (in this case) “exists in and through the corps of mandated
representatives who give it material speech and visible presence, and in the belief in its
existence that this corps of plenipotentiaries manages to enforce.”64 Bourdieu goes so far
as to suggest that no group can exist without a spokesperson: “A class exists insofar…as
mandated representatives…can be and feel authorized to speak in its name” …“Any
otherwise elusive social collective exists, if and only if there exists one (or several)
agent(s) who can assert with a reasonable chance of being taken seriously…that they are
the ‘class,’ the ‘people,’ the ‘Nation,’ the ‘State’ and so on.”65 This formulation raises the
important question of who needs to “tak[e] seriously” the spokesperson’s claims to speak
for the group. Bourdieu’s conceptualization of the role of the spokesperson is focused
primarily on actors speaking for subordinate groups in dominant political spaces. In that
context, and for the purposes of this project, “being taken seriously” means being taken
seriously in the elite space where the spokesperson works.
For members of the group represented, representation by a spokesperson creates a
tradeoff that can be simultaneously empowering and disempowering. On the one hand,
the spokesperson brings the group’s concerns to an arena where they otherwise would not
be heard, in a manner in which outsiders can understand them. The spokesperson’s claim

64
65

Ibid., 742.
Bourdieu, “Social Space,” 741; Bourdieu, “What Makes a Social Class?,” 15.

35

works to “make public (i.e., render objectified, visible, and even official) what had not
previously attained objective and collective existence and had therefore remained in the
state of individual or serial existence—people’s malaise, anxiety, disquiet,
expectations.”66 As a result, “the group represented…escapes from the powerlessness
attached to serial atomization and…can mobilize all the force, material and especially
symbolic, that it contains in potentia.” The cost is twofold. First, the group is understood
as a single entity (“capable of acting and speaking ‘as one man’”67); it is flattened and
treated as homogenous. Second, the spokesperson gains substantial power that those the
spokesperson claims to represent cannot easily check:
Personifying a fictitious person, a social fiction, he raises those whom he
represents from the state of separate individuals, enabling them to act and speak,
through him, as one man. In exchange, he receives the right to take himself for
the group, to speak and act as if he were the group made man.68
There is inevitably a “break with the ‘people’…implied by gaining access to the role of
spokesperson.”69 The spokesperson works in the dominant political space, at a distance
from group members, and has access to opportunities that they do not have—as a direct
result of being recognized as a representative of the group. If some within the group find
their views and interests poorly represented, their only option is to contest the claims of
the dominant spokesperson by putting forward a competing alternative.
How does someone become a spokesperson? Bourdieu at times phrases his
argument in a way that suggests an element of agency is involved for the group as a
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whole; the “mandators” can choose their “mandated.” In other formulations, he
understands spokespersonship as a claim made within the dominant political space. “The
‘people’,” as a political symbol, is “first of all one of the things at stake in the struggle
between intellectuals,” Bourdieu writes, and the “principle of different ways of situating
oneself in relation to the ‘people’…resides in the logic of the struggle within the field of
the specialists.”70 In other words, to understand why elites claim to speak for and speak
about the “people” in the ways they do, it is necessary to look at the dynamics of elitelevel politics. This is the insight I follow here.
As Sun-ha Hong notes, no political figure is “consecrated with a right to publicity
or to public spokespersonship,” but rather “seize[s] it.”71 Political actors make claims to
represent larger collectives, and those claims can be justified or evaluated based on
multiple criteria, some of which have more of a connection to rank-and-file opinion of
group members than others—correspondence between the spokesperson’s views and the
views of group members as measured by polling or election results, the spokesperson’s
personal history72, leadership in a mass membership organization. A substantial amount
of mass support is not necessary, though Bourdieu points to the importance of “the most
convinced fraction of the believers, who, through their presence, enable the
70
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representatives to manifest their representativeness.”73 In this formulation, the
appearance of mass support is most important in making those outside the group more
likely to judge a spokesperson credible. It is “belief in the existence of the class,” not the
specifics of non-elite opinion, “which is the basis of the authority of its spokesmen.”74
The connection between representation in the sense of speaking for and
representation in the sense of speaking about comes into play here as well. In political
conflict, Luc Boltanski argues, struggles “over social taxonomies and representations”
play the critical role of “staking out the legitimate sphere of influence of each of the
competing forces, that is, in practical terms, by defining which classes rival organizations
or parties may legitimately claim to represent.”75 The way in which a social group has
been defined impacts which political actors can credibly claim to speak for that group.
Becoming accepted as a spokesperson, then, is wrapped up in the broader struggle to
define the truth of the social world and to define the nature of groups.
This understanding of group formation points towards an alternative angle on the
importance of the white working class in American politics. Rather than focusing on “the
ideological clash of liberalism and conservatism”76 as the two ideologies seek public
support, this project foregrounds how liberals, conservatives, and others have claimed to
speak for and speak about the white working class. From this perspective, the white
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working class is a group-in-representation, a category that has meaning within elite
public discourse, connected to but not bound by the activities of the people it designates.
Like the “working class-in-representation” described by Bourdieu, the white working
class in this sense is the product of a long history of intellectual labor. Groups often
“present themselves with [the] air of eternity that is the hallmark of naturalized history,”
Bourdieu writes, but “they are always the product of a complex historical work of
construction.”77 The task of this dissertation is to uncover that “complex historical work
of construction” in the case of the white working class.

2. Defining and Conceptualizing the “White Working Class”
The usage of “white working class” in this dissertation differs from the norm,
reflecting the fact that this is a study of elite talk about white workers, not a study of the
white working class. In this project, I use the term “white working class” to refer to a
social category that actors can speak about or claim to speak for and that has meaning
within this discourse, apart from the activities of the people it designates. I do not use
“white working class” (or “working class”) to refer to an actor with agency. When I am
referring to white working class people as political actors, I use the suffix –actors (e.g.
worker-actors).
The project is framed around the representation of the “white working class”
because that frame allows for the best intervention in present-day media and academic
discourse, where “white working class” is used extensively. It is also intended to counter
the use of ostensibly race-neutral class categories, particularly “working class” or “blue
77

Bourdieu, “What Makes a Social Class?,” 8-9.

39

collar,” to refer only to whites, a longstanding (and continuing) bad habit in American
political discourse.78 However, it’s essential to be very clear up front about the way I use
“white working class” and the conceptual hitches, challenges, and concerns the “white
working class” poses as a unifying concept for this project. First, it is important to
differentiate clearly between the “white working class” as a construct or symbol—the
primary focus of this project—and the “white working class” as a way of naming people
existing in the world and capable of acting politically. Second, most of the actors this
study spotlights did not primarily use the term “white working class”: the study has to
navigate a range of related but not interchangeable categories.
The real-life referent of the “white working class”
While this study is focused on the white working class as represented in elite
discourse, it is important not to lose sight of an understanding of whiteness as a
historically constructed category that yields material and psychological “wages” for those
recognized as white (a category that changes over time)79, or an understanding of class as
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a political economic category rooted in a shared structural position in the economy. Here
“working class” means a lack of power at work, precarity, wage work, low-paying and/or
undesirable (monotonous, exhausting, or dangerous) work, and a lack of wealth or
substantial economic/cultural capital.80 It is important not to treat the working class as an
undifferentiated category (such that all working class people are on equal ground). In
many cases, access to jobs has been dictated so strongly by gender and race that white
male worker-actors occupied a political economic position clearly distinct from the
position occupied by working women and workers of color. Whiteness has also meant
greater opportunity to move out of the working class. I am a middle class white man; my
family, like millions of other descendants of European immigrants, reached the middle
class in the midcentury era when the American state intervened very directly to the
benefit of non-elite citizens through programs (veterans’ benefits, low-interest home
loans) that either excluded or delivered far fewer gains to working class people of color.
While reifying and ascribing agency to the white working class is conceptually
problematic, white people who are in a working class position do have agency—they can
vote, protest, form or join social movements, run for political office, and participate in
manner, and when political elites are encouraged to respond to the “white working class,” they tend to
focus on “white” rather than “working class.” No responsible politics can be built around an appeal to the
“white working class,” but the term’s use in scholarship and political analysis is a different question.
“White working class” needs to be used carefully, and it is made to do far too much work in present-day
discourse, but I do not argue for eliminating it. If used responsibly, it can capture divergence in
experiences and political views along racial lines within the working class, and it helps to discourage
commentators and journalists from using an unmodified “working class” to refer only to whites. This
project grapples with representational issues around the “white working class,” with an eye toward
achieving a better public discourse about the actually existing “working class.”
80
Debates about objective definitions of class generally or the white working class specifically are
bracketed in my work. An introductory discussion can be found in Erik Olin Wright, ed., Approaches to
Class Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Wright, The Debate on Classes (London:
Verso, 1998). Work in the field of working class studies is very useful for thinking through the multiple
understandings of class. See e.g. Sherry Linkon and John Russo, eds., New Working-Class Studies (Ithaca:
ILR Press, 2005); Michael Zweig, The Working Class Majority (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

41

less formalized political activity. A full assessment of white worker-actors as political
agents between the 1930s and 1990s incorporates a range of efforts, from progressive to
reactionary. As voters, white worker-actors empowered some of the most progressive
politicians of the era as well as politicians who appealed to their whiteness and promised
to protect them from others of color. Especially as members of unions, worker-actors
took great risks and made sacrifices seeking change, both in periods conventionally
associated with a progressive white working class and periods that are not. The extent of
workplace militancy in the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, was comparable to that of the
1930s. While the diversity in the white working class is obscured by conventional
images of backlashing heterosexual males, white working class people took part in and
supported the antiracist, antiwar, women’s, and queer people’s movements of the period.
In periods where (white) workers were strongly associated with liberal politics, white
worker-actors took steps to preserve their racial privileges in the workplace and in their
neighborhoods, often through informal and organized harassment and violence. In one of
many incidents that followed the integration of all-white neighborhoods (this one taking
place in early-1960s Philadelphia), mobs drove away a black family, the Wrights,
chanting “Burn, niggers, burn” and throwing stones, eggs, and potatoes at the Wrights’
house, breaking the windows.81 During organized labor’s midcentury heyday, the hiring
of black workers in previously all-white departments precipitated walkouts (“hate
strikes”) and harassment; in one factory, “tools mysteriously disappeared, a Negro was
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pushed into a machine, or other ‘accidents’ occurred,” such that “the Negro worker was
either withdrawn or quit voluntarily.”82
It is important to ask how this history should inform a study of white working
class representation. The most straightforward answer, in my view, is that an extreme
constructivist position—in which what is said about white workers in elite discourse is
only a product of elite invention—is unworkable. It is irresponsible to take an agnostic
posture on whether, for instance, the backlash reported in the 1960s “really” existed, or to
argue that its interpreters invented it. (An example of an irresponsible formulation is
Barbara Ehrenreich’s claim that “the working class as discovered” in the 1960s—“dumb,
reactionary, and bigoted”—was “the imaginative product of middle-class anxiety and
prejudice.”83) But foregrounding representation does not require this steep a claim. As
Barbie Zelizer writes, “Recognizing that there is a reality out there and that, in certain
quarters, truth and facts have currency does not mean letting go of relativity, subjectivity,
and construction. It merely suggests yoking a regard for them with some cognizance of
the outside world.”84 This is the approach I seek to follow here. Asking why a crossclass backlash against 1960s dissent was understood in elite discourse as a white working
class phenomenon, for instance, does not require a claim of racial innocence for white
workers.
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The analysis in this project is framed around the claims prevalent in elite public
discourse. I ask questions that focus less on what is than on what is seen, how it is seen
and why, how this changes over time, and why that matters. What lenses did
contemporaries use to understand politics, and how did those lenses influence what they
saw and wrote? Why were certain people or behaviors taken as representative of the
white working class in one period and not another? These kinds of questions allow for a
focus on representation and construction that retains a “cognizance of the outside world”
and will not be entirely foreign to scholars with different methodological approaches and
different source bases. In this framework, journalism and elite discourse on the white
working class cannot be dismissed as invented or pure ideology, but neither can it be
taken at face value as an unproblematic depiction of reality.
It is important to be clear that this is not a social history project. My original
research does not support any new claims about the political views of white working
class people. Though I refer to existing literature on that subject at certain junctures
where I feel it would be irresponsible not to (as in the paragraph above), I have not
comprehensively undertaken to compare a “real” white working class to the one
envisioned by elites or to “fact check” claims made by the analysts I spotlight. An effort
to do so would raise problematic methodological questions in its own right. To some
degree, it is useful for perspectives that see social groups as necessarily constructed and
perspectives that aim to describe the concrete behaviors, attitudes, and opinions of real
people to sit alongside each other in a productive tension, as complements.
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The challenges posed by terminology
Over the period this study covers (the 1930s to the 1990s), observers used
multiple labels and categories to describe blue-collar whites. The meaning of “white”
was not static in this period; the most important change was the incorporation of
Americans of southern and eastern European descent (Italians, Poles, Greeks, Slavs, etc.)
into a homogenous whiteness, a single category “white.” Existing scholarship dates the
culmination of that change in the 1940s, particularly the years around World War II.
“White working class” has only been the term most commonly used by elites to refer to
blue-collar or lower-income whites since the early 2000s, when it was widely adopted by
journalists and pollsters. It only began to appear consistently in the 1960s. The chapters
that follow feature elites speaking about “workers,” “the workingman,” “the worker,”
“the white worker,” “labor,” the “working class,” “working Americans,” the “middle
class,” “Middle Americans,” the “majority,” and more.
This presents a clear challenge for clear writing and conceptualization, and there
is no ideal solution to that challenge. Deemphasizing the differences between terms
certainly risks oversimplification. However, overemphasizing those distinctions risks
obscuring the relatively small and identifiable range of claims made about white workers
in the discourse. Problems of terminology are primarily addressed in a manner specific
to each chapter and outlined in the introductory sections of the chapters. As a general
principle, however, this work posits (based on empirical research) that the differences
between terms are modest enough to permit treating them as part of one narrative, the
“representation of the white working class.”
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The task of this project is to historicize a sense of groupness broader and more
durable than a single term.85 A good way to get a sense of this durable sense of groupness
is to look at the discourse itself. When elite commentators refer to labels used in the past
or to newly emergent labels, they typically treat them as different names for a familiar
group of voters: “The angriest and most pessimistic people in America are the people we
used to call Middle Americans” (2016)…“Think the ‘white working class’ sounds a lot
like the ‘Reagan Democrats’? Exactly” (2002).86 Commentators also use seemingly
distinct terms interchangeably to refer to the same group. In one infamous piece from the
2016 election cycle, National Review contributor Kevin Williamson jumps from “white
working class” to “white middle class” to “poor white America” to “white American
underclass” within four paragraphs as he decries “dysfunctional, downscale
communities…[that] deserve to die.”87 In this usage, there is no meaningful difference
between “poor” whites, the “white working class” and the “white middle class”; they are
different labels pinned to the same set of tropes.
As a result, it is most important to differentiate between representations of
different “kinds” of white workers, or different complexes of images—Northern
urban/suburban industrial workers, rural Southerners, southern and eastern Europeans,
Anglo-Saxon Protestants.88 This project focuses most on industrial workers, the source
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of much of the iconic imagery around the white working class—union militancy, highwage manufacturing jobs, the middle-income family headed by a single breadwinner, the
conservative “hard hat”—but is careful not to entirely neglect a broader picture of elite
representations of laboring whites.

3. Defining Elite Public Discourse
Elite public discourse can be defined as a mediated space of representation
distinguished both by who speaks and who is assumed to be listening—crudely put, a
space where elites talk to other elites. Most speakers within elite public discourse hold
positions of influence (politicians, government officials, businesspeople) and/or speak as
educated professionals with claims to expertise (journalists, pollsters, political
commentators, academics).89 Speakers who make claims within elite public discourse
often have the intention of, and have at least a chance of, shaping public policy or
shaping debate within influential circles. They can at least expect to narrate or explain
current events for an elite audience.
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Elite public discourse, importantly, is also publicly available to a non-elite
audience. Conversations behind closed doors or eyes-only memos are excluded—unless
they leak to the press. The majority of listeners may not belong to influential publics, but
speakers assume they are in conversation with an attentive public whose members share
their interpretative frames. Specific logics for talking about and understanding politics—
for instance, breaking voters down into the categories (including “white working class”)
used by journalists and pollsters; understanding politics as a battle between competing
ideologies—prevail within elite public discourse. Those logics can be learned and
mastered by consistent followers of the discourse, whether they can be termed “elites” or
not. Nonetheless, most speakers assume that the attentive relevant public is
predominantly professional and college-educated.90
I use the term “discourse” rather than “public sphere” to encompass the content
within the space as well as the space itself, but this is not an attempt to create a radically
new concept. Elite public discourse can be understood as a subcategory of the broader
public sphere (in Nancy Fraser’s definition, “a theater in modern societies in which
political participation is enacted through the medium of talk…an institutionalized arena
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of discursive interaction”91). Analogous concepts include the “dominant public sphere”
and what Ronald Jacobs and Eleanor Townsley call the “elite political public sphere”:
“the public communicative infrastructure in which the elites of our huge, complex
societies debate serious matters of common concern.”92
The news media—particularly media institutions with the greatest claim to
national-level stature—are the centerpiece of my understanding of “elite public
discourse.” (How the concept was operationalized in the research is discussed in the
methods section). News is the chief medium through which elite and non-elite observers
follow and debate the daily developments of politics. News media also hold a “specific
role in circulating to a wider audience the knowledges of other, more specialized fields”:
they aggregate a wide range of expert discourses, frame them in accessible terms, and
distribute them widely.93 As a result, news media serve as the nexus for the other kinds
of texts central to elite public discourse as defined here, including nonfiction books,
pollsters’ reports, academic works, and public speeches by politicians. Journalists have
reported consistently on polls and political speeches; book reviews point readers in the
direction of more in-depth material; pollsters have been consistently featured as political
experts.
The kind of discourse that prevails in these spaces is not monolithic, but it follows
predictable patterns. First, it is often superficial, as Ari Adut notes: this is a world that
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“reduces singular beings to appearances and types.” In the private sphere, we “relate to
intimates in singular terms: they are not fungible, and it is cognitively and morally hard to
reduce them to a type.” By contrast, “people who appear in the public sphere instantiate
types or represent groups for spectators—this synecdochic tendency being the stronger,
the more social distance there is between those who appear and those who watch.”94
Second, it is ordinary. Elite public discourse exercises influence in an everyday
and unexceptional fashion. The concept is intended to get at the importance of the
quotidian flow of the discourse, not only the most influential texts. That ordinariness is
aptly captured in James Carey’s description of the role of communication in “the
construction and maintenance of an ordered, meaningful cultural world that can serve as a
control and container for human action.” Reading a daily newspaper, in this “ritual”
view, is a situation not unlike attending a mass, in which “nothing new is learned but in
which a particular view of the world is portrayed and confirmed…What is arrayed before
the reader is not pure information but a portrayal of the contending forces in the world.”95
Elite public discourse’s attentive publics encounter a familiar world filled with familiar
actors who operate under a predictable set of rules. When those rules do not seem to
explain what is happening, a palpable sense of concern about where the conventional
wisdom went wrong and how it can be fixed is visible in the discourse.
Third, and perhaps most obviously, elite public discourse is skewed towards elite
perspectives. It displays identifiable biases and blind spots as a result. As Michael
Warner notes, dominant discourses (in contrast to counterpublics) often take on a
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universalizing tenor, not because speakers’ subject positions do not inform the discourse,
but because speakers often do not recognize the particularity of their way of
understanding the world.
Most of the actors who are highlighted in this dissertation are professional-middle
to upper class white men. Over much of the period, they inhabited a realm where they
were primarily in conversation with others like themselves and saw this state of affairs as
natural. In the primary source material, men unabashedly refer to the gendered division
of labor implicated in intellectual work. Scores of acknowledgements sections feature
authors thanking their wives for typing the manuscript or managing childcare while they
wrote. A Newsweek reporter thanks “three pretty and talented Newsweek researchers” for
their contributions to what wound up under his byline. As the political circumstances
changed and women and people of color had greater access to elite discursive spaces,
they faced tokenism and were often positioned as representatives of a broader group, not
as individuals. Observers still often speak about “journalism” as an entity entirely shaped
by urban, professional-class whites. To capture the power dynamics that shaped access
to elite discursive spaces, what is included under the umbrella of “elite public discourse”
depends on where it appears—intellectual engagement with the white working class in
alternative media oriented to African American, radical-left, or other counterpublics is
generally left out of “elite public discourse” as defined here, but the same authors and
arguments are included when their work appears in dominant discursive spaces.
Studying elite public discourse raises a fundamental tension from a critical media
studies perspective. Fundamentally, exclusion makes elite public discourse what it is; it
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deeply shapes the conversations that take place there. However, the process of excluding
inherent in researching an exclusive space can very easily reinscribe a narrow view of the
intellectual milieu of a period. Put differently, a focus on elite discourse skews a project
in a way that mirrors the exclusions in the discourse itself. Presenting a history of
discourse within dominant publics yields an incomplete picture and is much more likely
to exclude texts by authors who are members of marginalized groups. It is important to
mark it for what it is—particular.

4. Methods: Operationalizing “Elite Public Discourse”
This project follows conventional methodological approaches in the study of
communication & culture and cultural history—gathering and conducting close analysis
of relevant texts and constructing a historical narrative based on primary and secondary
source material. “The great question of communications history, I think, revolves around
how people make sense out of things,” John Nerone argues. “This entails reconstructing
mentalities that no longer exist, assumptions that are no longer commonly held.” “It is the
job of media historians to identify what the common sense was in past media
environments, what the dominant sensibilities were, and which coexisting discourses
challenged that common sense,” Susan Douglas writes.96 This objective—reconstructing
the discursive environments of the past—guided the research for this project. For each
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period, the goal was to gain mastery of the patterns in elite public discourse—what
different camps were identifiable, and what views or objectives distinguished them;
where there was debate and where there was consensus; what language authors used in
reference to working class whites and other groups. To do so, I employed an inductive
approach founded on “prolonged, unstructured soaking”97 in the material.
The central methodological challenge centers on the selection of texts—how to
define “elite public discourse” for the purposes of research. The texts examined
primarily fall into the following categories—news stories, nonfiction books for a
nonacademic audience, academic work, pollsters’ reports, and public speeches given by
politicians. This is an admittedly narrow understanding of political discourse, one that
excludes popular culture or entertainment media. This project will not investigate
representations of the white working class in film, television, or literature to keep the
scope of the project manageable and because nonfiction material’s claim to present
factual representations makes it more important for the purposes of the arguments here.
The emphasis is on print media for reasons of access and because print news media were
a primary prestige news source throughout the period.
The first stage in the research was to identify a set of publications and conduct
intensive reading within them. The research foregrounded the following daily
newspapers, journals of opinion, and business magazines: New York Times, Washington
Post, Los Angeles Times, Wall Street Journal, Time, Newsweek, the Nation, the New
Republic, Chicago Tribune (Chapters 1 and 2), the Saturday Evening Post (Chapters 1
and 2), Survey Graphic (Chapter 1), Fortune (Chapter 2), Business Week (Chapter 2),
97

Richard Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 250.

53

National Review (Chapters 3 and 4), and Commentary (Chapters 3 and 4). After this
initial set of publications was selected, articles were obtained through keyword searches
(an effective tool for tracking contestation around specific language) and/or by reading
through each issue published over a particular time period.
These media were selected to ensure representation of multiple elite political
perspectives in each period. Much of the dissertation overlaps with what Daniel Hallin
calls the “high modern” period for American journalism, in which national media were
heavily centralized and professional journalism was at its strongest.98 In this period
(roughly between the end of World War II and 1980), it is relatively easy to identify the
specific media that best fit “elite public discourse.” Contemporary scholars pointed to a
small subset of media called “quality media” or “the prestige press”; as described by
political scientist V. O. Key in a 1961 study, such media “command the attention of a
highly politicized and very influential audience…These people talk to each other through
these papers; thus they provide, in a sense, an arena for the continuing discussion of
politics among those principally concerned.” In the US context, media cited as typical
“prestige papers” included the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street
Journal—“eastern metropolitan newspapers of higher quality and better coverage”—
alongside newsmagazines Time and Newsweek.99 Publications like the National Review,
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New Republic, and Nation shed a great deal of light on conservative and liberal elite
opinion.
The centralized, professionalized media environment of the mid-twentieth century
is historically atypical, and it is important to avoid naturalizing it.100 The most recent
period (1990s/2000s-present) obviously presents a much more siloed, fragmented, and
dispersed elite discursive space. Because the project’s major narrative ends in the early
1990s, the changes in elite public discourse since that time have not been
foregrounded.101 A more complex elite discursive landscape is also present in the earliest
period the project covers (1930s to mid-1940s). The newspaper industry was less
concentrated, and elite political media were more siloed by ideology—most of the top
daily newspapers had a conservative bias and were viewed with distrust by liberals, who
turned to their own media seeking reliable information. This issue is addressed in more
depth in the introduction to Chapter 1.
To identify relevant books and other primary source material, the overall research
strategy sought to take advantage of a snowball effect—adding books to the sample if
they were reviewed in magazines and newspapers; reconstructing conversations among
writers and scholars by following citations and quotes in books or news stories. If one
book seemed to be in conversation with another, I consulted the other book. If secondary
literature pointed to the importance of a particular primary source, I consulted the source
directly. I also mined databases (e.g. JSTOR and Google Scholar) for relevant books, as
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well as the footnotes of primary and secondary sources. Archival research focused on
notable and representative journalists, political commentators, and union officials also
made up an important part of the research process. A full list of archival collections
consulted is available in the bibliography. This research expanded the project’s core
source base of books, news articles, press releases, public speeches, and other publicly
available texts. Personal papers, particularly correspondence, also give a sense of aspects
of intellectual work (personal relationships, unguarded or “backstage” speech) that
cannot be easily ascertained by looking at public discourse.

III. Road Map
This project’s main narrative is developed over the course of four chapters. The
timeframe—the 1930s to the 1990s—was chosen to encompass three critical transition
points in the history of white working class representation over the last century. First, in
the 1930s, ascendant liberal forces employed the (white) worker as a central symbol of
the need for reform and the mass constituency that would bring it about. In the 1950s,
the middle-income white worker (against the backdrop of the Cold War) became
predominantly symbolic of the broadly distributed prosperity produced by the American
system. Amid resistance to the civil rights movement and challenges to traditional
cultural norms in the mid- to late 1960s, the white working class became the predominant
symbol of cultural traditionalism and anti-black backlash. The four chapters look
specifically at these periods of transition and their significance.
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The first chapter, “The Rise of the Progressive Worker,” covers the 1930s through
the mid-1940s and examines how the strong link between (white) workers and
progressive politics developed in that period. The predominant question in elite public
discourse, especially during the Depression years, asked how a just and proper economic
system could be built in a modern, industrial society. Very broadly, liberals and leftists
who emphasized the need for an expanded role for the state confronted conservatives
who saw an expansion of state power as a threat to liberty and justice. Representations of
(white) workers were closely implicated in that conflict. Industrial workers, for liberals
and leftists, stood in for the future—a future in which the majority of Americans lived in
urban areas, worked for wages, and had little agency over their own lives. To place
industrial workers at the symbolic center of society was to call for Americans to abandon
the individualistic principles long central to national identity and recognize the
importance of cooperation and collectivism. Liberals also pointed to images of poor and
suffering whites—especially native-born rural whites, who made for effective victims—
to suggest the failures of the existing system. Meanwhile, conservatives sought to cast
deserving, self-sufficient workers as harmed by an expanding welfare state and cast
liberal constituencies as selfish or unfit. The dominant elite understanding, in a period
marked by the Depression, the rise of the New Deal Democratic Party, and the onward
march of the industrial union movement, defined (white) workers and other nondominant
groups against economic elites.
Chapter 2, “The Rise of the Affluent Worker,” covers the late 1940s through
1950s, when the dominant elite view figured (white) workers as part of a new and vastly
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expanded middle class. The broadly shared prosperity of the post-World War II economy
was a central theme in elite public discourse, and the tone was usually triumphalist—
Americans had solved the industrial problems they had fought over for decades,
enfranchising workers and expanding the role of the state while preserving the free
enterprise system. The secure, satisfied (white, male) worker was central to this
narrative—underprivileged during the 1930s, he and his family now enjoyed leisure,
homeownership, and a good standard of living. The dominance of this view of the
(white) worker was due above all to the imprint of the Cold War on domestic politics.
The Second Red Scare exerted an enormous chilling effect on left-of-center opinion;
anything that could be interpreted as a critique of American capitalism was dangerous,
and the suggestion that (white) workers remained disadvantaged fell out of mainstream
liberal discourse. In this climate, the affluent worker was a critical symbol for business
elites emphasizing their social responsibility and labor-liberals stressing their support for
the American system.
The emphasis on (white) workers’ integration into a prosperous mass middle class
fundamentally altered the dimensions of political contestation around the white working
class. In multiple ways, Chapter 2 stresses, the affluent worker was a key waypoint in the
migration of the (white) worker—as a political symbol—from left to right. Even as these
workers’ upward mobility served as evidence of labor’s success, their newly middle class
status placed labor and liberals’ claims to represent them in question. When they had
something to protect, (white) workers could no longer be an unproblematic symbol of
progressive change—they could instead suggest the benefits of the status quo, or even
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hardheaded resistance to change. In this period, influential pollsters and liberal observers
identified white workers as complacent or conservative, and an image of the (white)
working class as rigid, authoritarian, and prone to high levels of prejudice and violence
took shape among social scientists, laying the groundwork for the emergence of the white
worker as the central symbol of backlash in the 1960s.
Chapter 3, “Rethinking Middle America,” examines the rise of the white worker
as the central symbol of white backlash. It does so through a case study of the
construction of “Middle America” in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Middle America is
generally understood as a political identity created by conservatives (especially Richard
Nixon) to appeal to discontented white voters. Chapter 3 focuses instead on
(predominantly white and professional-class) liberals and journalists who sought to
understand and respond to the backlash. Informed by preexisting understandings of
working class culture as rigid and traditionalist and by arguments rooting racism in low
education & economic deprivation, contemporary liberals assumed that the backlash
would be concentrated among working class whites and conducted their research and
analysis accordingly. Some, following on the conventional wisdom of the post-World
War II period, argued that blue-collar whites were secure economically, and their reaction
stemmed from a desire to protect their gains. Others countered that white workers faced
significant economic disadvantage and legitimately felt forgotten by liberals who showed
them condescension. Elites of all stripes, for different reasons, coalesced around the view
that white workers were uniquely driven by cultural and racial anxiety and might form an
explosive right-wing constituency. Fundamentally, Chapter 3 argues, in order to
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understand the rise of the persistent frame pitting a conservative white majority against a
liberal white elite, it is necessary to understand why that conventional wisdom made
sense to left-of-center actors.
Central to my understanding of white working class representation after the 1960s
is the concept of an “elite consensus.” One of the primary reasons why white workers
have become so strongly symbolic of anti-black and culturally conservative views, this
concept suggests, is because it made intellectual and/or strategic sense for opposing elites
to position them that way. (To be clear, this is not to dispute the prominence of those
views among white workers; the goal is to show why views pervasive among
professionals, workers, elites of all sorts, and within society generally were so often
debated through the figure of the white worker). While Chapter 3 asks why this
positioning made sense to liberals, Chapter 4, “The New Liberalism and the Victimized
White Worker,” focuses on its utility for critics of liberalism. It looks at the role of the
white working class as a symbol of opposition to liberal politics after the mid-1960s
(what the chapter calls, for the sake of clarity, the “new liberalism”). In the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s, conservatives and alienated Democrats often argued that changes
within liberalism had produced a new liberal politics dominated by white elites and
African Americans and unconcerned with the physical safety, economic wellbeing, or
cultural values of middle-income whites. Speaking on behalf of the white worker helped
to invest arguments against liberal policy on welfare, integration, gender politics, or
crime with a sense of disempowerment rather than privilege. Ultimately, Chapters 3 and
4 imply, the consensus elite-level understanding of the white working class was a clear
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boon for conservatives and other critics of liberalism, who now held a strong claim to
speak in elite public discourse for white workers.
The dissertation concludes with a summary of the project’s major interventions
and a brief discussion contextualizing white working class representation in the age of
Trump within the narrative developed here. The rise of Trump has brought the white
working class back to the center of elite public discourse—where white workers have
been for most of the past eighty years. A historical lens is crucial for a comprehensive
understanding of how the symbolic construction of the white working class functions in
present-day American politics.
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Chapter 1: The Rise of the Progressive Worker
“American labor is being reorganized on a scale and with a speed which is
unprecedented in American social history,” economist Robert R. R. Brooks wrote in
1938. For “half a century,” Brooks explained, mass production and finance capitalism, in
the hands of the “great leaders of industry,” had been “the major sources of social
power…Millions of workers, traders and professionals have found their fundamental
loyalties directed toward management and finance.” Recent developments, however, had
“sapped the foundations of the old loyalties” and prompted “the reorientation of workers’
attitudes and beliefs.” Put simply, “the leadership of industrialists and financiers is being
discarded…for the leadership of union officers and organizers.”102
The period Brooks chronicled has long provided the most indelible imagery of a
progressive white working class. “I remember 1937 and ’38 so well, how much hope I
had,” recalled a socialist organizer in the early 1960s. “The auto strike seemed to make
people see the light; when I went into a community I didn’t have to explain there was a
class struggle. No doctrine. The struggle was in the men.”103 A longstanding
commonplace holds that the Democratic Party and the union movement earned the
overwhelming loyalty of white workers. One recent article describes the New Deal
Democrats as “the undisputed party of the white working class. Their dominance among
these voters was, in turn, the key to their political success.”104 The Depression and New
Deal era also tend to be remembered as a period in which white workers were seen as an
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invaluable resource for left/liberal politics. “In the 1930s and 1940s progressives
romanticized the working class, largely to the exclusion of women and racial minorities,”
one liberal argues.105 1930s politics, a recent commentator argues, was marked by
“idealized portrayals of noble blue-collar workers.”106 Liberals were once in harmony
with the (white) working class, many have assumed—for good (liberals commanded a
powerful majority) or otherwise (a focus on white working class men contributed to
racial and gender inequality).
This chapter examines the strong link between white workers and left/liberal
politics as it developed in elite public discourse in the 1930s and 1940s. The emergence
of that link is among the most critical developments in a history of white working class
representation in the twentieth- and twenty-first-century US: it is not an exaggeration to
say that nearly all elite engagement with the white working class since has taken place,
implicitly or explicitly, against that backdrop. Most of all, the robust link between white
workers and progressive politics in the period owes to the rise of powerful political forces
that spoke for workers in a new way: the New Deal Democratic Party and the industrial
union movement. More broadly, the chapter argues, the importance of the (white) worker
as a progressive political symbol must be understood in the context of elite debate on
how to respond to the changes brought by the industrial age—incredible wealth and
power for industrial elites and insecurity and Depression for the bulk of the population.
For left/liberal elites of the 1930s and 1940s, this was the singular challenge of the day.
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Liberals and leftists raised to dominant status the view that modernity required—and the
electoral majority demanded—an activist state and the protection of unions. The
individualistic ethic long central to American identity, in this framework, could not
secure justice in the modern world. (White) workers, especially urban industrial workers,
were representative of both the needs of a modern workforce and the aroused public that
would bring about reform.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Part One details how (white) workers
were incorporated into understandings of the political majority in the years just prior to
the Depression and New Deal. In the 1920s and early 1930s, dominant understandings of
the American worker were advantageous to a libertarian or classical liberal politics.
Common arguments held that most valued prosperity and the ability to consume almost
above all else; deserving workers’ political views would not differ significantly from
those of their employers; and the majority of Americans were middle class in lifestyle
and mindset. Parts Two and Three detail how liberals and leftists figured (white)
workers, especially urban industrial working men, as beneficiaries of and forces for
progressive reform. Urban workers epitomized the liberal argument about the changing
circumstances of American life, in which the majority now worked for wages, lacked
economic security, and faced the arbitrary power of industrial elites. These workers were
important in elite understandings of the liberal electoral majority and central to the
imagery of working class agency emerging from the industrial union movement. Gains
for labor and liberals in the 1930s and 1940s brought about major changes in the
dominant view of the majority, with the new dominant understanding advantageous to a
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liberal politics. From this perspective, the average American was a citizen of an
industrial society without significant wealth or power; the interests of most Americans
were opposed to the interests of a small group of industrial elites; and inequality could
best be redressed via the collective power of the state.
It is important to be clear, though, that the central significance of (white) workers
for 1930s and 1940s left/liberal politics should not be equated with a “romanticized”
view. The extent to which liberals romanticized the (white, male) working class is
overstated in academic literature and popular memory. Deep concerns about the
unsophisticated political views of (white) workers, their susceptibility to right-wing
politics, and their reliability as a progressive constituency hide in plain sight in 1930s and
1940s left/liberal discourse. A coda section following Chapter 1 develops this argument.
Fundamentally, that section suggests, what held together the commitment to the (white)
worker’s cause among liberals and leftists was not the belief that workers were virtuous
or intelligent, but the belief that they were disadvantaged, that their objective interests
(even if sometimes unrealized) were progressive, and that they had legitimate claims to
make on employers and the state.
Terminology and source selection
“Worker” was the term most commonly used in contemporary discourse to refer
to white male wage workers, especially industrial workers. “Wage earner” was
interchangeable. Unless modified (“the Negro worker”), “worker” usually referred to a
white man. “Working people” referred to white men and women. White working class
women were often incorporated into the discourse through their relationship to men (“the
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worker and his wife”). It is important to counteract the still-prominent tendency to use
“worker” and “working class” to refer only to whites, particularly white men. However,
an argument framed around the “white worker” as a progressive symbol can easily be
problematic—the progressive part comes from “worker,” not “white.” Whiteness is also
not what was most significant about white workers for contemporary elites—their status
as workers was (and nationality second; see the following paragraph). To mediate
between these concerns, I primarily use “worker” and “(white) worker” interchangeably
to capture the arguments contemporaries made. Parentheses are used to capture
distinctions that are important for present-day academic analysis but did not appear in
contemporary discourse. I also incorporate the phrasing “laboring whites” and “poor
whites” to include farmers and other disadvantaged groups who did not work for wages.
All of these categories are used to capture contemporary elite discourse. In the cases
where I am referring specifically to rank and file workers (for instance, strikers) as
historical agents, I use “worker-actors.”
At the outset of this period, workers of European descent were not necessarily
viewed as racially or culturally similar enough to constitute a single bloc. According to a
powerful racialist discourse that reached its apex in the 1910s and 1920s, southern and
eastern Europeans (for instance, Poles, Slavs, Italians, Greeks, often called “new
immigrants” because they came to the United States in large numbers later) were inferior
to northern Europeans (e.g. Anglo-Saxons, “Nordics”). Even within those categories,
individual racial/nationality groups were understood as having unique and distinct
characteristics that (for instance) suited them for different types of work. In this
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discourse, there were multiple European races, and an individual could be white and
simultaneously inferior to other whites. This brand of race theory was on the decline by
the 1930s and was almost universally rejected by elites by the 1940s. The idea that
European-descended industrial workers could be understood as a single group—and
could act politically as a group—became more or less axiomatic. A comprehensive
understanding of white working class representation in this period must take these
distinctions into account, however.107 To do so, I use “new immigrants” and “southern
and eastern European” synonymously. “Old stock” or “native-born” referred to whites of
northern European (especially Anglo-Saxon) descent whose ancestors had been in the
United States for generations.
Contemporaries also spoke frequently about the “middle class” in relation to
“workers.” As in the rest of the dissertation, I do not use “middle class” to describe an
actually existing social group. When contemporaries argued that most Americans were
“middle class,” that generally meant that they enjoyed middle-income status, did not
identify as part of a fixed working class, and held to a moderate political ideology
supportive of the capitalist system. Workers could be “middle class,” and for many
observers they were. To refer to people at a middling income level, I use “middleincome”; to describe middle to upper-income educated elites, I use “professionals” or
“professional class.”
In this chapter (as compared with the later chapters), it is more difficult to identify
a small group of media that meet the definition of “elite public discourse.” There is less
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of a sense in this period of ostensibly objective elite media as a consensus meeting point
for alternative perspectives. Most of the top daily newspapers had a conservative bias,
which ranged from restrained (the New York Times) to strident (Chicago Tribune, Los
Angeles Times). To compensate, the analysis in this chapter draws more on liberal
alternative media (particularly the Nation and the New Republic) than the analysis in the
other chapters. While their readerships were much smaller than the top dailies’
readerships, these media serve aptly as indexes of left-of-center elite opinion. The
greater focus on periodicals and books on the socialist left in this chapter reflects the
atypically large mainstream influence of the left during the period.

I: The (white, male) worker as a symbol of the strength of the existing system
The dominant view in the years just prior to the New Deal understood American
society as business-centered and individualistic. Most Americans, in this view, identified
as middle class, and consumer capitalism had created a broadly distributed prosperity that
respectable American workers valued and wanted to share. The predominant perspective
from organized labor echoed this view, as did disappointed liberal intellectuals skeptical
of the prospects for an independent working class movement. Egalitarian consumer
capitalism was one of the prominent resolutions proposed for what might be called the
problem of industrial modernity—how to deal with the changes industrial elites, large
corporations, wage work, and urbanization had brought to a society in which liberty and
equality were historically linked to independent proprietorship. The problem of industrial
modernity was one of the predominant themes in elite public discourse over the first half
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of the twentieth century, and the importance of the (white) worker as a progressive
symbol must be understood in that context.
American exceptionalism and the middle class
Perhaps the most durable argument about class in the US context is that it does
not exist. According to a longstanding set of arguments for “American exceptionalism,”
the United States had no hereditary or fixed class distinctions; it valorized formal
equality, opportunity for the individual, and self-made elites.108 A key corollary has held
that nearly all Americans were and understood themselves to be middle class. In the
years before the New Deal, elites often argued that the very rich and the disadvantaged
represented small minorities vastly outnumbered and dominated in political and cultural
terms by a middle-income majority. “The outstanding characteristic of American
civilization is the large size of the middle class,” Princeton historian T. J. Wertenbaker
put it in 1930. “This group, in many countries but a small fraction of the population, in
the United States tends to swallow up all the others.”109
In economic terms, the emphasis on the middle-class character of the United
States meant that most Americans enjoyed a good standard of living and that wage
earners were not held down in a semi-permanent “working class” (as they were, for
instance, in the UK). In cultural and political terms, it meant that most Americans held to
values like individualism, thrift, hard work, and entrepreneurship and did not identify
themselves as members of a subordinate, fixed class. “In the United States the average
108
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man has always played a prominent part in popular thinking, and a substantial portion of
the masses of the people have come to think of themselves as average persons,”
particularly as compared with European countries where Marxism had gained a
substantial toehold, political scientist A. N. Holcombe argued in 1933. In “thinking of
themselves as average persons they have made the middle class more comprehensive and
more important than it would have been otherwise.”110 Membership in the middle class,
in this framework, was partly a matter of self-identification, but economic circumstances
made possible and encouraged that middle class self-identification.
The historical reasoning that supported the view of the US as middle class
suggested that the lack of a feudal history, the agricultural basis of the early American
economy, and the availability of new land on the Western frontier had created a nation of
self-sufficient small producers.111 By the 1930s, these arguments had been offered
consistently for more than a century. For much of the history of the United States, liberty
itself had been firmly linked to independent landownership. In this framework, an
independent farmer would gain a range of practical skills that equipped him for
democratic decision-making, and with property came a stake in the welfare of the
community key to the responsible exercise of democratic rights. Wage work was most
acceptable on a temporary basis as a means of gaining the capital needed to become an
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independent entrepreneur.112 This rural ideal retained immense power as popular history
in the 1930s, with adherents across the political spectrum. Though it depended on the
subjugation of African Americans and Native Americans and the appropriation of land,
its early-twentieth-century champions imagined the settler society of the past as largely
devoid of inequality, want, or illegitimate power. “The existence of a vast unconquered
frontier made effective democracy relatively easy, offered limitless opportunity and a
large measure of economic security to every able-bodied citizen,” one put it.113 In
frontier mythology, land and hard work were all that were needed for a secure and
egalitarian society.
By the 1930s, however, understandings of American identity based around
independent landownership were firmly tied to the past. As a guiding force for modern
life, they had been under deep threat since at least the late nineteenth century. The
frontier was thought to prevent class conflict by offering opportunity for men facing a
lack of prospects in the city. It was also thought to cultivate American norms among
immigrants, to serve as a “transmuting force,” political economist Henry George put it,
“turn[ing] the thriftless, unambitious European peasant into the self-reliant Western
farmer.”114 The “closing” of the Western frontier (in the 1890s, in many accounts) raised
concern that the equality it had enabled would erode. The rise of industrial capitalism
brought with it an as-yet-unseen concentration of economic power, violent labor conflict,
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and an expanding urban workforce increasingly composed of immigrants from southern
and eastern Europe. “The development of capitalistic industry, and of the class of
industrial wage-earners who could not hope to become their own masters,” political
scientist A. N. Holcombe wrote, “tended to bring to the front a new kind of labor problem
such as had not been known in the earlier years of the Republic.”115 While immigrants
made up the bulk of the unskilled labor force, no demographic, including old-stock
whites, could expect to view wage work as a temporary condition. No group of elites
could escape the need to grapple with what might be called the problem of industrial
modernity. Four of the predominant elite-level prescriptions centered on cutting off
immigration; expanding the role of government to check industrial power; ensuring that
upward mobility remained possible; and emphasizing mass consumption and upward
mobility for workers.
Elite responses to the problem of industrial modernity
One elite-level response centered on the dangerous character of the new
immigration. Elite political and intellectual discourse over the first three decades of the
twentieth century was saturated with claims about the danger southern and eastern
Europeans posed to an Anglo-Saxon civilization. A 1909 book by the influential
education theorist Ellwood Cubberley captures the broad argument: “These southern and
eastern Europeans are a very different type from the north European who preceded them”
in immigrating to the United States. “Illiterate, docile, lacking in self-reliance and
initiative and not possessing Anglo-Teutonic conceptions of law, order, and government,
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their coming has served to dilute tremendously our national stock, and to corrupt our
civic life.”116 Because these “other races and peoples” were “accustomed to despotism
and even savagery, and wholly unused to self-government,” economist John Commons
worried, their ability to exercise independent citizenship was in question.117 Social
workers, industrialists, and reformers sought to improve new immigrants’ circumstances
and instill in them middle-class “American” norms; eugenicists and others who viewed
them as inassimilable or invariably dangerous campaigned for restrictions on
immigration. These efforts culminated in the adoption of the Johnson-Reed Immigration
Act of 1924, in which Congress imposed severe quotas that largely cut off immigration
from southern and eastern Europe and Asia until the 1960s.
Another set of responses—by no means incompatible with the previous one—
prescribed a revised understanding of American individualism and an increased role for
government as a counterweight to corporate power. “The utterly changed conditions of
our national life necessitate changes in certain of our laws, of our governmental
methods,” Theodore Roosevelt argued, such that “the people through their governmental
agents” could exercise sovereignty and escape the grip of “a few ruthless and
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domineering men.”118 In this view, the conditions that had once made it possible for
individuals acting alone to enjoy equality—the availability of land on the frontier,
personal relationships between workers and the employers who labored alongside them in
a small shop—had changed for good. “A simple and poor society can exist as a
democracy on a basis of sheer individualism,” Roosevelt put it elsewhere, “but a rich and
complex industrial society cannot so exist; for some individuals, and especially those
artificial individuals called corporations, become so very big that the ordinary
individual…cannot deal with them on terms of equality.” It was thus necessary for “these
ordinary individuals to combine in their turn,” to act collectively through the government
and through voluntary associations.119 Roosevelt’s argument here understands the state as
the tool of the public (“the people through their government agents”) for combatting the
industrial elite (“ruthless and domineering men”). Most New Dealers, including Franklin
Roosevelt, came out of this broad tradition.
Other elites countered that the coming of industrial modernity had not eliminated
the equal opportunity that distinguished the United States. Because no fixed class system
existed, American citizens enjoyed absolute political equality and could rise as far as
their talent and hard work allowed.120 It was unreasonable, in a democratic capitalist
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society, to expect “all the runners to end the race equally,” as Herbert Hoover put it in a
1930 radio address, simply by virtue of the unequal distribution of talent and drive.
Rather, it was necessary to “give them an equal start” and ensure that no ossified system
of privilege restricted talented men from joining the ranks of the elite. Classical
liberalism’s victory over royalist privilege remained the critical world-historical event, in
this view, opening careers to talent, enabling fair rewards for individual initiative, and
“constantly refreshing the leadership of the Nation by men of lowly beginnings.”121
Upward mobility was an index of character and the key to maintaining a just society.
American exceptionalism’s claim to the good society had never rested solely on
formal equal opportunity, however, but on broadly distributed material wellbeing. The
industrialized United States saw an immense emphasis on the mass bounty made possible
by American consumer capitalism and the share that wage earners could gain from it.
Middle class Americanism increasingly came to mean the ability to consume, a meaning
compatible with wage work. “To be a middle class American,” the Chicago Tribune
editorialized in 1926, “is to work eight hours a day, bring home a comfortable pay
envelop every week, and ride in one’s car on Sunday.”122 High wages and workers’
access to mass-produced consumer goods served as primary evidence that the “American
system” had not empowered a few at the expense of the majority but had harnessed talent
and ingenuity for broad benefit.
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Employers placed a particular emphasis on conveying to the public and to their
employees the benefits workers could expect from American capitalism. In a practice
known as “welfare capitalism,” employers and managers in the late 1910s and 1920s
sought to stave off unionization and win worker-actor goodwill by offering employees
perks and concessions such as membership in company unions, higher wages, medical
benefits, and firm-sponsored recreational activities.123 By adopting a paternalistic posture
towards workers, employers also sought to communicate to other elites that they could
behave responsibly and could solve industrial problems without interference. Welfare
capitalism acknowledged that concerns about the dangers and harms of industrialism
were entirely legitimate. Employers would need to behave in a responsible and
community-oriented manner and take on new responsibility for workers’ welfare, in this
framework, but wholesale changes in the system were not necessary. As distinguished
from industrial unionism, for instance, welfare capitalism appealed to workers through an
individualistic framework. “Modern technology has tended to create class cleavage, by
making the wage earner believe that…he has slight prospect of getting ahead as an
individual, and that his welfare depends upon the welfare of his class”—the precise belief
that made unionization appealing to workers, economist Sumner Slichter explained.
“Modern personnel methods,” Slichter emphasized, aimed “to counteract the effect of
modern technique upon the mind of the worker,” in large part by allowing better
opportunities for individual advancement: an abundant package of consumer goods,
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advancement up the company ranks for talented workers, stock ownership.124
Importantly, the connection between American identity and entrepreneurship could be
maintained even in a modern society, with the industrial worker imagined as an incipient
capitalist. The “wage earner,” one contemporary insisted, was “not satisfied any longer
to be a wage earner; he wants to be a partner.”125
The dominant 1920s view: “American” workers supported the existing system
One of the most basic claims running through discourses on the benefits of
consumerism, welfare capitalism, and the dangers of the new immigration held that
respectable American workers’ political views would not differ substantially from those
of their employers. They understood the benefits they gained from the “American
system” and would not be drawn to the siren song of foreign radicalism. Class cleavages
in a “European” sense would not predict their political views, and they would reject
demagogic appeals or the promise of direct aid from the government. Conservative
columnist Frank Kent, touring the country in 1925, noted “the completeness with which
all liberal thought has vanished, the astounding degree to which the country has become
conservatized, and the strong hold” of Calvin Coolidge’s business-centered appeal “on all
classes of society, whether rich or poor.”126 Those workers who did not subscribe to a
middle class politics could not be seen as fully “American” under this framework. Elites
reflexively linked foreignness and radicalism, with immigrants, especially eastern
European Jews, falling under the greatest suspicion. “One pair of ears is enough to prove
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the great majority of the agitators completely foreign born,” labor relations investigator
Whiting Williams reported from Detroit, “and one pair of eyes and ears soon learn that
most of their hearers are Europeans who have come here too recently to get a satisfactory
toehold.”127 These newcomers were susceptible to demagoguery, in this view, in part
because of their poverty and racial status, but also because they did not yet understand the
opportunity the American economic system (in contrast to the economic system of the
old country) provided them.
The benefit of these arguments for a business-dominated, anti-statist political
culture is straightforward. They offered a persuasive claim to represent the majority and
figured opponents as alien to the polity. Great wealth did not disqualify an employer
from speaking for workers in elite public discourse, particularly if he could claim humble
beginnings and an interest in workers’ welfare. Self-made industrialists, most notably
Henry Ford, were among the period’s most acknowledged elite-level voices for workers.
“Mr. [Henry] Ford represents better than any living person the American industrial
worker,” one progressive commented in 1926.128 In the dominant framework, there was
no necessary conflict between the interests of workers and the interests of business;
rather, the two were deeply intertwined.
Importantly, while the framework was most beneficial to their claims, employers
and their allies were far from alone in assuming that political views did not differ
significantly along class lines. Left-of-center intellectuals often saw farmers and workers
as almost entirely taken in by the dominant ideology. “We have no labor movement and
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no agrarian movement,” the New Republic declared in 1929. “Neither farmers nor
industrial workers, as such, possess sufficient self-awareness or status to make qualitative
contributions to our culture. Their standards and aspirations are swallowed in the
gigantic maw of middle-class ascendancy.”129 Workers did not perceive their separate
interests, liberals argued, for two primary and related reasons. First, “in this day of
movies and automobile,” they had been seduced by consumer capitalism and were
primarily concerned with making as much money as possible.130 Second, they were in
thrall to the pioneer individualism of the past: political culture remained, as John Dewey
put it, “saturated with traditions of liberty and self-help.”131 “Cultural lag,” one of the
most central concepts in progressive discourse, offered an explanation for why these
seemingly outdated values remained so powerful: ideology changed far more slowly than
objective conditions. In Dewey’s words, the “development of physical instrumentalities
has far outrun the present development of corresponding mental and moral
adjustment…We are carrying old political and old mental habits into a condition for
which they are not adapted, and all kinds of friction result.”132 In other words, for these
progressives, individualism became a guiding creed for Americans in a period where a
self-sufficient rural life was the norm. Even though that was no longer the case, the
complex of beliefs held by the majority of the public had not yet caught up.
It is important to draw out the connection in contemporary discourse between
rural imagery and consumer capitalism. At first glance, the link appears incongruous,
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with the rural associated with the past and capitalism with the future. The chief
connection lies in the importance both placed on individualism and self-sufficiency. For
conservatives, the achievements of individual ingenuity in the industrial age
demonstrated continuity with the self-sufficient rural past.133 For liberals, the new
industrial powers had exploited the much-revered memory of the pioneer days for
ideological purposes. Basing the doctrine of “least possible interference by
government…on the plea that certain persons or interests should have the chance to
become quickly rich and powerful” would have been politically ineffective, popular
historian James Truslow Adams emphasized. Instead, “the doctrine of laissez-faire had
to be linked with the preservation of the self-reliant virtues of the farmer and the
frontiersman, the ‘typical’ American virtues which otherwise, it was claimed, might be
ruined by paternalism.”134 For many liberals, this strategy had been very effective, with
individualism remaining in its place of valor as a guiding principle of American political
and economic life.
Liberals’ sometimes-despairing assessments of the prospects for a majoritarian
reform coalition reflected the dire conditions for their side at the macropolitical level.
Without discounting the appeal of conservative and consumerist politics to white workeractors, it is important to stress that the elite discursive environment of the decade prior to
133
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the New Deal was such that their resistance to the dominant ideology was hidden from
view. The two major parties did not differ substantially in ideological terms. Wall Street
and Southern planter class interests shaped the Democratic Party, a divided minority
coalition of Northern urban political machines and the Solid South.135 Within organized
labor, the dominant American Federation of Labor (AFL) articulated its claim to speak
for workers in a manner congenial to dominant discourses. The labor movement had been
crushed in the aftermath of World War I, and radicals like the International Workers of
the World (IWW) and the Socialists were much less prominent than they had been early
in the twentieth century. The AFL’s base comprised craft unions representing the most
skilled workers, largely Protestant white men of Northern European heritage. AFL
unions sought to win concrete gains in wages and working conditions for members by
bargaining directly with employers and avoided association with militancy or stigmatized
groups of workers.136 The objective, AFL president Samuel Gompers explained, was to
“make labor a contented and prosperous partner of business in this American system of
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acquisition and enjoyment.”137 “In America there is no such thing as a working class as
distinguished from a capitalist class,” one AFL union insisted, pledging “to show its
members and workers generally how they can become capitalists as well as workers.”138
The figure of the industrial worker as incipient capitalist and contented middle-income
consumer was not beneficial only to business interests; it carved out limited space for the
most privileged workers to make claims on employers about getting their fair share.
Redefining the American worker – the New Deal, the CIO, and the Popular Front
Prevailing understandings of “workers” were permanently altered by the politics
of the 1930s. In the understanding dominant by the end of the decade, the chief cleavage
in American politics pitted workers, the “people” or the majority against economic elites;
the political interests and views of the majority differed sharply from those of the most
advantaged. To be clear, the language pitting workers or the “people” against an elite
was not in any way new in the 1930s; republicanism, agrarian Populism, the Marxist
tradition, industrial unionism, the farmer-labor movement, and Progressivism (to name a
few) had drawn on that language. In the 1930s, this oppositional view of the worker
became dominant to an unprecedented degree in mainstream elite political discourse,
through the intersecting efforts of three primary political forces: the New Deal
Democratic Party, the CIO, and the Popular Front.
Under the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt (president from 1933 until his
death in 1945), the Democratic Party became clearly defined as the liberal party in a two-
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party system. The New Deal Democratic Party’s pioneering social legislation included
the National Labor Relations Act, or Wagner Act (1935), which guaranteed the right to
organize; the Social Security Act (1935), the foundation of the American welfare state;
the Works Progress Administration (1935), a large-scale government jobs program; and
the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), which set wages and hours requirements for
employment. The party remained a problematic vehicle for reform, as liberals within it
well understood, and scholars stress the tension between radicalism and conservatism in
the New Deal order.139 In particular, conservative Southern Democrats in Congress
retained a substantial limiting influence over policymaking, forcing the exclusion of most
African Americans from Social Security and other key programs and, by the late 1930s,
forming an alliance with Northern Republicans to restrict and roll back liberal gains. The
policy limitations of the New Deal did not significantly limit Roosevelt and his allies’
success in defining the Democratic Party as the party of the “people” and the Republican
Party, conversely, as the party of wealth and privilege.
The CIO (originally the Committee for Industrial Organization, later the Congress
of Industrial Organizations) was formed in 1935 by a group of union leaders, led by
United Mine Workers president John L. Lewis and Amalgamated Clothing Workers
president Sidney Hillman, who broke with the AFL leadership over its unwillingness to
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aggressively pursue the organization of industrial workers. A surge of organization
followed the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935; by 1938, CIO affiliates had largely
organized the key industries of autos and steel. The CIO disrupted the industrial status
quo in multiple well-documented ways, but it is essential for the purposes of this
narrative to stress its immense importance in altering public discourse around American
workers. “There is no other instrumentality set up or created through which Labor can
speak its mind or express itself except through the American Federation of Labor,” AFL
president William Green had insisted in 1933.140 Four years later, CIO national director
John Brophy claimed that “the CIO…has brought to American political life the voice of
the great mass of American workers—a voice for the first time organized and
forceful.”141 If both organizations claimed the near-exclusive right to speak for workers,
the CIO spoke for a different group of workers and represented workers in a different
way. Its leaders endorsed an antidiscrimination agenda and claimed to represent the
“great mass of American workers” as a whole, not the most privileged segments of the
working class. They adopted an often-combative public posture that defined workers
against employers. In contrast to the AFL’s policy of voluntarism (which warned against
close ties with any political party and favored bargaining with employers without state
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interference), the CIO formed an alliance with the Democratic Party and linked workers’
interests to an activist state.
Political forces to the left of New Deal and CIO leadership also greatly shaped
elite-level understandings of working class identity in this period, through the upsurge of
rank-and-file militancy and the cultural and intellectual production of the Popular Front, a
broad, social democratic movement comprising a wide ideological range of liberals,
socialists, communists, and other leftists and based on the premise that all left-of-center
forces should work together in an alliance against fascism and reaction.142 The Popular
Front was strongly committed to both industrial unionism and antiracism, key parts of an
antifascist project. Though most leftists saw themselves as allied with the New Deal and
the CIO during this period, they generally saw New Deal liberalism and CIO unionism as
first steps toward a significantly more ambitious agenda.
All of these political efforts, of course, took place against the backdrop of the
Great Depression. The mass poverty and unemployment of the Depression ran directly
counter to the claims made in support of the existing system. For a significant segment of
elite opinion, the Depression was an inexorable demonstration of the failures of the
“individualist creed of everybody for himself and the devil take the hindmost.”143 The
assumption that capitalist democracy would continue for the foreseeable future was
deeply shaken, and radical views gained an atypical level of purchase in elite liberal
142
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circles. It is important to stress, though, that a significant group of elites did not see the
Depression as disqualifying for the existing system and saw an increase in state power in
response to the Depression as a much greater threat. Familiar arguments about the broad
benefit of capitalism—in which the “many,” not the “few,” were its beneficiaries—
remained remarkably prominent in elite public discourse even at the height of the
Depression. “The American system…has provided bountifully for all but an unfortunate
ten percent,” protested a representative 1936 Chicago Tribune editorial.144
Contemporaries pointed to workers’ high wages; their ability to buy new products and to
own stock; the middle-income lifestyle ostensibly enjoyed by the majority of Americans;
the common interests of labor and capital; the fact that capitalists rose from the ranks of
workers; the dangers of statism. AFL president William Green warned against welfare
(“the dole”) on the grounds that it would make the worker “a ward of the state.”145
Ultimately, then, while the Depression was central to changing elite constructions of the
“worker,” its influence on elite public discourse was not predetermined. The
interpretation of the Depression was subject to political conflict.
The most basic claim in left/liberal discourse in the 1930s held that the economic
system as presently constructed served the interests of elites but did not meet the needs of
the majority of Americans. Leftists and liberals advocated a wide range of alternatives,
ranging from basic reforms of the existing system to socialism. Many of those farther to
the left wanted a greater degree of coordinated and centralized economic planning; in this
view, individualistic, decentralized decision-making by corporate interests would never
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allow for the nation’s productive capacity to be used in the best interest of its citizens.
Others championed measures that would increase the purchasing power of workers and
give citizens protection against the vicissitudes of industrial society. No matter the scope
of the change advocated, a consistent and fundamental claim throughout the discourse
held that a more activist role for the state would be needed to secure justice in the modern
world.146
Also broadly shared in left-of-center politics was a frame opposing a small group
of industrial elites to the majority of citizens. These were the “robber barons” and
“malefactors of great wealth” targeted by earlier generations—businessmen who had
taken advantage of the affordances of industrial capitalism to amass immense power
unknown in the early years of the republic. Contemporaries put forward class politics at
different levels of explicitness, with those most euphemistic in their framing closest to the
center of elite public discourse. New Deal Democrats did not identify a “capitalist class,”
but they did argue explicitly that a small group of industrial elites had interests that
diverged from the interests of the majority. In 1936, FDR boasted that his administration
had “earned the hatred of entrenched greed” and decried the “domination of government
by financial and industrial groups, numerically small but politically dominant.” “Never
before in all our history have these forces been so united against one candidate as they
stand today,” he exclaimed later the same year. “They are unanimous in their hate for
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me—and I welcome their hatred.”147 His acceptance speech at the 1936 Democratic
National Convention introduced the New Deal’s best-known term for its adversaries:
“economic royalists.” Similar language appeared consistently across the full range of leftof-center opinion. Liberals and leftists denounced the “predatory power of the
oligarchs,” “Wall Street and its minions…here full panoplied for battle,” “the small class
whose one aim is profits,” a “financial and economic dictatorship,” “industrial
autocracy.”148
Most often, liberals opposed these oligarchs and autocrats to “the people,” “the
majority,” the “plain people,” the “many,” the “common people,” the “average
American”—constituencies defined by little other than their ordinariness and their
numbers. These categories were broad and vague, expansive enough to suit a wide range
of ideologies and accommodate the disparate groups in the New Deal coalition. African
Americans and new immigrants could be explicitly included or left unmentioned. The
many-versus-few frame could support explicitly antiracist politics, but opposing the
people to the interests had also been commonplace in a Southern politics characterized by
the amalgamation of progressivism and white supremacy. In broadest terms, categories
like “the majority,” “the common man,” and the “people” included all groups without
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power or wealth: “the worker,” “the farmer,” “the housewife,” “the small business man,”
“the immigrant,” “the Negro.” For some speakers, they referred to non-elite whites.149
To be clear, then, liberals did not speak only on behalf of a contemporary
equivalent to “the white working class.” To an important degree, though, white, male
workers stood at the forefront of the imagery around the liberal public. This chapter
frames the importance of white working class representation in this period around two
basic but central questions in elite public discourse. First, was reform of the existing
system—understood by elites on both sides as individualistic, anti-statist capitalism—
needed and legitimate? Second, how were the politics of workers (and non-elite
Americans generally) changing, and what would they demand from their government and
their employers? Parts Two and Three look at these questions, respectively.
Plan of the chapter
Part Two seeks to underscore the importance of the (white) worker as a symbol of
the legitimacy of liberal reform. Representations of (white) workers were closely
implicated in debate around fundamental questions in elite public discourse—the proper

149

A 1944 CIO pamphlet, “The Negro in ’44,” gives a sense of the “people” in the broadest left-of-center
sense: “In this year of decision, 1944, Negro Americans find themselves at a crossroad. They are not there
alone. The small farmer, the small businessman, the white collar worker, the professional, the housewife,
both white and colored, are there. The foreign-born are there. So are all the people who live by the sweat of
their brows. All the ‘little people’ are at the crossroad this year.” An example of the “people” in the
narrower sense—non-elite, non-immigrant whites—can be found in Oklahoma congressman Paul Stewart’s
claim that “the people are going to take over…They are getting tired of this minority stuff, and labor is the
predominant minority group that is trying to wreck the government.” In between was the vague, unmarked
“people” most common among New Deal Democrats. Roosevelt’s purpose, interior secretary Harold Ickes
explained, was “to make this country of ours a better place to live in for the average man and
woman…There exists in Washington a sense of responsibility for the health, safety, and well-being of the
people.” CIO Political Action Committee, “The Negro in ’44,” reprinted in Joseph Gaer, The First Round:
The Story of the CIO Political Action Committee (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944), 451; Stewart
in Katznelson, Fear Itself, 391; Harold Ickes, “The Social Implications of the Roosevelt Administration,”
Survey Graphic, March 1934.

89

role of government in the economy, the appropriate responses to the changes brought by
industrialism. Rural whites primarily appeared in liberal discourse as evidence of the
wrenching poverty the vaunted “American system” had failed to alleviate. Urban
industrial workers epitomized the liberal argument about the changing circumstances of
American life, in which the majority now worked for wages and needed state intervention
to assure security.
Part Three seeks to capture how contemporaries understood and narrated the
emergence of (white) workers, particularly industrial workers, as a crucial progressive
political force. Longstanding imagery of the progressive worker emerged from the
electoral successes of the New Deal and the dramatic victories of the burgeoning
industrial union movement, the source of the period’s most indelible images of working
class agency. In the early days of the CIO, sympathetic observers saw the labor
movement’s gains as the beginning of a sustained forward drive towards a vastly changed
and more just society. Even as the political agenda associated with union workers
became significantly less ambitious (basic reform as pursued by the Democratic Party),
the frame depicting (white) workers as a vital force for progress remained in an altered
form. This imagery of “labor on the march” provides the centerpiece for Part Three. Part
Three concludes by noting elite resistance to the dominant progressive worker frame—
from observers who contended that deserving workers opposed liberalism or that any
kind of class politics would not take hold in the US context. Part Three covers the same
period as Part Two from a somewhat different angle; the two could be read in either
order.
90

II. The (white) worker as a symbol of the need for reform
“It is generally agreed by competent analysts of current affairs that the great issue
of these times is how far the state should go in organizing and directing the nation’s
economic activity—or conversely, how much of this organizing and directing should be
left to individuals and groups of individuals (business) competing for public favor in a
free market,” a mid-1940s National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) pamphlet
argued.150 The majority of elites, even those strongly opposed to the staunch business
conservatives of NAM, held to the same basic understanding of “the great issue of these
times.” The central questions in elite public discourse in the 1930s and 1940s centered
on the proper role of government and private business in a modern economy. Liberals
and leftists who advocated a more activist role for the state confronted a deeply rooted
antistatist tradition holding that “individuals and groups of individuals (business)
competing for public favor in a free market” should determine the direction of the
economy. Representations of laboring whites were directly tied up in that debate.
As Part One detailed, employers and other conservatives had placed a great deal
of emphasis on the prosperity workers enjoyed as a result of American capitalism. The
system was just, they argued, because it allowed for individual talent and drive to be
harnessed for broad benefit. Liberals and leftists sought to demonstrate that state
intervention was both needed and legitimate, in keeping with the traditions of the
American founding. They too drew consistently on representations of workers, but they
figured them much differently—as disempowered and deprived for the benefit of a few.
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Liberals sought to underscore the depth of poverty in America, and their spotlight often
focused on poverty suffered by the rural native-born white agricultural laborers central to
the national imaginary. Liberals also argued that urbanization and industrialization had
created a fundamentally altered society where justice could not be secured via longrevered individualistic principles; here urban industrial workers were symbolic of the
chronic insecurity and lack of agency that had made an activist state necessary.
Importantly, though, the (white, male) industrial worker had clear limits as a symbol of
the needs of a modern workforce—contributing to a separation of “labor” issues from
issues of race and gender.
Rural laboring whites as symbolic of the depth of American poverty
During times of crisis, journalists have often become particularly disillusioned
with journalism reflecting the activities of dominant institutions. 151 During the
Depression, liberals and leftists saw an elite-centered approach as an abdication of
responsibility, a way to conceal an urgent reality. “If we” professional-class Americans
“had to walk through street after street of dingy tenements, looking at thousands of
undernourished children,” one radical journalist wrote, “if these things were brought
squarely under our noses, we might be moved…But the trouble is that we don’t see. Our
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lives are so arranged that we don’t have to see.”152 The 1930s saw a flowering of
journalism written by liberals and leftists with the aim of documenting the poverty and
disadvantage hidden from elite view, making elites “see.”
Of all disadvantaged groups, this body of work spotlighted rural, native-born
whites most of all. In the mid-1930s, a series of texts dramatized for a middle-class
audience the predicament of white Southern agricultural laborers—sharecroppers and
tenant farmers.153 Journalists, novelists, and photographers depicted the human costs of
the Dust Bowl and the plight of migrants to Southern California.154 (The most famous
photograph of the era, Dorothea Lange’s “Migrant Mother,” comes out of this tradition).
In this discourse, rural whites were one thing above all—they were poor, incredibly poor:
In parts of the South human existence has reached its lowest depths. Children are
seen deformed by nature and malnutrition, women in rags beg for pennies, and
men are so hungry that many of them eat snakes, cow dung, and clay.
The children, dressed in scraps of dirty rags, stood around the table dipping their
hands into bowls of a watery liquid with grease congealing on the surface and bits
of broken crackers floating on it. There was no milk on the table, no vegetables,
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no fruit, no meat.155
In a country now capable of producing enough that no one would go hungry, for liberal
and leftist observers, it was an utter disgrace that people lived this way.
The prominence of native-born white poverty in left/liberal discourse reflects the
contemporary racial hierarchy. Anglo-Saxon whites were closer to the symbolic center
of the polity than African Americans or immigrants. Their suffering was more
destabilizing for antistatist ideologies and more difficult to ignore or explain away.
Liberals and leftists (even those who rejected the view that Anglo-Saxons were the
realest Americans) were abundantly aware of this and made strategic decisions on its
basis. Writer Sherwood Anderson, seeking to rebut the claim that “this [is] the land of
opportunity” and “there is a good deal of nonsense about all of this poverty,” consistently
stressed the pervasiveness of poverty among “whole generations of white men, their
wives, daughters, sons,” people who were “American to the bone”: “These are not the
foreigners of whom we Americans can say so glibly—‘If they do not like it here, let them
go back where they came from.’ These men are from the oldest American stock we
have.”156 One New Deal official urged a magazine editor running a story he had written
on tenant farming to “see to it that most of the pictures cover white subjects, for as my
article will show nearly two thirds of the cotton tenants are white and it is very important
that the nation as a whole should realize that cotton tenancy is not a Negro problem.”
Another official suggested to photographer Dorothea Lange that she “take [pictures of]
155
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both black and white, but place the emphasis on white tenants, since we know that these
will receive much wider attention.”157
The calculation is clear—if policymakers did not dispel the assumption that
tenancy was “a Negro problem,” it would be difficult or impossible to generate the
necessary concern among elites to address its evils; if elites assumed that only African
Americans and immigrants were poor, they would not view the problem as endemic.
This dynamic is suggestive of an enduring tension: White disadvantage drew more elite
attention because it tapped a sense that suffering was not “supposed” to happen to these
people. Making it visible was also necessary to force elites to recognize poverty as
something more than marginal.
Urban industrial workers as symbolic of the needs of a modern America
In recent years, white industrial workers have been firmly tied to the past—as
symbols of bigotry, or in the deeply nostalgic imagery around midcentury manufacturing
jobs. In the 1930s and 1940s, they were just as strongly associated with the future. The
census first found a majority of Americans living in urban areas in 1920. This, one
contemporary noted, was a “striking revelation”; the United States, “from the
beginning…had been a land in which most of the people lived in the rural districts.”158
For contemporaries, the transition from a rural to an urban society was ongoing,
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immediate, and disruptive. It generated both optimism and concern (much of it nativist in
nature), but few doubted it would bring change.
Liberal claims about the need for reform focused heavily on the changes brought
by the urban industrial age. In a very prominent narrative, equality, liberty, and
security—ideals that the United States claimed as central to national identity and that had
once been widely enjoyed—had been placed in jeopardy for the bulk of the population by
increasing economic concentration, irresponsible corporate power, and precarious wage
work. The rise of industrial capitalism had brought about a level of interconnectedness—
in the modern corporation, in mass production and distribution—that could not be dealt
with according to the individualistic principles of the past. Because individuals were now
at the mercy of vast, complex forces that they could not influence, in this framework,
justice required an increased role for collectives large and powerful enough to
counterbalance corporate power, namely unions and the state.
This narrative of the transition to industrialism can be found in roughly the same
form across the entire range of left-of-center opinion. The narrative is significant for a
history of white working class representation for two primary reasons: first, it helps to
explain the long-term symbolic importance of the (white, male) urban industrial worker;
second, it helps to explain the enduring discursive separation between “working class”
issues and issues of race and gender. The narrative undergirded some of the most farreaching left/liberal interventions of the period—that governments have responsibility for
their citizens’ welfare, that political liberty means little without economic security, that
those able to work should have the right to a job. It is also suggestive of the limits of the
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understanding of class and power that supported liberals’ claims on behalf of the working
population. The fundamental tension lies in the treatment of the preindustrial United
States as simultaneously a good society and a chapter that needed to be closed to achieve
justice in the modern world.
In liberal argumentation, preindustrial America frequently served as an idealized
backdrop to a more troubled present. Contemporaries implied that equality and
democracy had existed naturally in the pioneer days; slavery and settler colonialism were
absent or downplayed. Put differently, liberals seldom argued that the ideal of a
smallholding independent middle-income rural society was unjust, exclusive, or an
inaccurate depiction of the American past. Most often, they argued that it was obsolete.
“No matter how deeply we may yearn to return to the splendid simplicity of our log-cabin
and town-meeting era, here in America, there can be no turning back,” Roosevelt aide
Rexford Tugwell put it.159 Tugwell was typical in understanding the rural past as simple
and the present as infinitely more complex. During the frontier era, Roosevelt himself
argued, individualism had its day as “the great watchword of American life,” and “the
happiest of economic conditions made that day long and splendid.” On “the Western
frontier, land was substantially free…Starvation and dislocation were practically
impossible.” But these conditions had irrevocably changed, FDR stressed: “Our last
frontier has long since been reached, and there is practically no more free land. More
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than half of our people do not live on the farms or on lands and cannot derive a living by
cultivating their own property.”160
The widespread security and “equality of opportunity” of the past, in this
narrative, was directly attributable to the availability of land (for white settlers) on the
frontier. Anyone who could access land had agency and could earn a living. The same
condition did not apply to a landless wage worker. For W. Jett Lauck, an economist and
close advisor of John L. Lewis, the need for reform “had its origin and development in
the marvelous changes in industry and industrial life since the American Revolution,”
especially the rise of “large scale production” directed by “artificial legal personages,
known as industrial corporations.” Where an individual worker in a small shop could
exercise agency through a personal relationship with the employer, a worker employed
by a large corporation could only exercise agency as part of a collective, by “meeting
organization with organization…The individual wage-earner was helpless.”161 An
increased role for government or for unions, in this framework, did not violate
longstanding American norms because conditions the Founders could not possibly have
foreseen had rendered it necessary. “The rush of modern civilization…has raised for us
new difficulties, new problems which must be solved if we are to preserve to the United
States the political and economic freedom for which Washington and Jefferson planned
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and fought,” Roosevelt argued.162 Because economic inequality was so vast, formal
political equality had become “meaningless.”
The importance of the industrial wage worker in this discourse is straightforward:
first and foremost, this worker epitomized the changing conditions faced by non-elite
Americans. For leftists, industrial workers felt the pressures of capitalism most acutely;
they faced the oppression in the present that white-collar workers and others would face
in the near future. For liberals and labor leaders closer to the political center, framing
politics and policy around the needs of the modern public required recognizing the
United States as urban and wage-earning, not rural. “We have long ceased to be an
agricultural people,” John L. Lewis argued, noting that the workforce now comprised
three times as many wage workers as agricultural workers. It “is obvious that the future
of our country is indissolubly bound up with the economic and social advancement of its
industrial workers,” Lewis stressed.163 The time had come, New Dealer Harold Ickes
claimed, to “modify or even to discard certain social, economic and political concepts
appropriate to a pioneer people.”164 Libertarian concepts that might have been appropriate
when most Americans were self-employed landowners were now, in this perspective,
badly out of date.
One clear example of this reasoning can be found in the case made by John
Winant, the first chair of the Social Security Board, for why it was foolish and unjust to
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stigmatize Social Security as an invitation to idleness. “There was no need for social
insurance in [the] early days of the Republic,” Winant argued. “Security depended on the
individual’s own efforts…Poverty was a very relative term and was generally born of
shiftlessness.” However, Winant stressed, “that period in our history is over,” displaced
by an “economic revolution which has altered fundamentally the status of the average
American. Most of our population are wage earners, living in urban areas, working for
corporations whose owners are strangers to them…The worker is no longer a free agent,
who can provide for his own security by his own initiative.”165 The liberal understanding
of industrial modernity, as Winant’s argument typifies, justified an expanded role for the
state by stressing the limits of agency. Security was not a guarantee no matter how
industrious a worker might be. But Winant also presumed that security had existed for all
who did not succumb to “shiftlessness”—it was only industrialism that had taken it away.
This discourse helps to explain the constrained understanding of “class” and
“economic issues” that has long shaped elite political discourse. In the predominant
liberal narrative, the social injustice workers faced could be attributed to industrial elites
and the workings of industrial society. The narrative did not highlight other sources of
power, including those that might benefit its typical worker, or other kinds of labor (e.g.
agricultural, domestic, or reproductive). The exclusion of slavery from the dominant
understanding of the development of US capitalism encouraged a conceptual separation
between the “Negro problem” and the problem of industrial modernity. Some liberals
and leftists in the period were very attentive to these. But the dominant frame linked the
changes brought by industrialism to work largely performed by white men. Many of
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them were of southern and eastern European descent, and they became recognized as
“American” by becoming recognized as typical American workers. A few decades later,
when this group’s position had obviously improved, the continued subordination of
women and African Americans did not prevent elites from claiming that the problems
brought by industrialism had been largely solved (see Chapter 2).
It is important to stress that (white, male) industrial workers were useful as a
symbol of liberal reform because they suggested continuity as well as needed change. To
be clear, these workers appeared to many contemporaries as an “other”: Though nativist
language directed at southern and eastern Europeans was declining, it remained very
prominent in opposition to the ascendant liberalism. But European men—unlike others
confronted with the implication that they were not quite American—could lay claim to
one of the most important elements of the normative understanding of Americanness:
breadwinning white masculinity.166
Breadwinning white men were understood as the average American, the basic
democratic subject. One of the most infamous examples of Depression-era propaganda is
a National Association of Manufacturers billboard showing a white family—father,
mother, and two children—happily riding in a car. The text reads, “World’s Highest
Standard of Living”…“There’s no way like the American Way.” An iconic photo
featured in Life magazine captures a group of African American workers standing in a
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breadline, against the backdrop of this billboard.167 For NAM and its cohort, the
patriarchal family ideal and the “American Way” were deeply tied together; Americans’
high standard of living made possible a contented, normative family life. As a political
symbol, the patriarchal family ideal was not the property of the right, however; liberals
and labor laid claim to it as well.
What workers in an industrial age needed above all, liberals argued, was
security—stability in employment, enough food and shelter to live a decent life, a fair
wage, and income in old age or in the case of disability. Security was an ideal that could
directly challenge the existing economic system. “The ideals of the labor movement
must be security for every man and woman in the country,” Sidney Hillman argued. “If
capitalism can’t give us security, then let another system do it.”168 Security was also an
ideal firmly tied in with normative understandings of the family. “What do the people of
America want more than anything else?” Roosevelt asked in a 1932 speech. Work, he
answered, and “security for themselves and for their wives and children.”169 Where FDR
figured of breadwinning men as equivalent to “the people of America,” the labor
movement and its supporters framed the “worker” as a male with a wife and children.
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Liberals and organized labor argued that justice in an industrial society depended on the
family wage—a wage high enough that a single wage earner could support a family on
one income. “The American standard of living is based upon the earnings of the main
breadwinner,” argued a 1945 United Steelworkers release. “It rejects the concept that
other members of the family have to work in order to provide the family with the
necessary living essentials.”170 The Steelworkers here invoked an ideal held as normative
for Americans of all classes (“the American standard of living”) to argue that workers
deserved the same.
Stressing security for the individual family also helped unions to push back on
right-wing claims of dangerous radicalism. When labor officials wanted to convey that
organized workers were not a threatening other, they consistently emphasized that
workers sought above all to support their families. In a 1941 radio address clearly
intended for a skeptical professional-class public, CIO legislative director John T. Jones
described union workers as “good, upright patriotic American citizens, just like you and
your neighbors…Like you, they are also deeply concerned with protecting the welfare
and security of their families.”171 One unionist urged CIO publicity officials to emphasize
“that a C. I. O. man is likely to be the Sam or Bill around the family table; no more alien
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to the American scene than the most average and desirable type of American. If this idea
were driven home to the great majority of Americans do you think any politician would
dare to get up in Congress and talk against him?”172 Here, racial signifiers
(“alien”…“desirable type of American”) were rearticulated around (and rendered
unnecessary by) an image of averageness tied to breadwinning masculinity (“Sam or Bill
around the family table”).
Ironically, this focus on security for the individual male-headed family can be
read as an updated version of the rural ideal of individualism and self-sufficiency. When
1930s and 1940s observers remembered the preindustrial United States, they envisioned
independent families as its typical citizens: “The closely knit family group—its
prosperity determined by what could be wrested from the soil—was the unit of the new
society”…“The sovereign authority rested with a great middle class, whom we like to
term the typical Americans. They were the people whose ideal of life was to own a home,
and rear and educate a family in the fear of the Lord and in obedience to law.”173 In one
interpretation, liberalism promised the opportunity to achieve the same ideal through
modern means. An industrial worker could aspire to own his own shop or even farm or,
at the very least, his own home, and many worker-actors understood the New Deal’s
promise to its constituents as a “white entitlement to a home in a racially homogenous
neighborhood.”174 Even “the trade-unionist of urban America” was drawn to “the old
Jeffersonian tradition of the farmer as a free man on his own homestead,” liberal Harold
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Laski observed.175 Here the limits of the (white, male) industrial worker as a progressive
political symbol came into sharp relief. While a deprived worker who prized security
could be a symbol of radical change, the picture was much cloudier once that worker had
made some gains. As the next two chapters will detail, a (white male) worker dedicated
to securing what he had gained would become a chief symbol of conservatism and antiblack backlash.

III: The (white) worker as an agent of change
The most indelible imagery of a progressive (white) working class comes out of
the politics of the 1930s and 1940s and its legacy—union organizers socked by Henry
Ford’s goons at the Battle of the Overpass in Dearborn, Michigan…little houses in rural
West Virginia or South Boston where one of the only pictures on the wall was of
FDR…“My father always said, stick with the Democrats, they’re the party of the working
man.”176 The legacy of this imagery is only palely reflective of the major imprint it made
on elite public discourse in the 1930s and 1940s. The strong association between liberal
politics and the (white) worker owes most to two parallel developments, both taking
place against the backdrop of the Depression—the rapid gains made by the industrial
union movement in the mid- to late 1930s and the rise of the New Deal Democrats to
majority status in the same period.
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The dominant elite view in the 1930s and early 1940s identified a leftward
trajectory within the electorate, a broad ideological shift away from individualism and
towards liberalism and the state. The Democratic Party, which had appeared marginal as
recently as 1928, became the clear majority force in American politics. Amid a rush of
unionization and sometimes-violent labor conflict, workers’ trajectory became an
inescapable concern for all politically active groups. Collectively, these developments
raised to the level of conventional wisdom an understanding of American politics in
which the majority supported an expanded role for the state and saw its interests as
opposed to those of an economic elite. From the standpoint of contemporary elite
discourse, this was a significant shift from the view of workers (and voters generally) as
sympathetic to business-led governance. The first section below, “The Old Gods Are
Tumbling,” sketches out that transition.
A significant number of liberals and leftists believed that they were witnessing the
birth of a sustained working class radicalism, and much of the enduring imagery of the
progressive (white) worker comes out of their work. The second section below, “Labor
on the March,” focuses in particular on labor reporting in liberal and left periodicals,
where left/liberal labor journalists pictured workers as on the march against injustice,
anonymous but incredibly brave, facing down violence from employers to win their
rights. Imagery of a militant working class declined after the late 1930s as industrial
unions became an accepted part of the economic landscape, but it left an imprint on elitelevel politics. Liberals and organized labor continued to figure workers as a key force for
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social progress, but indicated that they would realize their gains within the bounds of the
formal political system and without violence.
Even at the height of the progressive worker’s power in elite discourse, some
elites remained skeptical. The view that workers as a group embraced liberalism never
went uncontested. Many observers saw workers as moderate or “middle class” in their
political views. Some argued that responsible workers resented labor, liberalism, and
undeserving workers and were basically conservative in their views. The third section
below, “Resistance to the Progressive Worker,” gives a brief sketch of this discourse,
with an eye toward foreshadowing arguments that follow in the ensuing chapters.
“The Old Gods Are Tumbling”: The Liberal Electoral Majority
In the dominant elite view, workers and the public broadly shifted to the left over
the course of the 1930s, amid the victories of the New Deal and the burgeoning industrial
union movement. The Democrats, clearly defined as the liberal party, replaced the
Republicans (defined as the business party) as the majority party. The dominant lines of
division going forward, in this view, would center on income, with the “have-nots”
opposing the “haves.”
***
Political analysis in the 1920s and early 1930s understood the United States as
“normally Republican.” Syndicated columnist Paul Mallon explained the conventional
wisdom: “that this is a Republican country; that the Republicans alone can bring
prosperity; that the voters merely chastise them occasionally, but always restore them to
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favor after a brief, unsatisfactory experience with the Democrats.”177 Belief in a natural
Republican majority followed on Republican victories in all but two presidential
elections since 1896. It was also tied up with assumptions about the composition of the
electorate—that most voters valued business-led prosperity; that political views did not
differ significantly based on income; that the Republicans’ middle-income Protestant
base was the dominant political force; and that the Democrats’ major constituencies, the
Solid South and immigrants in Northern cities, were marginal. Two Roosevelt victories
turned that conventional wisdom on its head. The Democratic Party’s “triumph now
reaches even greater heights, with the prospect that it will be the dominant factor in
American life for at least another decade,” a Washington Post correspondent commented
after 1936. “Talk abounds that the Republican Party is finished.”178
The new conventional wisdom rooted Democratic strength in an income-based
division pitting the disadvantaged majority against the better off minority. “Today we
have a new main cleavage of political opinion which, whether for good or ill, will be with
us as far as we can see into the future,” wrote Wall Street Journal editor Thomas
Woodlock in 1936. That cleavage “is deeper than any heretofore experienced since the
Civil War,” based “upon lines largely of economic class divisions.”179 “Any full
understanding of politics today must take account of the fact that there has been a
significant and far-reaching change in the political line-up of the country since the New
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Deal came to power,” pollster George Gallup noted in 1938. “This change has taken the
form of a cleavage of political opinion along economic lines, a split between the high and
low income brackets, a struggle for political power between the ‘haves’ and ‘havenots.’”180 This was the root of one of the most enduring truisms in American political
history—Democrats are the party of working people, Republicans the party of the rich.
It’s important to note that “class” in this context means the argument that the
interests of economic elites were opposed to the interests of the bulk of the population.
This was the argument that (for both supporters and opponents) New Dealers
mainstreamed. Allegations about Roosevelt’s legitimation of “class warfare” began as
early as his 1932 campaign and intensified by the mid-1930s. “Efforts to stir up classantagonism” had been made in the past, conservative columnist Frank Kent noted, but
they had always come from “those on the outside trying to get in…It is the first time in
history that a President of the United States has…initiated, encouraged, and promoted a
fight along those lines.”181 Initially, a significant segment of elites in both parties
believed that this kind of combative talk would turn off most voters. Some interpreted
FDR’s victory in 1932 as a one-time reaction to the Depression. By the time he won the
1936 election in a landslide (61% of the popular vote and all but two states, with a clear
income gap identifiable in the voting), few disputed that a dramatic shift had taken place.
Broadly, the dominant view in elite public discourse held that public esteem for
liberals and activist government was rising sharply, while esteem for business had
declined precipitously. The frame in which liberals deliver more government and
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conservatives less has been pervasive since the New Deal and was especially central in
the 1930s and 1940s. More recently, it has often been argued that this frame is
inaccurate and advantageous to the right: it fails to capture the fact that government is
always involved, including when policy is written for the benefit of corporate interests.
During the Depression, when business leadership was at its most embattled and the
federal welfare state undeveloped, liberals saw the government vs. laissez-faire frame as
politically effective. Whether they approved or not, elites of all political perspectives
understood the electorate as demanding more government.
An argument prominent among conservatives held that business was currently on
the losing end of an ideological contest with advocates of liberal government. “The
recently enfranchised masses and the leaders of thought who supply their ideas are almost
completely under the spell of [the] dogma” that “government with its instruments of
coercion must, by commanding the people how they shall live, direct the course of
civilization and fix the shape of things to come,” lamented Walter Lippmann, best known
to 1930s elites as a leading conservative syndicated columnist.182 Liberals identified the
same trajectory but saw it as encouraging. Voters had been skeptical of government
intervention in the past, in this view, but were starting to recognize the necessity of a
different approach. Liberal Stuart Chase interpreted the 1936 election as evidence of
“wavering public support for the religion of business”: “The old gods are tumbling…The
people have turned to a new god—the government, led by Mr. Roosevelt. The new god
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works.”183 Notably, while Lippmann only uses religious language (“dogma”) to describe
the views he opposes, Chase uses it in reference to his own side as well. The “people,” in
this framework, did not draw on critical thinking so much as faith. Their political role
was to place their trust in the right group of elites, and the chief indication of their
changing views was the worshipful attitude many adopted towards Roosevelt.
Chase’s phrasing is suggestive: the progressive majority built by the New Deal, as
many liberals imagined it, exercised agency through elites. It was a dispersed public184:
millions of people in little towns and big cities listening to the president on the radio or
talking with their neighbors about the need for change. That dispersed public made it
possible for reform to take place because voters demanded it at the ballot box. The
imagery of agency that came out of the industrial union movement was much different.
Here workers exercised agency directly and as an embodied group, putting their
livelihoods or lives on the line to secure their rights.
The rush of labor organization was among the most central stories in American
media and politics in the period, and that story proceeded at incredible speed. As New
York Times labor reporter Louis Stark recalled, the period saw a “Niagara of news” about
labor enter the top headlines “over night.”185 Labor news appeared prominently in mass
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publications and elite-oriented periodicals, and actors on both sides were deeply invested
in shaping public opinion about the new unions. The key strikes of the period—including
autoworkers in Toledo, truck drivers in Minneapolis, and longshoremen in San Francisco
in 1934, autoworkers in Flint and steelworkers in Pennsylvania and Ohio in 1936 and
1937—were reported extensively in a range of media, as were CIO involvement in
electoral politics and conflicts between the nascent CIO and the AFL. The tenor of labor
reporting varied across and within publications. Unfavorable press often claimed to
“expose” communist influence in unions or painted strikers as a small minority of
workers egged on by “outside agitators” against the wishes of the majority.186 Some
coverage was dry and straight-ahead, with a focus on political machinations within
unions and the political strategy of industrial relations. Some coverage, even in
mainstream publications, treated the CIO story favorably, as a compelling drama.
The new unions worked aggressively to shape their publicity. Nearly all CIO
affiliates had on staff a former newspaper journalist who knew how to write slick copy
and attract press attention, and unions made strategic use of radio at both the national and
local level. The CIO’s chief public voice in the mid- to late 1930s was its president, John
L. Lewis, who was quoted frequently in the daily press and delivered a series of national
radio speeches in which he claimed to speak for “labor” as a whole. As Lewis and other
elites argued, the power of the CIO’s claim to represent workers grew from the work of
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non-elite actors as well as elite actors. Rank-and-file worker-actor struggle supported the
claims of the CIO’s leaders and publicity operation, which in turn shaped the meaning of
that struggle at the elite level. The predominant frame put forward by the CIO mirrored
and reinforced the anti-elite rhetoric coming out of the New Deal (and from figures
farther to the left). “The organization and constant onward sweep of [the CIO]
exemplifies the resentment of the many toward the selfishness, greed and the neglect of
the few,” John L. Lewis insisted in a 1937 speech.187
In understanding contemporary discourse on organized labor, it is important to
stress that contemporaries responded not only to labor’s immediate, concrete
achievements, but also to what it might achieve in the future. The CIO, journalist C. L.
Sulzberger wrote in 1938, “was the militant voice of the workers, the guide to the
unorganized, a movement whose implied threat of power was beyond immediate
measure.”188 As much as anything, it was its “implied threat of power” that made the
CIO so important in contemporary discourse. Nearly all journalistic and intellectual work
on organized labor dealt in some form with the question of how far the workers might go,
what the unrest stirring across the country might portend. As the next section details,
some saw an entirely transformed society as more than possible.
“Labor on the March”: Union Militancy and (White) Working Class Representation
Leftists often saw the industrial union struggles of the 1930s as the beginnings of
a sustained working class radicalism. The New Deal and the CIO, in this view, were key
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initial stages in the left’s struggle to gain working class support.189 Leftists differed on
the kind of transformation they wanted, but many believed that workers would ultimately
go beyond the modest, reformist goals unions initially sought (the right to collective
bargaining, higher wages). The gains made by workers and unions would continue, in this
view, and workers’ political consciousness would grow. As inaugural CIO publicity
director Len De Caux (a journalist pushed out for radical affiliations during the late 1940s
Red Scare) recalled, the “working class became a concept to conjure with when newly
organizing millions seemed to promise a movement capable of transforming society.”190
Sympathetic observers used a persistent phrase to describe the trajectory of those
“millions”: “labor on the march.”
This section examines imagery of an onward-marching, militant working class as
it emerged from liberal and radical labor journalism. It is important to stress that the lines
between liberal and left in this period were blurry and were not strictly policed. The
drive to create a liberalism purged of any association with the radical left did not begin in
earnest until the late 1940s. In the 1930s in particular, radical reporting and radical
opinions appeared consistently in most left-of-center publications, including the liberal
Nation and New Republic. While this work does not fit as neatly under the umbrella of
“elite public discourse” as the reporting in the New York Times, left/liberal journalism
was known to observers outside of radical left circles.
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For liberal and leftist journalists, the archetypical imagery of an onward-marching
1930s working class emerged from strikes and labor conflict. Strikes took center stage in
liberal publications like the Nation and New Republic, in radical outlets like New Masses
and Partisan Review, and in the book-length accounts of sympathetic labor journalists,
including Charles Rumford Walker’s American City (1937), Mary Heaton Vorse’s
Labor’s New Millions (1938), Edward Levinson’s Labor on the March (1938), and
Benjamin Stolberg’s The Story of the CIO (1938). Strikes offered obvious manifestations
of class conflict—violent combat between workers and police or employers’ hired
thugs—and solidarity, as workers marched together, ate together, and fought together.
Left/liberal labor reporting spotlighted both, treating them as (in one chronicler’s words)
“expressive of the class awakening, of a mass soul in birth.”191
The chief theme in left/liberal labor reporting is the collective unity and power
exerted by scores of workers standing up for their rights. “Jesus, we got some power, us
workers, when we make up our mind to use it,” as one worker-actor quoted by a
journalist put it.192 That power was evident in the huge numbers unions mobilized, in
their coordination, bravery, and unity. This account of a Detroit march led by the United
Auto Workers (UAW) is typical:
The workers arrived in tens of thousands. They packed Cadillac Square, and
overflowed down the side streets. It was estimated that there were 150,000. But
they maintained perfect order. Bursts of song came from them. Now the Boss Is
Shivering in His Shoes, Parlez-Vous, and again, The Star Spangled Banner,
followed by Solidarity…The crowd was always in gentle motion, adding new
groups of workers with their banners flowing through the crowd like a river in a
sea. Huge slogans moved perpetually through the people: G.M.—Chrysler—Ford
191
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Next. Police Clubs Are No Way To Negotiate With Workers. You Can Beat Us
But You Can’t Defeat Us. Down With Police Brutality. You Sat On Us Long
Enough, Now We’re Sitting On You.193
In this passage, “the crowd” and “the workers” seem to have an agency all their own;
individual actors are absorbed into the collective (“new groups…flowing through the
crowd like a river in a sea”). The collective is simultaneously calm (“perfect
order…gentle motion”) and threatening, at least for the boss “shivering in his shoes.”
Workers were not looking for a fight, in this framework, but they were not afraid of
anything they might face.
Reporters explicitly depicted—and at times, celebrated—violence between
strikers and employers’ forces. With makeshift weapons, workers displayed incredible
bravery in the face of police brutality, in these accounts. “Thousands of workers, many
women among them, came with squared jaws to take their places” on the picket line, the
New York Post’s Edward Levinson reported from Flint. “Men and women carried clubs
and stout sticks; several had crowbars, stove pokers, and lengths of pipe. A few had
knocked the base off clothes-trees, and carried the poles, with metal hangers, on their
shoulders.” Levinson positioned the strikers as heirs of the American revolution; like “the
Minute Men of ’76…[and] as fully determined that their cause was righteous, they had
seized whatever weapon lay at hand and rushed off to do battle.”194 Journalists made
explicit the consequences of workers’ bravery and the brutality of their adversaries.
“They flowed directly into that buckshot fire, inevitably, without hesitation…And the
cops let them have it as they picked up their wounded,” Meridel Le Sueur reported from
193
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Minneapolis. “Lines of living, solid men, fell, broke, wavering, flinging up, breaking
over with the curious and awful abandon of despairing gestures, a man stepping on his
own intestines…another holding his severed arm in his other hand.”195 “The class line
was drawn in blood on the streets of the city,” the Nation’s James Rorty wrote.196 These
stark depictions of violence against strikers were intended to draw sympathy for workers
and condemnation towards the employers and authorities responsible. As one unionist
explained, “Often there is nothing that throws as bright a spotlight on the sufferings and
unrest of the workingman as a flareup of violence. The worker is not news when he
quietly starves.”197
Radical labor reporting’s focus on battle also reflected a broader understanding of
working class militancy in a masculinist idiom: the same strength that allowed
workingmen to perform hard physical work prepared them to stand against their
adversaries. Some in Pennsylvania steel country cited a mythical, Paul Bunyan-esque
steelworker named Joe Magarac, “made of steel all the way through” and seen as “the
symbol of the men who have long been masters of metal and fire and machinery, and
who only recently began to be masters of their own lives.”198 But reporters also
emphasized the strength of working class communities broadly, the organization and
collaboration required to keep the strikers fed and the bosses under pressure. “Between
four and five thousand persons ate at strike headquarters and slept in or near it for the
strike’s duration,” Charles Rumford Walker reported from Minneapolis. “Fourteen or
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fifteen hours of the day they were on the picket line, while at night they listened to the
news of the strike, the status of negotiations, the bosses’ latest move.”199 While women
were at times featured in supporting roles, they also consistently appeared as direct
participants in the battle—wielding potato mashers against gun-wielding deputies,
braving tear gas to get food to sit-down strikers, walking picket lines and coordinating
picketing.
The work of Mary Heaton Vorse offers a model example of the kind of journalism
practiced by leftwing correspondents. Vorse was a fearless reporter who witnessed much
of the iconic labor history of the 1930s firsthand as a freelance correspondent for the New
Republic and Federated Press (a labor-left wire service created as an alternative to the
Associated Press). Her reporting in this period—most notably her 1938 book Labor’s
New Millions—told the story of the rise of the CIO as an upsurge of rank-and-file
heroism, with individual “struggles” treated “not as isolated conflicts but as part of a
great forward thrust.” “The C.I.O., with its form of industrial unionism, its dynamic
leadership, was an answer to the unspoken wish which had existed in the hearts of
literally millions of workers,” Vorse wrote in a passage that might be read as a thesis.
“Labor’s new millions” believed that “it is the function of good government to promote
the welfare of people, rather than that of the small class whose one aim is profits,” and
they were quickly gaining the power to make that vision of government a reality.200
Vorse, like other like-minded journalists, consistently depicted violence in very
stark terms. “Piled on top of each other in [a] patrol wagon were sixteen dying and
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seriously wounded,” she reported from Youngstown, Ohio. “They lay every which way,
on top of each other. They couldn’t stand, they couldn’t sit. The blood dripped upon the
floor of the wagon.” A striker tried to help a dying man, who “made a gesture that he
wanted to smoke. She searched in his pockets to try to find his cigarettes, but they were
soaked in blood.”201 One critic surmised that Vorse had an “eighth sense” for where and
when strikes and violent confrontations would take place.202 More likely, though, she
relied on correspondence with organizers and local union officials, with all involved
keenly aware of the strategic value of depicting brutal violence against workers. One
Pittsburgh unionist, for instance, gave Vorse names to contact for an unspecified “blood
curdling” story and proposed a “Black Legion story which can be made sensational. New
strategy of attacking it, forcing big shot provocations into the open is in the
making…Story in it sure.”203 In a separate skirmish, Vorse herself was wounded when a
bullet grazed the side of her head, and a newspaper picture of her with “blood streaming
down [her] face,” Vorse’s agent wrote her, had “all New York…buzzing.”204
Undeterred, Vorse described the injury to her daughter as “the merest scratch.”205
Though Vorse’s agent at times stressed her “completely objective” view in
pitching stories—making a living writing for leftist and liberal publications on a freelance
basis was a constant struggle—Vorse in much of her reporting was unapologetic about
her own sympathies. When apprehended by authorities, she dared them to “Kill me, if
201
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you are not too yellow, I would rather die a martyr fighting for Democracy under the flag
of the Socialist party and the C. I. O. than to ever turn traitor.”206 Her bravery and
sympathy for labor’s cause won Vorse’s work a very warm reception from union leaders
and left/liberal publications. “A vast movement such as that which is embodied in the
Committee for Industrial Organization has epic connotations whose spirit you have
caught admirably,” John L. Lewis wrote to her in a letter of thanks.207 Another unionist
praised Labor’s New Millions as “one of the most outstanding contributions to the labor
movement on the North American Continent.”208 Others more suspicious of the CIO,
though, found Vorse’s focus on its heroism off-putting. As one blunt reviewer put it,
“The whole thing is pictured as a mighty uprising of labor’s millions. It is a folk
movement, a crusade. The leaders are idealized. The followers multiply as they come
one million treading on another’s heels. The writer is like a child watching a circus
parade.”209
This review, however uncharitable, called out a very real feature of radical labor
reporting: while it drew labor leaders as dynamic personalities210, it treated rank-and-file
workers as anonymous. The protagonists were “the workers,” not individual workers.
“This book has no hero or heroes; it is a story of the rank and file,” UAW-affiliated
reporter Henry Kraus began his account of the Flint strike.211 Radical labor reporters
typically gave rank-and-file workers’ names only if they were killed in the struggle (not,
206
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for instance, if they were quoted). Further, while some treated the rank and file as
intellectually gifted and perceptive, for many chroniclers, workers’ heroism drew on a
strong and single-minded devotion to basic truths: as Kraus put it, “an immense collective
unity and power based on simple loyalty to group interest.”212 In this framework,
workers did not need a deep understanding of politics; they needed to understand that
they were workers and that their interests were with the union.
To be sure, some argued that workers did desire a deep understanding of politics.
Vorse, for instance, saw an almost superhuman intellectual curiosity motivating a “steady
drive from beneath, by the rank and file…for more workers’ education”: “What the
workers want to know about most is the economic side of the world they live in…They
want courses in economics, the history of the labor movement, industrial situations,
government, economic history, legislation, community problems…parliamentary
law…[and] social philosophy.”213 More often, though, radical labor reporting featured
workers advancing leftist slogans in dialect or broken English. “It’s a state of war—
capital agin labor,” a Toledo worker exhorted his cohorts.214 Meridel Le Sueur, reporting
from Minneapolis, reproduced a letter from a striker to his girlfriend (“dere emily”) that
exemplifies the untutored radicalism of this idealized worker:
Here i am at strike head 1/4 an its plenty hot. Hell emily i bin thinkin the last few
days. theze here bosses we got in town keep yellin in the papers and over there
radios that communism and payin 54 1/2 [cents] an hour is one an the same thing.
well if thats what communism is, why i gess I’m a Communist an I expec most
evry one in the world excep a small bunch of potbellyd and titefisted bosses must
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be to.215
Not only has the striker begun to consider communism, in a common trope, the
experience of the strike has brought him around to that position (“i bin thinkin the last
few days”). Here the boundaries between authenticity, normativity, and inferiority
become very porous.
The connection between the working class and the body, so evident in radical
depictions of workers marching and fighting, reflected an often-stigmatizing
understanding of working class life which leftists did not escape. Both radicals and
conservatives might define working class culture as visceral and physical, in opposition
to the intellectual and rational culture of the professional class. For Le Sueur, a novelist
and journalist recognized as one of the leading “proletarian writers” of the period, the
working class world was a welcome contrast to her own origins. “I do not care for the
bourgeois ‘individual’ that I am,” Le Sueur explained: while she had been born into the
bourgeoisie, she sought to be “born whole out of it.” Despite her radical views, she
experienced a jarring transition “stepping into a dark chaotic passional world of another
class, the proletariat…stirring, strange, and outside the calculated, expedient world of the
bourgeoisie.” Le Sueur called on middle class readers, for whom “words are likely to
mean more than an event,” to recognize that if “you are to understand anything [from the
proletarian perspective] you must understand it in the muscular event, an action we have
not been trained for.”216 This is an archetypical example of what historian Grace Hale
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calls the “romance of the outsider”217—a common set of tropes in which professionalclass people imagine underprivileged people to have a more immediate, gratifying,
sensual life. In many such cases, an obvious investment in the wellbeing of the
“outsider” tends to be accompanied by an ascription of inferiority. Le Sueur does not
prize workers for their ability to think or verbalize.
The “romance of the outsider” is not so evident in the discourse of CIO leaders,
who tended to be from working class families and did not view outsider status as their
ultimate goal. But the frame preferred by those to their left—the labor movement as a
great forward march of ordinary people standing up to power and asserting their right to
justice and control over their lives—was also advanced by CIO elites. “No strength will
suffice to curb the onward march of American labor,” John L. Lewis insisted in a 1937
speech. “The workers of America are aroused. They are conscious of their rights and
their privileges and they intend to secure them.”218 In the 1930s, CIO officials sometimes
framed violent combat as part of labor’s struggle. They largely shied away from doing so
thereafter, however. Aside from a few holdouts, business elites largely accepted by the
late 1930s that hardline opposition to unionization (attempting to break strikes by
bringing in law enforcement, hiring replacement labor, and beating up strikers) was no
longer a workable option. As a result, worker-actors did not need to face down violence
just to force employers to recognize the union, as they had in the most famous strikes of
the period. Celebrating picket line militancy also gave off a whiff of radicalism that
became extremely dangerous for unions over the course of the 1940s.
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Ultimately, though, in order for the “labor on the march” frame to apply, the
workers did not need to be moving toward the radical left. The CIO built a close alliance
with the Democratic Party in the late 1930s and early 1940s, which helped to create a
strong link in elite public discourse between workers’ political goals and the agenda of
the Democrats.219 By the late 1940s, most of the radical-leaning officials in CIO unions
had been pushed out, but traces of left’s militant worker remained. Shortly after his
election as United Auto Workers (UAW) president in 1947, Walter Reuther roused
listeners in passionate terms: “We are the vanguard in America in that great crusade to
build a better world. We are the architects of the future, and we are going to fashion the
weapons with which we will work and fight and build.”220 Reuther, who had campaigned
promising to take a hard line on communists in the union, drew on powerful imagery
associated with the tradition he sought to expel.
Union leadership and the Democrats put forward what might be read as a reinedin version of the left’s onward-marching, militant worker. In this framework, workers’
gains would be beneficial to all but a selfish few. They would “lead…a national
movement devoted to the general welfare just as much as to the particular interests of
labor groups,” as CIO president Philip Murray put it in 1944.221 Most importantly, in this
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framework, they would accomplish their goals within the contours of the formal political
system and through their union representatives. 1940s CIO materials suggested one
primary way for a worker to be a force for progress: becoming a reliable Democratic
voter. A suggestive CIO poster of the early 1940s depicts a muscular white arm placing a
ballot into a ballot box. The text reads, “The ballot is a power in your hands. Use it—
and you help to secure good government. Fail to use it—and you score for the other side.
Your vote is the key to your freedom.”222
The view of the progressive worker as a Democratic voter was most clearly
embodied in the CIO Political Action Committee, founded in 1943. CIO-PAC was
tasked with registering worker-actors to vote and educating the rank and file about
politics. The CIO’s opponents seized on CIO-PAC as evidence that labor wanted to take
over American democracy by delivering a bloc of voters marching in lockstep, “an
attempt…by high-powered pressure groups to seize the people’s government from the
majority of the people.”223 While CIO officials rejected this view and insisted that they
did not control a “bloc” vote, they did at times frame the labor vote as a homogenous
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progressive force. CIO president Philip Murray touted PAC as “a mighty force devoted
to keeping the great majority of Americans vigilant and alert in guarding their proper
political interests”; CIO-PAC leader Jack Kroll promised that in order to “defeat its
enemies,” labor would “get out 60,000,000 votes.”224 The use of war analogies in
reference to electoral politics suggests the mainstreaming of the militant worker ideal.
By the end of the 1940s (see Chapter 2), only a handful of radicals believed there
was any chance that workers would support a politics to the left of the Roosevelt-Truman
Democratic Party. Nonetheless, the view of union workers as a reliable liberal vote
survived until the mid-1960s, when white worker-actor support for backlash politicians
made it no longer credible (see Chapter 3). Ironically, though, portrayals of the white
working class as the vanguard of white backlash bear a distinct resemblance to the
imagery of “labor on the march.” In each case, (white) workers act as a homogenous
group, marching the nation towards a changed politics.
Resistance to the Progressive Worker
It’s useful to conclude this chapter by spotlighting discourse that does not fit the
dominant trajectory of the period—the growing association between white workers and
progressive politics. While the view that the majority of (white) workers opposed
liberalism was a minority view in this period, it was not an insignificant one. Many
observers argued that optimistic liberals and leftists read too much into the events of the
decade; workers might support modest reforms that would raise their standard of living,
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but they were not motivated by ideology. Prominent arguments among conservatives
held that “honest” workers understood that labor leaders were not their friends and that
liberalism harmed the interests of deserving workers in favor of the undeserving. The
purpose of this section is not to undercut or contradict the larger argument of the chapter,
but to nuance its triumphalist tone and provide a brief sketch of alternative views in New
Deal-era elite discourse.
The most prominent elite-level rebuttal to the assumption that (white) workers
would be consistently progressive in their politics followed on the longstanding
commonplace of American exceptionalism: the vast majority of Americans remained
individualistic and moderate in their politics. Particularly in the years most marked by
labor struggle, centrist and right-leaning periodicals often reassured readers that the
nation was still overwhelmingly “middle class.” While “class consciousness…has been
read into” developments like the rise of the CIO, one 1937 New York Times article
explained, what “one finds…as one goes about the country is evidence that we are still
overwhelmingly a middle-class nation…There are no signs whatever [whatsoever] that
the huge middle class layer is being crushed between the plutocracy and the
proletariat.”225 Industrial workers, contemporaries argued, were overwhelmingly “middle
class” as well. Workers wanted to be treated fairly as individuals; they did not want a
fundamentally different system. New York Times labor reporter Louis Stark reported
from the Flint sit-down auto strikes that the workers “would be well satisfied with a
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workable plan of collective bargaining…The American worker is middle class in his
viewpoint and outlook, not revolutionary.”226 Sociologist Alfred Winslow Jones led a
1941 interview-based study seeking to uncover “to what extent the American people have
preserved the sameness of economic viewpoint that we may assume existed in the early
days”—in other words, whether Americans’ “middle class” outlook was only a product
of the relative equality found in small rural communities. Jones concluded that the same
perspective survived in industrial society: “The workers do not want to be set off as a
class apart, and if the agencies of public opinion were to attempt to set them off, the
result would be nothing but resentment.”227 In this view, liberals and leftists who
expected anything more than basic reform (e.g. the right to bargain collectively, social
insurance for old age or disability) had projected their own hopes onto workers.
Some conservatives drew on the notion that workers wanted a middle-class life
above all to suggest that a significant portion of the working and non-elite population was
out of sympathy with liberalism. To be clear, these elite voices were not representative
of conservative discourse as a whole. As labor and liberalism gained momentum, many
conservatives expressed deep pessimism about the purchase liberal ideas had gained. In
fatalistic terms, they figured themselves as part of a thinking minority overcome by a tide
of mass emotion and demagoguery and predicted that liberals could maintain power
indefinitely simply by giving voters goodies from the public purse. Taken as a group,
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though, conservative elites did not abandon the notion that they possessed (or could gain)
majority support.
One common argument held that liberals had not achieved majority support at
all—rather, they had gained power by catering to the self-interest and greed of minorities
at the expense of the majority. A range of conservatives, from business circles to rural
Christian circles, gravitated to a frame opposing idle and selfish minority constituencies
to a modest self-sufficient middle-income majority. Publisher Frank Gannett hoped to
assemble “a great middle-class bloc…[of] thrifty, frugal, hard-working, self-respecting
and God-fearing men and women who built America” to oppose the liberals’
constituencies, “the slackers, the shirkers, the incompetent, and the unfortunate.”228 “The
great body of normal, uncomplaining, hard-working, thrifty, self-sustaining, and
somewhat self-satisfied Americans,” “the great economic middle class…[that has]
worked and saved to secure the homes, farms, insurance policies and savings which build
and sustain the productivity of this country,” “the great middle class…given little
political attention save as the source of taxes, the supplier of funds, the producer of
votes”: these were the true victims of New Dealism, in this framework.229 In most
accounts, this “great middle class” included skilled workers alongside professionals,
small businessmen, and farmers. Though it comprised the vast majority, the middleincome constituency was not vocal, in this view, and a left catering to the less deserving
had ignored its interests.
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Particularly symbolic of this line of argumentation were efforts to reclaim the
symbol of the “forgotten man” from liberals. Figuring white workers as “forgotten” is
one of the most notable recurring devices in the long history of white working class
representation. Gilded Age social theorist William Graham Sumner coined the term to
valorize the quiet, deserving, productive member of society, defined against the idle
poor.230 When Roosevelt adopted it in 1932, promising economic policy built around the
needs of the “forgotten man at the bottom of the economic pyramid,” it came to mean any
underprivileged American. In response, conservatives who knew the original context
cried foul and attempted to return the term to its earlier meaning. Yale professor A. G.
Keller, a former student of Sumner’s, argued that the New Dealers had “pervert[ed]” the
term, applying it to the “willing or eager, and always whining, parasite on society who
possesses no social virtues such as thrift, industry, fairness, self-respect, and honor,” the
“whiner, who is never forgotten because he is so constantly dinned into the ear.” The true
forgotten man, Keller suggested, was not a “pauper” or “a member of the proletariat.”
Rather, he was the self-sufficient “tax-paying consumer” who “asks no favors. He makes
no trouble. He emits no squeals. He marches no marches on Washington nor maintains a
lobby there.” He simply wanted “to be let alone.”231
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This is the same basic claim that would underlie appeals to Middle America
several decades later: A deserving middle-income cultural mainstream (or “silent
majority,” as Richard Nixon would call it) had seen its political influence eclipsed by
vocal minorities. There is also an ironic resonance in this discourse with the enduring
argument that liberals direct specific appeals to individual minority groups rather than
appealing to a universal national interest. This argument is not a product of the age of
“identity politics” as conventionally understood—the period after the 1960s and 1970s.
It is evident in response to New Deal efforts to make the government more responsive to
nondominant groups (including white workers, who are now usually identified as those
left out when liberals pursue “identity politics”).232
The chief difference lies in the groups held to constitute the mainstream and the
margins. Here (unlike in the 1960s) a substantial proportion of the white working
population was relegated to the margins. One of the major minorities held to be seeking
control over national politics was organized labor, and conservatives who spoke for a
silenced mainstream were often reaffirming older understandings of that mainstream
centered on a self-sufficient Protestant middle class. “Clean,” “sober,” “thrifty,”
“industrious”: the adjectives applied to liberalism’s victims were longstanding signifiers
of white Protestant masculinity. Excluded were “peasants and parasites” or (more
Much,” Washington Post, August 27, 1933; “Mills’s Address Closing Republican Campaign in Maine,”
New York Times, September 11, 1932.
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explicitly) “the poor Pole…the illiterate Italian.”233 To be sure, it would be inaccurate to
frame the argument as pure nativism—Al Smith, the 1928 Democratic presidential
nominee and the first Catholic nominee of a major party, objected to the New Deal on
similar terms234, and explicitly nativist criticism declined over the course of the 1930s.
At bottom, in this framework, the key economic division pitted responsible
against irresponsible rather than rich against nonrich. “The dividing line runs not
between Capital and Labor, but between the kind of Labor that works and saves, and the
kind that doesn’t,” one conservative put it.235 Thrift, prosperity, and upward mobility
were indicators of virtue, in this view, while poverty was not. It was bad politics and bad
policy to condemn someone for having more. A thrifty and responsible skilled worker
would see his interests as aligned with the interests of his employer more readily than
with the interests of his irresponsible fellow-worker. In this framework, a conservative
did not need to be wealthy, but merely needed to have more to lose than gain from
irresponsible change. “Very often the smaller the amount of property the voter owns the
more intense is his conservatism,” columnist Frank Kent emphasized in a compelling
piece titled “America Is Conservative.” Kent contended that “the common characteristic
of all conservatives is that they have something—at least a little money or property,
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acquired through inheritance, or thrift, or plain hard work.”236 In this view, liberals erred
in assuming that all non-elite constituencies had common interests, or would see
themselves as having common interests. Distinctions that appeared unimportant from
afar—that one worker had a little money saved, while another did not—were vitally
important.
A related line of argumentation held that most workers recognized that unions and
union leaders did not have their best interests at heart. Especially by the 1940s, those
who sought to stem the growth of organized labor’s power often claimed to be defending
the rights of the individual worker against mandatory union membership (the “closed
shop”) and malfeasance in the union hierarchy. It was deeply unjust, in this view, for
workers to be forced to give up a portion of their wages to the union, and for the union to
take up political activity its members did not endorse. In this context, antimonopoly
language typically directed at employers could be repurposed as a rebuke of labor
leaders. “The American working man has been deprived of his dignity as an individual.
He has been cajoled, coerced, intimidated and on many occasions beaten up…His whole
economic life has been subject to the complete domination and control of unregulated
monopolists,” read a 1940s Republican House committee report.237 Unionism in itself
was reasonable and necessary, in this line of argumentation, but thugs and opportunists
posing as friends of the worker could easily seize power.
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One of the most zealous conservative defenders of the worker victimized by
unions was syndicated columnist Westbrook Pegler, whose exposés of union corruption
and organized crime involvement in the late 1930s and early 1940s drew considerable
attention. Pegler believed that “the honest American workingman needs a labor union to
protect him from the greed of his employer,” but he maintained that unions could
victimize “honest” workers just as much. “It is bad when the honest workman is spied
upon and denied his human rights by agents of a soulless corporation,” Pegler argued.
“But it is at least that bad, if not worse, when he is spied upon, robbed of his earnings and
coerced into strikes by men who cleverly appear to be acting in the interest of the
oppressed.” Union leaders—“parasite incompetents who live by their unionism”238—
enriched themselves at the expense of the workers they viewed as unthinking “robots.”
Most workers were not “orators or parliamentarians,” Pegler emphasized; they did not
have the publicity skills of the “smart professionals” who staffed the union hierarchy.
Even though many to most workers inwardly dissented from labor-liberalism, for Pegler,
their views went unheard in public discourse because they had been rendered “voiceless”
by unions.239
Pegler’s description of rank-and-file workers as “voiceless” has an odd resonance
with the claims of the most famous voice of organized labor in the period, John L. Lewis.
“The workers are still inarticulate,” Lewis told a journalist in 1938. “They are incapable
of influencing Congress, industry or anyone else.” The mission of Lewis and the CIO
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was to exert influence on their behalf: “I speak for millions of the inarticulate workers of
the United States”…“My voice tonight will be the voice of millions of men and women
employed in America’s industries, heretofore unorganized, economically exploited and
inarticulate.”240 For Pegler, Lewis and his cohort rendered workers voiceless; for Lewis,
they were voiceless without organization. Both spotlighted the mechanisms by which
labor and liberals claimed to represent a mass constituency. This chapter has sought to
do the same—and in doing so, to provide an alternative angle on some of the bestremembered events in the history of the US white working class.

Conclusion
In the 1920s, the dominant elite-level views of the majority and the American
worker were unfavorable to liberal politics, this chapter has argued; they stressed the
middle-income lifestyle most Americans, including workers, enjoyed and valued. In the
1930s and 1940s, liberals and leftists championed a new understanding of the majority
with urban industrial workers at its center. (White) workers, especially industrial
workers, were symbolic of the need for American politics to move beyond the antistatist
traditions it had inherited. The insecurity industrial workers faced, their inability to
secure decent lives through their own agency, underscored the need for dramatic changes
in government to meet the changes brought by industrial capitalism, for liberals.
Industrial workers—from the striker charging into battle with makeshift weapons to the
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worker voting a straight Democratic ticket—were also symbolic of the immense political
force that disenfranchised Americans could assert when they recognized their power. In
the newly dominant elite view, workers and the public at large had turned away from
business leadership in favor of liberals, organized labor, and the activist state.
From the perspective of a study of white working class representation, it is
important to stress that the association between the white working class and progressive
politics had a great deal to do with the progressive elites and institutions speaking on
behalf of workers in elite public discourse. There is no question that the changes in elite
public discourse owed in part to worker-actors putting their bodies on the line. However,
few of those worker-actors had any influence over the way elites interpreted their actions.
Progressive views among white worker-actors were mostly obscured at the elite level in
the 1920s because there was no institution powerful enough to highlight them there. In
the 1930s, the rise of powerful elite-level political forces speaking for workers from a
progressive perspective produced the appearance of a rapid shift to the left. Changes at
the level of elite public discourse are often rapid and sharp; micro-level changes are
rarely so fast or neat.
How elites saw workers as a political constituency—what they believed, which
elite-level voices could be taken as their representatives—changed in this period, and
changed for the long term. Industrialists who had once pressed strong claims to represent
workers were now defined as their antagonists. Until the 1960s, liberal politicians and
labor leaders exerted the strongest claim to speak for (white) workers at the elite level. By
the same logic, nonliberal views among white worker-actors were obscured (to a degree)
136

as a result. In particular, it is difficult to overstate how deeply unions shaped dominant
views of (white) working class political consciousness at the height of their power:
contemporaries often spoke about the views and interests of “workers” as interchangeable
with the interests of unions. At their midcentury peak, unions represented roughly a third
of the national workforce.
The same discourse that altered elite understandings of the American worker
limited the scope of the liberal intervention. Industrialists and industrialism were so
central to left/liberal understandings of the political challenges before the nation that
other sources of power received comparatively little emphasis. The image of the average
working American remained centered on the male worker and the patriarchal family.
When it expanded to include eastern and southern Europeans, African Americans were
excluded. It is important to stress, though, that liberals’ claims appear significantly more
limited from the standpoint of twenty-first century elite discourse than they generally did
from the standpoint of 1930s and 1940s elite discourse. For a number of supporters and
opponents, what was at stake was nothing less than a transformation of American
political life. The association between (white) workers and progressive politics
developed in a period where the dominant debates within elite public discourse centered
on economics narrowly understood—the role of unions, capital, and the state in an
industrial society. When the problem of inequality was defined narrowly around those
issues, the (white male industrial) worker in need of security was clearly a symbol of
change, even stark change. When the discourse changed, that was no longer the case.

137

In the late 1940s and 1950s, that worker remained a symbol of change, but it was
a different kind of change—a transformation of American capitalism, led by both
business and labor, into a tool for equality and broadly distributed prosperity. As Chapter
2 will stress, liberal successes challenged and altered the commonplace that America is a
middle class country, but that commonplace remained powerful. It was entirely
compatible with a labor/liberal politics that enabled individuals to better their economic
position and allowed a greater percentage of the population to reach middle-income
status. Between the late 1940s and mid-1950s, depictions of poverty and economic
disadvantage among working whites almost entirely disappeared from elite public
discourse. The newly dominant view held that labor-liberal gains and prodigious postWorld War II economic growth had raised nearly all white workers into the middle class.
These developments fundamentally changed the politics of white working class
representation, and that is where Chapter 2 turns.
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Coda: The (White) Worker as a Latent Progressive Force
A longstanding commonplace about 1930s and 1940s culture and politics holds
that liberals and leftists romanticized white workers, treating them as virtuous and
politically perceptive. That claim was made at the time241 and has appeared consistently
in historical work since. Notable works on the 1930s describe “the laboring of American
culture”; “a fascination with the folk and its culture, past and present”; a tendency “to
romanticize the intuitive knowledge of the ‘people,’ to decide that the common man was
really wiser and closer to ‘reality’ than those with formal education.”242 “Few public
figures questioned…whether average Americans were too apathetic or confused about the
sources of their collective problems to take up the burden of solving them,” Michael
Kazin writes.243 In a common declension narrative, liberals’ idealized view of white
workers in the 1930s gave way to a disdainful and condemnatory view in the 1950s,
1960s, and after.
This commonplace captures an identifiable strain of left culture and opinion, but it
is misleading if left to stand on its own. Most of all, it misses the extent to which 1930s
and 1940s liberals and leftists expressed sharp concern about the current political
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capabilities of (white) workers. That a liberal program benefited the vast majority of
Americans was, for all liberals, obvious. To what extent they recognized this—and what
role they might take in bringing about or implementing a new order—occasioned a much
greater range of opinion. Left/liberal assessments of disadvantaged whites might be
usefully understood as falling along a spectrum. On one end was a belief that they could
act almost instinctively to bring about a better world (evident, for instance, in some of the
radical strike reporting profiled in Chapter 1). At the other end was an understanding of
poor whites as passive, beaten-down populations in need of an outside intervention to
drag them towards responsibility or political consciousness. Most interpreters fell
somewhere in the middle: if the majority of Americans were or would be basically
progressive in their views, that majority was embryonic and could be easily led astray.
This coda section sketches out contemporary left/liberals’ concerns about current
working class politics as well as their reasons for optimism about (white) workers’ future
political trajectory. For many observers, (white) workers held tightly to dominant
individualistic norms, were unable to see through misinformation in the media, and were
apathetic and disengaged from political life. Some raised the possibility that white
workers would be drawn to fascism. These concerns were tempered, though, by the ways
in which contemporaries contextualized the views they saw as problematic. For many,
the political impoverishment of underprivileged people could be ultimately attributed to
the power of the dominant class. Many contended that (white) workers would develop a
more progressive politics over time, particularly if reform gave them the opportunity to
truly develop as human beings. What was broadly shared in left/liberal discourse, this
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section suggests, was the view that white workers’ objective interests were progressive
and that they were crucial to any political strategy.

Teleology and (white) working class representation
A deeply held majoritarianism could be reconciled with concern about the current
intellectual and political capacity of laboring whites for one primary reason: those who
put their faith in white workers as a revolutionary force or a progressive force did not
need to believe that these workers had broken through the walls of the dominant ideology
or had developed a fully-formed politics—only that they would or could do so in the
future. The starting point for understanding this is the teleological framework central to
left discourse in the period.
Belief in the “improvement” of underprivileged people was deeply rooted among
left/liberal elites. As schools of thought based in Enlightenment traditions, Marxism and
liberalism held to a firm faith in human progress and even perfectibility.244 Teleological
language suffused leftist characterizations of working class politics—“primitive” or
“elementary” forms of class action, “backward” or “advanced” workers, workers
awakening (as from sleep) and learning. An emphasis on “improvement” also emerged as
a direct response to the eugenicist view that individuals and groups possessed of bad
genetics were inherently limited in their development. (The non-normative behavior of
those belonging to ostensibly superior races—particularly poor rural Anglo-Saxon
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whites—could be understood using this framework, on the grounds that “feeblemindedness,” slothfulness, promiscuity, and other negative traits were genetically
heritable.245) The chief response to this school of thought emphasized that culture,
circumstances, and environment shaped behavior and life outcomes far more than genetic
endowment. As a result, if two individuals or groups had not been given the same
opportunities, one could not be deemed inferior to the other: Very different environments
would produce very different human beings. By the late 1930s, this culturalist
explanation of group differences had become hegemonic among academics and
intellectuals.
It was also a commonplace among early twentieth-century progressives and New
Deal-era professional-class reformers that a life of hardship and lack of opportunity
produced undesirable behavior. “Their ideas and resources are cramped,” Jane Addams
wrote of new immigrant industrial workers in 1930. “The desire for higher social pleasure
is extinct. They have no share in the traditions and social energy which make for
progress. Too often their only place of meeting is a saloon, their only host a bartender; a
local demagogue forms their public opinion.”246 The way to address these cultural and
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moral shortcomings was not to take punitive measures against underprivileged people, in
this view, but to change the societal conditions that had shaped them in the first place. A
major part of the rationale for social and economic reform was thus to create a system in
which people who would otherwise be turned to pathology by their circumstances could
live fulfilling and productive lives. As Bertrand Russell put it, “If it were indeed the case
that bad nourishment, little education, lack of air and sunshine, unhealthy housing
conditions, and overwork produce better people than are produced by good nourishment,
open air, adequate education and housing, and a reasonable amount of leisure, the whole
case for economic reconstruction would collapse.”247 The clear moral distinction made
here (“better people”) was very common in this period. In recent decades, elite
discussions of poverty have often pivoted on the question of whether structural inequality
or the culture of disadvantaged people is ultimately responsible. Those who judge culture
most important tend to argue against state-led structural interventions. This opposition
between culture and structure is a post-1960s phenomenon.248 In earlier decades,
reformers calling for a structural intervention often pointed to cultural deficiencies among
underprivileged people. Their pathological behavior served for reformers as evidence of
their dire situation, not of any inherent inferiority or wrongdoing.
As a result, lurid depictions of poor whites were repeatedly deployed in projects
that attempted to aid them. The most obvious example of this during the New Deal
period centered on the plight of Southern sharecroppers, which became a major concern
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in mid-1930s elite public discourse. In the dominant elite view, poor Southern whites
were interested in fighting, fornicating, drinking, and not much else. In this view, as
epitomized by journalist W. J. Cash, the “cracker” was “a remarkable romantic and
hedonist…steadily tumbling down the slope into degeneracy, waxing ever more
shiftless,” marked by “an intense individualism.” Deeply invested in white supremacy,
he would never strike at his true adversaries because “to succeed in revolt he must join
forces with the Negro. And rather than do that, he prefers to starve and to rot.”249
Sharecroppers’ professional-class advocates did not dispute this portrayal. They
contended that the behavior stemmed from an agricultural system that enriched large
landowners and subjected the vast majority to extreme poverty with no chance of escape.
“We hear on all sides that the share-cropper is shiftless and worthless, but how could he
be otherwise?” one asked. “By the conditions under which he lives his character is daily
attacked and destroyed.”250 If the region achieved agricultural reform, another wrote,
“many of the rural South’s disinherited people may be rehabilitated into useful and
intelligent citizens”; a change in the objective conditions, in this framework, would
necessarily precede any growth in “intelligen[ce].”251
The South had long appeared in national-level discourse as an exceptional and
pathological space; non-Southern laboring whites rarely appeared so distant from the
norm. For leftists, poor Southern whites displayed in heightened and undiluted form all
the traits that militated against a more enlightened public opinion: individualism, racism,
249
W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), 66, 31, 44, 295; Cash, “Genesis
of the Southern Cracker,” American Mercury, May 1935.
250
C. T. Carpenter, “King Cotton’s Slaves,” Scribners, October 1935.
251
Will Alexander, preface to Arthur Raper, Preface to Peasantry: A Tale of Two Black Belt Counties
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936), ix.

144

suspicion of outsiders, inability to recognize their real interests and rise up against their
oppressors. But the same patterns are evident in representations of other working whites.
Louis Adamic, for instance, is best remembered as an advocate for the inclusion of new
immigrants in American culture, but Adamic’s work is also marked by a very sharp
pessimism about the political potential of the working class. “If Marx saw this
‘proletariat’ in America today he would see precious few who might encourage him in his
idea…that the impetus for the great change toward a new collectivist social order would
come directly from this class,” Adamic wrote. Most workers, he suggested, were
“mainly done for as positive human material,” ground down by the Depression and
unable to see a way out of their predicament. They were “preponderantly
individualistic…not very conscious of the world in which they live…licked by the chaos
of America, by the machine, by industrialism; by regimentation on the one hand and by
their futile, frustrated individualist psychology on the other.”252 For Adamic and many
others, the dominant individualistic views continued to exert an immense amount of
power, and many of those most devoted to them were workers whose interests were ill
served by individualism.
The power of the dominant ideology—and how to break it
In recent years, liberals have often lamented working class whites’ seemingly
inexplicable penchant for voting against their interests (as liberals perceive them). This is
by no means a new concern. It is consistently present in left-of-center discourse in nearly
any period. “It is the merit of Marxian theory that…it stresses the psychological factors
resulting from the way in which the world lives and works,” Communist Party head Earl
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Browder argued in 1937. “Marxists know, and it is their duty to explain whenever
possible, the factors which make people act contrary to their better interests and the
practical consequences which flow therefrom.”253 “What…baffled” many of his
contemporaries, economist George Soule wrote the same year, “is why men are reluctant
to act in a rational manner. Why, when social change is necessary, when external
institutions are outworn, are men so often hesitant to see the truth and act upon it?”254
The most prominent answer in contemporary discourse held that industrial society
and the interests of capital worked to keep most workers, through no fault of their own, at
a low level of intellectual development. First, poverty and long hours of mind-numbing
labor were not conducive to critical thinking; second, the dominant class maintained
control over ideological channels—schools, churches, popular culture, and the press.
Nation editor Max Lerner framed the problem as follows: “Between those who stand for
corporate capitalism and those who stand for democratic collectivism there is a mortal
struggle going on today, a struggle for the minds and souls of the common people.”
Progressive views, Lerner continued, “must enter the consciousness of the vast majority
before that majority can become an effective force to displace minority rule. And the
ironic fact is that, for the present at least, it is the minority that is in control of the
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methods of influencing the majority’s mind.”255 The effects of media here were
understood as direct, predictable, and very difficult to overcome.
Press bias was perhaps the preeminent answer to the enduring question of why
workers continued to act against their interests. It is difficult to overstate the prominence
of the press in the demonology of the 1930s and 1940s left. New Dealers, faced with
near-constant criticism from leading daily newspapers and syndicated columnists,
recognized the daily press as among their most powerful adversaries and critiqued it
accordingly.256 The rising CIO saw the press as among its primary threats as well, and
many unionists argued passionately for a labor-funded daily paper. Conservative
publishers William Randolph Hearst and Colonel Robert McCormick served as
archetypical villainous economic royalists. In basic terms, the left/liberal critique held the
press was owned and controlled by a small group of economic elites (“part of the
financial oligarchy that is trying to rule America,” one critic put it257) who operated it in
the interests of their class rather than in the public interest. The commercial press
featured editorial opinion, news commentary, and ostensibly objective news stories
significantly weighted toward conservative views. It also, for many, occupied readers
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with lurid and trivial stories and features—crime, celebrities, sports, comics—that
distracted them from more important issues.258
Left/liberal press criticism consistently displayed a tension between majoritarian
language and bluntly pessimistic assessments of the majority’s capacity. For most
left/liberal press critics, the mass audience for radio or the daily press was passive and
suggestible. George Seldes, one of the foremost press critics of the 1930s and 1940s,
staunchly advocated a majoritarian labor-left politics on behalf of “the great massmajority of the American public” while holding to a view of that public as largely
incapable of resisting the machinations of the capitalist press. “Public opinion is made by
the newspapers,” Seldes claimed.259 Press lords were “little known to the people of the
country whose minds they rule.” “The reader,” he noted, “is generally fooled, and likes
being fooled.”260 He pitted the “intelligent minority” of workers who had begun to see
through press propaganda against the “ignorant and betrayed workingmen who…blindly
follow Huey Longs and Father Coughlins rather than those who teach them their own
self-interests.”261 Nation editor Max Lerner, who called intellectuals to put aside their
fear of the “mass mind” and become an “organic part of the life, the thinking, the striving
of the common people,” also expressed a deeply ambivalent view of mass literacy:
“Literacy for the common people is a fine thing. But it is also a dangerous thing unless
258

This critique drew from both the longstanding classical liberal argument that the press’s normative role
in a democracy is to provide the public with accurate information and a Marxian understanding of media as
tools of capital. The arguments differed little according to the critic’s degree of leftism: in each case, a
small group of reactionary elites manipulated the press to their benefit, and the press possessed substantial
power to shape public opinion in a manner advantageous to the right.
259
George Seldes, Freedom of the Press (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1935), 186.
260
“Labor Must Challenge the Press Lords,” n.d., George Seldes Papers, Kislak Center for Special
Collections, Rare Books, and Manuscripts, Van Pelt Library, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.
I am grateful to the staff at Van Pelt for allowing me to access these unprocessed papers.
261
George Seldes, Lords of the Press (New York: Julian Messner, 1938), 221.

148

the common people can have some control over what is given them to read in the press
and to hear over the radio. Literacy may only make the cattle ripe for slaughter.”262
That striking claim suggests one primary reason for the commercial press’s
prevalence in left/liberal discourse: bluntly put, the corrupt press worked to reconcile a
faith in the majority with exasperation at majority decision-making. In this period, to be
on the left was to be on the side of the workers, the majority, the common people. But
the majority often made mistakes. As Joli Jensen has argued, placing blame on the media
allows critics to “avoid a direct attack on ‘the people’” and maintain a “faith in [their]
natural goodness.”263 Contemporary left/liberal media criticism often follows Jensen’s
pattern—workers were capable of making sound decisions, liberals argued, but were
prevented from doing so by misinformation.264 Seldes and Lerner, for instance,
preserved their “faith” in the “people” by implicating the inaccurate information
disseminated through the media. But they also assumed that in order to bring about a just
economic system, the public would need to attain a level of political consciousness that
was very difficult to attain under the current system. That raised the question of how, if
at all, the cycle could be broken. For Seldes, the answer was clear—alternative media
would be needed to circumvent and counteract the “poison” of the conservative press.
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Contemporary leftists offered several other explanations for how workers might
progress to a greater level of consciousness. One line of argumentation suggested that
workers would become aware of their real interests as their social position gave them
what one journalist called a “practical education…in the principles of Capitalism.”265 A
worker did not need book learning to grasp the need for change, in this view, only a lived
experience of capitalist social relations. Leading American Marxian theorist Lewis
Corey, for instance, cited the “unemployment, mass starvation, and capitalist repression”
of the Depression as forces that could rapidly push the mass of workers to the left: “The
situation is so acute that revolution is on the order of the day; the conservative worker of
to-day may become the revolutionary worker of to-morrow…As the objective conditions
are favorable for the development of an American revolutionary labor movement and
communism, the ideological backwardness of the workers must disappear.”266 The
dominant ideology simply could not maintain public support indefinitely, in this view,
when real social conditions proved it so demonstrably false.
Others emphasized the critical role of organization and education. “We have a
long and arduous task of education ahead of us, before we can lead a majority of the
American people to the establishment of Socialism,” Communist Party leader Earl
Browder explained.267 In a prominent left perspective, workers who began simply by
voting for New Dealers and seeking collective bargaining would, through their reformist
struggles, come to recognize the inadequacy of what they could achieve working within
the system (in other words, the concessions they could win from capital). Radicals
265

Charles Rumford Walker, American City (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1937), 267.
Lewis Corey, The Decline of American Capitalism (New York: Covici Friede, 1934), 511, 568.
267
Earl Browder, “The Haves and Have-Nots,” New Masses, March 15, 1938.
266

150

needed to be involved in basic, unglamorous trade union work in part for that reason, in
this view—as workers desired more radical change, they would look to the organizers
who had worked alongside them and earned their trust.268
Actors outside the radical left, including CIO operatives who hoped to convince
the rank and file to register and vote for Democrats, also stressed education. “Arousing
our people from their political apathy and their economic ignorance” was the key initial
step, one official bluntly put it.269 In general, CIO leaders were consistently frustrated by
the political disengagement of the rank and file. However, they believed that apathetic
workers would be progressive if they became politically aware; the basic problem was
one of understanding and motivation. As CIO president Philip Murray argued in 1944,
“We, of the CIO, and of labor generally, believe in the democratic system. We believe
that the people, once they understand the issues, will decide them wisely.”270 This is a
very suggestive and even startling phrasing. It obviously begs the question of how (and
by whom) sufficient understanding of the issues would be determined. More broadly,
though, it suggests that the “people” in whom Murray placed his faith were not the people
as existing at that moment; his faith was based in an as-yet-unrealized future.
The white worker and the threat of fascism
Most of the analysis reviewed in this section so far has held in one way or another
to a teleological framework in which laboring whites’ political consciousness would
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improve over time. Not all analysis held to this assessment. If, as many leftists argued,
political change was ultimately contingent on human agency, workers’ suggestibility and
lack of sophistication could easily cripple the left, even if structural conditions were
favorable. “Socialism is not inevitable,” Marxian intellectual Sidney Hook put it. “It is
something to be accomplished when objective conditions are ripe…by men and not by
economic forces.” Conceding for the sake of argument “Marx’s claim that the working
class is, and has been, in a position to lead a successful socialist movement,” Hook
continued, “unfortunately, being in a position and being able to move from that position
are two different things. The test of events has shown that the working class has been
petrified in its position of potential movement.”271 At its more innocuous, this meant that
workers would only support reformist measures and that socialism would not take hold in
the American context; at worst, it meant that workers might be attracted by the far right.
For some, workers’ inability to understand the true causes of their discontent
might lead them to support a radical right-wing politics. It is important to understand this
analysis in the context of very real and deeply felt concern about the potential for fascism
in the United States. Fascism for 1930s and 1940s leftists did not only or primarily refer
to the Nazi regime; it meant a ruling class-led program of rabid nationalism, xenophobia,
and violence intended to reestablish social control and stave off progressive change.272 If
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the dominant class’s control over the existing system of nominal bourgeois democracy
had begun to slip, in this view, it would be forced to reveal the iron fist under the velvet
glove. In the American context, a campaign of scapegoating and violence against Jews,
blacks, immigrants, and radicals would be the likely outcome. The group thought to be
most susceptible to fascism was the lower middle class (petite/petty bourgeoisie), defined
by structural position in the economy (e.g. small-scale employers, shopkeepers) rather
than income level. White workers would not be the leading participants in a fascist drive,
in this view, but they might very likely be caught up in it.
The radical right would take advantage of workers’ anger, in this view—anger
created by the ruling class—by misdirecting it towards the most vulnerable. Joseph
Schmetz, a Woonsocket, RI textile unionist and the leading protagonist of Gary Gerstle’s
Working-Class Americanism, rejected the notion that feelings of oppression would
necessarily push workers to the left. “The working class is ordinarily conservative,”
Schmetz explained, and the “bitterness which eats away at the heart of a man who feels
himself the victim of circumstances renders him easy prey to Fascism and Nazism.”273 In
a key recurring argument, economic hardship pushed people to vent their frustration on a
scapegoat. “Our people are bewildered by economic problems which most of them do
not understand and cannot solve,” radical journalist John Spivak explained. Unable to
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comprehend their circumstances, “they seethe with an ever-growing bitterness.” Thus,
“when they cannot reason themselves out of a situation they turn their resentment, like a
child who stubs his toe on a stone and kicks it, against the immediate thing which hurt
them.” The targets of that resentment could be the villains identified by the left or the
scapegoats identified by the right: “If he is told a banker or millionaire is responsible for
his ills he can understand it and vent his hate on them. If that hate can be deflected from
‘millionaires,’ ‘bankers,’ and ‘politicians’ into another channel, the financiers and
industrialists would get a breathing-spell.”274 The angry, alienated, benighted (white)
worker as a potentially explosive right-wing force appears repeatedly in twentiethcentury American political analysis, particularly after the 1960s. Its prevalence in the
1930s has gone mostly unnoted.
***
The discourse detailed in this coda section is unexpected and counterintuitive, and
it is important to ask what it says about the broader context of the period. I want to
suggest that the most important takeaway is the idea of a latent or embryonic progressive
working class majority. The declension narrative in which liberals sour on a white
working class they once romanticized is overstated. Concerns about (white) workers’
susceptibility to bigoted, right-wing political appeals were present well before the 1950s
or 1960s. But many contemporaries expected white workers’ politics to change, and
perhaps change a great deal, under a different political economic system, a different
media system, or after a period of organization and workers’ education. It was this belief
that white working class politics and culture would significantly change for the better that
274
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declined by the 1950s. What appeared in a teleological framework to be initial, groping
steps toward greater understanding appeared to be enduring limitations without that
framework. Chapters 2 and 3 show how the abandonment of that teleological framework
changed liberal elites’ understandings of the political potentialities of white workers.
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Chapter 2: The Rise of the Affluent Worker
“What is often described as ‘The March of the Masses’ is usually thought of as a
radical, even insurrectionary development,” journalist Samuel Lubell remarked in his
1951 book The Future of American Politics, one of the acclaimed political texts of the
1950s. It was not, Lubell insisted. Ten years earlier, Lubell had argued that the New
Deal “has drawn a class line across the face of American politics. That line seems to be
there to stay.” Now he saw the enfranchisement of white workers as “an almost complete
refutation of the Marxian thesis. Our class struggle, if it can be called that, arises not
from the impoverishment of the masses but from their progress. It is evidence not of the
failure of the American dream but of its successes.” The chief demand pressed by “the
masses,” after all, was “acceptance into our predominantly middle-class society.” The
changes brought by the New Deal could thus be said to have “strengthened rather than
weakened the traditional middle-class basis of American politics.”275
The claim that (white) workers had become part of a broad, prosperous middle
class appeared again and again in 1950s political discourse, as observers of all stripes
testified to Karl Marx’s irrelevance. Dwight Eisenhower, addressing an AFL-CIO
audience in 1955, labeled the “Class Struggle Doctrine of Marx…the invention of a
lonely refugee scribbling in a dark recess of the British Museum. He abhorred and
detested the middle class. He did not foresee that, in America, labor, respected and
prosperous, would constitute—with the farmer and businessman—his hated middle
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class.”276 In 1950s media and elite political discourse, the “worker” was nearly always a
white man who worked steadily in a unionized industrial sector, owned a home, and
amply supported a wife and children, as in a 1955 Newsweek profile of “The Union
Man”: “He owns a new and well-equipped home, a new car, and he and his wife and 6year-old son live well, indeed…[The] “portrait of the worker that Marx and Engels
painted” all those years ago “bears as little resemblance to Harold Giebel as a surrealist’s
nightmare.”277 “If Marx were able to visit the United States today,” economist Sumner
Slichter quipped, “he would undoubtedly be amazed at the trouble enterprises have in
providing adequate parking space for the ‘proletariat.’”278
This chapter examines the emergence of the middle-income worker figure and its
significance in late 1940s and 1950s political contestation and political analysis. It is not
a new argument that the postwar economic boom preoccupied and did key ideological
work for a range of elites, or that it was exaggerated as a result of changes in elite-level
politics and political discourse. In a discursive environment shaped by the Cold War and
the entrenchment of basic liberal reforms, liberals, moderate conservatives, organized
labor, organized business, and the foreign policy establishment had a significant stake in
touting the material benefits American workers enjoyed. The scope of this project allows
for an argument that goes somewhat further (and continues beyond this chapter): The
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belief in (white) working class affluence was a crucial factor driving the migration of the
white worker, as a political symbol, from left to right.
Once a view of the majority as secure rather than needy became hegemonic, the
contours of political representation fundamentally changed. In the 1930s and early
1940s, images of laboring whites had primarily served as evidence of injustice in
American society and as symbols of the resistance to that injustice. By the 1950s, white
workers had become almost universally symbolic “not of the failure of the American
dream but of its successes,” in Samuel Lubell’s words. It became more difficult to justify
fundamental political economic reform—and, just as important, difficult to envision a
majority constituency that would support such reform. As white workers approached
“have” rather than “have not” status—moving to the suburbs and living a lifestyle nearly
identical to that of professionals—they would have much less interest in liberalism, many
interpreters assumed. As the incomes of unionized white workers and white
professionals converged, contemporaries also began to place more emphasis on cultural
differences between blue-collar and educated whites in a manner that generally privileged
the educated and tied working class whites to intolerant politics. In sum, a secure (white)
majority could be much more easily figured as disadvantaged by or hostile to further
change—or victimized by those seeking to alter what had worked in the past.
This chapter is divided into two parts. Part One details the emergence of the
affluent worker figure as part of a broad elite consensus—among liberals, conservatives,
labor, and business—around the existence of widely distributed prosperity. Part Two
outlines the predominant elite-level assessments of what this mass affluence would mean
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for white workers’ engagement in national politics; some observers predicted that (white)
workers would remain solid liberal voters, while others predicted a turn to the right
among upwardly mobile blue-collar whites, centered on a desire to protect economic
gains or on cultural antagonism towards liberals. As a whole, the chapter seeks to both
underscore the importance of the middle-income worker for postwar politics and lay the
groundwork necessary to convey the importance of the affluent worker figure in a longer
story of white working class representation.
Terminology and the collective memory of the midcentury blue-collar middle class
As in the period detailed in Chapter 1, “worker” was the term most often used to
refer to white, usually male workers. “Wage earner” was interchangeable. White
working class women were more often integrated into the discourse as “the worker’s
wife” than as workers themselves. Perhaps the most difficult terminological question for
this chapter is how to refer to blue-collar whites who had reached middle-income status.
Contemporaries were not always sure what to call this group; several analysts, finding no
satisfactory term for the group’s present position, resorted to “ex-masses.” The most
common approach, however, was to call them “middle class.” In midcentury elite public
discourse, it was common for (white, male) workers and their families to be described as
both “workers” and “middle class”; “worker” referred to occupation and “middle class”
to income and lifestyle. A worker who was “middle class” held a stable job, earned a
moderate income, owned a car, and owned a home filled with modern appliances, most
likely in the suburbs. I use “middle-income (white) workers,” “upwardly mobile
workers,” “middle-income blue-collar whites,” and similar formulations to refer to this
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group. Because “middle class” is such a fraught and flexible term, I use it to reflect and
represent contemporary discourse, not to describe a real social position. To refer to
middle- and upper-income professionals, I use “professionals” or “professional class.”
Postwar constructions of the postwar middle class left a legacy that extends to the
present day, and I would be remiss not to mention that here. In 2017, the decline of the
same “middle class” celebrated by Eisenhower, Slichter, and Lubell has become a
powerful and multifaceted narrative in American politics. Liberals often identify a
racially unmarked middle class as the victim of corporate greed—inequality was modest
then, in this view, unions were strong, and blue-collar workers earned incomes that could
comfortably support a family. “Previous generations of Americans built the greatest
economy and strongest middle class the world has ever known on the promise of a basic
bargain: If you work hard and do your part, you should be able to get ahead,” Hillary
Clinton claimed. “And when you get ahead, America gets ahead. But over the past
several decades, that bargain has eroded.”279 Meanwhile, Donald Trump and his
populist/nationalist conservative supporters claim to speak for a more explicitly white
working/middle class victimized by cosmopolitan political and corporate elites.280 The
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same period has served, for authors like Robert Putnam, Charles Murray, and J.D. Vance,
as a backdrop to claims about the decline in morality, family stability, and social capital
among white working class people.281 The temptation to see the world of the 1950s
middle class through a nostalgic lens is widespread, though for different reasons.
The powerful and varied politics attached to the legacy of the middle-income
(white) working class underscores the importance of looking at postwar constructions of
white workers with sensitivity and nuance. While this chapter focuses, like the rest of the
dissertation, on issues of representation, it is important not to dismiss—or to overstate—
white workers’ economic, social, cultural, and political gains.282 This period remains
simultaneously one of the most powerful illustrations of “whiteness as property” in
American history and a glimpse at an alternative governing philosophy to the one that
now holds sway. From the 1930s to the 1970s, the state intervened on behalf of non-elite
Americans to an extent exceptional in the history of the United States. Yet the postwar
middle class, nostalgically envisioned, connotes much more than relative economic
equality, as a result of the racial and gender inequality built into its growth. Many of the
interventions that allowed citizens of modest means to attain protection in old age, attend
college, purchase homes, and build wealth—Social Security, the GI Bill, FHA and VA
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loans—substantially or almost entirely excluded citizens of color until the 1960s. In a
profoundly segregated labor market, white men in unionized industrial sectors gained the
most as organized labor won extensive “firm-centered, job-dependent benefits” for
workers that generated “islands of security, with high waters all around.”283
Yet while white worker-actors as a group clearly fared better in this period than
they did in decades before and after, it appears as a golden age only by comparison.
They encountered a diversity of experiences, too seldom noted at the time (or since).284
The best-paid (male) workers and their families appear as typical in collective memory,
but women (and men outside the unionized industrial heartland) were less likely to hold
stable and decent-paying jobs. Social programming was designed around the needs of
employed males and their dependents, leaving others less secure. Further, even by the
standard of the independent male-headed household, material hardship clearly remained a
significant part of the lives of many white working class people, and middle-class
lifestyles were often more apparent than real. In 1951, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
yearly budget for a “modest but adequate” standard of living was $3,750; the average
family income was $3,700.285 According to historian Mark McColloch’s calculations, the
average steelworker’s family moved above the poverty line in 1953 and did not reach a
283
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“modest but adequate” standard of living until the late 1960s.286 Many workers took on
significant consumer debt to afford the goods associated with middle class status.
Meanwhile, the postwar tax structure became increasingly regressive, and inflation cut
into rising incomes. For many, the gains were obviously and tangibly real. At the very
least, though, it is fair to say that the elite discursive environment exaggerated those gains
and rendered other experiences essentially invisible. The consequences are the focus of
this chapter.

I: The Affluent Worker’s Origins
In August 1946, Time-Life’s glossy business magazine Fortune published one of
its semi-regular profiles of “typical” American workers, this one focusing on Detroit
autoworker Bill Nation. The magazine found it necessary to explicitly stress that Nation
was no radical: “[he] likes his job…and he does not want to destroy General Motors or
the capitalist system.” Nonetheless, Nation was “a loyal union man and an admirer of
Walter Reuther” who believed that “there are plenty of things wrong with the world, and
that working people can do a lot to make the world a better place.” He was “not too sure”
of his security and concerned about his ability to support his large family.287 By 1951,
Fortune’s assessment of the typical worker’s position had changed significantly, with
“the worker” figured as “a middle-class member of a middle-class society.”288 In 1953,
the magazine heralded “the rise of a huge new moneyed middle-income class,” a “New
286
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Bourgeoisie” comprised, “to a startling extent, of groups hitherto identified as
proletarians.” The archetypical middle class American was no longer a small town
landlord or small businessman, Fortune emphasized, but “a machinist in Detroit.”289
“Cars, refrigerators, sailboats, travel, places in the country, tennis, swimming pools, and a
host of other things started out as the perquisites of the well-to-do and now belong to the
masses,” competitor Business Week claimed the same year. “The Detroit factory worker”
now “flies to Europe for his vacation.”290 The stark gap between Bill Nation and the
“Detroit factory worker” vacationing in Paris is suggestive of the rise of a new elite-level
paradigm for thinking about (white) workers.
The basic narrative advanced in the latter three articles became dominant by the
early 1950s: American capitalism had delivered broad-based prosperity, raising nearly all
Americans to middle class status. An extremely common device in mid-century
journalism compared the United States of 1950 or 1960 to the United States at the turn of
the century or the outset of the 1930s.291 In its more modest articulations, the narrative
held that the once-poor majority had now reached secure middle-income levels. As
former New Republic editor Bruce Bliven put it, “When the century began, there was…a
well-defined class structure in this country. At the base of the pyramid were the working
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class and most of the farmers; together, they were practically identical with ‘the poor.’”
By 1960, however, “most of us really are beginning to approach the classless society we
were always supposed to be…The new American society is centered upon the middleincome group.”292 In its most triumphalist iterations, the narrative suggested that poverty
and the working class had been abolished. “There are no workers left in America; we are
almost all middle class as to income and expectations,” suggested Herbert Gold’s
suggestively titled The Age of Happy Problems.293 “Poverty was all but eliminated, a
large measure of security provided for all,” US News and World Report claimed in
1957.294 One commonplace likened the progress of the first half of the twentieth century
to a revolution: “the permanent revolution,” “half-century revolution,” “bloodless
revolution,” “near revolution,” or “Second U. S. Revolution.” The primary evidence for
this claim, and the linchpin of the entire conceptual structure, was the movement of
(white) workers into the middle class.
“Middle class,” as argued in Chapter 1, was a fraught term with overlapping
cultural, racial, political, and economic connotations. Most simply, when contemporaries
identified (white) workers as middle class, they were referring to the incomes and
lifestyles these workers had gained. The dominant narrative was one of homogenization:
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“a narrowing of the difference between rich and poor”—and between workers and
professionals—“in their ways of living.”295 In this discourse, the most important evidence
for the gains the worker (understood as a white husband and father heading a nuclear
family) had achieved was his ability to provide his wife and children with the standard
package of modern conveniences, on a single income. “The wage earner’s way of life is
well-nigh indistinguishable from that of his salaried co-citizens,” a 1959 Department of
Labor report claimed. “Their homes, their cars…the style of the clothes their wives and
children wear, the food they eat…their days off, the education of their children, their
church—all of these are alike and are becoming more nearly identical.”296
Contemporary elites also used the category “middle class” to describe the erosion
of distinctions marking off whites of southern and eastern European descent from whites
of northern European descent.297 Becoming “middle class” or “American” meant
becoming incorporated into a homogenous whiteness. The suburbs, which
contemporaries accorded nearly unlimited power to homogenize, were critical in this
regard. (White) workers had been identifiable as workers in part because of where they
lived—workers’ housing in company towns, urban neighborhoods marked as immigrant
295

Frederick Lewis Allen, “The Big Change,” Harper’s, October 1950.
United States Department of Labor, “How American Buying Habits Change” (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1959), 6.
297
On the changing racial mapping of whites of new immigrant descent see especially David Roediger,
Working Toward Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants Became White (New York: Basic Books, 2005);
Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); James Barrett and David Roediger, “In-Between Peoples:
Race, Nationality and the ‘New Immigrant’ Working Class,” Journal of American Ethnic History 16, no. 3
(1997): 3-44; Gary Gerstle, American Crucible (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Thomas
Gobel, “Becoming American: Ethnic Workers and the Rise of the CIO,” Labor History 29, no. 2 (1988):
173-198; for contemporary treatments of ethnicity and religion see e.g. Nathan Glazer, “America’s Ethnic
Pattern,” Commentary, April 1953; Will Herberg, Protestant, Catholic, Jew (New York: Doubleday, 1955);
Ruby Kennedy, “Single or Triple Melting-Pot? Intermarriage Trends in New Haven, 1870-1940,”
American Journal of Sociology 49, no. 4 (1944): 331-339; Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
Beyond the Melting Pot (Oxford: MIT Press, 1963).
296

166

spaces. Suburbia functioned as a “second melting pot,” contemporaries suggested,
turning urban working class Catholics and Jews into middle class Americans. “People
may come out of the new suburbs middle class; a great many who enter, however, are
not,” journalist William H. Whyte put it.298 “In the suburb the Catholic is regarded, at
last, as a full-fledged American,” priest-sociologist Andrew Greeley explained. “The
ghetto walls are crumbling…Suburbia, with its conglomeration of nationalities and
religions, seems the ultimate melting pot.”299 Pollster Louis Harris’s account of the same
process captures the racial transition at work especially explicitly: “The third- and even
fourth-generation offspring no longer had the telltale markings of the immigrant home.
In speech, they were hard to tell from any son or daughter of the Revolution…This was
civilization out in the suburbs, and Jimmy Ripple, the grandson of Lladislaw Repulski,
could pass with the best of them.”300 Once Jimmy had Anglicized his name and moved
to the suburbs, in this framework, he was no longer identifiably Polish, and he felt only
pride in leaving the “immigrant home” behind.
While contemporaries who stressed (white) workers’ middle class status were
most concerned with life outside work, “middle class” status had a related connotation in
the context of workplace and labor politics—workers had moved beyond an oppositional
working-class consciousness. Notably, business organs chronicling this transition
applied traits long mapped to native-born Protestants—thrift, hard work, self-sacrifice,
patriotism—to union workers. When Fortune introduced a dedicated labor section in its
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October 1948 issue, it cited concerns that workers might “come to rely more on group
security and group loyalty, the group being the work team and the union”—an obvious
challenge to management’s “faith in the Protestant ethic emphasizing individual
responsibility, risk, and competitiveness.”301 Three years later, the gap between workers’
views and management’s views seemed to Fortune much narrower: “American labor is
not ‘working-class conscious’; it is not ‘proletarian’ and does not believe in class war.”
Instead the union was the worker’s “tool for gaining and keeping as an individual the
status and security of a full citizen in a capitalist society…There are no Wobblies today,
no Jewish Bund, no Italian anarchists, no Debs, no Mother Jones”—largely symbols
associated with a specifically foreign radicalism.302 A Fortune profile of the
International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU)—a union with a predominantly
Jewish and Italian immigrant membership founded on the New York garment industry—
compared the rise of the ILGWU and its president David Dubinsky to a Horatio Alger
story.303
The claim that workers had moved into the middle class obviously relied on a
very limited understanding of the “worker.” The white working class woman generally
appeared in this framework as a beneficiary of the family income, able to perform her
normative role more easily with the goods her husband could afford: “Housework is not
drudgery for Mrs. Dupas with the aid of modern appliances…Her food budget allows her
to feed [her] family an ample and varied diet.”304 Triumphalist elite-level chroniclers of

301

Introduction of labor section, Fortune, October 1948, 139.
“The U.S. Labor Movement,” Fortune, February 1951.
303
“I.L.G.W.U.—From Rags to Riches in Fifty Years,” Fortune, July 1950.
304
“Worker Loses His Class Identity,” Business Week, July 11, 1959.
302

168

American affluence either ignored African Americans altogether or dismissed their
situation as the great blemish on an overall healthy society. Fortune did the latter,
drawing on longstanding tropes of Southern exceptionalism: “The South is problem
country. It grew up differently from the rest of the nation…It still has with it the problem
of the Negro.”305 What elites called the “Negro problem” was understood separately
from issues of industrialism and organized labor—or at least separately enough that the
dominant story of broad equality remained untroubled by African American
disadvantage.
Yet the vision of the worker as white and male did not in itself make possible the
widespread belief in working class affluence. A similar understanding of the worker had
been dominant in the 1930s, but it had still allowed for passionate claims about the
injustice workers faced. Above all, what allowed the narrative of the affluent worker to
gain the prominence it did was the near-unanimity with which elites embraced it. It
emerged from the work of business groups engaged in public relations, liberals endorsing
postwar capitalism, unions emphasizing their role in the rising standard of living,
government officials stressing the superiority of the American system in a Cold War
context, and journalists chronicling the dramatic changes they perceived. Together, a
wide range of voices portrayed a secure United States that experienced little to no social
conflict on political economic matters.
For a number of years, scholars often understood the period between the late
1940s and early 1960s as characterized by a “liberal consensus” in which a low level of
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conflict and dissent, particularly on economics, characterized American politics.306
Contemporaries who made this claim pointed to conservatives’ accommodation to the
active role of the state and the majority of New Deal reforms, liberals’ disavowal of
socialism, and the rise of professionalized, bureaucratized labor relations marked by
negotiation rather than violence. “The fundamental problems of the industrial revolution
have been solved,” sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset declared in 1960. “The workers
have achieved industrial and political citizenship, the conservatives have accepted the
welfare state, and the democratic left has recognized that an increase in state power
carries with it more dangers to freedom than solutions for economic problems.” These
developments heralded “the end of ideology,” as Daniel Bell put it.307 The liberal
consensus interpretation also appeared in later historical work, though often lacking the
triumphalist inflection of Bell and Lipset. In the mid-1970s, for instance, Godfrey
Hodgson popularized a pessimistic version of the argument, in which the “liberal
consensus” represented a kind of straightjacket indicative of the defeat of the left, a
“strange hybrid, liberal conservatism” that “blanketed the scene and muffled debate.”308
In more recent decades, the consensus interpretation has been challenged and
largely unseated by scholars pointing to the prevalence of aggressive anti-labor efforts by
business interests, conservative activism against the New Deal order, and opposition to
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liberal policy on race among white liberal constituencies.309 “Even at its zenith, liberalism
was far less secure than it appeared to be,” Kim Phillips-Fein notes, if scholars “loo[k]
beneath the surface.”310 Recent defenders of the consensus interpretation respond that the
dissenters did not have the influence to command a substantial following or win
substantial gains and that “the sharpest conflicts did not dominate the mainstream.”311
Without question, the consensus interpretation does not capture the full range of the
period’s politics. It remains, however, very apt for understanding elite constructions of
the white working class in the late 1940s and 1950s. Again, simply put, the imagery of
the affluent (white) worker attained the prominence it did because it appeared persuasive
to and made strategic sense for a wide range of elites.
The years immediately following World War II, as scholars have noted, seemed
promising for a social democratic politics in the United States; in the aftermath of the
wartime experience, planning, full employment, and other left-liberal priorities enjoyed
considerable public support. The Popular Front was largely defeated by the late 1940s,
however, amid a resurgence of anticommunism. A few dates give a rough sense of the
timeline: in 1947, the Truman administration adopted a policy requiring government
employees to sign a loyalty oath, and the antilabor Taft-Hartley Act passed; in 1949, the
309
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CIO banned communists from leadership positions in member unions; the next year, it
dismissed eleven communist-led unions.312 The narrative of widespread prosperity
became hegemonic in the wake of the Popular Front’s defeat and the shift to the right
within the labor movement and within mainstream liberalism. It is instructive, for
instance, that the texts spearheading the narrative appeared in the early 1950s, including
Peter Drucker’s The New Society (1950); Fortune’s series USA: The Permanent
Revolution (1951) and The Changing American Market (1953); and Frederick Lewis
Allen’s The Big Change (1952). The foremost driver of the narrative of mass prosperity
was the influence of the Cold War and anticommunism on domestic politics and media.
The Cold War had a paradoxical effect on American liberalism. On one hand, it
sliced off its left wing and discredited the more ambitious aspects of its agenda; on the
other, it linked the legitimacy of the American state to the position of subordinate groups
in American society. The Soviet state’s legitimacy was staked on its claim to represent
working class and marginalized people, and Soviet elites repeatedly invoked racial and
economic inequality in the United States.313 In a period where the two powers competed
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for the allegiance of European, African, and Asian nations, the American state needed to
vehemently challenge those claims. International propaganda consistently cited
American workers’ high standard of living, often in comparison to Soviet workers. The
United States Information Agency (USIA) drew on one typical frame in its traveling
international exhibit on “People’s Capitalism,” a “dynamic new kind of capitalism which
benefits all the people.”314 Richard Nixon’s “kitchen debate” with Soviet premier Nikita
Khrushchev inside the American National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959 may be the
most famous example of the ideological value of the affluent (white) worker and working
class housewife for Cold Warriors. The exhibit featured a model home identified as
affordable for the average American family and packed with modern conveniences. “Can
only the rich in the United States afford such things?” Nixon asked, walking Khrushchev
through the exhibit. “If this were the case, we would have to include in our definition of
rich the millions of America’s wage earners…Any steel worker could buy this house.”315
In this climate, liberals who strayed outside acceptable contours risked serious
danger; those who worked within those contours could see real gains. For African
American elites, this meant pressing for racial equality in a language of US nationalism,
accepting an optimistic interpretation of the progress blacks were making in the United
States, and being careful not to link American capitalism or imperialism to racial
inequality within the nation’s borders. For organized labor, it meant employing a
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nationalistic frame of reference, excluding radicals from positions of influence, and
adopting a language of cooperation with business when appropriate. The view that white
workers as a group were disadvantaged—or that the “American system” did not work for
a majority of its citizens—was increasingly excluded from the mainstream.
Journalism: “A True and Honest Picture of Our Civilization”
Journalism spotlighting poverty and inequality was generally at a low ebb in the
postwar period. A broad-based media reform movement, flourishing during the 1940s,
had largely been defeated by the end of the decade.316 The view that journalism had a
duty to reinforce American values, particularly during wartime, was widespread among
journalists, publishers, and government officials. For some, this aligned with an anti-New
Deal domestic agenda. In 1945, Frank Gannett urged his fellow publishers to “tell our
readers what we stand for”—“the American way of life…a system of competitive
enterprise.” “Our best promotion will be the re-selling of that American system,”
Gannett insisted. “In doing so, we will be selling ourselves.”317 The ties between the
foreign policy apparatus and the media industry ran deeper than partisan politics,
however. Former newspaper journalists staffed government propaganda operations, and
316
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journalists working in the private sector had wartime propaganda experience. FBI
director J. Edgar Hoover cultivated relationships with journalists, and about two dozen
media outlets, including the New York Times, Time, and CBS, cooperated with the
CIA.318
Certainly most journalists touting the prodigious growth of the American
economy firmly believed in their reporting. “I believe we might all agree that a
distinguishing factor of our own particular period in history is the rapidity of change,”
American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) president Kenneth MacDonald told an
industry audience in 1956. “A new revolution is altering rapidly the social, economic,
and cultural life in this country…[Our economy] is tending to produce a classless
society.”319 “Magazine liberalism and iconoclasm” had declined since World War II, one
journalist claimed the same year, in part because “most of the immediate social gains
have been gained.”320 Journalists understood, though, that they were not simply reporting
on the American economy for an audience of everyday American readers. It was
commonplace for news accounts to contain direct refutations of Soviet allegations about
American society, often with a non-American audience in mind. One American
journalist, chagrined at the tendency of some Europeans to “depict the American system
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as a horror to be rejected equally with the Soviet horror,” insisted that “we learn to draw
for Europe a true and honest picture of our civilization.”321 “The European does not see
the rapidly changing, socially conscious capitalism of 1950,” Fortune worried. “He sees
Wall Street, Mammon—and he trembles aloud over all the false dilemmas it would imply
for Europe.”322
If this sense of duty motivated positive portrayals of American life, the dangers
associated with leftism also militated against comprehensive attention to inequality.
Subscriptions to liberal magazines and newspapers such as the Nation, New Republic,
PM, or In Fact raised suspicion in loyalty investigations. Journalists understood that they
could be fired at any time if evidence of unacceptable leftism came to light. Anyone
within journalistic or media reform circles who had a radical past or continued to work
from a Popular Front perspective was particularly at risk. Over a hundred journalists were
brought before Congressional committees investigating communist influence, where
rhetorical tropes seen as mainstream during the New Deal could be read as evidence of
communist ties.323 One of those journalists was inaugural CIO publicity director Len De
Caux, who had been asked to resign from his CIO post in 1947 amid concerns about his
radical history. Another was media critic George Seldes, who had been forced to suspend
publication of his newsletter In Fact when resources dried up amid allegations of
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communist involvement.324 At his hearing, Seldes encountered questioning from
McCarthy lieutenant Roy Cohn on a story he had written about industrial tycoons: “Cohn
read one paragraph, something about the DuPonts, Mellons and Rockefellers getting
monopolies in industry while there was unemployment and poverty. ‘Do you think that is
the right kind of reading matter to send to European countries we want as friends?’”325
This view was by no means confined to the hard right wing of anticommunists. A
1948 exchange between Seldes and liberal journalist Ferdinand Lundberg is suggestive.
Ten years earlier, Lundberg had worked in the same vein as Seldes: his 1937 bestseller
America’s 60 Families tracked the control exerted by a handful of immensely wealthy
and powerful families over American industry, government, and journalism. Seldes
continued to focus his attention almost exclusively on the American right, American
capitalism, and the commercial press—entities, in the eyes of Lundberg and many
liberals, considerably less dangerous than the Soviet Union. “No liberal that I know of
objects in the slightest to [your] running critique of the newspaper press or the
skullduggery of the higher-ups,” Lundberg explained in a letter to Seldes:
What they object to, in short, is the clear implication in In Fact [Seldes’
magazine, which ran from 1940-1950] that the U.S. press and U.S. higher-ups,
and [their] friends abroad…are about the worst things politically in the world.
This isn’t so, isn’t a fact. There is worse, much worse, and it centers in the
Kremlin, about which you preserve a strange silence...By failing to put its critique
of the American scene into the proper perspective against the world background
In Fact merely does what it can to promote disaffection in the U.S. In so doing it
becomes an instrument in the ideological warfare of the USSR against those
countries not under its control.
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Bringing the injustices in the United States into sharp relief would be harmful on multiple
fronts, Lundberg implied: it would diminish the legitimacy of elites who could fight
communism, it would aid the Soviets in their outreach to unaffiliated countries, and it
would “creat[e] disaffection” on the home front. In short, it would be “helpful only to the
Kremlin.”326
None of this meant that objectivity was abandoned or that no diversity of views
could surface: part of what distinguished the American press from the Soviet press, in its
anticommunist backers’ views, was its openness to the free exchange of ideas.327
Alternative perspectives on communism or the Cold War were simply outside the sphere
of legitimate controversy. In a particularly illustrative turn of phrase, Lawrence Spivak of
NBC News explained the political perspective of his show Meet the Press: “Ideologically
I never really took a position…and of course we carried on the most vigorous
anticommunism campaign from the beginning.”328 “There is always room for divergence
of opinion within the bounds of basic principles, but there is no room to compromise
those principles,” one publisher insisted.329 Liberals had a very prominent place in the
elite discursive environment of the period, but that discursive environment generally
included only moderate and respectable elite perspectives.
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Labor and Business: “The People…Are Using the Capitalists”
Contestation within acceptable boundaries also serves as a good one-sentence
characterization of the fate of labor, liberal, and left articulations of working class
identity after the late 1940s. On one hand, basic claims—that the Democrats held the
allegiance of ordinary people, that workers saw their interests as opposed to those of big
business—remained strong throughout the period. At the same time, mainstream liberals,
labor leaders, moderate conservatives, and business elites could increasingly agree that
American capitalism had evolved from the tycoon days of the past and that the United
States was a basically just society in which the majority of workers enjoyed security and
a reasonable opportunity for happiness.
The dominant narrative of business-labor relations in the period stressed the
broadly shared benefits made possible by an evolved capitalism. In this narrative, the
events of the past twenty years had brought about a transfer of power from employers to
workers and the public, allowing for a reasonable balance of interests. Workers and nonelite groups were getting more of the gains, contemporaries stressed, and corporations
had embraced social responsibility. As a result, an egalitarian society had been achieved
without recourse to coercive statism. Americans had developed “a system which not only
helps the underdog, and brings about a dynamic redistribution of income in his favor, but
also maintains the freedom of business enterprises and other private institutions,”
Harper’s editor and popular historian Frederick Lewis Allen put it.330 This narrative had
a great deal to offer both labor and business groups, and their claims overlapped
substantially. It suggested that criticism of a selfish, antisocial capitalism was outdated
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and that there was no need for further encroachment (by unions or the state) on
management’s privileges. It also recognized unions’ legitimacy, respectability, and role
in the American system, in a period where the appearance of radicalism was deeply
dangerous.
Business groups’ public relations efforts were one chief impetus behind elite
discourse’s emphasis on broadly shared prosperity. Business elites concerned that liberal
successes had turned public opinion against capitalism and toward an activist state
invested significant time and resources in persuasive efforts aimed at workers,
schoolchildren, and the broader public. In 1952, Fortune editor William H. Whyte
estimated that corporate spending on public relations and educational materials
promoting “free enterprise” stood at more than $100 million per year.331 These efforts
often rested on a view of workers as credulous, easily misled by simplistic anti-business
arguments, but persuadable: if workers truly understood how business worked (why
corporations should not be condemned for making profits, for instance) and what they
gained from it, they would view business positively. “When you talk to the people in
lower income levels you find a large majority who wonder if the American capitalistic
system is really right,” one advertiser worried, advocating that business “educat[e] the
general public on why our economic system has been able to do what it has for them…on
how and why it works so that they would have sufficient knowledge of its basic
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principles, to be able to judge future issues.”332 “The story of business economics and
philosophy needs to be told simply, understandably, repetitiously and without dilution or
distortion—to broad masses of the people,” another businessman insisted.333 The scope
of business elites’ investment in communicating to workers is strong evidence of how
seriously many took labor-liberal claims to represent workers. Ironically, much like
liberals, they assumed that views they saw as mistaken were the result of misinformation
and could be dispelled through education.
In their public argumentation, moderate business groups in this period moved
away from the hardline approach adopted by much of the right wing during the
Depression: attacking New Deal liberalism and industrial unionism as utterly contrary to
American principles. Instead, they accepted a role for unions and the modern state but
warned against class conflict. In a narrative advanced by groups like the Advertising
Council334 and appearing consistently in news media, capitalism had once undeniably

332
“Plan for Action Program,” n. d., box 1, folder 7, UAW Political Action Department: Roy Reuther
Records, Walter P. Reuther Library, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University,
Detroit, MI (hereafter cited as “UAW Political Action Records”). Part of what rankled, in this view, was
that business’s legitimate claim to represent workers’ interests had been successfully displaced by other
interests remote from workers’ lives: “Here you see two great forces—politicians on one hand, union
leaders on the other—doing everything they can to gain workers’ goodwill and making real progress at it,
while those who are really close to them, who are their natural leaders and friends, the industrial managers
who have the opportunity of legitimate daily contact with them, are recognized as managing the properties
capably but are nevertheless made to seem against the workers!”
333
Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise, 40.
334
A multi-session program on “People’s Capitalism” conducted by Yale and the Advertising Council is an
archetypical illustration of the consensus thesis. As the summary booklet explains, “it took place in an
attempt to create a consensus that could become the possession of the average man; to help fill a serious
vacuum and to meet a need made clamorous by the challenge of international communism.” It brought
together “brilliant minds from the Yale faculty, and from business and labor, to examine the American
economy and, so far as practical, to reach conclusions on (a) the manner in which the American form of
capitalism differs from older (and less enlightened) forms; (b) the degree to which it has spread the material
benefits to all our people, and obtains its supply of capital from the people; (c) The interrelationships of our
economic and political systems; (d) The methods that keep power in the hands of the people.” “An
economy based on private property, profit and free enterprise has actually achieved the socialistic goals of
welfare for the people at large more effectively than any socialistic regime has yet been able to do,” the

181

generated unacceptable inequality and hardship for workers, but no longer. American
capitalism at the turn of the century “seemed to be what Marx predicted it would be and
what all the muckrakers said it was,” a typical account in Fortune held, and the United
States of the 1930s was “a society that could not solve, did not know how to solve,
internal problems that threatened to destroy it.” A resolution came, this narrative
suggested, through a revised understanding of individualism that recognized “the right to
organize and bargain collectively” and acknowledged “that ownership carries social
obligations.” The magazine conceded that “the American capitalistic system still works
injustices” but insisted that “to think about it in terms of exploitation is to think in terms
of a past century...It is not the capitalists who are using the people, but the people who
are using the capitalists.”335 In a period where capitalism had become cooperative rather
than coercive, in this framework, the responsibility incumbent on workers was to
recognize the need to “pull together.”336 The implicit bargain posed was that corporate
leaders would deliver broadly shared prosperity for all if they could direct the economy
without significant unrest or interference from labor or the state.
A significant group of moderate Republicans—including the first Republican
president since the New Deal, Dwight Eisenhower—made similar arguments.
Eisenhower was associated with an ideology called “modern Republicanism,” a centrist
report explained. American capitalism had extended “to the population as a whole of the standard of living
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approach that (for its supporters) transcended both libertarianism and New Deal
liberalism and emphasized cooperation between labor and capital for shared prosperity.
Eisenhower aide Arthur Larson identified the “New Republicanism” as “a set of ideas
keyed explicitly to contemporary mid-century facts” in which “wellworn niche[s] like
‘liberal’ or ‘New Deal’ or ‘prolabor’ or ‘probusiness’ or ‘left’ or ‘right’” were obsolete.
“This Administration is against neither” labor nor business, Larson insisted, “but is for
both.”337 Modern Republicanism accepted the basic liberal understanding of industrial
modernity—that workers in an industrial society required the protection of unions and the
state338—but argued that antagonistic attitudes toward business were as obsolete as the
tycoon.
To be clear, this approach was not representative of all conservative discourse—
right-wing critics saw modern Republicanism as a slightly watered-down version of
liberalism, and the most vehement voices on the right continued to assail organized labor
in stark terms. NAM warned its members of the dangers posed by the “spread of
Collectivist thinking in America,” particularly among “such large groups as
labor…people in large cities…and the lower-income segment of our population,” and
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deemed labor elites “professional propagandists for powerful, totalitarian-inspired
organizations…bent upon destroying everything this nation has achieved in the last 150
years.”339 As unions became an entrenched feature of the political economic landscape,
allegations about labor leaders’ immense, illegitimate power only increased. The muchdistributed 1957 book Labor Union Monopoly claimed that “the greatest concentrations
of political and economic power in the United States of America are found” not among
corporate interests but “in the underregulated, under-criticized, under-investigated, taxexempt, and specially privileged labor organizations—and in their belligerent, aggressive,
and far-too-often lawless and corrupt managers.”340 From a presentist perspective, it’s
instructive to note that conservative anti-union argumentation followed a logic that
continues to be prominent on issues of race and immigration (see also Chapter 4)—
liberals pretend to be championing the underprivileged but are in fact seeking benefits for
themselves.
It’s important to be clear that the argument that management reached an “accord”
with organized labor in this period, recognizing labor’s right to exist and the value of its
role in the social order, only holds by comparison to what came before and after. The
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1940s and 1950s saw consistent efforts to undercut union power.341 For a powerful
segment of the business community in the midcentury United States, however, it made
strategic sense to adopt a labor policy that offered good pay and benefits and recognized
unions as a natural facet of industrial society. Large firms in capital-intensive industries
(archetypically autos and steel) faced little international competition, which had been
decimated by World War II. For these firms, continued labor unrest and union demands
for input on managerial decisions appeared far more destructive than generous and
consistent wage and benefit increases. From this perspective, middle-income workerconsumers with a stake in the existing system were desirable employees; they would
work steadily and dependably and would be uninterested in radicalism. “The first
requirement of a functioning industrial order is to get rid of the proletarian,” management
theorist Peter Drucker emphasized. “Industrial society cannot afford him…[It] demands
the active and real citizenship of the worker. It demands acceptance of the principle of
profitability from the worker. It loses its social cohesion if the worker is a proletarian.”
The affordances of a “modern industrial order,” for Drucker, made it possible to “get rid
of the proletarian,” to “convert the socially destructive proletariat into the very basis of
social strength and cohesion.”342 For radicals in later decades, the power structure in this
period made concessions that “integrated [workers] into American capitalism”343 and
snuffed out labor militancy in the process. Drucker called for just such an approach and
framed it as a great positive.
341

Concise discussions of employers’ approach to unions in this period can be found in Lichtenstein, State
of the Union, chapter 3; David Brody, Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century
Struggle (New York: Oxford University Press: 1980), 173ff.
342
Peter Drucker, The New Society: The Anatomy of Industrial Order (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1950), 229.
343
Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986), 8.

185

The narrative of middle-income workers and an evolved capitalism had a great
deal to offer organized labor as well. It placed unions firmly within the bounds of the
American tradition as safeguards for workers within modern society, not proponents of
“class war” or “socialistic” principles.344 It meshed with the most common argument
labor officials made in tying gains for unions to the national interest: that increasing
workers’ purchasing power would stimulate the economy as a whole. “Year after year
objective observers increasingly agree that trade unionism has been largely responsible
for raising the nation’s standard of living,” an Amalgamated Clothing Workers pamphlet
suggested.345 Perhaps most simply, labor could most persuasively claim success by
pointing to the material gains it had won for members. “The labor movement in America
is developing a whole new middle class,” Walter Reuther argued.346
The arguments made by labor officials overlapped substantially with the
arguments made by moderate business groups and in the business press. Certainly there
were differences: where business gave productivity and innovation most of the credit for
the increase in workers’ incomes, labor and liberals stressed collective bargaining and
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New Deal reforms. What was shared was the implication that American workers were the
beneficiaries of a revolutionary social transformation that obviated the need for class
conflict. In the preface to a 1956 reissue of Edward Levinson’s Labor on the March, a
chronicle of the early CIO, Walter Reuther readily consigned 1930s militancy to the past
in a tone that would have been familiar to readers of Harper’s, Fortune, and other
newsmagazines. The sit-down strikes described in the book, Reuther wrote, would seem
to the mid-1950s reader “as far away as the Whiskey Rebellion, the Dred Scott Decision
or…the Haymarket riots…[The] improved income of millions of wage earners has made
the 1950’s as unlike the 1930’s as the 20th century is unlike the 19th century.”347
This emphasis on prosperity and middle class status reflected the primary postwar
course pursued by organized labor. Though inflections differ, as do assessments of
whether a course farther to the left would have been possible, the literature emphasizes
the tradeoff inherent in this trajectory. Unions gained mainstream status, respectability,
and considerable security for members but did not realize the transformative agenda
many had desired for them. Briefly, they generally adopted a strategy of bargaining with
employers to secure firm-specific benefits for their workers (higher wages, health
insurance, vacation time, etc.) rather than making claims for a broad public welfare state
of the European variety, aggressively attempting to organize the most underprivileged
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workers, or seeking worker representation in firms’ decision-making.348 Organized
labor’s embrace of the existing system was firmly in line with the broader trajectory of
liberalism, as liberals based policy around the assumption that strong economic growth
within a mixed economy would meet the needs of the vast majority.349
It is important to note that some leftists and labor advocates disputed the
dominant, sunny interpretation of working class life. Workers were not, in fact, secure
and happy, these contemporaries stressed. Instead, a surface affluence (often financed by
steep debt) concealed tension and malaise. Breadwinners with alienating and repetitive
jobs sought a “progressive accumulation of things” because they had no other way to feel
that they were moving forward, sociologist Ely Chinoy emphasized.350 The stay-at-home
“wife of the…worker” lived a life of “quiet desperation,” not contentment, labor
intellectual Patricia Cayo Sexton argued; her time was occupied by “Junior’s whooping
cough, the week’s ironing, the plugged sink, the wet pants, the runny nose, the pay check
that can’t cover expenses, the kids who won’t stop yelling and fighting—and the husband
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who offers little affection or attention in payment for her drudgery.”351 Above all, in this
framework, life in the working class family was marked by a basic sadness, exacerbated
by families’ inability to comfortably afford “the things they want and need—or are
pressured into believing they must have.”352 These critical voices were far from the
center of elite public discourse, however, often confined to liberal and left periodicals
like the Nation, Dissent, and Monthly Review. The dominant voices in organized labor
were far more optimistic.
It’s important to note that the demands of the Cold War, the dismissal of radicals
from mainstream institutions, and the extensive focus on (white) workers’ upward
mobility did not mean that labor could no longer oppose workers to industrial elites. In
some contexts, pitting workers against employers could be dangerous, particularly if the
speaker had a suspect past. In other contexts—supporting Democrats over Republicans,
articulating the union’s case during strikes, or calling out industry for going back on a
bargain—it became a well-worn language that elites could offer almost ritualistically
when it made strategic sense to do so. “The National Association of Manufacturers and
Big Business are waging a class struggle in America as Karl Marx wrote it would be
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waged,” Walter Reuther railed in 1959 against an anti-labor bill being considered in
Congress. “They are working overtime to prove Karl Marx was right.”353
Though workers continued to be defined against economic elites, prevailing elitelevel understandings of working class identity had fundamentally changed since the days
of “labor on the march.” White working men putting their bodies at risk now played a
much-diminished role in public representations of labor. Language of bargaining
displaced language of war and combat; when combat was necessary, it would not require
physical violence. “There were no mass picket lines; no flying squadrons swept through
the city; few meetings were held,” Mary Heaton Vorse reported from a 1950 Chrysler
strike. The “conflict was a bitter one, in which neither side pulled any punches. But the
blows were struck through full-page advertisements, radio speeches, newspaper releases,
and endless and often acrimonious negotiations.”354 A different kind of (white) working
class masculinity, one less associated with bravery in combat or feats of strength than
with breadwinning, homeownership, and consumerism, now took center stage. An early
CIO poem had featured a striker telling the young child of a fallen comrade that
“Daddy’s on another picket line tonight.” In the predominant midcentury framework, the
breadwinner’s battle would take place in the voting booth. “CIO members owe it to
themselves, their wives, and their children to accept the political challenge thrown at
them,” union officials fighting Taft-Hartley urged workers in a 1947 appeal.355
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This breadwinning (white) working class masculinity was simultaneously a
powerful symbol of respectability for labor and legitimacy for business. The narrative of
capitalism’s evolution was linked far less to changes in the nature of industrial work itself
than to the claim that workers now had the time and money to live a fulfilling private life.
“Shorter hours [and] vacation time give the breadwinner plenty of time to enjoy his
family and the comforts he has bought for them,” a Business Week profile of a “typical”
worker read.356 From labor’s perspective, a worker seeking to provide for his family—
“Joe Smith needs more money to buy his kids food and get them adequate clothing and
provide decent shelter”357—was less threatening than a worker whose unionism was
motivated by political ideology.
By the early 1950s, the worker, narrowly defined, had been incorporated into the
symbolic center of American identity and was often interchangeable with the “average”
American. That meant a great deal. But unions’ and liberals’ emphasis on (white)
workers’ middle class status worked at cross-purposes even to their relatively modest
aims. Conceding that the injustices faced by white working class people had effectively
been resolved, or were resolvable under the existing system, sapped the moral urgency of
the labor-liberal cause. “The political chemistry of the New Deal worked a double
transformation: the ascendancy of labor and the eclipse of the ‘labor question,’” Steve
Fraser has argued.358 The “labor question” could be eclipsed because white working
class disadvantage all but vanished from elite discourse. As argued in Chapter 1, the
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dominant New Deal-era narrative of industrialism’s social consequences centered on
white workers, especially male industrial workers. It did not incorporate in any
meaningful sense slavery or the experiences of workers of color and treated pre-industrial
America as an egalitarian and largely just society of independent producers undone by
the rise of industrial society and the greed of industrial tycoons. The industrial order of
the 1950s could easily be read as a resolution to that inherently limited story, in part
because the workers it spotlighted the most had seen the most conspicuous gains.
A more capacious understanding of the problem of industrial modernity would
have required much more attention to (in modern terms) the intersection of class, race,
and gender than mainstream left-of-center elites offered. Most political figures who
could offer it were under suspicion of radicalism and/or unable to access mainstream
forums. One of the long-term consequences of the narrow understanding of the American
working class has been that issues of class narrowly understood—unionization, the
workplace, corporate power—often do not appear in elite discourse unless disadvantaged
white men appear in elite discourse. When the institutions chiefly responsible for
bringing white working class grievances onto the front pages of newspapers rarely did so
any longer, the urgency that had been attached to those issues declined. Organized labor,
at the height of its power, had an extremely strong claim to speak at the elite level for
“labor” and the “worker” as homogenous categories. The power of unions’ claims to
represent workers now served to minimize the visibility of (white) working class
disadvantage, as the heterogeneity of experiences even among white workers went
unnoticed.
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II: Affluence and (White) Working Class Politics
While few mainstream elites disputed the existence of mass prosperity, more
disagreement surrounded the political implications of (white) workers’ upward mobility.
Contemporary analysis can be usefully condensed into three broad narratives, detailed
below. (To be clear, these were not mutually exclusive, and the differences were
sometimes subtle; the analysis below aims to draw out differences and points of overlap.)
First, a significant number of observers thought newly affluent (white) workers likely to
retain their labor-liberal allegiance. Even if their circumstances had changed, in this
view, these voters still understood their interests as opposed to those of the wealthy, and
they still had more to gain than lose from liberal programs. They remembered the
Depression vividly and would not abandon unions and the Democratic Party, so central in
their rise to prosperity.
For others, however, the sharp income-based divisions that had marked national
politics during the Roosevelt period would not last. In the second narrative detailed
below, as white workers eagerly seized the opportunity to assimilate to the broad (white)
middle class through suburban homeownership and consumerism, they would adopt the
conservative views typical of professional-class homeowners concerned about taxes and
inflation. The third narrative outlined below predicted a different kind of conservative
turn: politics in a period of economic abundance would focus less on immediate material
interests and more on issues like civil rights, civil liberties, and enlightened
administration, where lower-income and less educated whites would likely be more
conservative than their more educated counterparts. While #2 and #3 both predicted a
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turn to the right among white workers, they drew on different understandings of class and
politics. #2 remained situated within the dominant framework in which a middle class
mentality was tied to conservatism and a working class mentality to liberalism. #3
pushed back on that conventional wisdom in a way that foreshadows discourse of the
1960s and after.

1. (White) workers would remain a central part of a solid liberal majority
From the mid-1930s to mid-1940s, the understanding of the American electorate
as “normally Democratic” pitted a nonaffluent majority against an affluent minority.
“The strength of the Democratic Party is evidenced by the hold which it has upon the
middle and lower economic levels,” George Gallup explained in early 1946. “The
majority of voters look upon the Republican Party as the party of wealth and consider the
Democratic Party as the party of the people.”359 While its influence fluctuated and it
certainly did not go unchallenged, this basic mapping of the electorate retained strength
throughout the 1940s and 1950s, with interpreters convinced that liberalism would
remain a majority force for the foreseeable future. Admittedly, (white) workers had more
than before, but they would not cease to identify as workers, in this view; the few would
always have more than the majority, and workers’ gains needed protection from elites
continually eager for a larger share of the pie.
Harry Truman’s victory in 1948 was interpreted as one of the most significant
pieces of evidence for this claim. To be clear, by the late 1940s, only a few would
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contend that white workers desired or would come to desire an agenda significantly to the
left of the New Deal.360 White workers could still be positioned as a force pushing for a
more progressive future within the framework of postwar liberalism. Truman, by no
means a favorite of labor-liberals early in his presidency, had adopted an electoral
strategy that called for him to emulate FDR’s indictments of “economic royalists” (“If
you let the Republicans get control of the government, you will be making America an
economic colony of Wall Street”…“The battle lines of 1948 are the same as they were in
1932”).361 His victory—stunning to journalists and political insiders, who had been
almost unanimously convinced that Republican Thomas Dewey would win—suggested
that the Roosevelt coalition could hold without Roosevelt and perhaps indefinitely.
Truman’s victory “confirms an old revolution,” Fortune commented—making clear, in
other words, that the political cleavages of the New Deal still held. The magazine
dubbed Truman “Our Laboristic President” and predicted that Republicans would not
regain power “until they have found a way to interest the workingman and the farmer in
the Republican cause.”362
The most common explanation for liberalism’s continued appeal to (white)
workers pointed to material self-interest. This could be framed negatively, as in the everpresent conservative allegation that New Dealers won by doling out benefits to voters, or
positively, as when Democrats ran on the narrative that they had led the country from
360
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poverty to prosperity (“You never had it so good”…“Truman and Prosperity—or Dewey
and Depression”). In either case, the implication was that the labor-liberal program
obviously offered the majority more material benefits than did the opposition. 1952 press
reports noted a refrain among Detroit autoworkers: “Vote Democratic and live like a
Republican.”363 A 1952 New York Times feature identified as key Northern Democratic
constituencies “the masses of urban workers and wage earners” and “the national and
racial minority groups.” These groups, the Times suggested, were “‘liberal’ in a largely
material and selfish way,” with “more to gain than to lose through high wages, greater
Government benefits of whatever sort, effective labor legislation and laws to improve the
social and economic status of minorities.”364 The analysis reflected an assumption that
would collapse within fifteen years: urban white and black workers were natural political
allies, and both would gain from liberal programs whatever those were.
While the dominant view linked majority support for liberal programming to
simple self-interest, some saw Northern white workers as genuine adherents to a liberal
creed who wanted justice and progress, not simply “more.” In a telling mea culpa
published shortly after the 1948 election, New York Times political reporter James Reston
suggested that journalists had believed in a certain Dewey victory because they had not
accorded enough weight to a few simple facts: Americans had enjoyed prosperity under
Democrats, more voters had become “sensitive to the influences of organized labor,” and
“a whole generation had grown up under the strong influences of the Roosevelt era.”
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Because journalists had missed the overriding “political influence of the Roosevelt era on
the thinking of the nation,” Reston concluded, “we were wrong, not only on the election,
but, what’s worse, on the whole political direction of our time.”365 In a 1956 study of
Detroit autoworkers, social scientist Arthur Kornhauser and his colleagues argued that
these UAW members’ “predominant political outlook or ‘philosophy’ is clearly one that
conceives of workers’ and unions’ goals as opposed at many points to those of business
and wealthy groups.” To be sure, many workers were relatively “passive and unaroused”
politically, but “if they go conservative, it will not be because economic prosperity
compels it but because liberal leadership…fails to reach them with convincing alternative
social-political interpretations that fit their own fundamental needs.”366 America would
not revert back to pre-New Deal politics because prosperity had come, in this view; the
successes of liberals and organized labor had left a broad and lasting imprint on public
opinion.
For political observers who saw white workers as a reliable liberal constituency,
that faith had deep roots; it did not fall apart in the face of unfavorable political
outcomes. This has a great deal to do with the way liberals thought about (white)
working class politics. As argued in the coda to Chapter 1, many liberals held to a
teleological understanding of (white) working class political consciousness; they
expected workers to become more aware and politically sophisticated over time. In this
framework, problems in the near term would be less problematic in the long term: for
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instance, racism would lessen as whites came to understand that it was wrong and counter
to their own self-interest. In the short term, however, (white) workers could be readily
misled by external forces working against their interests—advertising, the conservative
press, deceitful politicians, business-funded campaign messaging. CIO political officials
generally held to this basic framework. They saw the rank and file as generally liberal—
though apathetic and uninformed—and sought to educate workers about politics and
motivate them to vote. “Once they know the facts there is no doubt about how they will
vote,” CIO Political Action Committee director Jack Kroll argued:
Will any man knowingly vote to pay heavy taxes, just so others who make much
more than he will be able to pay small taxes? Will any man knowingly vote to
pay higher prices for his food and clothes and shelter in order to pile up huge
profits for big business? Will any man knowingly vote to give away his
property…so that a few people can make money out of it? Knowingly, people do
not do such things. Our major job is to see that they know.367
Beyond the key assumptions of CIO political action—the CIO worker/voter is a
breadwinning male concerned with the costs of domestic life; the chief political cleavage
pits the wealthy against the majority—what is particularly suggestive about this quote is
its repetition of “knowingly.” Attributing conservative votes among workers to a lack of
knowledge (essentially, false consciousness), as Kroll did here, made it difficult for
liberals to understand workers drawn to conservative politics as acting with full
consciousness or exerting agency.
This way of thinking about political agency comes through clearly in CIO
political analysis from the late 1940s to mid-1950s, which typically credited favorable
political outcomes to the self-assertion of a natural liberal majority and unfavorable
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outcomes to factors like low turnout and misinformation. The 1946 Congress had
assembled “a record of benefit for the few and injustice for the many,” a 1947 pamphlet
explained, because “56,000,000 Eligible Americans Failed to Vote…The majority of us
did not elect this Congress. WE DIDN’T VOTE AT ALL.”368 Two years later, the
“Victory Edition” of PAC’s newsletter celebrated Truman’s victory in typical
majoritarian terms: “The people took back control of the United States on November
2.”369 National CIO-PAC’s 1950 midterms postmortem noted Democratic weakness on
issues like inflation, taxes, anticommunism, and foreign affairs, but continued to
emphasize voter apathy and confusion: “While Democrats have good, defensible
positions…their arguments are mainly intellectual, while the charges of the Republican
opposition are loaded with emotion,” and “assisted by almost unanimous support from
the daily press.”370 Eisenhower’s victory in 1952, national CIO-PAC emphasized, “was a
personal one in every sense of the word… It was victory for a popular hero, constantly

368

“Freedom…Your Most Precious Heritage” [pamphlet], box 8, folder: “Washington, DC, misc.
correspondence, 1945-48,” CIO Political Action Committee Collection, Walter P. Reuther Library,
Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI (hereafter cited as “CIO-PAC
Papers”).
369
“Victory Edition,” Memo from PAC, November 22, 1948.
370
CIO-PAC Research Department, “Report on 1950 Elections,” March 9, 1951, box 14, folder 28, CIOPAC Papers. Similar readings can be found in Americans for Democratic Action, “House of
Representatives 1950 Election Analysis,” December 7, 1950 (“If the…[Democratic Party in Congress]
construes the ’50 election as a mandate of disapproval of the liberal policies of the Truman Administration,
the political task for the Democrats, and especially liberal Democrats, will be much more difficult in ’52”)
and UAW-CIO Legislative Department, “Analysis of the 1950 Off-Year Election,” November 15, 1950
(“By no stretch of the imagination can the 1950 results be considered as an anti-Fair Deal mandate”), both
box 52, folder 2, UAW Political Action Department: Roy Reuther Records, Walter P. Reuther Library,
Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI (hereafter cited as “UAW
Political Action Records”); Republicans would be “taking a long chance” if they interpreted their victories
in the 1946 elections as “a mandate to destroy the achievements of the Roosevelt era,” the New Republic
argued. “They won control of Congress not because the country longed for Republicanism…but because in
almost every state in the country a vote for G.O.P. was the only way in which a hazy discontent could be
expressed.” “Picking Up The Pieces,” New Republic, November 16, 1946.

199

before the electorate in a heroic role since 1942, and cannot be construed as a repudiation
of the principles of the New Deal and the Fair Deal.”371
The weaknesses of this framework—in which liberals won when the natural
majority voted its interests and lost when that majority stayed home or was misled—
came into sharp relief on issues of race. One suggestive example can be found in 1940s
Detroit, where UAW-backed candidates lost to race-baiting conservatives in three
mayoral elections over six years. In 1949, liberal George Edwards faced Albert Cobo, a
conservative businessman running on opposition to so-called “Negro invasions” of white
neighborhoods.372 The UAW-led labor campaign against Cobo played in the typical key
of labor-liberal populism (“Who is the Big Business Candidate? ‘Cobo, the Republican
Tax Collector’”…“Edwards has been in the peoples corner. Big business wants Cobo”).
One flyer put the issue succinctly, in the words of a classic union song: “The question in
this election is which side are you on? You know which side you are on—the same side
with George Edwards and the Union.”373 The election result reflected the fact that the
union was not the only “side” to which white workers belonged—Cobo won by
approximately 100,000 votes, the largest margin in any Detroit mayoral election to that
point.
Several groups of UAW officials met shortly after the election to discuss what
had gone wrong. They offered a wide range of explanations, collected in two compelling
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documents.374 Some attributed the result to their side’s campaign missteps (“I think we
would have won if we had a program…a concrete program”… “Ringing door bells on
Monday when women were in the basement was bad. I am convinced that sound cars
should be at busy intersections rather than making noise in residential communities and
waking babies up”…“[Canvassers] stop ringing door bells and have a few drinks and by
the time noon arrives they are pretty tight”). One saw a manifestation of the power of the
media (“I think we got the vote out but…the people were conditioned wrong. I don’t
know who conditioned them, whether it was the newspapers or radio”). Several officials
identified more a deeply rooted problem for union political action—a political
consciousness rooted in the intersection of race and homeownership. “I think…we are
dealing with people who have a middle class mentality. Even in our own UAW, the
member is either buying a home, owns a home or is going to buy one,” one unionist
noted. “It boils down to this,” another remarked bitterly, “that the Union helps their
economic condition until they can have a front porch and for that they become
capitalists.” This imposed obvious limits on the political influence of the union: “You
can tell them anything you want to but as long as they think their property is going down,
it is different”…“The fellow is not going to go along with you because you give him a
leaflet or because Philip Murray says to do so.”
What these unionists were getting at, at bottom, was the viability of assuming that
(white) workers were or would become liberal voters. In a prominent liberal
understanding of working class political consciousness, shared membership in the
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“people,” shared economic interests, and shared opposition to big business and
reactionary politics would ultimately outweigh divisions within the liberal coalition. The
organizer who stressed that he and his colleagues were “dealing with people who have a
middle class mentality” expressed a different view. Workers would support the union
insofar as it helped them to increase their standard of living, in this view, but they would
have no interest in a labor-liberal program that appeared to threaten their gains. This
reading of white workers’ relationship with liberalism would not become dominant until
the 1960s. Even in the midcentury period sometimes remembered as the height of liberal
influence, however, prominent political analysts devoted considerable attention to factors
motivating a turn to the right among (white) workers. The next two sections turn to those
arguments.

2. White workers as part of a right-leaning middle class majority
A second prominent argument about the political consequences of mass affluence
predicted that white workers’ rapid absorption into a broad middle class would erode the
income-based cleavages that had undergirded liberal success since the New Deal. In this
view, a liberal program drawing an opposition between the majority and the privileged
few would appeal to voters only in a period of Depression and scarcity. As their
circumstances changed, their politics would change as well. “The real roots of the
Roosevelt coalition were established along economic lines,” pollster Louis Harris argued.
“As we move into an increasingly middle-class society, these lines are disappearing.”375
“The proportion of the population who can easily identify themselves with ‘the common
375
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man’ is declining,” political scientist Angus Campbell put it in 1956. “If the current high
level of economic activity in this country is maintained for a sufficient period to bring
about a significant upgrading in class identifications, the Republican Party is likely to
collect a sizable dividend.”376 One Democratic official offered a succinct version of the
thesis: “The trouble is, we ran out of poor people.”377
For some observers who held to this view, the prosperity of the postwar period
had already transformed millions of urban Democrats into Republicans. This
transformation was a matter of lifestyle, not simply income, with suburbanization the
chief cause. In the dominant interpretation, suburban life produced political and cultural
homogeneity. Newsweek offered a typical formulation in 1957: “When a city dweller
packs up and moves his family to the suburbs, he usually acquires a mortgage, a power
lawn mower, and a backyard grill…Often, although a lifelong Democrat, he also starts
voting Republican.”378 The New Deal, liberal historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. argued,
“gave millions of people new economic and social status and enabled them to become
‘respectable’…They moved out of the cities into the suburbs, abandoned tenements for
bungalows, bought automobiles, and became Republicans.”379 In most accounts, new
suburbanites (consciously or unconsciously) jettisoned their liberal views chiefly because
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they wanted to fit in with their neighbors. By changing political affiliations, they could
leave their immigrant past behind and blend into an affluent, homogenous existence.
When liberals made this argument, it typically came with a note of bitterness—
they suffered politically because of the gains they had made possible. Conservatives
gave the argument a different inflection: workers who became part of a middle-income
suburban mainstream would easily see through liberal promises and demagoguery. “The
fairly well-paid industrial worker today…has his home, his automobile, his insurance,
and his children are getting a good education,” New Dealer turned conservative
columnist Raymond Moley explained. “He has too much money and too much sense to
believe the guff of John L. Lewis or William Green or Philip Murray about wage slavery.
He knows that no one is grinding his face at the work bench. In fact, he is beginning to
resent this talk that puts him in a class apart from his neighbor the white-collar worker or
the small independent businessman.”380 These workers had moved into what Moley
called the “middle interests” of society, the symbolic center he identified “with such
concepts as self-help, personal liberty, individual enterprise, and opportunity.”381 As a
result, in this view, they could be expected to vote like small businessmen or
professionals, regardless of union leaders’ efforts to persuade them otherwise.
In contemporary elite public discourse, one the most notable analysts of the
consequences of white workers’ ascension to the middle class was journalist and pollster
Samuel Lubell. Lubell made his name with his work on the New Deal coalition,
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especially as developed in his 1951 book The Future of American Politics, and with an
idiosyncratic methodology viewed with skepticism by traditional pollsters but compelling
to a popular audience: He parsed election returns to identify areas that would be
representative of demographics of interest, visited those districts on foot, interviewed as
many voters as he could, and then generalized from his interactions.382 Looking in depth
at Lubell’s work is useful, most simply, because he was an influential figure in his own
right. Though not as well known in the present day as comparable figures (Kevin
Phillips, for instance), Lubell was hailed in the 1950s as “one of the top political analysts
in the nation today,” “one of the accomplished political writers of this generation,” and
“the nation’s leading political analyst...something of a major prophet.”383 More broadly,
looking at Lubell’s work helps to shed light on the reasoning of contemporaries who were
convinced that the era of liberal dominance was a thing of the past.
Lubell saw the changes and tensions within the New Deal coalition as the
fundamental story in 1950s politics. His central research question, as he explained to an
editor, centered on the “varied elements making up [the] new Democratic majority, what
brought them together, the struggle now raging among these diverse groups to shape and
control the destiny of this new majority, [and] whether it will hold together or split,
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giving the Republicans a chance to ‘come back.’”384 Perhaps most of all, Lubell sought to
push back on the view that the Democratic coalition would “remain [a] ‘leftist’ force”;
rather, he implied, it contained “the seeds of its own conservatism.”385 For Lubell, the
class polarization characteristic of the New Deal was a product of a particular place and
time. “When Roosevelt first took office, no segment of the population was more ready
for ‘a new deal’ than the submerged, inarticulate urban masses,” he wrote. As the
Democratic Party successfully brought urban new immigrant workers into the political
mainstream, “awaken[ing]” them “to a consciousness of the power in their numbers,”
they became “the chief carriers of the Roosevelt Revolution.” Anticipating the “culture of
unity” argument later made by social and labor historians, Lubell argued that the New
Deal had “drawn the same class-conscious line of economic interest across the entire
country” and “subordinated the old nativistic prejudices of race and religion, which had
divided the lower half of American society for so long,” bringing working Americans “a
greater degree of social unity than they had ever shared before.” These two
developments—working class unity and the emergence of the urban vote—brought about
“the transformation of the United States from a nation with a traditional Republican
majority to one with a normal Democratic majority.”386
For Lubell, it was a serious mistake to assume that these changes in the electorate
would mean Democratic dominance for the foreseeable future. By the beginning of the
1950s, the Democrats were no longer “an aggregation of economic ‘have-nots.’” Key
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Democratic groups, especially labor and urban immigrant-descended workers, had been
lifted to “a ‘have’ status” and desired “not to get more but to preserve the gains of the last
twenty years.” As a result, Lubell suggested, the “inner dynamics of the Roosevelt
coalition” had “shifted from those of getting to those of keeping.” This introduced an
inescapable instability into the Democratic coalition. When voters had nothing to lose,
they experienced liberal programs, taxation, and spending as largely cost-free. When
they had something to lose, they became sensitive to the costs: “Once the bite of taxes
was felt, the Welfare State took on a new aspect.” Yet while the new middle class—the
old Northern urban working class, in other words—had become “conservative in the
manner of all middle classes,” for Lubell, its conservatism did not manifest in the
traditional way, as reflexive antistatism. For voters whose “memories of discrimination,
poverty and the Great Depression” were vivid, the Democrats, not the Republicans,
would be the “conservative” choice—at least for a time. 387 “Because we have slipped
into the habit of considering the Republicans as the nation’s conservative party and the
Democrats as the liberal party,” this “conservative turn within the Democratic coalition”
had been obscured.388
As they moved forward, Lubell emphasized, none of the key Democratic
constituencies could advance further without imperiling the gains of the others. The core
of the Democratic appeal had been based on the principle of government helping “havenot” Americans to rise. When Democrats offered new gains to the most disadvantaged
members of their coalition, they risked “taking it away from somebody else through
387
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inflation.”389 Further, while the emphasis Lubell placed on anti-black views as a factor in
Northern politics is modest by 1960s standards, it was substantial by 1950s standards.
Lubell saw potential peril for the liberal coalition in the fact that whites perceived blacks’
struggle for upward mobility and better housing as a threat to their efforts to assimilate
and achieve middle class status. “The emotions stirred by the civil rights issue assume
their most violent form,” he suggested, among whites struggling to reach middle class
respectability, living in areas “along the line where expanding Negro settlement pushes in
on those unable to rise higher on the social ladder…Wherever the Negro appears on the
urban ladder, he puts to test the relative strengths of the economic ties binding the
Roosevelt elements and the racial prejudices tugging them apart.”390 This model of white
workers as torn between their racial prejudice and their close ties to the Democratic Party
would be central to elite understandings of the political landscape from the 1960s through
the 1990s. Lubell essentially arrived at this conventional wisdom ten years earlier.
Lubell and the other analysts featured in this section positioned their arguments
chiefly in response to liberals who assumed the political cleavages of the New Deal
would continue indefinitely. Importantly, though, the argument that financially better-off
workers would turn to the right was consistent with the labor-liberal assumption that
economic interest was the driving force in politics. “Keeping,” in Lubell’s terms, had
simply become more important than “getting.” In this framework, economic interest
trumped ideology, and the latter could quickly change to fit the former—as in the
archetypical new suburbanite’s switch to the Republican Party. Further, importantly,
389
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narratives #1 and #2 both drew on an association between conservatism and middle class
norms and between liberalism and working class norms. Here a worker who turned
conservative had become less like “workers” as a group. The erosion of these dual
associations—middle class/conservative and working class/liberal—is one of the critical
events in a study of white working class representation. It began earlier than the
traditional backlash narrative lets on, as the next section shows.

3. (White) workers as more conservative than (white) professionals
The third broad narrative of postwar white working class politics raised the
possibility that (white) workers might become more conservative than a (white)
professional class increasingly understood as liberal. Presenting this as a single narrative
requires more synthesis and indulgence than the previous two. Doing so, though, helps to
show how the opposition between liberal white elites and a conservative white working
class—the dominant view since the 1960s—built on intellectual work conducted in the
1940s and 1950s. In 1940s and 1950s discourse on anticommunism, racial prejudice,
cultural differences between social classes, mass culture, intellectual identity, and more,
it is possible to discern emergent images of (white) workers as rigid and traditionalist and
of (white) professionals as elitist liberals.
Before the 1960s, a clearly established narrative suggested that the liberal
governing class was different from the “average American.” A common interpretation of
the New Deal in contemporary elite discourse held that liberal intellectuals had dislodged
businessmen as the predominant governing elite. Critics of this trend argued that
209

intellectuals had no practical skills, whereas those who had been successful in business
had proven their ability as leaders and administrators. Conservatives consistently argued
that the New Deal empowered a dangerous and unqualified clique of intellectuals bent on
intruding into Americans’ private lives. Conservative columnist Frank Kent derided
them as “third rate college professors and unsuccessful welfare workers”; H. L. Mencken
as “obscure and impotent fellows” raised to “the secular rank of princes of the blood.”391
This line of argumentation flourished as the prominence and prestige of intellectual
occupations grew: government money poured into research universities, the GI Bill
swelled undergraduate enrollment, and intellectuals maintained high-level, prestigious
positions in government. The 1952 Dwight Eisenhower-Adlai Stevenson campaign
brought to prominence the term “egghead,” a derogatory label for a liberal intellectual.392
Eisenhower’s victory, charged one conservative, “demonstrated...the extreme remoteness
of the ‘egghead’ from the thought and feeling of the whole of the people.” The majority,
in this view, disdained those who “treated mankind as if it were a large lump of dough to
be molded into shape by the confused and pushing fingers of those who, however lacking
in experience, were persuaded beyond all argument that they knew best.”393
For their critics, liberal intellectuals were also distinguished by their tendency to
push the boundaries of conventional morality on issues of gender and sexuality. “The
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average American just does not want some expert running around prying into his life and
his personal affairs and deciding for him how he should live,” Ohio congressman
Clarence Brown commented in a 1946 hearing on the creation of a national social
scientific foundation; it would be a nonstarter, Brown stressed, if liberals hoped to
“establish some sort of organization in which there would be a lot of short-haired women
and long-haired men messing into everybody’s personal affairs and lives.”394
“Nonconformity in politics is often the handmaiden of the same proclivities in sex,” two
Hearst journalists alleged in a 1951 tract deeming the nation’s capital a “femmocracy”
populated by call girls, “crackpots from the campuses, Communists, ballet-dancers and
economic planners.” In the culture of the liberal governing class, they charged, “the
women wore flat-heeled shoes and batik blouses, and went in for New Thought. The
men, if you could call some of them that, wore their hair longer than we do, read
advanced literature, and talked about the joys of collectivism.”395 One of the surest ways
to identify a radical, in this discourse, was to look for signs of unconventional personal
behavior—grooming or dress associated with homosexuality, marriages in which wives
held high-level professional jobs.
This understanding of “nonconformist” liberal culture was particularly prominent
in anticommunist discourse, which typically identified wealthy Eastern liberals as most
prone to communist involvement. “It has not been the less fortunate, or the members of
minority groups, who have been traitorous to this nation,” Joseph McCarthy alleged, “but
rather those who have had all the benefits that the wealthiest nation on earth has had to
394
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offer…the bright young men who were born with silver spoons in their mouths.”396 A
prominent stereotype of communist sympathizers in government centered on an effete,
homoerotic clique of State Department officials from old New England WASP families: a
“conspiracy of the gentlemen”…“the pompous diplomat in striped pants with phony
British accent”…“striped-pants snob”…“dilettante diplomats…with kid gloves in
perfumed drawing rooms”…“boys in striped pants.” Anticommunism and the persecution
of gay men proceeded in parallel, with allegations of homosexuality and disloyalty in the
State Department prominent in the same period.397
The common claim that communist ties were concentrated at the top of the social
hierarchy typically came with the corollary that American workers had no interest in the
false promises of the radical left. Communists might claim to speak on behalf of
workers, in this view, but workers were loyal to the United States. John Birch Society
founder Robert Welch dismissed communism’s claim to be a “movement of the
proletariat” as “one of the biggest lies in all history. For Communism has always been
imposed from the top down by the very rich, the highly educated, and the politically
powerful on the suffering masses.” In the contemporary United States, Welch charged, “I
can find you a lot more Harvard accents in Communist circles…than you can find me
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overalls.”398 American Legion magazine, commenting on suspected Soviet collaborators
brought before the House Un-American Activities Committee, stressed that the group
included “no farmer or workman or so-called ‘common man.’ Without exception they
were college graduates, Ph.D.’s, summa cum laudes and Phi Beta Kappas from Harvard,
Yale, Princeton and other great colleges.”399 Ex-communist Whittaker Chambers, whose
explosive allegations of communist involvement against former State Department official
Alger Hiss prompted a high-profile 1949 trial, saw the Hiss case as significant for the
“jagged fissure, which it did not so much open as reveal, between the plain men and
women of the nation, and those who affected to act, think and speak for them”—the
elites, and only the elites defended Hiss, Chambers suggested, while ordinary Americans
saw through his disloyalty.400
One of the most consistent patterns in liberal discourse in the New Deal era is the
use of the language of averageness (“common people,” “plain people”) to mark off
liberals’ majority constituency from the wealthy and well connected. The more
identifiable liberals became as an elite, the more that same language (“common man,”
“plain men and women,” as in the previous paragraph) could undercut their claim to
speak for the majority. In this context, to be “average” meant to lack significant power or
wealth—which prominent liberals now had—and to remain within a cultural and political
mainstream where radicalism and non-normative sexual practices had no place. It is
important to stress, though, that the work of defining liberals against the “plain people”
398
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was not performed by conservatives alone: in a pattern that would become increasingly
prevalent in the 1960s, liberals who themselves felt a sense of alienation from the (white)
majority adopted frames that mirrored the conservative claims against them.
Liberal intellectuals, like their political adversaries, advanced a frame in which
liberal leadership meant leadership by intellectuals instead of businessmen.
(“Intellectuals” is effectively synonymous with “liberals” in contemporary discourse).
For contemporary liberals, there was no workable alternative to intellectuals in
government—their expertise was needed to direct the complex programs of the modern
state. Liberals did, however, identify intellectuals as a distinctive elite class with an
unconventional outlook. “New Dealism” was not only a set of policies, historian Eric
Goldman argued, but a way of looking at the world. It was “the assumption that the new
was better than the old; that intellectuals ought to be leaders; that morals and religion as
well as economics and politics were constantly to be re-examined…that the cocked eye
was man’s most proper expression.”401 Liberals also expressed concern that the growing
power and prestige of intellectuals would set off dangerous anti-intellectualism within the
broader public. “The practical, non-intellectual man feels uneasy” under liberal
leadership, intellectual David Riesman hypothesized. “He resents the fact that his own
importance, as well as his own understanding of the world, are threatened by the
intellectual and the intellectual’s ability to change ideas.” Riesman predicted that
American politics would increasingly be marked by “a new status warfare” between “the
better educated upper middle class people” and “the groups which, by reason of rural or
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small-town location, ethnicity, or other parochialism, feel threatened by ideas.”402 It is
not difficult to see here the familiar frame in which liberalism and sophistication
accompany upper middle class status.
For Riesman and his contemporaries, this kind of anti-intellectual politics
manifested most clearly in the anticommunist conservatism exemplified by Joe
McCarthy. The dominant liberal reading understood McCarthyism as a populist revolt
against elite liberals.403 In a compelling 1955 essay, Riesman and Nathan Glazer framed
the rise of McCarthyism as a bookend to liberals’ claim to speak for the majority.
“During the New Deal days a group of intellectuals led and played lawyer for…a mass of
underprivileged people,” they suggested. Now, however, “many who were once among
the inarticulate masses are no longer silent” and had “reject[ed] the liberal intellectuals as
guides” in favor of “right-wing demi-intellectuals.” Riesman and Glazer posited that the
relationship between the liberals and the “masses” was only a temporary alliance—it
relied on white workers’ submerged status, their lack of anything to protect, and their
inability to speak for themselves. “The earlier leadership by the intellectuals of the
underprivileged came about through a program of economic changes,” they stressed.
Now raised to security, these groups remained “discontented,” but for reasons more
402
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difficult to alleviate—the fear of losing what they had gained, the desire to be recognized
as fully American. In a prosperous but somehow still unsatisfactory existence, Riesman
and Glazer wrote, these “ex-masses” “must continually seek for reasons explaining their
unrest—and the reasons developed by intellectuals for the benefit of previous proletariats
are of course quite irrelevant.”
The literature on McCarthyism formed part of a broader reappraisal of workingclass politics among liberals. Concerns about workers’ susceptibility to dangerous,
emotion-laden politics were nothing new, as emphasized in the coda to Chapter 1.
However, these concerns became more central after Nazism, as it became
(understandably) far more difficult for liberals to view mass politics through a rosy lens.
Fascism was in part a “popular mass movement,” sociologist Talcott Parsons argued in
1942, in which “large masses of the ‘common people’ have become imbued with a highly
emotional, indeed often fanatical, zeal for a cause.”404 Nazis’ use of radio and film
intensified concerns about the uncritical mass media audience and its susceptibility to
elite manipulation (see coda to Chapter 1), a concern that came through particularly
clearly in postwar criticism of industrialized popular culture.405 Broadly speaking,,
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contemporaries emphasized the power of hatred to motivate political mobilization. Led
by historian Richard Hofstadter, liberal scholars in the 1950s popularized a reappraisal of
the populist history of the United States, in which Populism was an antimodern
movement driven by psychological strains and anti-Semitism.406 A vast social scientific
literature on prejudice407 identified a link between class status and tolerance and implied
that lower-income American whites posed the greatest impediment to racial equality.
One key common thread in this analysis—and a key difference between
understanding white workers as becoming conservative like professionals (section #2)
and becoming more conservative than professionals (#3)—was an emphasis on
psychology-based frameworks for understanding politics. These frameworks, in
comparison to political economic frames, tended to yield a more pessimistic assessment
of white workers’ potential as a progressive force. If political behavior ultimately
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depended on emotional and often irrational drives, whether a constituency’s objective
interests were progressive was less important. What mattered most was how that
constituency perceived and acted on its political interests in present-day politics.408
As the coda to Chapter 1 showed, concerns about how white workers perceived
and acted upon their interests had been prevalent in left-liberal discourse throughout the
Depression era. But liberal discourse in previous decades had often attributed socially
undesirable behavior to material deprivation: If most workers were currently at a low
level of political or cultural sophistication, that would change as their socioeconomic
circumstances improved. By the 1950s, a far greater percentage of leftists and liberals
had abandoned these kinds of teleological assumptions about (white) workers. The
foremost reason for this was, again, the widespread belief that the formerly
underprivileged had achieved economic security. As one liberal explained, “It has not
been many years since [liberals] could concentrate on removing the economic and social
disabilities suffered by the people, while telling themselves that when this was
accomplished the proletariat would raise itself from its intellectual and cultural
degradation.” Now he and his cohort were like “climbers who discover, on attaining
what they had taken to be the summit, that they have only reached a plateau…We are
separated from the good society by terrain far more forbidding than any we had
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foreseen.”409 While “today’s material conditions of life are fantastically better than we
ever thought possible,” another contemporary wrote, there “would be much less cause for
concern if levels of taste, thought and morals had come as far from what they were in
1933 as the average income has moved from what it was at the same time.”410 For these
elites, once white workers’ obvious material deprivation seemed to have been eliminated,
it was more difficult to overlook concerns about “taste, thought, and morals” and
continue to view white workers sympathetically.
Taking multiple literatures broadly, mid-1940s through 1950s social science and
political commentary offered at least four explanations for (white) workers’ higher
susceptibility to racism and right-wing politics. One line of reasoning centered on
education. In the dominant postwar framework—often called “racial liberalism” and
exemplified by Swedish social scientist Gunnar Myrdal’s 1944 book An American
Dilemma—racism was understood as an irrational set of beliefs in the head of the
individual, reducible through education and persuasion.411 The idea that existing racial
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inequality did not stem from biological inferiority was difficult to grasp for the
uneducated “masses of white Americans,” Myrdal wrote. Environmental explanations
for social inequality, he suggested, “tax knowledge and imagination heavily…To
conceive that apparent differences in capacities and attitudes could be cultural in
origin…requires difficult and complicated thinking about a multitude of mutually
dependent variables, thinking which does not easily break into the lazy formalism of
unintellectual people.” More broadly, in this view, effective democratic citizenship
required critical thinking and respect for free expression and the rights of others—skills
that required cultural capital. “A liberal outlook is much more likely to emerge among
people in a somewhat secure social and economic situation and with a background of
education,” Myrdal argued. “The problem for political liberalism…appears to be first to
lift the masses to security and education and then work to make them liberal.”412
In a second common line of argumentation, poor whites vented or displaced
frustration with their economic status through racism, and they held most tightly to
racism simply because they possessed little aside from whiteness. The economically
insecure white man was “afraid to lose his own feeling of superiority,” the Journal of
Social Issues explained. “If he did he might have to face the fact that he wasn’t
succeeding as well as he wished—that he was unable to realize the American dream.” If a
man invested in white supremacy felt “downhearted and uncertain of his job, [or] if he is
living in poverty and squalor—at least he can feel that he has something in his make-up
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that is superior to others.”413 It is important to note that leftists also generally attributed
white working class racism to economic deprivation and competition for scarce
resources.414 A key difference lies in the implication that educated and economically
secure whites would make better allies precisely because they did not compete with
blacks and thus felt less threatened by them. As Myrdal put it, “the Negro’s friend—or
the one who is least unfriendly—is still rather the upper class of white people, the people
with economic and social security who are truly a ‘noncompetitive group.’”415
Third, contemporaries suggested, those who had recently attained middle-class or
middle-income status would be most opposed to anything that seemed to threaten it.
Political scientist Robert Lane’s work on “why the American common man believes as he
does” found that these (white) working class men—as distinct from the “lower classes”—
did not “want equality.” These “stable breadwinners, churchgoers, voters, family men”
had achieved stability “through hard work and sometimes bitter sacrifices,” Lane
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stressed; the idea of seeing the “lower orders raised and one’s own hard-earned status
given…as a right and not a reward for effort, seems to them desperately wrong.”416
Lane’s argument here pushed back on the liberal view of all nondominant groups as part
of the same “people” or “majority”—distinctions that elites overlooked meant a great
deal to those who had worked hard for modest gains.
A fourth prominent line of argumentation held that working class cultural norms
and ways of life—family life especially—drew workers to right-wing politics. A
growing academic literature in the 1940s and 1950s focused on understanding class
differences in cultural terms. One scholar writing in 1947 outlined the basic premise:
“Social classes in America constitute somewhat separate sub-groups in American society,
each with its own cultural attributes of behavior, ideas, and life-situations.”417 Studies
examined differences across a range of areas, from childrearing to mental health to
participation in political activity.418 Where the dominant view in elite public discourse
tied rising incomes and consumerism to cultural homogenization, this social scientific
literature stressed that workers with higher incomes did not cease to be distinctively
working class. While “today’s wage earners do have tremendous buying and consuming
416
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power,” one researcher put it, “they are not just like everyone else”—meaning educated
white professionals—“now that they have money to spend.”419 This finding was of
particular interest to marketers hoping to appeal to white workers, the impetus behind
much of the research on working class culture in this period.
The most infamous argument about the political distinctiveness of the working
class was developed in the late 1950s by sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, under the
title of “working class authoritarianism.”420 Briefly, Lipset contended that the “lowerclass way of life produces individuals with rigid and intolerant approaches to politics.”
Workers’ “unsophisticated perspective…greater suggestibility, absence of a sense of past
and future…inability to take a complex view, greater difficulty in abstracting from
concrete experience, and lack of imagination” excluded them from meaningful
participation in political debate, in this view. Because of the rigidity of working class
parenting practices, the “lower-class individual” was “likely to have been exposed to
punishment, lack of love, and a general atmosphere of tension and aggression since early
childhood”; all experiences likely to “produce deep-rooted hostilities” that emerged later
in life as “ethnic prejudice” and “political authoritarianism.” Individuals with a “relative
lack of economic and psychological security” also tended to relieve tension via “the
419
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venting of hostility against a scapegoat,” Lipset argued. In sum, the working class tended
towards a view of “politics and personal relationships in black-and-white terms, a desire
for immediate action, [and] an impatience with talk and discussion.”421
Lipset’s view of the working class was more alarmist than the literature as a
whole but generally consistent with it. The imagery that emerged from social scientific
and marketing literature portrayed (white) workers as rigid, traditionalist, familycentered, and distrustful of the outside world. Because they were the primary target of
advertising, white working class women drew more attention than white working class
men. Marketers understood the white working class woman as a housewife who lived an
exceedingly narrow life focused on her home and family and had little knowledge of or
inclination towards the outside world. Journalist Vance Packard, summarizing the
consensus in 1957, identified her as “Mrs. Middle Majority”:
Mrs. Middle Majority has a fine moral sense of responsibility and builds her
whole life around her home. On the other hand she lives in a narrow, limited
world and is quite timid about the outside world….She works harder than other
women, her life has very narrow routines, she likes to deal only with familiar
things and tends to view anything outside her narrow world as dangerous and
threatening…She finds it difficult to manipulate ideas in an original way and is
not very adventurous.422
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“Mrs. Middle Majority” had no identity beyond her role as wife and mother—to
researchers, she was, in the words of the title of one of the most notable 1950s studies of
working class culture, Workingman’s Wife. White working class men, as they appeared
in the social scientific literature, tended to be figured as “traditional, ‘old-fashioned,’
somewhat religious, and patriarchal.”423 Above all, in this discourse, working class life
was simple, routinized, and repetitive. Here white workers had some admirable
qualities—though rigid and not particularly intelligent, they were devoted to those within
their circle. But there was little in this emerging vision of (white) workers that supported
an understanding of the white working class as an essential part of an informed or
progressive citizenry.
Liberal scholars in the postwar period worked to understand very difficult and
important questions—why people could follow an ideology like Nazism, what caused
racial prejudice, why bullies with no regard for the truth could gain such incredible
power. Their concerns about mass politics should not be written off as simple elitism.
But a significant takeaway from this work, particularly as it bled into social commentary
and journalism, was that educated and sophisticated thinkers about politics could not
have faith in what one contemporary called “the basic assumption of democracy—that
ordinary men and women possess good sense.”424
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Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the postwar middle class—as a symbol and (in part)
as an actually existing social formation—gained such power because a wide range of
political actors had a stake in incorporating white industrial workers into the symbolic
center of the American polity. Secure, happy workers occupied a crucial position in the
vision of America that elites hoped to convey to prospective international allies. Their
advancement proved capitalism’s evolution from tycoon days and the social
responsibility exercised by modern business. It also served as vital evidence of unions’
successes and mainstream status. Even in a period of substantial consensus, though,
contemporaries could read the ascent of (white) industrial workers to middle-income
status quite differently: as proof of the long-term dominance of American culture by a
middle class mentality, for instance, or, conversely, the consolidation of the changes
brought by the new liberal governing philosophy.
As Chapter 1 argued, one of the achievements of the labor-liberal alliance was to
fundamentally alter how elites understood the American electoral majority. It is useful to
conclude this chapter by asking to what extent the widespread emphasis on mass
affluence undermined, reversed, or solidified those changes. The view that modernity
required and the majority demanded the protection of unions and the state maintained
hegemony throughout the period. The widespread emphasis on working class affluence
heightened the symbolic importance of (white) workers, as their prosperity and
contentment served for so many as chief evidence of the goodness of American society.
No mainstream elites accorded them—publicly at least—anything less than full
226

citizenship. As has long been noted, the first Republican presidential administration
since the New Deal accepted the basic New Deal understanding of the modern electorate.
Even conservatives who opposed New Deal reforms in general could not display
indifference to industrial workers’ welfare; they argued instead that those who claimed to
represent workers undermined workers’ wellbeing.
The view that the majority might support a far-reaching left/liberal politics did not
fare so well, even while the continued power of the labor-liberal understanding of
working class identity helped to consign libertarianism to the margins. Interpreters
identified clear limits on the kinds of politics that would be realistic in a post-scarcity
age. To be sure, there were significant differences of opinion about the future course of
(white) workers’ politics. Some predicted that the basic cleavages of the New Deal era
would continue, in somewhat muted form, for the foreseeable future; for others, domestic
politics would be centered on a broad, comfortable suburban middle class primarily
focused on protecting its gains; alternatively, the material divisions of the New Deal
period would be supplanted by cultural antagonisms that placed white workers ever more
on the right side of the ledger, opposed to liberalism. But only strong partisans could
imagine majority support for a politics to the left of New Deal liberalism or to the right of
moderate Republicanism. Left/liberal faith in white workers as a key progressive force
was a faith founded on those workers’ objective economic interests. When their
economic interests appeared well served by the existing system, that faith could not be
easily sustained.
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“New Dealism, having labored mightily to lift low-income Americans, found that
it had created a nation of the middle class,” historian Eric Goldman wrote in 1956.425
The dominant view prior to the New Deal had understood the United States as a “nation
of the middle class,” but the middle class Goldman referenced was different. Laborliberalism had a great deal of success in shifting dominant understandings of American
identity such that proud unionism, support for “big government,” or non-Nordic ancestry
did not disqualify an American from membership in the normative middle class and the
values mapped to it—individualism, self-reliance, the work ethic. A white steelworker
who prized his seniority and distrusted his employer did not violate the work ethic. A
white autoworker who bought a suburban home on a VA loan and a union wage was no
collectivist. These workers, whatever the role collective economic rights had played in
their enfranchisement, could be seen as advancing as individuals in a way that was less
true for working class people of color. The chief symbol of their advancement was the
single-family home, and the policies that supported them remained relatively invisible.
The new middle class was more urban and suburban, less rural; it included Poles, Czechs,
Italians, and Jews. It did not, as Samuel Lubell emphasized, share the old-stock middle
class’s reflexive distaste for statism. But it was still a middle class; it valued moderation,
stability, and self-sufficiency. The normativity of the great middle class, individualism,
and the work ethic proved durable, as did their link to whiteness and the patriarchal
family.
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In the short term, a limited labor-liberal agenda could benefit from that
normativity. As the triumphalist narrative of American prosperity was replaced in the
1960s by a focus on racial and cultural inequality and division, this was no longer the
case. When longstanding understandings of middle class Americanism appeared to be
under deep threat in the 1960s, belief in the political and cultural dominance of a broad,
secure white majority served few left-of-center aims. As Chapter 3 details, the prevailing
elite imagery of middle-income white workers changed significantly by the late 1960s—
picturing them as deeply angry and alienated from society, not incorporated smoothly
within it. Yet 1950s intellectual work on working class affluence deeply informed the
analysis of backlash politics that displaced it.
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Chapter 3: Rethinking Middle America
Since the late 1960s, “Middle America” has been one of the more durable tropes
in American politics, used to refer to a traditional Americanism and a politics of
resentment most often associated with the white working class, rural America, and the
Midwest. Donald Trump is only the latest in a long line of populist conservatives to be
deemed “Middle America’s messenger.”426 Yet while Middle American culture is
sometimes imagined as fixed in time, the concept of “Middle America” has a history, and
a significant one. It dates to the late 1960s, when the anger and alienation spurred by the
civil rights movement, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and an increasingly high-profile
radical left rose to the forefront of elite public discourse. “In recent years we have
become aware of the emergence of Middle Americans,” sociologist Murray Friedman
wrote in 1971. “Newspaper and magazine articles have been written about them, social
scientists are starting to study this group, and politicians have developed elaborate
strategies in an effort to use them to gain or keep power.”427
The conventional story of the construction of Middle America focuses on the
conservative politicians who saw opportunity in the turmoil of the period. In the
conventional account, conservative electoral strategy in the late 1960s centered on
appealing to the cultural values and racial fears of white working class and lower middle
class voters who felt threatened by the rise of the civil rights movement and the dissent
and cultural change of the period. “Middle America” was both a name for this
constituency and a rhetorical trope that contemporaries, most notably Richard Nixon,
426

Patrick J. Buchanan, “Trump: Middle America’s Messenger,” The American Conservative, February 23,
2016.
427
Murray Friedman, Overcoming Middle Class Rage (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971), 15.

230

used to appeal to it. Reworking liberal and left populism by substituting journalists,
academics, and liberal politicians for the economic elites targeted by the left, they
developed a political identity that defined white workers against (white) liberal/cultural
elites and African Americans. Emphasizing “their solidarity with the concerns of an
imprecisely defined ‘silent majority’ of…taxpayers, white ethnics, housewives, [and]
‘Middle Americans’ who felt scorned by the New Left and besieged by powerful
liberals” allowed Republicans to “capture” formerly Democratic constituencies like
“ethnic Catholics…blue-collar workers, union members…Out of this maelstrom of
defection there emerged a new social formation, Middle America,” the backbone of a new
conservative electoral majority.428
Nixon remains the political figure most associated with Middle America in both
academic literature and popular memory. He is sometimes positioned as possessed of a
unique insight into the psyche of alienated white workers. “Nixon knew in his very soul
that working people would rally against a new kind of elite,” Jefferson Cowie writes.429
In both scholarly and popular accounts, he is credited with almost singlehandedly
originating the “two Americas” frame that has opposed Middle America to intellectual
elites, Red States to Blue States, and so on. For Rick Perlstein, “What Nixon left behind
428
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was the very terms of our national self-image: the notion that there are two kinds of
Americans. On the one side: Nixon’s ‘Silent Majority,’ the ‘non-shouters’: the Middle
Class, Middle America…On the other side are the ‘liberals,’ the ‘cosmopolitans,’ the
‘intellectuals.’”430 “With one rhetorical stroke,” Matthew Lassiter argues, referencing
Nixon’s 1969 speech introducing the term “Silent Majority,” “Nixon identified a new
populist category that redefined how political groups strive for influence.”431
The conventional account of the construction of Middle America, this chapter
suggests, only captures part of the story. Middle America was as significant for liberals
and journalists—the elites defined against Middle America in conservative criticism—as
it was for conservatives, and the claims Nixon and his supporters made about white
workers were not unique in the broader elite public discourse of the period. This chapter
develops an alternative origin story for Middle America, spotlighting the work of
journalists and liberal commentators who sought to understand and respond to what they
saw as a sharp turn to the political right among white workers. Placing the focus on these
actors suggests that Middle America—as an identity category in elite political
discourse—was not the product of conservative strategy alone. Rather, it was the product
of the mutually reinforcing discourses of disparate and often competing elites. Many
liberals, like conservatives, argued that a vast cultural divide separated well-off and
professional whites from an increasingly conservative white majority; like their
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contemporaries, they characterized this majority’s politics as marked by anxiety about
change, support for traditional Americanism, and hostility to black Americans.
The centerpiece of my understanding of white working class representation since
the 1960s is the notion of “elite consensus.” This is meant in the most straightforward
descriptive sense: elites of divergent aims and perspectives coalesced around the same
basic understanding of the politics and culture of white workers. To be sure, some elites
(often conservatives) championed and romanticized white workers, while others (often
liberals) were disdainful of them. However, whether white workers were viewed as
reactionaries or defenders of rightful tradition, the fundamental assumptions about the
group’s politics and culture were largely the same. Conservative efforts to define, claim,
and appeal to a majority constituency consistently dovetailed with liberal and journalistic
efforts to understand the voters many saw as the most important force in American
politics. The elite consensus frame foregrounds this basic alignment. It sheds light on
one of the most fundamental questions for a history of white working class representation
since the 1960s: why and how the white working class became the predominant symbol
of cultural traditionalism and anti-black backlash.
The short answer to this question, the next two chapters suggest, is that it made
intellectual and/or strategic sense for elites leading the reaction against 1960s dissent, and
for those seeking to quell that reaction, to place the white working class at the forefront
of their claims. Liberal analysis of the backlash understood resistance as concentrated
within the white working class, Chapter 3 suggests, in part because that reading was
consistent with prevailing understandings of racism and working class culture and
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because it fit a vision of society favorable to white, professional-class liberals. By
placing white workers at the center of their appeals, Chapter 4 suggests, conservatives
and other critics of liberalism could invest their claims with a sense of underdog status.
Framing the analysis in this way should not obscure the fact that resistance to the civil
rights movement and to social change was widespread within the white working class, as
it was among higher-income whites and white America broadly. One key goal of
Chapters 3 and 4 collectively is to convey the causes and consequences of the assumption
that anti-black and traditionalist views would be found almost exclusively within the
white working class. This frame allows for sounder analysis than (for instance) asking
whether the stereotype of the bigoted white worker is “true” or not.
Chapter 3 is divided into two parts. Part One lays out the political context that
prompted elites to speak to, for, and about Middle America—the growing elite awareness
of Northern white resistance to the civil rights movement and resistance to the
counterculture & anti-Vietnam War movement. Against that backdrop, both liberals and
conservatives sought to label and describe those Americans who were most opposed to
dissent and most dedicated to the preservation of the older ways of life dissent seemed to
threaten. Part Two focuses on how contemporary liberals’ engagement with what might
be called the problem of the white working class—how to explain white working class
backlash and support for right-wing politicians, and what to do about it—helped to
redefine the dominant elite-level view of the white worker.
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Terminology
In this chapter, I use “Middle America” to refer to a political identity,
constituency, and social type defined by middle-income whiteness, cultural and social
conservatism, cultural mainstream status, anti-black racism, and/or antipathy to white
liberal elites. While the boundaries of Middle America were never rigidly delineated,
Middle America clearly included certain “kinds” of people and excluded others. White
men doing blue-collar work—“hard hats”—stood at the forefront of the imagery around
Middle America. For some interpreters, Middle America also included lower-status
segments of the white-collar working white population, such as clerks and salespeople.
Occasionally, conservative businessmen or professionals might be included. Excluded
were African Americans, white liberal, urban, or cosmopolitan elites, feminists, political
radicals, and others seen as antagonistic to traditional, mainstream Americanism.432
“Traditional” is always a fraught concept, but it had a clear meaning in contemporary
discourse. Norms of hard work, self-sufficiency, the patriarchal family, heterosexuality,
chastity, and a restrained self-presentation were collectively described as “traditional”
values, “older” American values, or “middle class” values.
Contemporaries used other language to refer to the “kind” of people who made up
Middle America: the “working class,” the “white working class,” the “lower middle
class,” the “middle class,” the “Forgotten Americans,” the “Silent Majority,” the “New
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American Majority,” the “majority,” the “people,” the “workingman,” the “worker,” and
the “white ethnic.” These terms were not entirely interchangeable. “White ethnic,” for
instance, referred to a white worker of southern or eastern European (or sometimes Irish)
descent; the “Silent Majority” and “Middle America” were more inclusive of professional
or managerial-class conservatives than was, say, “working class.” Very often, though,
these terms were not clearly differentiated in analysis. Here “middle class” and “working
class” are not two distinct political economic categories; they are two ways of naming a
group of middle-income whites distinguished by a shared cultural orientation. I have
framed my argument around “Middle America” because it was both entirely new in this
period and used consistently across the political spectrum. When I am referring
specifically to white working class people as historical agents, I use “worker-actors.”
One of the central frameworks in the analysis of American politics after the 1960s
opposes “social” and “economic” issues. That framework has been particularly common
in analysis of the politics of the white working class, which is not coincidental—it
entered the discourse to explain the breakup of the New Deal coalition.433 Prior to about
1970, “social issues” meant any issues of societal importance, particularly as related to
social justice. Earlier in the twentieth century, the “social question” had been
synonymous with the “labor question”—how to deal with the changes brought about by
industrial capitalism. The first influential use of “social issues” as opposed to economic
433
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issues came in the 1970 book The Real Majority, written by a pair of conservative
Democrats who warned that any party losing touch with the “unyoung, unpoor, unblack”
majority would be promptly removed from power. Here the “Social Issue”—also called
“law and order, backlash, antiyouth, malaise, change, alienation”—was understood as “a
new…issue powerful enough that under certain circumstances it can compete in political
potency with the older economic issues”434 that had ensured Democratic dominance.
It is important to note that the opposition between “social” and “economic”
issues—as with any conceptual framework opposing economics and culture—has clear
limitations. The framework largely restricts the realm of the “economic” to the issues
most associated with New Deal liberalism—organized labor, regulatory policy,
government intervention in the economy as a basic principle. From the 1970s to the
1990s, analysts repeatedly designated as “social issues” issues with obvious political
economic significance, including busing, welfare, efforts to improve the representation of
women and people of color in the workplace, the Equal Rights Amendment, and the gay
rights movement.435 In some cases, conservatism on “social issues” seems to be simply a
euphemism for racism.436 There has been a clear tendency to understand “economic
issues” as in effect what the imagined average voter (typically a middle-income white
heterosexual man) might see as economic. The effect was to detach issues associated
434
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with people of color, women, and LGBTQ people from political economy. The
framework also encourages a reading of liberal politics among white workers as
motivated by straightforward material rewards alone rather than solidarity or the pursuit
of dignity and fairness.
In short, my view is that the social vs. economic issues framework can be, if not
handled in a careful way, very often counterproductive. I often refer to “social” and
“economic” issues in the next two chapters, though, because it is difficult to accurately
represent the discourse without using these concepts as contemporaries used them. It has
often been argued that white workers began to be understood as conservative in the
1960s, but this is not specific enough. The emerging elite consensus framed white
workers as conservative on social issues. Very few elites saw white workers as economic
conservatives devoted to a business or austerity agenda or the sanctity of free enterprise.
For contemporaries, it was precisely this bifurcated political identity that made white
workers a significant swing constituency—cultural issues pulled them to the right, while
economic issues pulled them to the left.437

I. The Roots of Middle America
What I call the “elite consensus” view of white working class identity—in which
white workers were understood as the foremost opponents of racial and cultural
liberalism—developed out of disparate elites’ overlapping responses to the political
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context of the mid- to late 1960s. Staunch opposition to the civil rights movement, the
counterculture, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and the rapid pace of change, including
and especially among Northern white workers, became one of the central themes in elite
public discourse; as a result, older political assumptions—about Democrats’ advantage
with white workers and Northern whites’ basic support for civil rights—eroded
considerably. By the late 1960s, multiple observers—most notably Richard Nixon and
his supporters—saw blue-collar whites as the core of a patriotic, moral, and traditionalist
anti-liberal majority held together by opposition to dissent. New political categories
(“Middle America,” the “Silent Majority”) emerged to describe this constituency, while
older ones (“workers,” the “middle class”) took on new meaning.
Resistance to the civil rights movement among Northern whites
The immediate roots of Middle America’s rise to prominence lie first and
foremost in the increasing salience for 1960s white elites of Northern white resistance to
the civil rights movement. For decades, Northern white worker-actors had been
“defending” their neighborhoods against integration, often violently, and Northern
politicians had been successfully drawing on racial appeals438, but a significant majority
of white elites simply did not grasp the political implications of race outside the South, in
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part as a result of the discursive environment they inhabited.439 Before the 1950s,
coverage of racial issues or black communities in the Northern white press was minimal
and typically stigmatizing. This began to change dramatically when the civil rights
movement in the South became a major national story in the mid-1950s. As a substantial
literature has documented, Northern white media and Southern black activists developed
a symbiotic relationship in which, as Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff put it, the media
“held in common with the civil rights movement an interest in a simple, live, electrifying
story in which good confronts evil.”440 Through the mid-1960s, the dominant
understanding of race and politics among white Northern elites hewed heavily to a frame
of Southern exceptionalism, in which the problem of race in America was a Southern
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problem and most white Northerners were sympathetic (at worst, indifferent) to African
Americans’ claims.
It was against this backdrop that elite-level observers understood what came to be
called the “backlash” as new and motivated by 1960s political developments—urban
rioting, the visibility of black radicalism, and (first and foremost) the national Democratic
Party’s increasing ties to the civil rights movement’s agenda. Elite public discourse noted
clear rumblings of resistance, for instance, after John F. Kennedy took a newly strong
stance in a nationally televised 1963 speech on civil rights.441 Politicians noted newly
unfavorable reactions to the prospect of new civil rights legislation from their white
constituents: “For the first time I’m getting mail from white people saying ‘wait a minute,
we’ve got some rights too,’” a Democratic senator told the Washington Post in 1963.442
Robert Kennedy revealed after his brother’s death that JFK had been concerned that civil
rights legislation would harm the party’s prospects “even in the suburbs” and “the big
cities in the North.”443 For the first time and even suggest the apparent novelty of this
concern. As Democrats expressed unease about the political implications of Northern
resistance, some Republicans saw a new strategic opportunity. “A year ago it was said
that Kennedy was unbeatable,” commented one Republican strategist in 1963. “But
people are not thinking that way now.” “The hostility to the new Negro militancy has
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seemingly spread like wildfire from the South to the entire country,” wrote an advisor to
Arizona senator and 1964 GOP presidential nominee Barry Goldwater.444
It is important to situate this discourse in the context of the “Southern strategy”
advocated by some conservative Republicans in the period, including Goldwater.445 In
this view, Republicans’ path to a national majority ran through the South, the nation’s
most conservative region, which was locked into supporting the Democrats in national
elections because of its entrenched one-party system. Liberals and moderates within the
Republican Party recoiled from what they saw as an openly racist strategy and
emphasized the need to reduce Democrats’ margins in the industrial cities among white
ethnic and African American voters. In general, in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s,
white ethnic and Southern white constituencies were championed by two different groups
of Republicans and linked to two different kinds of political appeals in a running debate
one historian calls “The South versus the City.”446 Northern white workers were
associated with the brand of politics conservatives derided as “me-tooism”—cultivating
support among interest groups along the lines suggested by the New Deal. Conservative
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stalwart Robert Taft wrote to one correspondent that his moderate rivals “never had any
interest in the South because it interferes with their idea that we should appease the
minorities of the North”447—labor, African Americans, and white ethnics. A decade
later, liberal Republican Nelson Rockefeller attacked the Southern Strategy on the
grounds that it would, by “writ[ing] off the Negro and other minority
groups…deliberately write off the great industrial states of the North.”448 “Other minority
groups” could refer equally to Italians, Jews, and Puerto Ricans, and the phrasing
suggests an assumption that Northern white ethnic workers had more in common with
Northern African American workers than they did with white Southerners. This
assumption—evident, to name only a few examples, in one journalist’s casual reference
to the “Negro and labor vote” and a segregationist newspaper’s attacks on “labor, the
minorities” and “the gimmecrats”449—is indicative of labor-liberal success in linking
labor’s cause to the civil rights cause at the discursive level (if not as much in practice).
The 1964 election cycle, in one prominent elite-level frame, was a test of the
political potency of anti-black sentiment in the North. It was during the 1964 campaign
that the term “backlash”—which initially referred specifically to the threat posed by the
“race issue” to Democratic prospects, especially in Northern, urban white
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neighborhoods—began to appear regularly in the media.450 1964 was the first
presidential run for segregationist Alabama governor George Wallace, perhaps the single
individual most responsible for drawing elite attention to Northern white working class
backlash. Wallace, whose level of Northern support shocked and disturbed many
observers, “demonstrated…for the first time the fear that white working-class Americans
have of Negroes,” journalist Theodore White wrote in his election postmortem.451
Republican nominee Barry Goldwater adopted a strategy explicitly pitched at anti-black
sentiments among white voters, emphasizing the need for “law and order” and states’
rights.452 In contemporary elite discourse, one of the key questions raised by the
Goldwater campaign was whether conservatives could bring about a realignment in
which the parties would be defined by opposing positions on race, and in which the
Republicans would be the party of the white majority. “The race issue” was unique,
columnist Stewart Alsop argued, in that “it permits Goldwater to reach across party lines
for votes in areas normally heavily Democratic.” Alsop noted a “growing belief that
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white votes for Goldwater might at this time of racial crisis vastly outnumber black votes
for Kennedy, in the North as well as in the South.”453
Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory in 1964, accompanied by substantial gains for
the liberal wing in Congress, reduced the salience of liberal concerns for a short time.
Johnson won 44 states and 61% of the popular vote, the largest margin for a Democratic
presidential candidate since FDR. Goldwater won only South Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, along with his home state of Arizona. Most
observers framed the result as a repudiation of conservatism and as confirmation that
anti-black racism was not a determinative issue in Northern politics. “The vote in 1964
must be taken as a decisive setback to the cause of segregation and what came to be
named the ‘white backlash,’” pollster Louis Harris told an audience shortly after the
election. “For other than in the deep South, people turned their backs on prejudice.”454
“White Backlash Doesn’t Develop,” one New York Times headline put it.455
The view that the problem of race was a Southern problem, and that “white
backlash” would not infect Northern politics, collapsed rapidly in the mid-1960s. Riots
in African American neighborhoods in multiple cities outside the South (typically in
response to incidents of police brutality, and beginning in August 1965 in Watts, Los
Angeles) came as a shock to most white elites and shifted the focal point of elite attention
from the rural South to the urban North. Northern whites who “for many a long
year…could look down their noses at the South,” Newsweek editor Osborn Elliott wrote
453
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in 1967, “came to realize that their own vision was similarly impaired.”456 One of the
consequences of increased elite attention to issues like housing segregation, employment
discrimination, and educational disparities in the North was greater elite awareness of
white resistance there. When Martin Luther King and other activists marched through
white ethnic Chicago neighborhoods in 1966 as part of an open housing campaign, they
were met with slurs, jeers, death threats, and thrown projectiles. King, who was hit by a
rock, told reporters that he had never seen such a display of hatred before: “The people of
Mississippi ought to come to Chicago to learn how to hate.”457
Electoral politics was also critical in drawing elite attention to the scope of the
backlash. In the mid-1960s through early 1970s, prominent politicians in multiple cities
(including Louise Day Hicks in Boston, Mario Procaccino in New York, Charles Stenvig
in Minneapolis, Sam Yorty in Los Angeles, and Frank Rizzo in Philadelphia) built
careers on appeals to white grievances. At the national level, Democrats suffered steep
losses in the 1966 midterm elections, including 47 seats in the House. Daniel Patrick
Moynihan described the result as “a bruising declaration that the electorate is fed up to
the teeth with demonstrations and riots,” a message to elites that “the country has gone
about as far as it wishes in providing social welfare and economic assistance to the Negro
masses…The voters think Negroes have received enough for the time being.”458 For
Moynihan, “the electorate, “the country,” and “the voters” were all interchangeable with
white America; this reflects both an enduring inability to understand blacks as full
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members of the public and a growing sense that any political program would only
proceed at the sufferance of the white majority. Moynihan’s assessment of the new
political reality was shared by a significant number of Democratic elites. One aide, for
instance, urged that 1968 nominee Hubert Humphrey “not talk about anti-poverty
programs, racial integration, civil rights, welfare handouts, or social justice…stay out of
the ghettos and away from minorities.”459
As Richard Nixon prepared for his 1968 presidential run, some within his circle of
advisers continued to urge the liberal Republican line of leadership on civil rights, but
others advocated an appeal to discontented white voters in the North and South. “Take it
easy on the pro-negro speeches,” publisher William Loeb wrote to Nixon in early 1968.
“Neither the popular vote nor justice is in that direction. You have no idea how stirred up
the people in the metropolitan cities are on this subject, especially those in the north.”
“All this endless talk we have been getting about [Nixon] losing unless he gets the Negro
and Jewish vote is a pile of crap,” Pat Buchanan put it in a July 1968 memo. “We have
let ourselves be sold a bill of goods.” Instead, Buchanan emphasized, Nixon needed to
win the “Wallace Protestants,” the traditionally Democratic white working class vote in
the South, and the “Humphrey Catholics,” the traditionally Democratic white ethnic
voters in the North.460 Buchanan’s pairing of these constituencies suggests that the
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“South vs. the City” debate was becoming moot: the two constituencies might be brought
together under one program and one political identity.
Resistance to the new youth culture
This chapter understands Middle America as first and foremost a symbol of racial
grievance. It is important to be clear, though, that the backlash central to contemporary
political discourse was not only a reaction against African Americans’ advancement. It
was also understood as a reaction to the counterculture, anti-Vietnam War movement,
and changing conventions on gender and sexuality, all of which were blurred together
and understood as part of an emergent rebellious culture among young, educated whites.
“The child of prosperity and the past decade,” Theodore White put it in a typical account,
the “new culture” was defined “by its contempt and scorn of what the past has taught”
and its opposition to “all laws, manners, mores, institutions which restrict such areas of
individual expression as drugs, sex, [and] obscenities.”461 The highest-profile
manifestations of this “new culture” and its divisiveness included the student protests that
shut down Columbia University (1968), the beating of anti-Vietnam War protestors by
the Chicago Police during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago (1968), and
the “hardhat riots” (1970) in which a counter-protest group led by construction workers
beat up antiwar protestors on Wall Street in New York City.
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For contemporary elite observers, the counterculture, antiwar protests, the civil
rights movement, and urban rioting were firmly tied together under the broad umbrella of
“change,” “dissent,” “unrest,” or “disorder.” All the elements of the “social turmoil that
has gripped the country”—“racial disturbances and urban unrest, antiwar demonstrations
and revolutionary talk by dissident intellectuals, the soaring use of drugs and an apparent
collapse of conventional values”462—were seen as having arisen at roughly the same
time, ran counter to engrained modes of behavior, and had been heavily covered in the
media. As a result, in a prominent view, voters experienced them as a collective and
visceral threat. “Between 1964…and 1968, the average middle class American has gone
through many wrenching experiences,” NBC News president Reuven Frank argued. “He
has seen the ghetto riots in his living room; he has watched with horror young people of
good background expressing contempt for his dearest values in the way they dress and act
and what they say…What he has seen…has shaken him physically and morally, made
him fear for his safety, his savings, his children, his status.”463 Issues of race, sex, gender,
and culture were also tied together because they cut across conventional lines of majorparty political contestation. They gave Republicans a chance to make inroads among
Democratic voters, and they collectively raised the possibility that a (white) majority
angered by the direction of the country would dictate the future course of American
politics.
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Conservatives and Middle America
The conservative claims central to the conventional account of Middle America
came out of this context. Chapter 4 focuses more explicitly on conservatives’
championing of white workers; liberals and journalists are the focal point of this chapter.
In order to situate liberal representations within a broader context, however, it is
important to briefly outline how the most influential conservative voices of the period
understood white workers and Middle America.464 Above all, conservatives claimed a
majority constituency that had been wrongly drowned out in public discourse by vocal
but marginal groups. Nixon, who spoke on behalf of “forgotten,” “quiet,” and “silent”
Americans, provides the archetypical example. In his acceptance speech at the 1968
Republican National Convention, he defined his constituency as “the great majority of
Americans, the forgotten Americans—the non-shouters, the non-demonstrators…They
give steel to the backbone of America. They are good people, they are decent people;
they work, and they save, and they pay their taxes, and they care.”465 In a November 1969
speech on Vietnam policy, he famously appealed to the “great silent majority of my
fellow Americans,” defined against the “vocal minority” who advocated immediate
withdrawal from Vietnam “and who try to impose it on the nation by mounting
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demonstration in the street.”466 It is difficult to overstate how rapid and substantial an
imprint these categories made on conservative discourse and elite public discourse
generally. Almost immediately, conservative activists and rank-and-file citizen-actors
engaging with elite discursive spaces—writing letters to the editor or petitioning
politicians, for instance—began to identify themselves as part of the Silent Majority.467
For conservatives, categories like Middle Americans, forgotten Americans, or the
Silent Majority were not equivalent to the “worker”; they were broader. They allowed for
a populist claim on behalf of workers against an elite but did not exclude the sympathetic
professional-class and wealthy whites long central to the conservative coalition. Above
all, for conservatives, “Middle America” meant a dispersed national majority united by a
traditionalist point of view.468 In a basic argument running through much conservative
discourse, there had been a consensus way to be a good American, rightfully held up as
normative for decades. Recent years had seen a dangerous challenge to this older
understanding of Americanism, in this view, a spreading sense “that our values are false,
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that there is something wrong with being patriotic, honest, moral and hard working.”469
Middle Americans, very simply, were those who continued to hold to the “‘old values’ of
patriotism, hard work, morality, and respect for law and order,” “the traditional values of
middle class America—hard work, individual enterprise, orderly behavior, love of
country, moral piety, material progress.”470 In “its values, its virtues, its instinctive grasp
of what the United States and the West have always stood for…Middle America is the
last heir of Western civilization,” exclaimed National Review’s Frank Meyer.471 As a
result, for Meyer, Middle America met with “utter contempt” from liberals who viewed
these values as passé.
Conservatives claimed white workers (in the North and the South) as part of this
national traditionalist majority. Though formerly a liberal constituency, they argued, the
white working class rejected the excesses of 1960s liberalism. “The Catholic and ethnic
and Southern conservative foot soldiers who gave FDR those great landslides are in
fundamental disagreement with the isolated, intellectual aristocracy and liberal elite who
now set the course of their party,” Pat Buchanan argued, on issues ranging from the war
to “marijuana, school prayer, welfare, [and] campus disorders.”472 The sense that white
workers were rebelling against liberal leadership—shared, as this chapter stresses, by
liberals—was unambiguously encouraging for conservatives. As “anti-proletarian feeling
469
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on the intellectual Left” increased, one National Review contributor explained,
conservatives “discovered” the “blue collar” and became “full of admiration for his
instinctive patriotism, his mistrust of the reigning liberal abstractions and his neo-Puritan
work ethic.”473 This ironic phrasing—tying predominantly Catholic industrial workers to
a “Puritan” work ethic—is suggestive of a broader trend.
Conservatives claiming to speak for white workers in this period sought to blur or
deemphasize distinctions like North/South, Protestant/Catholic, and union/nonunion. In a
framework especially prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s, white workers in the South
and white workers in the North were very similar politically: socially conservative and
alienated by permissive liberalism. “There has come into being a vast middle American
constituency, which increasingly transcends regional and ethnic differences,” argued one
conservative in 1974. “A…conservative Southerner whose grandfather might have been
riding around in a white sheet now feels quite comfortable with [New York] Irish and
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Italian Catholics.”474 Nixon, though opponents assailed his “Southern Strategy,” rarely if
ever made arguments directed to a specifically Southern identity. By the late 1960s, no
mainstream national politician who appealed to white Southerners argued in favor of
segregation or against legal equality. Instead, a common argument stressed that the South
was reflective of the national mainstream view. “This is the heart of America, out here in
Middle America,” Nixon began a 1974 speech at the Grand Ole Opry in Nashville.475
(White) Southerners were “in the mainstream of American political thought,” George
Wallace stressed. “The people of Arkansas and Alabama speak the language the great
majority wanted to hear politicians speak for so long.”476 In collapsing the South into
Middle America and stressing the nationwide scope of their message, conservatives
sought to rebut the claim that their intent was to make a racist appeal to white voters.
It’s important to be clear that observers who understood social conservatism as
central to the politics of white workers, both North and South, rarely saw these workers
as conservative on economic issues. In the predominant view, cultural and economic
issues fell into two distinct categories, with the latter favorable to liberals and the former
favorable to conservatives. Most conservatives in the late 1960s and early 1970s saw
cultural issues as much more salient than economic issues. These contemporaries
assumed that mass prosperity had raised blue-collar (white) workers to a secure economic
position and that the liberal and radical challenge to basic American norms was such a
far-reaching and immediate threat that other concerns paled in comparison. “The real
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issues…are the ones like patriotism, morality, religion—not the material issues. If the
issues were prices and taxes, they’d vote for [the Democrats],” Nixon commented in
explaining his working class support.477 Conservatives’ claims to speak for white workers
in this period did a great deal to shift dominant elite understandings of white working
class identity, but the basic association between white workers and distrust of the rich
remained.
***
Stressing white workers’ strong commitment to “middle class” values was not
new in the 1960s, as the material in Chapter 2 indicates. However, when 1950s observers
stressed (white) workers’ movement into the middle class, they implied that these
workers had become just like other Americans (implicitly, white professionals). For late1960s observers who saw white workers as strongly committed to “traditional” or
“middle class” values, the point was that they were not just like all other Americans.
They were positioned against other groups thought to depart from these norms, as those
who did not shout or protest, as those who did not take welfare or drugs, as Democrats
who were not drawn in by their party’s foolishness.
Put differently, the strong association between white workers and “middle class”
or “traditional” American norms crystallized at a moment when these norms could not be
understood as something that nearly all Americans aspired to or shared. From one angle,
uncritical patriotism was to blame for the disgrace of Vietnam; rigid and patriarchal
477
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family norms yielded unhappiness and injustice toward women; the work ethic was a
screen for a racist society. From another, America remained the greatest country in the
world; the traditional family made for happy homes and good citizens; the work ethic
ensured a well-functioning economy and a moral society. Traditional norms were
understood as divisive, opposed by vocal and powerful groups. They were no longer
normative in a taken-for-granted way, and it was clear that those who supported them
would have to explicitly defend them. In this political moment, drawing a connection
between white workers and cultural conservatism proved appealing to political actors on
opposing sides. Even as business, government, the press, and the white-collar world
generally remained marked by segregation and professional and managerial-class whites
railed against the student left, what was by any fair assessment “a cross-class backlash
against dissent” was “represented synecdochically by the [white] working class.”478
For conservatives, the strategic benefits of that connection are easier to see.
Political actors who spoke on behalf of white workers could make a powerful elite-level
claim to represent the majority against an elite. Conservatives’ “classic populist
interpellation,” as one scholar terms it, rested on “the construction of a (implicitly
majoritarian) popular opinion whose views are embodied in the agenda of the…Right
itself against the socially and politically isolated elite liberals.” The elite consensus frame
calls attention to the role the “isolated…liberals” played in that process of
construction.479 The mid- to late 1960s saw a reshaping of the dominant elite-level
mapping of the American electorate in a way that placed white workers and liberals on
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opposing sides. That reshaping cannot be attributed only to conservative electoral
strategy or the substantial mass appeal of backlash politics. It is also necessary to look
critically at liberal political analysis. As the next section suggests, understanding the
backlash as concentrated within the white working class fit with understandings of class
and racism central to contemporary liberal discourse. It made it easier for liberal
professional-class whites to distance themselves from culpability for racism and
inequality. The scope and the importance of the backlash, including among white
workers, should not be in question. However, the broadly shared assumption that
political reaction would predominantly be found among low- and middle-income whites
pushed elite discussions around fundamental issues—race, gender, sexuality, equality,
morality, good citizenship—in a specific direction, foreclosing other possibilities.

II. Liberals, Journalists, and Middle America
As the scope of the backlash and its political implications came into focus
beginning in the mid- to late 1960s, journalists and liberal activists & intellectuals
produced a substantial body of work seeking to document white discontent and make
sense of its causes and consequences. This work emerged in the same period as the
conservative claims central to the conventional understanding of Middle America.
Liberal syndicated columnist Joseph Kraft coined the term “Middle America” itself in
June 1968. The highest-profile news media treatments of the subject appeared beginning
in fall 1969: Newsweek’s forty-page “The Troubled American: A Special Report on the
White Majority,” published in October 1969, and Time’s January 1970 issue naming
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“The Middle Americans” Man and Woman of the Year. In the same period, the Ford
Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, and Carnegie Corporation began to fund research on
working class whites. Multiple notable books on white workers from a liberal
perspective appeared in the early 1970s, including Peter Binzen’s Whitetown, U. S. A.
(1970), Louise Kapp Howe’s The White Majority (1970), Patricia and Brendan Sexton’s
Blue Collars and Hard Hats (1971), Sar Levitan’s Blue Collar Workers: A Symposium on
Middle America (1971), Michael Novak’s The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics (1971),
Robert Coles’ The Middle Americans (1971), and Murray Friedman’s Overcoming
Middle Class Rage (1971).
Above all, this work was motivated by the urgency of the moment. Simply put, it
was clear to contemporaries that white discontent imperiled the full range of left-ofcenter political goals, from continued progress for left movements to continued
incumbency for Democrats. Journalistic work on white working class discontent was
motivated by the clear electoral implications of the backlash and the broad sense that
white workers had become a major social problem in need of attention. Trends within the
media industry also played a role. Major elite media institutions were significantly more
sensitized to covering issues of race by the late 1960s, when the media industry saw a
“wave of vigorous endeavor…to penetrate the urban and racial crisis.”480 Reporting on
white resistance was part of this effort. As they increasingly spotlighted inequality and
division, however, news organizations confronted a spiraling backlash from conservative
politicians, viewers, and readers who saw their reporting on radicalism and dissent as
excessive. Journalism faced pressure to self-correct, to devote more attention to (in the
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words of trade publication Editor & Publisher) “the views of what is called ‘the silent
majority’ who feel that television has devoted too much time to the role of the militant
and the agitator and has given too little coverage to the quiet hard-working Americans of
all races.”481
It’s important to emphasize that while conservatives were careful to include
higher-income conservative constituencies within their “Silent Majority,” liberal and
journalistic analysis of the backlash generally focused narrowly on white workers, for
several reasons. Professional-class whites conducted most of the research. Conservative
views among white workers appeared more anomalous—and thus more in need of
analysis and explanation—than conservative views among well-off whites who drew
more obvious material benefit from a conservative agenda. Most of all, as the last section
of Chapter 2 argued, notable intellectual work in the postwar period had helped to
mainstream a view of white workers as more conservative than white professionals.
Prevailing understandings of what racism was and what caused it encouraged white
professionals to interpret racism as concentrated in the white working class, and
preexisting understandings of working class culture associated the white working class
with rigidity, traditionalism, and anti-intellectualism.
Two longstanding and widely accepted arguments linked working class whites to
higher levels of racial prejudice. First, the framework dominant since World War II
understood racism as a set of individual-level irrational attitudes reducible through
education; in this view, less educated whites lacked the intellectual training that would
help them to grasp the true causes of racial inequality and adopt a sympathetic view of
481
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marginalized racial groups.482 A second longstanding argument understood racism as
rooted in job competition and economic hardship; in this view, lower-income whites felt
more threatened by blacks because they would compete more closely with them. Both
explanations remained prominent in the 1960s. “It’s the man who thinks that his
neighborhood will be damaged or his job placed in jeopardy by the disenslavement of the
Negro who is the center of the ‘white backlash,’” one liberal argued.483 “In many
Northern college-educated and ‘sophisticated’ circles, at least a kind of superficial
antiracism is the norm,” another contemporary noted. For those who inhabited “worlds
in which a strong civil-rights position is not an accepted social convention, it takes either
an extraordinary compassion, or else a certain ability to deal with abstractions, to grasp
it.”484 Fundamentally, most contemporary liberals assumed, antiracist norms had not
penetrated working class culture.
An established line of social research understood working class culture as narrow
and rigid, centered on the patriarchal family and tending toward authoritarianism in
politics. Typical 1960s accounts of the “working-class subculture” understood (white)
482
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workers’ world as “distinguished by the dominant role of the family circle” as “the
outside world…is faced with detachment and…hostility”…“reminiscent of the
past…insulated from contemporary currents of thought…narrowly circumscribed by the
family, the relatives, a few friends, the union, the boss, the church”…marked by “a desire
for stability and security and an unwillingness to take social and economic risks…an antiintellectualism which aspires for the understood result.”485 The most notorious concept
in the literature on working class culture, Seymour Martin Lipset’s “working class
authoritarianism,” had a clear imprint on late 1960s analysis. “Working-class
authoritarianism goes far to explain the rigid and intolerant approach many blue-collarites
take to American political affairs,” one social scientist wrote in 1969. “Unable to
understand how politics works, and contemptuous of conciliation and compromise,
working-class authoritarians seek to impose on society some sort of ‘fundamental truth’
that will liberate America from its soft-headed illusions.”486 Traditional values, in this
view, were appealing to white workers because they offered a black-and-white sense of
right and wrong; challenges to those traditional norms unsettled white workers because
they undermined that moral clarity.
In sum, the intellectual environment encouraged elite-level liberal interpreters to
presume that anti-black and socially conservative views would be most widely held
among blue-collar whites and seek answers accordingly. “I started this study with the
assumption that America is a racist society and that the most overt expression of that
485
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racism is to be found among working-class and lower-middle-class people,” sociologist
Lillian Rubin flatly declared. “It was not my intention to spend more than two years to
document the obvious.” That assumption, on the part of professional-class whites,
encouraged a sense of cultural division, of entering an unfamiliar space to understand
something far from the researcher’s lived experience. “For an upper-middle-class
professional like me to view the world from the perspective of what the media call
Middle America is, to say the least, difficult,” Rubin admitted. “The requisite empathy is
elusive because too many experiences, beliefs, and values divide us.”487 In the
predominant framework, the world of the white working class—marked by its explicit
and unabashed racism, its emphasis on rigid patriotism and moral rectitude—was utterly
distinct from white professionals’ day-to-day world.
This assumption comes through clearly in most journalism focused on white
workers. Reporters (even for middlebrow publications that no doubt counted Middle
Americans among their readers) wrote as outsiders interpreting unfamiliar experience for
a politically attentive public that was assumed to be non-Middle American. “In this book
we hope to bring before the reader something about the lives of millions of American
citizens,” two contemporaries began 1971’s The Middle Americans.488 Some writers
plumbed the quotidian details of working class life: “Once a week his wife leaves him at
home when she goes to play bingo. There is usually a Christmas party for the men on the
job.”489 Most often, late 1960s reporting on the white working class afforded starring
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roles to men who sprayed their speech with racial epithets and showed no interest in
norms of civility: “None of them politicians gives a good goddamn. All they worry about
is the niggers. Everything is for the niggers. The niggers get the schools. The niggers go
to summer camp. The niggers get the new playgrounds…And they get it all without
workin’.” …“Bastards don’t want jobs. If you offered them jobs now, 90 per cent of
them would run like hell. They ought to take machine guns and shoot the bastards.”490
Above all, in this discourse, what distinguished white workers was their anger and their
willingness to vent it freely and widely—towards “integration and welfare, taxes and sex
education…the rich and the poor, the foundations and students,” but above all towards
African Americans.491
Looking closely at the research process of one prominent study of Middle
America, Peter Binzen’s Whitetown, U. S. A., provides insight into the cultural dynamics
at work in research on the white working class. Whitetown is a 1970 study focused on
urban white working class neighborhoods (“Whitetowns”) and their schools; Binzen was
an education reporter and later an urban affairs reporter at the Philadelphia Bulletin.
Though he made trips to “Whitetowns” in several other major cities, Binzen conducted
the majority of his research in the Northeast Philadelphia neighborhood of Kensington.492
He taught in several schools, interviewed dozens of teachers, staff, parents, and children,
played bingo at area Catholic churches, and spent time in bars listening to neighborhood
men sound off about politics. Binzen, a Yale graduate whose father was an executive at
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JC Penney493, grappled with a strong sense of cultural difference from his subjects
throughout the reporting. He worried that he would be seen as a “do-gooder, ivy liberal
from Yale with a Carnegie grant.”494 As he attempted to secure interviews, he found the
cultural mores of Kensington’s inhabitants irksome: “When you enter one of these houses
at midday you can be sure a TV soap drama will be filling the room…And the lady of the
house, even while sitting for an interview, will not turn off the TV or even turn it down.
She’ll keep watching between questions.”495 Most of all, Binzen’s observations of
Kensington were shaped by his own identification as a white liberal professional-class
suburban dweller with progressive views on race. Though he readily admitted that his
own neighborhood was as segregated as Kensington, Binzen began his research under the
impression that white professional-class suburbanites were liberal on race issues, while
urban white ethnic workers as a group were not. “As an outsider, a WAP (white Alsatian
Protestant) and a middle-class suburbanite, I went into Kensington with preconceived
prejudices,” he acknowledged.496
Binzen, like many of his contemporaries, had a sincere desire to draw sympathetic
elite attention to white workers. He saw Kensington as a neighborhood with serious
needs that had been wrongly overlooked by the press and city government. Throughout
his reporting, he also understood “Whitetown” as a distinctive, isolated space
distinguished by its residents’ resistance to any kind of change: their “alienation from the
493
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American ‘mainstream,” their “contempt for white rich and black poor,” and their
“bristling defensiveness and yearning for the recent past when life was simpler and
loyalties less complex, when children were reared by the Bible and the beltstrap, when
the schools stuck to the three R’s, and when patriotism meant ‘My country right or
wrong.’”497 Binzen made the decision not to foreground ideological diversity within
Kensington, even when he encountered differences of opinion during his interviews. The
significant unit of analysis was Kensington itself, “home to a hundred thousand proud,
irascible, tough, narrow-minded, down-to-earth, old-fashioned, hostile, flag-waving,
family-oriented ethnic Americans.”498 As he later put it in a turn of phrase that
characterizes elite writing on Middle America as a whole, “I was trying to look at a
whole mass of people.”499
***
One of the most common arguments made about liberal politics in this period held
that (white professional) liberals viewed white workers with condescension and disdain.
Conservatives and fellow liberals charged liberals with “class snobbery,” a tendency to
“savage” white workers “as rednecks, ethnic clods, Archie Bunkers, and the like.” Many
of the arguments white professional-class liberals made about white workers in this
period are self-evidently classist. However, simply labeling them as classist or elitist
misses a broader story—the intellectual context that supported the prevailing view of
white workers; the element of self-criticism in liberal discourse on Middle America; the
importance of symbolic constructions of the white worker for the political claims liberals
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made; and the extent to which liberal representations of white workers dovetailed with
conservative claims to represent them.
The remainder of this chapter seeks to shed light on that broader story. It is
organized around the two primary arguments liberals and journalists made in diagnosing
the political grievances of the white working class. Though both arguments can be
understood as under the umbrella of a broad elite consensus, the differences were
significant. The dominant argument (#1) suggested that white workers were a middleincome group, economically secure and culturally & racially conservative, and their
primary political concern centered on protecting what they had gained. While in earlier
decades they had been animated by economic concerns, they now voted based on anxiety
about integration and cultural change. The first section below (#1) outlines this view.
Joseph Kraft, the liberal syndicated columnist who coined the term “Middle America,”
serves as the primary case study.
The major challenge to this construction of the white working class came from a
group of liberals who diagnosed the situation in a different way, arguing that white
workers were far closer to poverty than affluence. Their anger, in this view (#2), was
motivated by economic deprivation and the rightful sense that they had been forgotten by
liberal elites. To combat it, liberals needed to address the real economic and social needs
of white workers and work to bring them together in a coalition with working class
people of color that would pursue an agenda to benefit all. For these liberals, white
workers’ ongoing conservative turn could be reversed. The second section draws out
these arguments through the example of what contemporaries called the “white ethnic
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movement”—understood here as a small group of liberal activists and intellectuals who
advocated for increased elite attention to disadvantaged ethnic whites.

1. White backlash stems from economic security and racial/cultural antagonism
The dominant view in journalism and liberal discourse understood blue-collar
whites as defined less by any underdog class status and more by a shared cultural anxiety.
In this view, white workers had little need for progressive reform themselves, little
interest in government measures designed to aid those below them on the social ladder,
and considerable concern about further change. The archetypical white worker, as
pictured in this discourse, was a homeowning and breadwinning male who had achieved
a (perhaps tentative) middle class lifestyle and seethed with anger at those he saw as
threatening his gains:
The forgotten man of Roosevelt’s day has made spectacular progress. He not
only has a job a generation later, but he has property. He has benefited from the
welfare state and the planned economy and has now moved out of the slums of
the cities into the suburbs…The vast army of the unemployed of Roosevelt’s
day…have bought houses and now resent taxes, and are now indifferent and many
of them even hostile, to the militant poor whites and blacks who are left behind.500
He is almost out of his mind with frustration — call it hate. He sees his
Government, with programs for blacks and for the indigent and programs for
everyone except him, and he figures, “God dammit, I’m paying for this out of my
pocket.” He’s got some bungalow in a development and a whole bookful of
installment payments and he is mad as hell.501
Frustration, anger, and fear are his natural reactions to blacks, the government and
middle-class liberals. He holds strongly conservative views in politics, religion,
and education. The rebellious blacks and dissident students fill him with rage.
They threaten everything for which he worked and fought. Patriotic, proud,
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family-loving, authoritarian, generous, anti-intellectual, he is being left behind in
the turmoil of our society.502
This figure might be understood as the dark underside of the “typical” worker as pictured
in triumphalist 1950s discourse. Then, his position as the king of his own castle served as
evidence, for business and labor alike, of the basic fairness of American society. In this
period, for many liberals, the picture was much less optimistic.
It is essential to understand 1960s liberal views of the white worker in the context
of the still-dominant affluent society discourses discussed in Chapter 2. For most elitelevel observers, including liberals, 1960s America offered the majority a secure and even
prosperous life. This view remained remarkably durable despite the period’s critical and
contentious political discourse. The narrative of mass affluence survived the civil rights
movement’s intervention into elite public discourse, in part because it had never treated
African Americans as full members of the polity. Contemporary elites could understand
poverty and racial inequality within an affluent society as a disgraceful injustice while
remaining convinced that the political economic status quo basically worked.503 Some
continued to hold to the triumphalist view that a wealthy United States could eliminate

502

James Weigel, “Forgotten Man: Get Moving,” Chicago Tribune, July 14, 1970.
Lyndon Johnson, signing the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, hoped to “eliminate the paradox of
poverty in the midst of plenty”; a 1966 book investigated Poverty Amid Affluence; one of the central claims
of the 1968 report of the Kerner Commission on urban rioting held that “our nation is moving toward two
societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal…one, largely Negro and poor, located in the central
cities; the other, predominantly white and affluent, located in the suburbs and in outlying areas.” Robert
Bauman, Race and the War on Poverty: From Watts to East L.A. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
2014), 4; Oscar Ornati, Poverty Amid Affluence (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1966); Report of the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1968), 1, 23. This frame fit
with the dominant view that private sector job creation rendered full employment-oriented public policy
unnecessary; instead skills training and antidiscrimination measures were needed to enable unemployed
and underemployed workers to attain jobs. For criticism of this turn within elite-level liberal politics see
e.g. Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running America: Race, Economic Policy, and the Decline of Liberalism
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Adolph Reed Jr., “The Kerner Commission and
the Irony of Antiracist Politics,” Labor 14, no. 4 (2017): 31-38.
503

268

social problems in relatively short order. “Hell,” Lyndon Johnson told aides in 1964,
“we’ve barely begun to solve our problems. And we can do it all. We’ve got the
wherewithal…There’s nothing we can’t do, if the masses are behind us.”504 The
assumption of mass affluence also undergirded much of the highest-profile social
criticism of the period, including Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963) and
Students for a Democratic Society’s Port Huron Statement (1962).505 In an increasingly
influential frame, America was an affluent but unhealthy society that overvalued material
gain and tolerated inequality and injustice that it had the resources to resolve.
Pessimistic views of affluent America were tied to pessimistic views of the most
obvious beneficiaries of postwar affluence, middle-income white workers. The sharpest
examples can be found in New Left discourse, where the dominant view understood bluecollar whites as economically secure, dulled by prosperity and consumer culture, and
adamantly opposed to further change. “The working class today shares in large measure
the needs and aspirations of the dominant classes,” Frankfurt School theorist and New
Left intellectual leader Herbert Marcuse argued, and was most concerned with “the need
to buy a new car every two years, the need to buy a new television set, the need to watch
television five or six hours a day.”506 Charles Reich’s 1970 radical manifesto The
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Greening of America depicted an American public “in their sullen boredom, their
unchanging routines, their minds closed to new ideas and feelings, their bodies slumped
in front of television to watch the ball game Sunday.”507 Radical students, one activist
complained, “frequently claim that all workers live in the suburbs, own two cars and a
color television set, and that the main problem of the working class is
overconsumption.”508 Above all, in New Left discourse, the white worker epitomized a
society that had met the basic needs of most of its members but had left them
intellectually and spiritually impoverished.
What changed most in liberal elite opinion over the course of the 1960s was not
belief in an economically secure majority, but how that secure majority was situated
within a broader context. The mounting evidence of pervasive resistance to liberalism
pushed elite observers to emphasize the negative social and political consequences of the
segments of the New Left advocated outreach to and alliances with white worker-actors and conducted
organizing work in factories and white working class neighborhoods. On the New Left and white workers
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security white workers had attained, to understand the secure white majority as an
immense and potentially immovable obstacle to further progress. Liberalism had been so
successful in raising white workers’ incomes, many suggested, that it had created a
conservative majority.
This dynamic comes through particularly clearly in the work of Joseph Kraft, the
political analyst who coined the term “Middle America” in 1968. Kraft was a former
journalist and John F. Kennedy speechwriter who had become a well-known columnist
and news commentator by the mid-1960s. Looking in depth at Kraft’s understanding of
Middle America is useful for several reasons. Most simply, he was an influential figure
whose work gives a good sense of the dominant view among liberals in his cohort.509
Kraft was based in Washington, D.C., and his papers make clear that he possessed a
substantial network of politicians, government officials, and journalists who read his
column regularly and whom he saw socially510; in the period detailed in this chapter, his
column appeared in over 200 newspapers. More broadly, Kraft’s work on Middle
America helps to illustrate the sense of urgency tied up in liberal writing about white
workers, the sense that white working class anger would halt progress and that liberal
elites themselves bore some responsibility. Kraft’s work also serves as a particularly
509
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clear illustration of how liberal and conservative claims intersected to create “Middle
America” as a political category. Kraft was a prominent liberal and a member of the
“Georgetown cocktail party” circle assailed by conservatives. When Nixon’s “enemies
list” was uncovered during the Watergate investigation, Kraft’s name was included. It is
significant and instructive that Nixon, and generations of populist conservatives after
him, could profitably use a term invented by Kraft.
Kraft first began to argue that white discontent was central to the future of
American politics in 1967 and wrote about the theme consistently for the next several
years. He understood Middle America as the vast majority, the “ordinary” American of
the 1960s—and, like many contemporaries, equated ordinariness with whiteness and
middle-income status. As their incomes rose, Kraft argued, “American workers have
come to personify the national majority”511, and for Kraft the archetypical Middle
American was an industrial worker. Middle Americans had achieved “security,” in
Kraft’s view, but nonetheless felt their economic position to be precarious. They desired
“ease of life”512 but found it difficult to find. There were always new expenses, constant
pressure to “keep up with the Joneses for better cars and homes and other appurtenances
of the good life.”513 Middle Americans also confronted, Kraft suggested, “a sense of
having worked steadily and hard for naught…of having been conned somehow”514—that
perhaps working hard to buy more did not bring happiness after all.
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Kraft’s analysis of Middle America’s politics followed the left-to-right trajectory
characteristic of the emerging dominant narrative—what would be known to later
journalists and scholars as the backlash narrative. “As the backers of Roosevelt and
Truman, and the supporters of the unions and their broad social welfare programs, [white
workers] stood for decades on the forward frontier of politics,” he emphasized.515
However, as economic prosperity “dissolved the harsh lines of opposition between
economic groups, and diminished the appeal of bread-and-butter issues,”516 their chief
political goal became preserving what they had gained and opposing anything that
appeared to threaten their newfound security, particularly African Americans’
advancement. “The ordinary white worker,” Kraft argued, “feels that the value of his
home is seriously threatened by the enormous migration of Negroes to the cities. He may
feel the same about his job, and his social standing, and the safety and education of his
children.” Asked to “pay more for social services which serve him only slightly,” the
white worker’s response was to “dig in against higher taxes for more welfare
spending.”517 White workers’ relative economic security also increased the salience of
noneconomic issues in their politics, Kraft emphasized, particularly “fear of the new
culture with its drugs and sloppy clothes, rhetorical violence, and love of minorities.”518
In sum, Kraft argued in a representative articulation of the dominant view, “the basic tie
of economic interest that bound working-class America to the Democratic Party of the
New Deal has progressively come unstuck. Now this group—the group which I have
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called Middle America—is up for grabs and the stakes are tremendous. Who wins the
support of Middle America dominates American politics.”519
Though contemptuous of a class struggle frame that opposed workers to
employers (which he dismissed as “Depression politics—not to say Populist stuff out of
the 1890s”520), Kraft gravitated towards a class struggle frame that opposed Middle
Americans to wealthy liberals. He posited a deep divide between Middle Americans and
the progressive upper-income whites he labeled “Upper Americans”: where the latter
were “sure of themselves and brimming with ideas for doing things differently,” the
former were “traditional in their values and on the defense against innovators.”521 “Upper
America, in countless ways, is always sticking its finger in the eye of Middle America,”
he wrote in 1970.522 Upper-income whites placed themselves at odds with Middle
Americans in multiple ways, in Kraft’s framework: their desire to “improve the status of
the Negro, at the expense of Middle America, to raise taxes, also at the expense of
Middle America; and to circumscribe the power used in wars fought chiefly by the sons
of Middle America,” their “assault on the Army and police” and “mockery of the kept
hair, tidy clothes, and harmonious music which Middle Americans identify with
decency.”523
It’s important to note that this framework allows for the populist positioning
conservatives undertook in pursuit of the Middle American vote: the righteous middle
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victimized by arrogant and misguided liberal elites. Kraft, however, believed that the
liberal elites were right, while Middle American political views were unsophisticated and
wrong. “The upper-income whites have got, I believe, a good grip on the problems of the
Nation,” he wrote in a 1968 column. Since “notions of restraint and balance that are
intrinsically hard to grasp, have not been fully absorbed” by Middle America, however,
“there is no majority in the country for sophisticated ideas about race relations, economic
policy, and defense.”524 Kraft had deep concerns about populism, influenced by the work
of Richard Hofstadter, Seymour Martin Lipset, and like-minded scholars. Drawing on
Lipset’s term, he characterized George Wallace’s campaign as indicative of the “awful
threat of working-class authoritarianism.”525 The United States had a dark populist
history, he stressed, and the political environment of the late 1960s threatened another
outbreak of mass intolerance against blacks and Jews. Kraft also offered unselfconscious
support for elite leadership in politics, which he considered a necessity in the twentieth
century given that “the stuff of public life eludes the grasp of the ordinary man.”526
In sum, Kraft’s work on Middle America is not about Middle America in a
vacuum; it is very directly about the relationship between Middle America and his own
cohort of educated, liberal whites. “The central problem” in American politics “is not the
visible problem of disaffected Negroes and young people,” he wrote in 1968. “The
central problem is that the lower middle class whites who comprise the great body of the
electorate have lost confidence in the upper-middle-class whites who have been running
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the country for the past decade.”527 This is a striking statement, reflecting a view of
politics as a game played by elites who ultimately served at the sufferance of the mass
public. For Kraft, many of the dire consequences of “a new wave of folk
malevolence”528 would be realized through electoral politics. Because Middle America
was the majority, it had the power to expel the incumbent, enlightened governing class
and replace it with a dangerous one: “Backed by the great mass of middle Americans, the
conservatives could come to power” and “could plunge the country in cataclysm.”529
Kraft presented Middle Americans as victimized by Upper Americans despite his
belief in Middle America’s backwardness because he felt that liberal elites bore a
substantial responsibility for the emerging backlash. For Kraft, elites had a responsibility
to promote a fair, stable, and orderly politics and to be cognizant of the needs and views
of other groups—above all, to recognize their own privilege and particularity. He argued
that most of his cohort had failed in this regard, instead adopting “an overconfident
attitude of snobbish contempt,”530 because they had failed to take into account how civil
rights, Vietnam, and cultural change impacted the lives and psyches of non-elite whites.
Journalists, Kraft argued, had displayed a “systematic bias towards young people [and]
minority groups” and needed “to make a special effort to understand Middle America,”
“the great mass of ordinary Americans.”531 White elites generally, in his view, had failed
to recognize the “terrible tensions” faced by working class whites “being called upon to
share their neighborhoods with the blacks, to accept Negro children in the schools with
527
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their own kids, and to yield up hard-won job privileges to Negro workers.”532 Kraft
reserved his sharpest criticism for young, affluent student protestors, whom he saw as
classist and needlessly provocative, inclined to “rub the country’s nose in a ‘superior’
lifestyle at odds with traditional notions of morality and patriotism.”533
Kraft’s work illustrates the contradictory nature of much liberal discourse on the
white working class. He saw Middle American views as destructive and unsophisticated,
but nonetheless called on liberal elites to be more attentive to them. He argued that
Middle Americans’ anger threatened racial retrenchment but conceded that they faced
“strains” better-off and better-educated whites did not. He both criticized and effectively
mirrored fellow liberals’ “snobbish” view towards working class whites. Kraft’s work on
Middle America reveals, simultaneously, concerns about the dangers posed by the white
majority; concern about the political and social consequences of straying too far from the
white majority’s views; and an understanding of professional, liberal identity as defined
against Middle America.
Understanding the majority as white, economically secure, and invested in the
status quo left Kraft, and liberals generally, with only one plausible solution to the
problem of the white working class: put forward a more restrained politics that would not
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antagonize white workers. Kraft argued explicitly that liberals had no chance to win if
they allowed themselves to be defined by support for African Americans’ and students’
claims; rather, it was only through a moderate approach that they could keep Middle
American discontent at a manageable level. If they continued to press policies that could
not gain majority support, they would only worsen the backlash. He was more optimistic
about liberals’ long-term prospects (in an argument with ironic presentist resonance in
2017) because of demographic change: the college-educated population was growing,
while “blue-collar workers and white ethnic groups…are now shrinking relative to the
rest of the population.”534 Kraft therefore urged that “enlightened convictions” be “put
forward”535 for a period of time until the composition of the electorate was more
favorable. In the meantime, “unless all of us are careful about pushing our claims, the
country is going to go agog with demagogic appeals to the lower middle class.”536
The great irony in the history of “Middle America” is that a term so closely
associated with populist conservatism was coined by a liberal who described himself as
an “antipopulist.”537 Kraft had none of the political goals usually associated with the
rhetoric of “Middle America.” Rather than hoping to break apart the New Deal coalition
or polarize the country by race, he sought to avert this outcome. It is clear from Kraft’s
columns that “Middle America,” when it emerged on the national stage, did not have the
positive connotation that it would attain for Nixon and his supporters.538 Yet generations
of conservatives and other sympathetic observers have valorized Middle America and
534
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claimed it as their constituency, taking the term in a direction Kraft never intended. It’s
important to consider what made this possible.
Certainly “Middle America” has a pleasingly egalitarian ring, and middleness has
long been valorized in American politics.539 Most importantly, though, Kraft defined
Middle American identity—and social divisions in America broadly—in a way that
overlapped with and largely bolstered the claims of conservatives, pitting white workers
against white liberal elites and African Americans and identifying them as defenders of
traditional American values. It is not surprising, for instance, that Pat Buchanan admired
Kraft’s writing on the “forgotten” white working class (sending a series of Kraft’s pieces
to Nixon in fall 1967 with the comment that “these columns…make some damned
interesting points about what is needed at this point in time in the way of political
leadership”540). As the two continued their very separate work, Buchanan’s arguments on
the cultural divide between liberal elites and conservative masses became nearly
indistinguishable from Kraft’s. “The most explosive social tension in the country now
lies along the fault line that separates Middle America from Upper America,” Kraft wrote
in 1970. Three years later, Buchanan claimed that the “most serious political rupture in
the nation” was the “ideological fault” running “between the lower and middle class
Democratic center and right, and its upper-middle-class elite and left.”541
Populist conservatives had a deep stake in the claim that they represented a
popular revolt against a liberal elite. Kraft (and many other liberals in his cohort) put
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forward the same reading. Some saw white workers’ patriotism as dangerously
uncritical, while others saw it as praiseworthy, but few disputed the link between white
workers and staunch patriotism. Pat Buchanan celebrated “traditional America, ‘Middle
America,’” where Kraft saw those “traditional in their values and on the defense against
innovators” as a regressive force in society, but both drew the link between Middle
America and traditionalism. To be clear, this is not a simple story of appropriation, in
which the concept of “Middle America” was detached from its original context and put to
work by conservative elites. Rather, the arguments made by disparate political actors in
the same period overlapped to produce a consensus elite-level view of the white
worker—a view most favorable to conservatives.

2. The needy white worker as a symbol of the urgent need for further change
It’s important to stress that some prominent liberals directly contested the
dominant view—or at least a significant piece of it. For this second camp of liberals,
white workers’ reaction stemmed not from economic security but from economic
insecurity. White workers were not at all affluent, in this framework, and they were not
inevitably conservative. Rather, the movement of white working class voters to the right
could be reversed if elites took the appropriate lesson from it: that they needed to pay
attention to the very real problems of disadvantaged whites and work to address them.
Though this argument is distinct from the dominant view of the period, it can still be
understood under the umbrella of a broader elite consensus. Liberals who worked to stop
white workers from turning to right-wing demagogues made arguments that overlapped
280

substantially with the conservative claim that white liberal elites had overlooked
traditionalist whites in favor of vocal and marginal minority groups.
***
One result of the increasing visibility of white discontent in this period was
increased elite attention to economic precarity among white working class people—a
trend also visible in elite public discourse in the post-Trump era. In the 1960s, as in
recent years and months, this attention grew out of elite-level efforts to answer the why
question—why white workers were so discontented and (for liberals) why they were
moving to the right. White workers were thought to be the chief beneficiaries of thirty
years’ worth of change, and their unhappiness called out to elites for an explanation in a
way that other groups’ pain did not. “We know the United States is an affluent society,
and it goes against our preconceptions to think that the American worker is in a bind,”
one contemporary put it.542 Much of the research liberals conducted on the white
working class in this period, including projects funded by the Ford Foundation and
Rockefeller Foundation, set the explicit goal of understanding and finding solutions to
white workers’ resentment. “Great numbers of working-class Americans have not been
at the center of recent social concerns...It is important to know more precisely the
economic and social roots of their anxiety and to explore ways of mitigating their
discontent,” Ford Foundation president McGeorge Bundy explained.543 “We will have to
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understand far more about them before we can expect to stop their move to the right,” for
sociologist Louise Kapp Howe.544
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a notable cohort of liberals with ties to the civil
rights movement, the labor movement, and the white ethnic movement coalesced around
a clear understanding of the problem of the white working class: White workers were
lashing out because of basic economic deprivation and unhappiness. An increasingly
visible narrative stressed that blue-collar whites’ gains from postwar prosperity had been
heavily overstated. Family expenses strained the paycheck; men worked multiple jobs
and felt emasculated by the need to “send the wife to work”; consumer goods conveyed a
surface affluence, but they had often been financed through steep debt. As one
contemporary stressed, “the home, the car, the paid vacation,” and the other “outward
signs of affluence…that celebrants of American society have publicized are deceptive
indices of security. Purchased to give security, as often as not they have only increased
anxiety.”545 Contemporaries argued, drawing on deeply rooted social democratic analysis
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of race and class, that racism grew out of this insecurity. In a 1966 speech, for instance,
civil rights and labor activist Bayard Rustin urged listeners not “merely to [condemn]”
the group of white Chicagoans who had thrown rocks at Martin Luther King during an
open housing march. These whites’ “racial prejudice…was permitted to come to the
surface by objective economic and social conditions,” Rustin stressed: these were “people
who were buying homes that were only one-third paid for, who were saving money to
send their children to college, who were sending their wives to work…It was this
economic fear that made it possible for their latent prejudice to come to the surface and
be politically organized.”546
This understanding of what caused the white backlash pointed to a clear solution:
strike at the source by working within a multiracial coalition towards economic security
for all. African Americans, Rustin argued, “can either spend the rest of this century
denouncing these people as racist and being denounced by them in turn. Or we can
attack the root causes of their fear…We can eradicate white fear and black rage by
satisfying the real needs of all our people.”547 Rustin and like-minded progressives had a
clear view of what the needed agenda would be, rooted in the longstanding priorities of
the black-labor-left alliance: an ambitious government-led structural intervention that
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would ensure jobs and a livable income for all citizens. Voices within the civil rights
movement and the left wing of organized labor pushed back on the dominant elite-level
view that the private sector would create the necessary jobs, while government’s role was
to assist the minority of poor Americans to increase their skills and become integrated
into the affluent society. The 1963 March on Washington was a March for Jobs and
Freedom; the messages on marchers’ placards included “We March for Jobs For All
Now.” The Freedom Budget, put forward in 1966 by a coalition of civil rights, labor, and
other progressive groups, was an ambitious set of policy proposals centered on full
employment, fair wages, the right to medical care, and the right to decent housing; it
called for the government to allocate $185 billion towards these priorities over ten
years.548
For contemporaries who sought this kind of fundamental economic reform, the
white working class was a crucial constituency, numerous enough to force major action
in national politics. The disadvantage white workers faced and the common interests
they shared with African Americans provided strong ground for an alliance, in this
framework, but the racialized political consciousness many working class whites adopted
stood in the way. The challenge, as contemporaries saw it, was to turn disadvantaged
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whites away from the psychic salve of conservative rhetoric and toward a liberal agenda
that could actually meet their needs. Key to the solution, in the predominant view, was
the reform agenda itself—providing jobs for all would neutralize the resistance that
stemmed from whites’ fears of losing their jobs to blacks. “We must develop a federal
program of public works, retraining, and jobs for all—so that none, white or black, will
have cause to feel threatened,” Martin Luther King Jr. argued.549
White workers also played a key symbolic role for liberals seeking fundamental
economic reform. As Chapter 1 and its coda section argued, liberals in the 1930s and
1940s consistently drew on imagery of needy and troubled whites to stress the need for
reform. As Chapter 2 showed, the widespread belief in (white) working class affluence
convinced many elites that further change was not needed. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, liberals once again pointed to white working class disadvantage as evidence of the
failure of the existing system. The anger raging among blue-collar whites was
indisputable proof that the affluent society was a myth, many argued. For Gus Tyler of
the ILGWU, the backlash was the price elites should have expected to pay when “the
basic and burning need to redistribute the wealth of America [was] forgotten…It is
precisely this continuing maldistribution of income and wealth” that had “turn[ed]…poor
against near poor; white against black.”550 White working class anger also testified to the
need for immediate action: if progressives could not reach disadvantaged whites quickly,
some argued, the backlash would halt or reverse the progress that had been made. If
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policymakers did not respond to the “real needs of these people,” one contemporary
warned, the result would be “a sharp move to the right—even beyond Wallace.”551
There was, importantly, a clear tension running through efforts to employ the
white worker as a progressive political symbol. White working class discontent served as
evidence of the continuing unfairness of American society, but it also suggested that the
liberals who had been in power for most of the preceding thirty years had failed to meet
white workers’ needs. The tension lies in how contemporaries explained why liberalism
had failed working class whites. In one line of argumentation, white workers’ needs had
been rendered invisible in elite public discourse because of the widespread belief in
working class affluence. “The myth that all Americans are affluent has made us
unobservant of middle America,” Patricia and Brendan Sexton of the UAW argued.552 In
another—adopted often by white progressives, rarely by black progressives—they had
been overlooked because of a narrow elite-level focus on black disadvantage. The white
worker “was ignored—consciously, carefully, and, many believed, necessarily,” argued
sociologist Louise Kapp Howe. With “pressures from civil rights groups mounting,”
Democrats chose “to move…on behalf of those most in need, the black and the poor,
without waiting any longer to assuage the fears and prejudices of those one notch higher
on the economic ladder.”553 These two arguments often appeared together, but they were
very different in their implications. One placed the blame on postwar liberal elites who
adopted a triumphalist take on the American economy. The other rebuked 1960s liberals
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for not giving sufficient attention to the needs of white workers during the civil rights
revolution.
To be clear, those in this camp who argued that 1960s liberals had overlooked
disadvantaged whites did not want to slow the progress of the civil rights movement.
They wanted to prevent white backlash—which they saw as rooted in unrecognized
economic deprivation—from wrecking that progress. The advantage of the elite
consensus frame is that it recognizes that actors with different aims could coalesce
around a set of arguments more beneficial to some political projects than others. One of
the ironies of white working class representation in this period is that liberals who
explicitly sought to prevent white workers from being captured by the right adopted
many of the discursive tropes employed by their adversaries—defining white workers
against blacks and professional-class white liberals.
Useful examples of this dynamic can be found by looking at the work of major
figures in the white ethnic movement. While its political moment has mostly passed,
whites’ ethnic identity was a prevalent theme in elite public discourse in the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s. The reassertion of ethnic identity among whites emerged as a response
to and an attempt to mirror the efforts of African Americans, Latinos/as, Native
Americans, and others who pressed claims as marginalized minority groups and rejected
assimilationist ideologies in favor of pride in their group identity. It also drew from a
conviction that white ethnics had been denied the promises of the postwar affluent
society and should not be treated as part of a homogenous, dominant whiteness. Ethnics
had been promised the good life in return for assimilating, in this view, but had ended up
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culturally and economically deprived. White ethnic organizations sought to make ethnicidentity-based political claims, disaffiliating from a generic white middle class identity
and demanding recognition as Poles, Italians, or ethnics generally.554
Existing literature has often linked the white ethnic movement to conservative
politics. In this view, the reassertion of white ethnicity was primarily about racial
grievance: Italians, for instance, demanded recognition in an effort to undercut claims
made by blacks or Chicanos/as. This is too narrow an interpretation.555 White ethnic
advocates did not want to displace other social movements. They wanted disadvantaged
ethnic whites to be more explicitly included in liberal programming and in elite public
discourse. It is not necessary to draw a straightforward connection between white ethnic
grievances and conservatism to recognize that liberals sympathetic to white ethnics talked
about white working class disadvantage in a way that undermined their own goal of
defining white workers as a potential progressive force.
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Speaking about a “movement” as a whole is obviously harder and riskier than
representing the arguments made by Joseph Kraft or any single individual. It is possible
to speak somewhat broadly about the white ethnic movement, though, because this
movement can be understood as a loose coalition of elite-level actors who spoke for
white ethnic workers from a liberal perspective. “A small coterie of about twenty people
gave birth to what was called the ‘ethnic movement,’” recalled Richard Krickus, a
sociologist active in that cohort.556 Elite-level actors prominent in the white ethnic
movement included the American Jewish Committee (AJC), a liberal Jewish advocacy
organization, and two of its staff members, Irving Levine and Murray Friedman; Geno
Baroni, a Catholic priest and activist who led the National Center for Urban Ethnic
Affairs and later served in the Carter administration; Andrew Greeley, a priest and
sociologist; Barbara Mikulski, a Baltimore activist and politician; and Michael Novak, a
writer and intellectual. For clarity, I refer to these actors as “white ethnic advocates.”
The major figures in the white ethnic movement were motivated by two primary
concerns: first, that white ethnic workers were moving to the racist right; second, that the
dominant view of these workers among professional-class white liberals was inaccurate,
unjust, and politically destructive. To address the threat of the populist right, they
argued, liberal organizers needed to channel the anger and anxiety white workers felt
towards material solutions—which white ethnic organizations sought to do at the local
level in cities like Baltimore, Chicago, and Philadelphia. “If we don’t get these people
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first, Wallace will,” one advocate put it.557 White ethnic advocates also stressed the
urgent need for an alliance between white ethnics and people of color.558 “The interests
of the lower-middle-class white and the poor non-white are identical,” Michael Novak
argued. “Both together, they need a larger slice of the American pie. United, they can
prevail; divided, they doom each other.”559 A 1970 statement by advocate Geno Baroni
gives a good two-sentence summary of the chief intervention the movement sought to
make: “We must stop exploiting the fear of the ethnic Middle American and consider his
legitimate needs. We must bring together a new coalition to press for new goals and new
priorities for all the poor and the near poor.”560
Standing in the way of this objective, for white ethnic advocates, was the all-toofrequent liberal assumption that white workers did not have legitimate grievances.
Organizations active in the ethnic movement sought to combat that perception, producing
reports on white workers’ problems (including a “Middle America Pamphlet Series”),
sponsoring conferences, and facilitating connections between like-minded liberals. As
Richard Krickus recalled, they conducted a coordinated effort to “sensitize middle-class
urban experts, journalists, government bureaucrats, and progressive politicians to the
unmet needs of residents of white working-class communities,” drawing on connections
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in government and the press to “inundate[e] government agencies, the media, and
politicians with pertinent information.”561 They had a significant influence on funders
like the Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation, who underwrote multiple projects
proposed by white ethnic organizations beginning in the late 1960s as part of an effort to
put resources behind political leaders who could tamp down white resistance.
White ethnic advocates also directly, and often combatively, argued that the
snobbery and blind spots of upper-income white liberals were partly responsible for the
backlash. First and foremost, white ethnic advocates charged, white professional-class
liberals had wrongly scapegoated white ethnics for racism. Second, they suggested, these
same elites had only paid attention to black disadvantage and had ignored the
disadvantage white ethnics faced (Chapter 4 deals with this theme in more depth). “The
ethnic American is sick of being stereotyped as a racist and dullard by phony white
liberals, pseudo black militants and patronizing bureaucrats,” Barbara Mikulski insisted
in a widely publicized piece. “He pays the bill for every major government program and
gets nothing or little in the way of return.”562 Often, legitimate critiques of the ofteninsistent focus on white working class racism—“They’re not the people in the executive
suites who would not hire a single Jew or Negro for so long,” one advocate noted—slid
into a complete elision of any privilege or culpability for white ethnics: “Nobody has
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done anything for ethnics since Social Security.”563 Some ethnic advocates reinforced
the broader cultural mappings marking white workers as socially conservative and white
elites as liberal, arguing that liberals had wrongly derided the traditional values dear to
ethnics. “The white ethnic’s commitment to his family, home and neighborhood is
profound in a way few who are part of the more cosmopolitan elite understand,” Andrew
Greeley insisted.564
White ethnic advocates did not champion white workers in pursuit of populist
conservative political goals. They mounted a direct challenge to the prevailing notion
that an affluent America had met the needs of the majority of its citizens, and they sought
to build a multiracial liberal coalition in support of a universalistic policy agenda. Yet in
seeking to convince other liberals of the need for a different political strategy, they
echoed some of the key arguments made by conservative critics of liberalism—a
coalition of white elites and African Americans dominated liberalism, leaving the white
working class out; blacks received government largesse but hardworking whites did not;
cosmopolitan liberal elites were chiefly responsible for the wrongs suffered by white
workers. Writing in 1972, for instance, George Meany expressed his hope “the new
focus on ethnicity” would mean a “renewed and serious concern for the lives and
problems of ordinary Americans—following a period of undue attention to the antics of
the rich, the marginal, and the bizarre.”565
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Taken as a whole, elite discourse on Middle America returns again and again to a
single frame—ordinary whites who comprise the majority have been forgotten in elite
public discourse, displaced by marginal minority groups. This frame proved both
seductive and flexible. It was useful for those who wanted to remove liberals from power
(Nixon and his supporters) and those who wanted liberals to be more responsive to white
workers (Joseph Kraft). It was compatible with an emphasis on the economic
disadvantage white workers faced and the need for fundamental economic reform. But
the frame also suggested that advocacy on issues of race and gender would necessarily
alienate white workers. It encouraged zero-sum, either-or frames in which liberals could
either be vocal champions of the new social movements or representatives of the white
working class, not both. The dominant elite-level view defining white workers as antiblack and anti-liberal placed clear limits around what the white working class could mean
in elite public discourse—limits that persist to the present day.

Conclusion
This chapter has sought to challenge the close association between the concept of
Middle America and the populist conservative politics identified with Richard Nixon. It
presents a narrative rooting Middle American identity in the overlapping responses of a
range of elites to white reaction against the civil rights movement and the dissent and
cultural change of the mid-to-late 1960s. Liberals and journalists largely framed working
class whites as those who were most enraged by dissent and most anxious about or
hostile towards integration and political gains for African Americans, and their
293

characterizations of white working class identity mirrored those of conservatives. The
notion that white workers comprised a homogenous group increasingly opposed to social
change became widespread throughout media and intellectual discourse and was adopted
by figures from across the political spectrum.
Placing liberals and journalists alongside conservatives, via an elite consensus
frame, reorients the traditional narrative of the rise of Middle America in a few ways.
First, it stresses that the longstanding culture-wars discourse that opposes “Middle
America” to “liberals, cosmopolitans, and intellectuals” cannot be attributed to
conservatives alone. In order to understand its longevity as a feature of American
political discourse, it is necessary to understand its appeal to liberals and the role they
have played in perpetuating it. The history of Middle America was deeply bound up with
white-liberal anxieties around straying too far from the white majority on issues of race,
but it also placed the blame for regressive policy and racial inequality at the feet of the
mass of less enlightened whites and allowed “Upper Americans” to enjoy the privileges
of whiteness without being marked as racists. Liberals defined themselves against
Middle America in the same moment that conservatives sought to define Middle America
against liberals, and the two trends reinforced each other.
Second, the elite consensus frame suggests the value of viewing the late 1960s as
a period in which what the white working class meant in elite political discourse changed
rather than a period in which white workers as a group changed their political affiliations.
As scholars such as Thomas Sugrue, Becky Nicolaides, and Kenneth Durr have
emphasized, none of the “backlash” behavior so central to late 1960s reporting on the rise
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of Middle America—whether resistance to integration, opposition to government
programs perceived as aiding African Americans at the expense of whites, or attachment
to religious or ethnic values—was new.566 In the period examined in this chapter, it
became more visible on a national stage. The civil rights movement forced Northern
whites to think more rigorously about racism and racial inequality outside the South.
Backlash was more directly at issue in national-level contestation between the
Democratic and Republican parties, as the Democrats became the party of new social
movements and the Republicans the party of the opposition. The news media began to
cover race, dissent, and cultural turmoil more consistently. Elite understandings of the
preeminent social divisions in American politics were relatively new in the 1960s; the
real-life referents were not.
By the late 1960s, ethnicity, religion, patriotism, traditional values, racism, and
other signifiers of cultural affinity were seen as more central to working class identity
than the bread and butter political economic concerns emphasized by labor, not because
they were not central to the political views of white working class people in previous
decades, but because national-level understandings of what class meant in US politics
were still heavily informed by the New Deal era’s opposition between workers and
economic elites. Republicans, once viewed as partisans of business and the middle class,
could now stake persuasive claims to speak for white workers. The emergent
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understanding of white working class identity cut across traditional regionally- and
religiously-based divisions and allowed Southern and Midwestern Protestants and
Northern ethnic Catholics to be claimed under the same political identity. The
realignment of the prevailing elite-level mapping of the electorate was as abrupt and
long-lasting as any that emerged from the 1960s, and it was made possible by elite
consensus.
Crucially, the emergence of the white worker as the chief symbol of cultural
traditionalism and white backlash did not sever the association between white workers
and New Deal-style economic populism. Labor and liberal understandings of working
class political identity were founded on an opposition between workers and economic
elites, and this was in no way incompatible with a focus on racism or cultural
antagonism. While the notion that white workers as a group could be progressive on race
or on cultural issues did not survive the 1960s, the notion that they could be progressive
on economic issues certainly did. This is particularly clear in the decades of calls from
the left for staunch economic populism as the antidote to backlash politics. In the
prevailing understanding of white working class identity after the 1960s, material interest
and cultural grievance were opposing forces, each with the ability to override the other.
White workers were defined against economic royalists, white liberal elites, and African
Americans simultaneously—as an anxious and elusive swing constituency ill at ease with
either major party but critical to the hopes of both.
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Chapter 4: The New Liberalism and the Victimized White Worker
At a 1989 conference sponsored by the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), a
centrist group working to move the Democratic Party away from its liberal image,
political scientist William Galston delivered a speech critical of the state of the party.
Afterward, he recalled, “all hell broke loose,” as party elites in attendance broke into
heated disagreement in full view of the media. The speech that had generated such heat
was a sharply worded call for Democrats to increase their appeal to middle-income
whites. “The inescapable fact is that the national Democratic Party is losing touch with
the middle class, without whose solid support it cannot hope to rebuild a presidential
majority,” Galston and coauthor Elaine Kamarck wrote in a corresponding memo. With
the party “increasingly dominated by minority groups and white elites…the public has
come to associate liberalism with tax and spending policies that contradict the interests of
average families; with welfare policies that foster dependence rather than self-reliance;
with softness toward the perpetrators of crime and indifference toward its victims…and
with an adversarial stance toward mainstream moral and cultural values.”567
The arguments in Galston and Kamarck’s paper were intensely controversial—
centering a “middle class” synonymous with the “public” and defined against “minority
groups and white elites”—but they were not new. The paper drew on a recognizable
critique that had developed over the course of several decades. In the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s, criticism of liberalism’s treatment of those Americans contemporaries most often
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called the “middle class,” the “lower middle class,” or the “working class” was never far
from the center of elite public discourse. Elites of multiple stripes objected to the
trajectory of liberalism since the late 1960s, and they often cast blue-collar whites who
had worked hard to achieve a tenuous middle-income lifestyle as those most harmed by
the new liberal politics. Critics charged that leniency on crime and misguided integration
policies had placed white working class people and their children, especially in cities, in
danger. An antagonistic attitude towards traditional cultural norms—the patriarchal
family, chastity, heterosexuality, hard work, personal responsibility—had undermined
what working class whites valued most, others argued. Government had spent freely on
misconceived social policy targeted to African Americans, many charged, placing the tax
burden on middle-income whites who gained nothing from the programs they were asked
to support.
This chapter provides a detailed treatment of the argument that liberalism after the
1960s neglected the interests and needs of its blue-collar white constituents, with an eye
toward illuminating why working class whites have served as such a consistent and
useful foil for elites critical of liberalism. Where Chapter 3 explored the elite consensus
on Middle America from the perspective of liberals and journalists, Chapter 4 focuses on
the work of critics of liberalism. For those who sought to defend traditional values as
they understood them, oppose the cultural left, or oppose liberal policy on race, it made
sense to place Northern working class whites, especially white ethnics, at the forefront of
their appeals. Blue-collar whites’ grievances could not be (as) easily dismissed by
liberals as an attempt by the privileged to harm the underprivileged. Advocates could
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point to working class whites’ immigrant histories and modest lifestyles as evidence that
their claims came from a position of disempowerment, not a position of power. A
populist frame opposing (white) workers to a liberal elite was more palatable than a direct
attack on African Americans or other marginalized constituencies. Positioning white
workers in this way was not necessarily baldly strategic (though it often was)—it was
simply easier (at least or especially for white elites) to see their grievances as
sympathetic.
This chapter, unlike the previous one, does not focus on a specific, tightly
bounded time period. It attempts to capture a set of recurring arguments put forward
consistently from the late 1960s through the 1990s. These arguments did not change
markedly over that time period, and the chapter is structured in a way that brings together
material from the late 1960s through the 1990s. The first section provides a brief
background on the national-level political actors who were particularly influential in
taking liberalism to task for a bias against working class whites, including conservatives
who sought to make white workers a permanent conservative constituency and centrist
Democrats who sought to moderate the party’s position on issues of race and culture.
The second section clarifies what these actors meant when they talked about “liberals”—
affluent, college-educated professionals who did intellectual or “verbal” work, held
political priorities centered on “post-materialist” issues, and cultivated an elitist attitude
toward non-elite citizens, especially white workers. The remainder of the chapter focuses
on three primary arguments contemporaries made against liberalism: 1) Liberal urban
policy unfairly placed the burden of integration onto white workers, exempting suburban
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white elites; 2) Cultural liberalism, especially the feminist movement, chipped away at
the traditional family norms prized by white workers; 3) Liberal programs gave unearned
benefits to African Americans and nothing to working class whites, who were taxed to
pay for them anyway.
A note on terminology and white working class exceptionalism
Contemporaries used different language to refer to the same basic “type” of
people. As in the previous chapter, it is that “type” that is most important to the
argument here. Galston and Kamarck, for instance, argued that liberals had lost touch
with “the middle class,” “mainstream values,” “lower middle-class voters,” “lower
middle-class white voters,” “working-class voters,” “middle-income voters,” and “the
demographic and political center”—seemingly distinct terms used interchangeably in this
context. As employed by contemporaries, “middle class,” “Middle America,” and
“mainstream” were slightly broader in income terms than “working class,” but the
differences are modest. The “middle class,” “Middle America,” the “mainstream,” the
“working class”: these are flexible, empty terms that were defined more by what they
were not—e.g. black, poor, rich, liberal, queer—than by what they were. They referred
to lower-middle to middle-income whites, typically homeowners, non-college educated
and working blue-collar or low-level white-collar jobs. The use of “middle class” reflects
blue-collar whites’ more central symbolic position within the polity in the 1980s and
1990s (as compared with the 2010s), as well as the continued elite assumption that most
blue-collar whites were economically secure. I use “blue-collar whites,” “middle-income
whites,” “white workers,” “working class whites,” “white working class,” and “white
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working class voters” interchangeably to refer to this group as talked about by elites. As
in previous chapters, if I am making reference to white workers as political actors with
agency, I use the suffix “actors” (white worker-actors). I use “professional” or
“professional class” to refer to upper-middle-income educated elites.
In any period, the multiple meanings of “liberal” make it easy to lose the thread of
an argument, and that problem is especially pressing in this period, when what it meant to
be a “liberal” was explicitly contested and in flux. From the late 1940s to early 1960s,
the dominant “liberalism” had been welfare state-oriented, pro-union, pro-civil rights,
nationalistic, anticommunist, and hawkish if necessary in its anticommunism. As
understood in contemporary discourse, the emergent “liberalism” was opposed to the
Vietnam War, anti-nationalistic, much less union-oriented, in favor of affirmative action
rather than strict legal equality, and much more oriented to challenging traditional norms
around gender and sexuality. Many elites who had identified with the former did not
identify with the latter. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, “liberal” came to refer to a
distinct social type—elitist, professional, college-educated, upper- or upper-middleincome whites—as much as an ideology. This poses a challenge for clarity in writing.
While the dissertation as a whole uses “liberal” as a descriptive term, the negative
construction of “liberalism” as defined by its alienation from white workers is so
pervasive in this period that it becomes difficult to capture the discourse without using it
as contemporaries used it. To clearly differentiate references to “liberalism” in this
chapter from the analysis in the previous chapters, I use “new liberal” and “new
liberalism” to refer to the emergent liberal ideology and the social type associated with it.
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I use “progressive” as a descriptive term to refer to any person with left-of-center views.
The analysis of the “new liberalism” in this chapter should be read as an effort to
historicize a caricature, not to make descriptive claims about changes in liberalism or
progressive politics.
For a significant portion of elite opinion, it has long been axiomatic that working
class whites are more prejudiced and more socially conservative than the white
population as a whole. As Thomas and Mary Edsall’s 1991 bestseller Chain Reaction
puts it: “It has been among the white working and lower-middle-classes that many of the
social changes stemming from the introduction of new rights—civil rights for minorities,
reproductive and workplace rights for women…and the surfacing of highly visible
homosexual communities—have been most deeply resisted.”568 From this perspective, it
is easy to understand why critics of the new liberalism invoked disadvantaged whites so
frequently: these whites were most angered by the new liberalism and were the most
receptive audience for critics’ claims.
The Edsalls’ argument is not footnoted and is presented as self-evident. This is
not to say, of course, that no evidence could be cited in support of it. Over many
decades, one of the most consistent findings in public opinion research on whites’ racial
attitudes is that whites with lower levels of education are more likely to express
prejudiced views.569 The predominant explanation has held that education confers
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training in egalitarian norms and a better grasp on the structural causes of inequality. A
dissident reading attributes the gap to cultural capital; in this view, educated people are
more likely to know the “right” answer, and education equips members of the dominant
group “to promote their interests more astutely.”570 It’s also important to note that
interpretations of the same data can vary significantly depending on how much emphasis
is placed on differentiating between white subgroups. To take one very simple example:
in General Social Survey data from 1977-1989, part of the period this chapter covers,
67% of whites with a high school education and 51% with more than a high school
education agreed with a statement attributing racial inequality to a “lack of motivation or
willpower” among blacks.571 These figures support the argument that less educated
whites were more likely to choose the prejudiced view. They also support the argument
that the prejudiced view was prominent among whites in all educational categories. They
do not support the argument that less educated whites as a group were prejudiced, while
educated whites were not.
Understanding resistance to new-liberal perspectives on issues of race, sex,
gender, morality, and the work ethic as widespread throughout American society and
white America in particular—and as frequently pressed by elites contesting other elites in
elite public discourse—suggests that the arguments detailed in this chapter should not be
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understood only or primarily as political appeals to non-elite whites. This chapter draws
on an alternative explanation for the prominence of white workers in anti-liberal
discourse: The most seductive and politically effective way to respond to a claim of
marginalization is with a counter-claim of marginalization.
In existing literature, the theme of “white victimhood” captures the prevalence of
imagery of wounded or disadvantaged whites in contesting threats to white normativity.
As Sally Robinson argues, in a period where whiteness and white masculinity cannot be
normative in the everyday, uncontested way they had been in the past, whites and white
men have often responded politically by “claim[ing] a symbolic disenfranchisement.”
Robinson understands the rise of Middle America in this context, as “Middle Americans,
so angry at others’ use of the logic of victimization, position themselves as victims.”
This positioning allows them to pursue a kind of “identity politics of the dominant” in
which they “compete with various others for cultural authority bestowed upon the
authentically disempowered, the visibly wounded.”572
This is a very useful framework, but it also raises questions in the context of a
longer study of white working class representation. It is important to stress that
victimization claims on behalf of white workers have a long and varied history. That
history includes a wide range of claims, from the consistent comparison of wage work to
slavery (the upshot being that free whites should not be treated as “slaves”) to depictions
of strikers beaten and shot at the behest of employers (see Chapter 1). Further, if working
572
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class people, including whites and men, are understood as “authentically disempowered,”
there is nothing necessarily problematic in their claims to disempowerment. What is
most important is how white disadvantage is made visible, contextualized, and explained.
Over the last fifty years, this has very often taken place in elite discourse in a manner
favorable to the right. This chapter aims to shed light on that dynamic.

Advocates for the White Working Class Against the New Liberalism
The argument that the new liberalism gave the white working class a raw deal was
advanced by political figures associated with both major parties and with disparate
ideological traditions. It cannot be easily mapped to any one single political project.
While the chapter as a whole emphasizes this broadly shared critique of the new
liberalism and deemphasizes the specific goals of the actors who contributed to the
critique, this section outlines the basic political context. Significant criticism of the new
liberalism’s treatment of working class whites came from conservative activists and
politicians who sought to win blue-collar white voters to their cause. It also came from
left-of-center elites—intellectuals, Democratic politicians, and labor leaders—who
sought to make the new liberalism more responsive to white working class views as they
understood them. Through the period, the dominant elite-level view understood the white
working class as a discontented swing constituency, “an unpredictable force in American
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political life, an uneasy ally for either the Left or the Right.”573 Criticism of the new
liberalism had very clear electoral (as well as symbolic) stakes for all involved.
Conservatives: Converting opposition to the new liberalism into a durable majority
Richard Nixon and his aides had worked towards a goal they called the “New
Majority”—a durable conservative electoral majority founded on substantial white
working class support. When Nixon resigned in 1974, the New Majority project was
very much unfinished, but influential conservatives continued to work towards that goal.
Writing in 1975, National Review publisher William Rusher saw in the mid-1970s
electorate an “imposing (though not yet politically united) conservative majority.”
Critical to that majority were the “hard-hats, blue collar workers and farmers” who had
once been the backbone of the Democratic coalition. These workers were deeply
alienated from the “verbalist elite” and the “semi-permanent welfare constituency”574 that
dominated the new liberalism, Rusher and other contemporaries argued, and they made
up a latent conservative constituency key to success.
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Few conservatives believed that any national political force had fully capitalized
on the rightward trend among white workers, however, or that doing so would be an easy
or frictionless project. Rusher and his counterparts cited several major obstacles to their
pursuit of the blue-collar white vote: many voters angered by the new liberalism held a
deep and emotional attachment to the Democratic Party, inherited from their parents and
grandparents; the Republican Party remained associated with wealth and Eastern elitism;
Democrats who recognized their vulnerability on social issues could simply moderate
their positions; even deeply socially conservative voters were often skeptical of big
business; Watergate had eroded the progress made under Nixon, as identification with the
Republican Party dropped to extreme lows. The challenge for conservatives was to
overcome white workers’ longstanding ties to the Democrats and build a conservative
politics that appealed to alienated blue-collar whites.
The conservatives who most consistently and passionately spoke for white
workers in the 1970s and 1980s came out of the populist conservative social movement
often called the New Right. New Right organizations were most associated with activism
on what were called the “social issues”—feminism, busing, abortion rights, school
prayer, pornography, and gay rights. In the predominant contemporary framework,
passionate social conservatives tended to be blue-collar whites; more affluent
conservatives were willing to talk about abortion or busing at election time but cared far
more about lowering the tax rate. The New Right sought to build a conservative program
in which “‘social issues’…[received] more than lip service” and in which social
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conservatives and economic conservatives were “equal partners.”575 In their public
criticism of liberalism, and in their calls for their fellow conservatives to recognize the
moral and electoral importance of social issues, New Right activists frequently stressed
the harm new liberals had done to blue-collar whites. Among the most visible New
Right-associated voices in the period were analyst/strategist Kevin Phillips, former White
House aide Pat Buchanan, National Review publisher William Rusher, North Carolina
senator Jesse Helms, televangelist Jerry Falwell, and activists/strategists Phyllis Schlafly,
Richard Viguerie, and Paul Weyrich.
The most influential conservative critic of the new liberalism was without
question Ronald Reagan. For both supporters and opponents, Reagan epitomized white
working class voters’ turn against the new liberalism, as reflected in the demographic that
bears his name (“Reagan Democrats”). In the dominant elite-level interpretation, his
victories in 1980 and 1984 were glaring proof of the electorate’s rejection of new liberals:
for decades, elites in both parties had assumed a candidate with his views would be too
conservative to win the presidency. Reagan was a former Democrat who had idolized
FDR as a young man and served as president of his union (the Screen Actors’ Guild). He
continued to see value in the liberalism of the past, which he associated more with
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common purpose and cultural traditionalism than with activist government or economic
reform. He also consistently criticized 1970s and 1980s liberalism from the perspective
of a disappointed true believer and sought to convey to disillusioned former Democrats
that the Republican Party was a hospitable place for them. “When the left took over the
Democratic Party, we took over the Republican Party,” he claimed in a 1988 speech.
“We made the Republican Party into the party of working people, the family, the
neighborhood, the defense of freedom, and, yes, the American flag and the Pledge of
Allegiance to one nation under God.” “Working people,” in this framework, were defined
by their attachment to family, neighborhood, and nation and their aversion to the “left.”576
Democrats: Mounting opposition to the new liberalism
When Reagan in 1988 decried the Democrats for their alienation from “working
people,” Democrats unhappy with the new liberalism had been expressing the same
concern for two decades. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Democrats worked to
maintain and regain support among white working class voters. Candidates followed two
primary approaches—placing the emphasis on economic issues and moving to the
center/right to lessen their vulnerability on race and cultural issues. For the purposes of
576
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this chapter, it’s most important to spotlight those Democrats who argued that the key to
winning working class whites was (in a common contemporary phrasing) a “mainstream”
cultural positioning—in other words, an appeal more in line with majority views on
issues of race, work, sex, and gender.
It is useful to situate the arguments that follow in the context of the deep party
divisions Democrats confronted beginning in the late 1960s. The 1968 convention,
where violent confrontations between protestors and police in the streets of Chicago
received more attention than the convention speeches, brought these divisions into sharp
relief. Antiwar Democrats were outraged by the nomination of pro-Vietnam War
candidate Hubert Humphrey, the sitting vice president who (having entered the race late
after the incumbent, Lyndon Johnson, dropped out) had not entered any primaries, while
the majority of primary votes had been cast for Eugene McCarthy and the late Robert
Kennedy, both antiwar candidates. In the wake of this crisis, the party yielded to calls for
reform of the convention process. The reforms developed by the McGovern-Fraser
Commission beginning in 1969 changed the process of delegate allocation for the
convention, requiring that states award delegates based on public participation and in
proportion to the votes won by candidates. States were now required to hold primaries or
caucuses open to the public, and candidates could no longer win the nomination at the
convention without running in primaries. More controversially, the reform committee
endorsed quotas to increase the representation of African Americans (and Latinas/os in
some states), women, and young people in state delegations to the convention.577
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For their supporters, the reforms made the party more responsive to its rank-andfile constituents and opened up opportunities for previously excluded groups. To
opponents, most vocally the AFL-CIO, they were an unjust and politically disastrous
power grab at the expense of white workers. The reforms worked “to favor the affluent
liberals within the party and to diminish the influence of its lower-middle and workingclass constituents,” one labor advocate argued.578 The reforms, the typical argument held,
made the party less responsive to (white) working class views by failing to ensure
proportionate representation for workers in state delegations and by reducing the
influence of politicians and labor leaders responsive to them, who would no longer enjoy
substantial power to influence candidate selection and other decisions by bargaining on
the convention floor.579 Instead, critics argued, the new primary system was designed to
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give excessive weight to the views of engaged activists and would produce candidates too
far to the left to win. The most inexorable demonstration of this, for many, was the 1972
election. South Dakota senator George McGovern, the Democratic nominee, was
associated with the political program of (in his own words) “the poor and the minorities
and the young people and the anti-war movement.”580 Nixon, who dubbed McGovern the
candidate of “acid, amnesty, and abortion,” won 49 states and 60% of the electoral vote.
For decades afterward, Democrats pointed to the “McGovern coalition” as an indication
of the drubbing they would receive if they alienated the moderate white vote.
The early to mid-1970s saw a passionate effort by moderate Democrats to push
the party back towards the center, toward the internationalist, anticommunist, pro-union,
welfare state agenda identified with Democrats from Truman to Hubert Humphrey.
Many of the critics of the new liberalism gathered around the AFL-CIO; this camp
included AFL-CIO president George Meany; Al Barkan, head of the AFL-CIO’s
Committee on Political Education (COPE); Washington senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson,
a presidential candidate in 1972 and 1976; and analysts/strategists Ben Wattenberg and
Penn Kemble. In the same period, a group of formerly liberal intellectuals often called
“neoconservatives” (Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Norman Podhoretz, Jeane
Kirkpatrick, and Michael Novak, among others) gained considerable elite-level
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prominence as cutting critics of the new liberalism, particularly the core liberal approach
of using government programs for the benefit of underprivileged people.581 As one
observer noted, these groups were united in their opposition to “what they see as the
liberal excesses of the sixties…too much government intervention, too many demands by
blacks…social and political changes by ‘the kids’ and their sympathizers of the late
sixties.”582 They were also united in the belief that those “excesses” were absolutely
anathema to white working class voters and would prevent the Democratic Party from
ever regaining a national majority.
It is important to be clear that moving towards the center/right was not the only
option put forward by Democrats seeking to regain white working class support. In the
early to mid-1970s, advocates of a “new populism” argued that a focus on combatting
corporate power could overcome whites’ racial fears and unite “a majority coalition of
economic self-interest…across race, age, sex, and regional lines.”583 For notable voices
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on the left wing of the labor movement, white workers were disillusioned and
disengaged, but not conservative; they could be engaged by a revived social democratic
politics. When AFSCME president Jerry Wurf urged progressives to enter the
“competition for the political loyalties and the support of middle America,” he disputed
the assumption that this would require a move to the right: “I have not given up on the
basic decency of the American people…I believe you can still rally a majority in this
country around an ideal.”584 To overcome disengagement, in this view, the Democratic
Party and progressives generally needed to make political participation meaningful. For
UAW president Douglas Fraser, “People stay home and don’t vote because they have lost
faith that casting that vote will impact on the course of the nation…The proclaimed shift
to the right has occurred not so much among the public as among those who have been
elected to serve it.”585
The view dominant in the Democratic Party by the 1990s held that an electoral
majority did not exist for the kind of politics new liberals had embraced. Centrists who
argued that the party was too far left to win in national politics gained in influence over
the course of the 1980s as Democrats continued to lose, and the party as a whole shifted
to the right. These “New Democrats”586 defined themselves against what this chapter
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calls the “new liberalism,” which they viewed as outdated and ineffective. Collectively,
New Democrats argued that the liberal Democratic tradition as they saw it—problemsolving through government programs, attentiveness to minority constituencies like
“blacks, feminists, gays, [and] organized labor”—was no longer workable as politics or
policy.587 They championed a group they most often called the “middle class”—middleincome whites skeptical of big-government solutions, particularly those they associated
with aid to people of color. These were the voters Democrats had alienated, New
Democrats argued, and the voters they would need to regain to return to power.
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The chief institutional engine of the New Democratic effort after 1985 was the
Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), headed by Al From. The most influential New
Democratic voices on the needs of blue-collar whites (the “middle class,” in their terms)
included pollster Stanley Greenberg and Bill Clinton, who served as the chair of the DLC
in 1990 and 1991 and drew substantially on New Democratic ideas and rhetoric in his
campaigns and his presidency. Clinton ran as a “different kind of Democrat” (a
Democrat not defined by the new liberalism, in other words), promised to “end welfare as
we know it,” and pursued center-right policy on criminal justice and welfare reform.
While their new-liberal critics accused them of capitulating to a right-wing agenda,
Clinton and like-minded Democrats saw themselves as building a center-left politics that
could work in an irrevocably changed political landscape.588 In their efforts to refashion
the Democratic Party in that image, they consistently critiqued the new liberalism’s
treatment of the white working class.
Deindustrialization and the political economic context
It is critical to stress that these elite debates took place against the backdrop of
deindustrialization and the collapse of the Keynesian economic order organized labor had
helped to build. The postwar economic boom had brought about a great deal of
confidence in Keynesian economic expertise. By the mid-1970s, elites perceived major
signs of trouble. The United States ran a trade deficit in 1971 for the first time in the
twentieth century. Unemployment in 1975 sat at 8.5%, as compared with 3.5% in 1969.
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Where conventional wisdom for decades had implied a tradeoff between inflation and
unemployment (if one was high, the other would be low, and policymakers could keep
the economy in balance by adjusting spending and interest rates accordingly), the 1973
oil crisis and 1973-5 recession were marked by rising inflation as well as rising
unemployment—“stagflation.”589
Elites understood that something was wrong but, collectively speaking, were
unsure how to articulate it or address it. “The economics profession, in sharp contrast to
its position 10 years ago, is divided and unsure as it contemplates these problems….It
knows neither what ails the economy nor what should be done about it,” one observer
noted in 1979.590 Multiple alternatives gained purchase in elite circles. On the left,
microeconomic planning measures prescribed a significantly more active role for
government, which would intervene in specific industries to achieve goals around wages,
prices, and employment. Others advocated reworking trade policy to better protect
domestic firms and workers in industries (archetypically autos and steel) now facing
vastly increased international competition. “The present trade policy is slowly but surely

589

Unemployment figure in Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 222. This discussion of the 1970s economy draws
especially on Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the
Seventies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010) as well as Cowie, Stayin’ Alive; Perlstein,
The Invisible Bridge; Jennifer Stepp Breen, “Capitalizing Labor: What Work is Worth and Why, From the
New Deal to the New Economy” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2011).
590
Marshall Robinson in Leonard Silk, “‘New Economics’ Was Born in Crisis 50 Years Ago: The Great
Crash,” New York Times, October 28, 1979. For other contemporary news media treatments see e.g.
“Keynes Is Dead,” Wall Street Journal, January 31, 1977; Irving Kristol, “Toward a ‘New’ Economics?,”
Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1977; David Broder, “Democratic Party in Transition, But the Question Is, To
What?” Washington Post, January 14, 1979; Michael Harrington, “Two Cheers for Socialism,” Harper’s,
October 1976; Mike Mallowe, “Labor’s Last Stand,” Philadelphia, January 1982.

317

converting America into a service industry country,” George Meany stressed in 1978. “It
is possible that we will lose our position as a major manufacturing nation.”591
On the right, supply-side economics, growing in influence in the pages of the
Wall Street Journal and among policymakers like New York congressman Jack Kemp,
understood unemployment as an outgrowth of insufficient capital rather than (as
Keynesians had argued) insufficient demand from the rank-and-file consumer. Growth
came from the private sector, in this framework, and policymakers needed to incentivize
private sector investment by getting rid of overly burdensome taxes, regulation, and
deficit spending. The period saw a wide-ranging political mobilization on the part of
American business, including a growing investment in Washington, D.C. lobbying and
campaign contributions and a more aggressive stance against organized labor.592
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Employers by the 1980s sought steep concessions from workers during contract
negotiations and saw strikes as an opportunity to break unions. Broadly speaking, the
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s saw a shift in the dominant economic reasoning toward
deregulation, cuts to the social safety net, and tax cuts tilted to the highest income groups,
while the economy as a whole shifted away from manufacturing and towards financial
services.
It’s important to note here that elite public discourse, particularly in periods where
the economy seemed (according to the standard indicators) to be doing reasonably well,
was not altogether pessimistic about economic change. To be sure, it is possible to find
interpretations very familiar to a present-day reader in the discourse. “The system that
seemed to be capable of providing a steadily growing standard of living during the
turbulent 1960s [has] become totally incapable of providing people with a simple home
mortgage, a stable job, or a secure pension,” two labor-left economists argued in a 1982
book, with the decline of “productive investment in our basic national industries” giving
way to “shuttered factories, displaced workers, and a newly emerging group of ghost
towns.”593 Especially during the 1990s, however, a current of optimism and even
triumphalism ran alongside a current of pessimism and concern. In a 1992 analysis, R. W.
Apple of the New York Times stressed “the tremendous increase in the size of the middle
class and the concomitant shrinking [of] the working class…The have-nots are still there,
and still vocal, but there are far more haves now, and many are less and less prepared to
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help the have-nots.”594 “There is every reason to believe that this new era will see a
revolution in goods and services that will empower and enhance most people,” House
Speaker (and futurist) Newt Gingrich told an interviewer later in the decade.595
The impact of deindustrialization and the rise of neoliberalism on the history of
white working class representation has been significant to a degree beyond the scope of
this chapter. For the purposes of the argument here, though, it is important to first stress
that the dominant understanding of white working class identity continued to foreground
cultural traditionalism and anti-black views. The disadvantage white workers faced amid
deindustrialization and economic transition came into the discourse against that
backdrop. Contemporaries suggested that economic stagnation was likely to make
middle-income whites even more focused on protecting their own gains. Blue-collar
whites’ “social anger…turned downward as the economy stopped expanding,”
Massachusetts senator Paul Tsongas argued, directed at “the have-nots,” now a
“minority…whose desires seemed seriously to threaten the achievements of the newly
arrived middle class.”596 Second, deindustrialization might be understood as an invisible
actor within the discourse traced in this chapter. Critics of the new liberalism referred
consistently to the disadvantage suffered by white workers, but they paid little attention
to the causes of inequality and of disinvestment in cities and industrial towns. Rather,
criticism of the new liberalism spotlighted the consequences (crime, urban blight, high
unemployment, precarity), explaining them through the racialized frame of personal
594
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behavior. Critics made white workers’ pain visible not to address it materially but to
portray white workers’ response to it as normative.
This chapter has been organized around specific, distinguishable arguments
central to a broader critique of the new liberalism’s treatment of the white working class.
Individual sections of the chapter deal with three overlapping attacks, phrased here in
language reminiscent of new liberals’ critics: (1) New liberalism was indifferent to the
physical safety and wellbeing of its urban constituents; (2) New liberalism undermined
the traditional values prized by the white working class; (3) New liberalism was
indifferent to white disadvantage and forced working class whites to pay for new-liberal
favoritism toward blacks. Before turning to these specific claims, however, it is necessary
to clarify and contextualize what critics meant when they talked about liberals, liberalism,
or liberal elites. That is the goal of the next section.

The “New Class”: The Historical Context of the New Liberal Elite
In this period, criticism of liberalism as elitist was not nearly as well worn as it
has been in more recent decades—there was a level of novelty to the argument.
Contemporaries put forward a specific historical narrative explaining the new liberalism’s
turn toward elitism, and most understood themselves to be describing a relatively recent
development. In the key narrative, the transition from an industrial society to a
postindustrial society had empowered a new group of college-educated white liberal
elites, sometimes called the “New Class.” These elites, many of them influenced by newliberal campus culture and the New Left, were disdainful of mainstream America, in this
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view, and especially disdainful of working class whites. They held a different set of
political views than liberals had held in New Deal days, critics argued, and were
indifferent to material issues like physical and economic security. Critics charged that
the new liberals sought to use their influence in government, influence over intellectual
institutions (particularly journalism and academia), and influence over the Democratic
Party to move national politics to the left, through undemocratic means. This section
should be read as an attempt to historicize a critique of the new liberalism, not to evaluate
the critique’s validity.
***
The vision of the new liberalism that came under fire in this period was in many
respects a straw man. It is most easily grasped as a still-familiar set of images: urban
liberal elites, “affluent, well-educated cosmopolitans who judge the factory worker and
mill hand from their high-rise foundation offices, TV studios, and tweedy campus
retreats,”597 journalistic snobs, denizens of the ivory tower. While these images have
outlasted their earlier context and now suggest an ahistorical elitism, 1970s and 1980s
critics of liberalism had a very specific cohort in mind: affluent, college-educated white
professionals, many young enough to have grown up in the prosperous 1950s and 1960s,
empowered by the rising status of fields like government, journalism, academia, and
social services. Contemporaries often used a term to describe this cohort that has since
dropped from the discourse: the “New Class.”
Like the “economic royalists” of the 1930s, the new liberal elite was understood
as having emerged as part of a large-scale socioeconomic transformation. In this case,
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that large-scale transformation was the transition to a postindustrial society, in which the
service sector and the professions increased in importance as manufacturing declined.
While industrial society had empowered conservative elites, New Class theorists held, the
coming of postindustrial society empowered a new group of liberal elites distinguished
by their ability to manipulate language and claim intellectual expertise. As Kevin
Phillips argued in a typical account, “America’s new mandarins are not the people who
sell manufactured items but the people who shape and market ideas and information.”598
The New Class construct was broadly inclusive of “college-educated people whose skills
and vocations proliferate in a ‘post-industrial society,’” as Irving Kristol wrote in a 1975
op-ed, but the archetypical new elites, in this framework, included liberal intellectuals,
journalists, academics, government bureaucrats, and foundation officials.599
Critics of the new liberal elite argued that its emergence was a recent
phenomenon and a unique phenomenon: it was historically atypical for a privileged class
to hold liberal views. “Until the rise of a large, distinct knowledge sector, broadcast
networks, major newspapers, and fashionable Ivy League colleges tended to reflect the
conservative views of the industrial establishment,” Phillips emphasized.600 FDR,
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delivering the commencement speech at Harvard in 1936, had been booed. In explaining
the rise of the new liberal elite, contemporaries cited liberalism’s successes since the New
Deal; the growth of the state; the larger and more prestigious social role played by expert
administrators, bureaucrats, and public intellectuals; the growth of higher education
during the affluent postwar period; and the creation of a national media establishment
concentrated in Washington and New York. Critics tended to picture younger members
of the elite as children of affluent America, shaped by liberal campus cultures in the
1960s and 1970s and the intellectual currents of the New Left. Older members of the
new liberal elite tended to be pictured as 1930s and 1940s radicals who had become
elitists as their status rose in the 1950s and 1960s. “The ex-underdogs, the ex-outcasts,
the ex-rebels are satisfied bourgeois today, who pay $150 a plate at Americans for
Democratic Action dinners,” journalist Howard K. Smith claimed.601 Amid the
incredible changes in the country and in their own lives, in this view, these elites had
remained liberals, in part as a status symbol. They wanted it known that they supported
liberal causes and organizations like Americans for Democratic Action (and that they
could afford to support them). However, as liberalism became the ideology of an elite, in
this view, the meaning of liberalism itself had changed.
The ideology of the new liberal elite
For critics, the new liberal elite held to an ideology distinct from the liberalism of
the past. It was less focused on bread-and-butter issues, more negative about American
life, and much more contemptuous of working class whites. First, in this view, elite
liberal politics was distinguished by its post-materialist focus: its assumption that
601
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economic security and a decent standard of living were no longer the most pressing
political issues. “There are now two Lefts—the materialist and the postmaterialist—
which are rooted in different classes,” Seymour Martin Lipset put it in a typical account.
Traditional, working class-centered liberalism prioritized “satisfying material needs, i.e.,
with sustenance and safety” and pursued a “high standard of living, a stable
economy…an enduring family life, crime fighting, and maintenance of order.” In
contrast, the issues prioritized by educated liberals included “a clean environment, a
better culture, equal status for women and minorities, the quality of education, peaceful
international relations, greater democratization, and a more permissive morality.”602
Lipset deemed these “non-economic or social issues,” a particularly clear demonstration
of what the culture/economics binary falsely excluded from the realm of the
“economic”—the environment, education, “equal status for women and minorities.” In
this framework, voters would only become concerned with these issues when they no
longer had concerns about their economic stability and wellbeing. That made it easy to
dismiss concern with “social issues” as elitist.
Second, critics argued that the New Class held a basically negative view of
America itself—as racist, imperialist, and culturally bankrupt. “A few fashionable
intellectuals and academics,” Ronald Reagan charged in a 1976 address, would “have us
believe ours is a sick society—a bad country.”603 Where the old liberalism had been
proudly patriotic, in this view, the new liberalism saw the history of the United States as a
602
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history marked by slavery, consumerism, and unjust war in Vietnam. The term
“adversary culture,” coined by literary critic Lionel Trilling, was widely adopted to
describe this orientation. For Trilling, writing that cultivated an adversary stance had the
objective of “detaching the reader from the habits of thought and feeling that the larger
culture imposes, of giving him a ground and a vantage point from which to judge and
condemn…the culture that produced him.”604 Intellectual life, in this view, was
fundamentally critical and oppositional; it required intellectuals to stand at a distance
from the broader culture to identify and point out its flaws. The value of the concept for
critics of the new liberalism was clear—it identified a powerful cohort hypocritically
distinguished by its opposition to majoritarian norms. When conservatives like Irving
Kristol, Kevin Phillips, and Pat Buchanan referred to “adversary culture,” they meant a
culture “hostile to the prevailing middle-class values of work, patriotism, and traditional
morality,” as Phillips put it.605 For many, that adversary stance extended to capitalism.
At bottom, it meant that new liberal intellectuals treated negativity toward American
society as a means of class distinction.606
Third, for critics, the new liberal elite held a contemptuous view of lower and
middle-income whites as narrow-minded, bigoted, and unconcerned. Critics most often
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tied these views to the influence of the 1960s New Left.607 Contemporary discourse
understood the New Left as a movement of professional-class white students who “have
all ‘had it made’ in economic terms,” as the AFL-CIO News alleged608, and for many, the
New Left (and student radicalism generally) left an egregious class bias in its wake. Penn
Kemble, an intellectual and strategist close to the AFL-CIO, charged that the New Left
had mainstreamed the idea “that the average American had been brainwashed by the
Establishment and was tainted by racism” and therefore “could [not] be fully trusted to
make the best decisions for himself or the nation.” Instead, “political decision-making
had to be shifted into the hands of those who by virtue of superior education and the
possession of ‘conscience’…could give some civilized shape to the malleable politics of
the masses.”609 For Kemble and other critics, New Left-inspired intellectuals did not only
see education as an index of competence and expertise; they saw it as an index of purity
and intelligence. They saw themselves as entitled to lead for both reasons. Their
emphasis on the intractable bigotry of the white working class, in this view, served their
professional interests.
A common corollary held that liberals took a patronizing and paternalistic attitude
towards a range of marginalized minority groups, whom they blatantly favored over all
others. “Liberals are obsessed with the need to rectify, by federal intervention, the
injustices historically perpetrated by whites against the black population of the country,
607
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as well as other wrongs allegedly committed against a whole series of newly-discovered
and acutely self-conscious ‘minorities,’” William Rusher charged, “ranging from
homosexuals and American Indians to Spanish-speaking citizens, flower people, prison
inmates, and women.”610 Any semi-organized minority could get something from liberal
elites simply by proclaiming itself as such, critics complained. While similar charges had
been directed at 1930s and 1940s liberalism and organized labor (see Chapter 1), in this
period, working class whites were not mapped to any minority group in elite public
discourse—they were instead understood as those most excluded in any discussion
focused on “minorities.”
The new liberal elite’s sources of power
The New Left had figured itself as an oppositional social movement working
against the Establishment from the outside. For critics of the new liberalism, New Leftinfluenced professionals were part of the Establishment. They sought to deny their class
interests, in this view, even to themselves, but their power was very substantial. Broadly,
within discourse critical of the New Class, liberal elites exercised power in three primary
ways: their influence in government; their influence in dominant intellectual institutions,
particularly news media and universities; and their influence over the Democratic Party.
First, fundamental to the conservative critique of the New Class was the view that
the most significant, coercive power was now the state, not business. Conservatives
charged that the increasing size and scope of the administrative state had empowered a
powerful group of liberal bureaucrats insulated from the wishes of the electorate. The
courts were similarly unaccountable to the democratic process, in this view. Because
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they lacked faith in the majority, critics charged, new liberals pursued reform through
these and other channels where they could circumvent the need to get majority support.
They sought, Kristol argued, to have “a set of ideals and values that are not shared by the
majority of the American people…imposed on them through legislation, regulation and
judicial decree.”611 It is critical to stress the connection between the language of
“impos[ition]” and issues of race and integration, the subtext of Kristol’s comments here:
Elites who envisioned an integrated society of a certain kind used state power to force the
less powerful (white) majority to comply with their vision, regardless of consent.
Liberalism had begun as a defense of ordinary people against powerful and coercive
elites, in this framework, but had evolved into an equally coercive power. “In 1928, the
average industrial worker in Cleveland was as helpless against his autocratic factory
owner as his grandson is today against court-ordered busing,” populist conservative Bob
Whitaker argued.612
New liberals did not only use the state to impose their desires on others, in this
framework; they also exploited it to support themselves financially. Most versions of the
thesis tied the New Class to the creation of a vast, powerful, self-serving state apparatus
claiming to ameliorate social problems. A system of glorified cronyism took place, as
bureaucrats in control of government resources created “federal initiatives making
hundreds of thousands of jobs and opportunities available to those whose hearts itch to do
good and who long for a ‘meaningful’ use of their talents, skills, and years.”613 As a
result, in this view, taxpayer money ostensibly intended for the poor primarily served to
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enrich elites. Americans working in the private sector picked up the tab. This,
businessman and former Treasury secretary William Simon claimed, was a “politics of
stealing from productive Peter to pay nonproductive Paul, creating a new class of
Americans which lives off our taxes and pretends that its institutionalized middle-class
pork barrel is all for the sake of the ‘poor.’”614 Central to criticism of the liberal elite was
the view that new liberals camouflaged and justified their desire for power by claiming to
work on behalf of the marginalized. They cloaked their naked ambition in a heavy dose
of moralism, in this view, and imagined themselves as the forces of light and their
opponents as the forces of darkness.
Conservatives who sought to bring about an alliance between working class
whites and business-focused economic conservatives cited New Class power in
government as a key unifying issue. In a 1976 book, Pat Buchanan called on the
Republican Party to become “the party of the working class, not the welfare class,” to
“champion the cause of producers and taxpayers, of the private sector threatened by the
government sector, of the millions who carry most of the cost of government and share
the least in its beneficence.” His besieged constituency comprised “producers and
laborers, blue collar and white collar,” asked to carry “upon their backs” an “expanding
army of millions, utterly dependent upon government for education, medical care, food
and shelter.”615 The slippage in this account between the interests of the (white) working
class and the interests of business (“the private sector threatened by the government
sector”) is clear and intentional. Buchanan and like-minded conservatives argued that the
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key economic divide in American politics pitted “producers” and “taxpayers” against
nonproducers. Because (white) workers and their employers worked, produced things of
value, and were overtaxed to pay for those who did neither, in this view, they had a
common interest in opposing “intellectuals,” the “welfare class,” and the statist apparatus
that supported them.
Second, in this framework, the New Class exerted power through its influence
over the intellectual establishment, especially the news media and universities. Both, for
contemporaries, were realms where liberal elites had displaced an old conservative elite.
Universities had once defended the social order; students were now pushed to question
the foundations of capitalism and American society. Similarly, contemporary critics of
liberal bias in the media did not dispute that the press had been conservative during New
Deal days. They argued that a new generation of journalists, more educated and more
liberal, had attained positions of influence as news production became centralized in
Washington and New York. The result was a milieu in which elite journalists inhabited
closed professional circles unwelcoming to alternative views. “Unlike his predecessor of
a generation ago, the adversary journalist is less at home in the neighborhood tavern than
the college seminar,” Pat Buchanan charged, and that “adversary journalist” had “ceased
playing the neutral observer and reporter and [taken] up the more exciting and satisfying
role of pleader, partisan, and advocate.”616 For Buchanan and other critics, new-liberal
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journalists sought not to report the news but to convert the audience. Television news,
the greatest offender for most conservatives, portrayed America as a troubled society
marked by constant conflict and an endless parade of social problems.
Liberals’ growing influence in the Democratic Party comprised a third leg of New
Class power. When Reagan and centrist Democrats charged that “the left took over the
Democratic Party” via the McGovern-Fraser reforms, the culprit was a Democratic Party
faction then called the “New Politics.” The New Politics was understood to comprise
younger, college-educated activists, often connected to anti-Vietnam War, civil rights,
feminist, and queer people’s movements—in the words of one critic, “educated,
prosperous people, members of the professional and technical intelligentsia.”617 “New
Politics” Democrats differed from New Left radicals in their belief that change could
come through mainstream institutions. For their critics, they were just as antagonistic to
majoritarian American norms, to white working class people, and to organized labor.
Opponents defined the New Politics against the “majority,” the “ordinary” American.
When they called for increasing the influence of women, one critic charged, new liberals
meant not “Catholic women or ordinary housewives” but “politically untypical
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women”—liberal well-to-do white professional women.618 “I honestly believe that these
new politics types get a psychological comfort out of losing,” remarked the AFL-CIO’s
Al Barkan. “They don’t want to be identified with the majority.”619
For critics, the outsize influence of the new liberal elite in government, media,
academia, and the Democratic Party had serious negative consequences. Individuals and
groups who had little sense of life as most Americans lived it occupied positions of
power, they argued, and their decisions harmed those with less privilege. The remainder
of this chapter examines three separate charges: 1) New liberal urban policy placed white
workers and other non-elite urbanites in danger; 2) The pressure new liberals placed on
conventional moral norms harmed working class whites most; 3) New liberals
overlooked white disadvantage and created a welfare system whereby the most deserving
workers paid heavy taxes to support the least deserving. The goal of this chapter is to
stress the importance of the white worker as a symbol of resistance to the new liberalism.
Contemporary elites consistently invoked white workers in debating many of the most
contentious issues of the period—feminism, busing, integration, crime, welfare, and
more. A full treatment of the political history around these issues is beyond the scope of
the chapter. I have focused primarily on portraying contemporary arguments and
analyzing them in the context of a history of white working class representation.
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1: The new liberalism places the body at risk: Integration and crime
A prominent line of attack on post-1960s liberalism held that new-liberal policies
placed the bodies and lives of lower- and middle-income constituents in danger. This
critique focused heavily on Northern cities, understood as home to the white
(predominantly ethnic) working class. Upper-income new-liberal whites, critics charged,
lived in the suburbs, removed from the real-life consequences of their policies,
particularly policies dealing with crime and integration. New liberals, opponents argued,
blamed social injustice for crime (rather than criminals themselves) and were unwilling to
support the strong anti-crime measures necessary to protect law-abiding citizens. They
supported desegregation busing plans, despite the harms inflicted on the children
affected, in this view, but kept their own children out of integrated lower-income schools.
Law-abiding urbanites were the ultimate victims. Simply put, in this discourse, the chief
privilege afforded by class status is understood as the ability to avoid dangerous urban
spaces—less obliquely, the ability to avoid mixing with blacks, or as mainstream critics
of new liberals more often framed it, mixing with any dangerous “lower class” regardless
of color.
***
The starting point for understanding discourse on crime, integration, and the white
working class is the common argument that white elites compelled the least well-off
whites to take on a disproportionate amount of what observers often called “the burden of
change,” “the costs of integration,” “the price for racial integration.” The “burden” of
change, as understood in this framework, could be seen in heightened competition among
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the less advantaged for jobs and resources—if the courts or the mayor’s office mandated
that a certain percentage of jobs on a construction project go to blacks, a white
construction worker would be put out of work, not a white city planner. Most of all, it
could be seen in a deteriorating and dangerous school experience for children and in the
changing culture of neighborhoods. “The vast mass of white citizens…see change as
taking place at their expense,” neoconservative Aaron Wildavsky wrote in a typical
account. “It is their jobs which are sought for blacks, their schools which are invaded by
other people, and their children who are bused to strange locations.”620 As Wildavsky’s
phrasing (“invaded,” “other people”) made particularly clear, the burden of change in this
framework ultimately came down to sharing space with African Americans.
Contemporaries, especially critics of new liberal urban policy, often argued that
class, not race, was the issue—urbanites with stable family lives, regardless of race,
reasonably did not want to live alongside others, regardless of race, who were dangerous
and loud. New York politician Mario Cuomo, for instance, framed controversy over the
construction of public housing in Forest Hills, New York as “a clash between working
and nonworking people, many of the unemployed being black…The objection is to crime
and deterioration and not color. The coincidence [sic] that most of the lower economic
class are black is what produces confusion.”621 This argument was rooted in a common
elite-level opposition between two very different cultures found among lower- to middleincome urbanites. One was orderly, family-centered, quiet, clean, traditional; the other
was loud, violent, crime-ridden, lacking in stability, marked by sexual promiscuity and a
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desire for immediate gratification.622 These clearly fit conventional imagery around white
ethnics and blacks, respectively, but observers often framed the opposition in race-neutral
language (e.g. “working class” versus “lower class” or “poor”).
For critics, lax law enforcement, public housing and neighborhood integration,
and busing had all chipped away at the barriers neighborhoods had built to insulate
themselves, bringing pathology closer and closer into the sphere of once-stable
neighborhoods. Journalist Jim Sleeper described the problem from the perspective of
Italian New Yorkers:
The Italians knew—and these were, indeed, incontestable facts—that at eight each
morning, when the men in their families had gone to work and their sidewalks and
stoops were already hosed down and the wash was hanging out back, garbage
covered the sidewalks in front of the “welfare” buildings, whose residents were
sleeping off another night of noise and mayhem. The nightly screams and
shatterings of glass, the inevitable police sirens and bubble gum lights ricocheting
through the Italians’ blinds and around their parlors, had brought the block to the
edge of war. Puerto Rican and black boys urinated against the fronts of the
block’s two abandoned buildings in broad daylight and strode down the street
bearing boom boxes at full blast.623
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In this framework, cleanliness attests to respectable domesticity (“sidewalks and
stoops…hosed down” and “wash…hanging out back”); pathology is evident in the
dirtiness of a living space (“garbage covered the sidewalk”; “boys urinated…in broad
daylight”). Sleeper and like-minded critics charged that new liberals did not confront the
problems brought by pathological lower class culture with clear eyes, under the
wrongheaded impression that doing so would be racist. Because their daily lives were
touched by the pathological culture, working class whites—and, in many accounts, lawabiding, working class blacks and Latinos/as—paid the price. Deindustrialization here
was an invisible actor; the discourse depicted the consequences of racial inequality and
the disinvestment in cities but foregrounded bad behavior.
Crime
First, in this framework, lower-income urbanites paid for the blindness of
suburban new liberals when they were victimized by crime. When New Democrats
Galston and Kamarck charged Democrats with “softness toward the perpetrators of crime
and indifference toward its victims,” they echoed the longstanding argument that new
liberals were too quick to attribute crime to poverty and injustice rather than to the
agency of the criminal and (as a result) unwilling to support strong law enforcement
measures. A 1972 article by George McGovern suggests the type of reasoning they had
in mind. “The purse-snatcher, the mugger and the car-stripper” committed crimes
primarily because they had no other means of getting money, McGovern argued. The
“dismal fact is that the street criminal is almost always the product of poverty and
alienation. To deplore street crime and not deplore the conditions that provoke it is
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senseless.”624 For critics, this kind of argument gave criminals more indulgence than
their victims. It was both unjust and politically damaging, and it was primarily a product
of new liberals at a safe distance from the very real and legitimate worries of the urban
street.
One of the most influential treatments of crime, white workers, and new liberal
politics can be found in sociologist Jonathan Rieder’s 1985 book Canarsie, an
ethnographic study of a predominantly Jewish and Italian neighborhood in Brooklyn.
The book asked why urban white ethnics—people whose parents and grandparents had
provided the “élan” and “ballast” for the New Deal—had turned against their political
heritage. Rieder rooted urban white ethnics’ turn to the right in a “distinctive politics of
space” forged by concerns about integration, mugging, and “crime in the streets.”
Canarsie residents, he argued, “began to see liberalism as being out of key with the
requirements of urban living and to equate it with a self-destructive idealism...[that]
ignored the demands of bodily survival.”625 New liberals, for Rieder and other
contemporaries, had unfairly dismissed these concerns as illegitimate. Instead of
incorporating the “need for law and order” into a broader progressive program, they had
ceded the issue to the right. As a result, Rieder argued, “left-liberalism hardened into an
orthodoxy of the privileged classes.” Privilege, in this framework, is idealistic, soft,
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unwilling to accept difficult truths, more interested in appearing righteous or pure than in
acting practically.
Centrist Democrats consistently stressed that calling for “law and order” was not
equivalent to racist backlash politics. In their view, crime was “a real problem” that
constituents needed policymakers to address, and the law-abiding African American and
Latino/a majority had the same concerns as the whites new liberals reflexively deemed
racist. As those most victimized by crime, in this view, urban voters naturally wanted
strong policing. Washington senator Scoop Jackson epitomizes the argument: “Well,
first the absolute left said that law and order was a code word for racism. Then they said
it was a code word for repression…[But] who takes it on the chin? Not the fellow in the
new high rise downtown” or “the fellow in the exclusive suburb…No, it is the vulnerable
little guy again who is victimized. There are elderly people, there are poor people, there
are black and Chicano people in this country who are afraid to walk out in the street at
night or during the day. Talk about repression!”626 In this view, liberals’ traditional
mission had been to safeguard the welfare of the “little guy”; “law and order” was
consistent with this heritage, and anything else was not.
Never far from view, however, was a discourse in which urban working class
whites were the primary white victims of crime, with blacks and Latinos understood as
the primary perpetrators. “In suburbia…a distant sympathy for the black condition can
be aroused,” journalist Theodore White argued, as “the white middle class can insulate
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itself—by zoning and money—from the stress and strain of experiment, from the fear of
violence.” Urban whites, however, understood crime as “a peculiar, savage condition
brought about by Negroes.” White conceded that “blacks who live in black ghettos are
most in danger,” but stressed that “those who live close to black precincts are also in
danger…and those who live close to the black precincts are by and large the white poor,
the white working class, largely of recent immigrant stock themselves,” dismayed as “the
streets on which their old ladies walk to midnight mass…[became] dangerous because of
purse snatchers.”627
The association of blackness with criminality is obviously among the most deeply
rooted tropes in American politics, as is the need to protect the white body from black
intrusion. This discourse specifically turns on which white bodies are in danger and
which are not. White implies that “distant sympathy for the black condition” is only
possible for those (affluent) whites who do not share space with African Americans on a
daily basis. In this framework, it is not simply that new liberals can insulate themselves
from urban strain; liberals can only remain liberals because they are untouched by street
violence. Working class whites are in danger, in this logic, and therefore cannot possibly
remain liberal. A pair of jokes best captures this connection between ideology and street
violence: “A conservative is a liberal who’s been mugged…A liberal is a conservative
who hasn’t been mugged—yet!”628
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Neighborhood and school integration
Contemporaries cited busing, perhaps more than any other issue, as evidence that
working class whites bore the burden of integration.629 Particularly after the 1974
Milliken v. Bradley Supreme Court decision held that metropolitan desegregation plans
could not touch the suburbs, the chief argument against busing from white parents and
politicians held that it placed the burden on the least privileged urban families (whites
and, for some, blacks too). These children endured long bus rides to unfamiliar or
dangerous neighborhoods, in this view; at school, they faced inferior instruction and
violence. The most central charge in this case against busing was a charge of basic
hypocrisy: The elites who designed and imposed the busing plans exempted their own
children. For one conservative, liberal stalwart Ted Kennedy’s support of busing was
easily explicable and deeply unjust: “No Kennedy has ever had to experience the horrors
of having himself or his children bused into the ghetto. The Kennedys of
America…created a system whereby the rich could buy their way out of racial trauma.”630
It is difficult to overstate the pervasiveness, in antibusing discourse, of a “class
struggle” frame stressing the unfairness of upper-income whites treating white working
class families differently than their own. “Busing is a strategy devised by the haute
629
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bourgeoisie to force the working class to pay the price for racial integration while their
kids bask in lily-white suburban or private schools—with, of course, a few upper-middleclass blacks around to make it look good,” white ethnic advocate Andrew Greeley
argued.631 Boston antibusing activist Louise Day Hicks focused her criticism on “rich
people in the suburbs,” “the establishment,” “the outside power structure.”632 The same
frame is foregrounded in journalist J. Anthony Lukas’s 1985 Pulitzer Prize-winning
treatment of the Boston busing crisis, Common Ground: “class resentment did more than
anything to feed the fires of white resistance in the inner-city neighborhoods,” Lukas
argued. Framing busing as a class-based conflict between the affluent and the working
class was beneficial for antibusing activists. It allowed them to claim underdog status
and to soften any direct attack on African American children or activists who had worked
to desegregate schools. Racism was not the motivating factor, they implied; class
unfairness was. More broadly, in this framework, the only group with any power or
agency within urban politics was the white elite, and this group imposed busing (or any
policy intended to promote integration) from the top down. The longstanding work local
civil rights movements had done on education issues was elided. This is characteristic of
much of the discourse on liberalism’s unfairness to working class whites. In a customary
framework, African Americans do not have any political agency; the white elite
champions them, at the expense of the white working class.
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For contemporaries, the outsize burden borne by working class whites also
manifested in the changing nature of urban white ethnic neighborhoods. It’s important to
note that sympathetic contemporaries framed these neighborhoods as warm, communal
spaces home to an almost timeless culture. “These are places…where the white worker
gets back his face and his name, where he ‘has a say,’ where he experiences participation
and community,” one scholar explained.633 A common corollary held that residents of
these neighborhoods did not want other groups to move in because they wanted to
preserve the ethnic homogeneity central to their identity. “The pattern of ItalianAmerican life is continuous with that of their ancestors,” Italian-American advocate
Richard Gambino argued; with “outsiders” understood as “threats to neighborhood
stability which is necessary to the close-knit life and culture of the people.”634 In this
view, opposition to integration was not about anti-blackness, but about preserving (in this
case) Italianness. This argument was prominent enough in the period to inspire one of
the highest-profile controversies of the 1976 presidential campaign, in which Democratic
candidate Jimmy Carter averred that “I see nothing wrong with ethnic purity being
maintained” in a neighborhood. Government should not, Carter suggested, “break down
an ethnically oriented community by interjecting into it a member of another race,” “alien
groups,” or a “diametrically opposite kind of family.”635 Carter’s inartful phrasing
underscores the obvious subtext behind references to ethnicity and “family” norms in this
633
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context—“another race,” “alien groups,” and a “diametrically opposite kind of family”
are effectively synonymous.
Urban elites, critics charged, were indifferent to white ethnics’ legitimate worries
about change in their neighborhoods—loss of ethnic distinctiveness, fears about safety
and disruptive neighbors—instead writing them off as racism. These concerns were “not
merely irrational, and over skin color,” white ethnic advocate Michael Novak argued
(following a common contemporary framework in equating racism with irrational
psychological attitudes). Rather, “in the present system, the only thing one gets for
integration is punishment: higher crime, worse schools, the diminishment of basic
services, and the rest.”636 Furthermore, Novak and like-minded critics stressed, neither
white ethnics nor their ancestors had created the American racial regime, and they had
been victimized by it themselves. “Racists? Our ancestors owned no slaves. Most of us
ceased being serfs only in the last two hundred years,” Novak insisted. This argument
had a clear corollary: it was unjust for the white ethnic, “who is living on the margin
himself,” to be “asked to pay the entire price for the injustices done to blacks”—to
redress the sins perpetrated by white Anglo-Americans before his ancestors had even
arrived in America—“while those who were enriched pay nothing.”637 The ultimate class
privilege, in this view, was the ability to reap the benefits of racism while displacing the
blame and the costs onto others.
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Since the 1960s, white working class anger at the liberal elite has sometimes been
attributed to an abstract sense of condescension or bias. In mid-1960s-1980s discourse
on integration and crime, the cause is often much more explicit: new liberals designed
urban policy based on their own self-interest or their sense of moral righteousness,
without regard to the practical, immediate, and bodily concerns of non-elites. Working
class whites were harmed as a result, as their neighborhoods and schools deteriorated—in
large part because they were forced to share space with African Americans. In this
framework, white liberals are liberals predominantly because they lack direct experience
with the consequences of their policies, a luxury not afforded to most—only a white
person with class privilege can “afford” to be liberal.

2. The erosion of traditional norms hurts the (white) working class most
The victimized white worker was first and foremost a symbol of racial grievance.
Because of the association between the white working class and traditional values,
however, white workers could be defined against anything ostensibly threatening to those
values—changes within the family structure, women in the workplace, “women’s
liberation,” normalization of homosexuality, increasingly nontraditional norms in schools
and in popular culture. This pattern manifests particularly clearly in elite public
discourse around the Christian conservative movement and the feminist movement.
Contemporaries argued that the changing norms brought by feminism and the new
liberalism harmed white working class people. Working class whites found meaningful
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lives through stable and close-knit family life, in this view, and the new liberalism took
an adversarial approach to their major source of agency and happiness.
Feminism and the white working class
It was a commonplace in elite public discourse that second-wave feminism was
primarily a movement of professional-class white women. Progressive white working
class women and women of color argued as much; so did observers from other
perspectives. Those who framed feminism as out of touch with white working class
women made two primary arguments: first, the movement’s economic agenda focused
too heavily on equal access to professional jobs, a priority only for professional-class
women; second, professional-class feminists’ leftwing social views ran counter to
socially conservative working class norms.
In one prominent line of argumentation, the women’s movement was too heavily
focused on workplace equality with men, which it assumed to be necessarily liberating.
“Women’s Lib periodicals assume that the majority of women are college-educated,
endowed with superb talents they are churning to express to a reluctant world, eager to
enjoy a fascinating career,” one white ethnic activist wrote.638 That assumption, in this
critique, did not reflect the needs and experiences of women who did not have
professional men in their families and were not in a position to choose whether or not to
work out of the home. “We’re not after the jobs that our men have because we know
how our men feel,” Baltimore politician Barbara Mikulski explained. “We know that
when they come home from work every day they feel they’ve been treated like the
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machines they operate.”639 When the only jobs a woman could conceivably hold were
low-paying and boring with little chance for advancement, subsidized childcare, family
leave, and job training were more pressing concerns than workplace equality, in this
view.
A second line of argumentation held that white working class people found the
“role-changing” associated with feminism offensive. Since at least the 1950s, social
researchers had understood white working class women as heavily focused on stability
and the family. While new research conducted in the mid-1970s was significantly more
nuanced, often stressing the agency and activism of white working class women in their
families and in local politics, that emphasis on the close-knit family remained. “The
working-class and lower-middle-class subculture…is dominated by an inner-family
orientation; members are expected to find both social and emotional gratifications within
its bosom,” sociologist Lillian Rubin wrote in a 1976 study. “No woman worthy of the
title Mother would wish to do otherwise.”640
In this framework, role changes posed a particular challenge for white working
class people, both men and women, because they were less likely to find fulfillment or
self-actualization in their jobs. Now, in this view, cultural change imperiled their ability
to find it in family and community too. The movement had “unsetting” implications for
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both “the male breadwinner whose self-esteem derived mainly from that role, and to the
woman whose life’s commitment was to husband, children, and home,” noted Nancy
Seifer, a leading researcher on white ethnic working class women.641 “It [women’s
liberation] doesn’t relate to us,” one New Yorker argued. “You can’t agitate women
without agitating men. It’s destructive to the family. Most of us were poverty families—
the men were put down as much as women. They need support too.”642 In this
framework, those who could not easily attain social status outside of traditional roles
were hurt the most as titles like “mother,” “father,” and “wife” no longer carried
automatic regard. Women who suffered class disadvantage also, in this view, reasonably
did not see men or the family as oppressive. Men dealt with the same pressures women
faced, and the family was their refuge against the outside world.
In looking at this discourse, it is important to stress that there has been a
longstanding connection between economic security (particularly for workers) and
traditional norms around gender and family. For instance, some of the earliest labor laws
limiting the power of employers had governed the hours and conditions under which
women could legally work; while they were grounded in paternalism, they also provided
real gains. A significant number of feminists in the first half of the twentieth century
opposed the Equal Rights Amendment (“Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex”) on the
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grounds that it would take away these protections.643 In the 1970s, conservatives, most
notably Phyllis Schlafly, led opposition to the ERA. Schlafly was less insistent than
many of her social conservative allies in linking her claims to the welfare of white
workers. Much of her public argumentation featured lurid and homophobic allegations
directed at “radicals,” “man-haters,” and “lesbians.” But she and her supporters did tap
the notion that seeking to be treated exactly like men would disadvantage women by
removing protective measures designed for their benefit: “In the face of the double cost,
industry just takes the benefits away from the women so men and women can be equal on
a lower level.”644 Traditional roles, for Schlafly and like-minded conservatives, protected
women and privileged them over men.
More broadly, the notion of economic security and the “good life” has historically
been deeply tied to the breadwinning father/homemaker mother model, which had been
normative for workers and professionals alike for decades. During the heyday of
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organized labor’s power, officials argued strongly in favor of the family wage system,
which they saw as central to economic security and justice. Staunch support for the
family wage within labor circles certainly did reflect norms proscribing wage work for
women who had a choice in the matter, but it was not read as “conservative.” The
expectation that multiple members of the household would work for wages, in this
framework, was most advantageous to employers (and harmful for working class men),
because it allowed employers to defend paying the primary earner lower wages.
When critics framed the new liberalism as classist, they tapped (implicitly or
explicitly) the connection between (white) working class economic security and
patriarchal family norms. “The culture wars that have convulsed America since the
sixties are best understood as a form of class warfare,” Christopher Lasch argued in a
typical account, pitting an “enlightened elite (as it thinks of itself)” against “the
majority.” The “working and lower middle classes,” Lasch continued, “favor limits on
abortion, cling to the two-parent family as a source of stability in a turbulent world, [and]
resist experiments with ‘alternative lifestyles.’”645 Lasch here played on the longstanding
connection between the white working class and stability. (White) workers, in his view,
had a healthy understanding of limits that elites lacked. They regarded strict moral norms
as protection from the vicissitudes of “a turbulent world,” not as oppressive.
Christian conservatism and the white working class
More broadly, the value of “class struggle” frames on issues of sexuality and
gender, as with race, is straightforward: they undercut a frame in which the conservative
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position is the position of dominant groups (Christians, heterosexuals, men) and identify
it instead as the position of the (white) working class. This dynamic can be seen in the
public claims-making of the New Right, which championed working class and middleincome whites more vocally than any contemporary conservative group. The movement,
leader Richard Viguerie claimed in 1983’s The Establishment vs. the People, “represents
the class of Americans variously referred to as ‘the little people,’ ‘the forgotten men and
women,’ ‘the working class,’ and ‘the silent majority.’”646 The “establishment,” the
“cultural elite,” and the “intellectual elite” were customary adversaries for Christian
conservatives. “Over the last 15 years, Middle America’s fabric of beliefs, conventions,
norms, customs and moral values has been torn apart,” charged one conservative, with a
“new intellectual elite…carrying out the process of demolition.”647
An understanding of the social conservative constituency as a previously “silent”
majority was advantageous for the New Right. While many of the leaders of the New
Right had grown up in (white) working class America, they were also seasoned activists
and operatives who saw an opportunity to win gains for their brand of conservatism by
mobilizing support among evangelical Christian and Catholic voters. In a frequent
narrative, however, social conservatives and Christian conservatives had only become
involved in politics recently, as the nation took a sharp turn to the left. They were not
professional politicians with an ax to grind or a thirst for power, in this framework. They
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simply wanted to defend the moral system that most Americans supported and that had
been accepted as the natural order until recently.
In a 1986 interview, New Right leader Paul Weyrich offered a representative
articulation of this narrative. The movement’s base, he argued, “is comprised largely of
people who, for many, many decades, were very quiet politically.” Weyrich defined a
“cultural conservative” as “someone whose main concern is family, neighborhood,
community and church. These are people very much wrapped up in their children and the
family network. They are mainly ethnic blue-collar people who have worked in the same
factory or the same job for a long period of time.” Cultural conservatives were forced to
speak out, Weyrich argued, because they could no longer live quiet and contented lives
by keeping to themselves. The tide of recent events—sexual education in schools, the
Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion, the Engel v. Vitale decision banning prayer in
public schools, acceptance of “homosexual affirmative action”—“cause[d] these people
to feel that they were under siege.”648
“Siege” suggests a distant, external authority exerting its power to reshape local
or private space—home, school, church, neighborhood—against the wishes of locals. In
this framework, new liberals were unwilling to allow ordinary Americans to live their
lives and raise their children the way they saw fit; they sought instead to impose the
views they considered best, regardless of consent. The power of the “Big Media,” for
many, lay in its ability to break down the barriers citizens had built to keep out dangerous
material, to “pour violence and filth and anti-Americanism into our homes and places of
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work,” as Richard Viguerie charged.649 This understanding of liberal power also came
through particularly clearly on education issues—textbooks with liberal bias, liberals
“distributing sexual propaganda to our third and fourth graders.”650 This emphasis on the
power of the new liberalism to break down barriers suggests a key continuity across
issues of race and sexuality. From busing to integration (North and South) to sex in the
media, illegitimate power is understood as distant, external, and imposed against the
wishes of locals without consent.

3. White workers pay for new liberal programs and get nothing in return
In 1985, pollster Stan Greenberg conducted a study in an industrial suburb north
of Detroit that yielded one of the most influential portrayals of white working class voters
in the post-civil rights era. Macomb County, Michigan was a former labor-liberal
stronghold where Ronald Reagan had won roughly two-thirds of the vote in 1984, and the
Michigan Democratic Party and the UAW had hired Greenberg to make sense of that
result. During focus groups with Macomb County Democrats who had voted for Reagan,
Greenberg recalled, “we raised the race issue, and unbelievable emotion came pouring
out.”651 The argument he put forward to explain these voters’ “defection” from the
Democrats was straightforward: Macomb County’s white working class voters held a
649
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“profound distaste for blacks, a sentiment that pervades almost everything they think
about government and politics.”652 Macomb voters’ anti-black racism manifested in
opposition to a range of liberal policies, in Greenberg’s account, but especially welfare
and affirmative action. They perceived “the special status of blacks as a serious obstacle
to their personal advancement”—insisting that they had lost out on job opportunities and
loans because of racial favoritism—and viewed government “as a black domain where
whites cannot expect reasonable treatment.” Macomb voters also saw themselves as
heavily taxed but receiving nothing in return, “ignored by the government but forced to
support social programs that did not benefit them,” for Greenberg. In sum, “blacks
constituted the explanation for their vulnerability, for almost everything that has gone
wrong in their lives.”653
Greenberg put forward a particularly extreme and explicit version of an argument
that had been made consistently for twenty years prior to his Macomb study: the white
working class received, or felt that it received, nothing from new liberal social policy
geared only towards African Americans. This argument undergirded much discourse on
Middle America (see Chapter 3). It deeply shaped the politics of the 1980s and 1990s,
including the efforts of Republicans to appeal to “Reagan Democrats” and the efforts of
Clinton and the New Democrats to win them back. Throughout the period, working class
whites appeared consistently in elite public discourse as those most harmed by and most
opposed to new liberal welfare and affirmative action policy. In each case, what most

652
Stanley Greenberg, “Report on Democratic Defection” (Washington, D.C.: The Analysis Group, 1985),
quoted in Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction, 182.
653
Stanley Greenberg, Middle Class Dreams: The Politics and Power of the New American Majority (New
York: Times Books, 1995), 38-43.

354

distinguished working class whites was the fact that they faced disadvantage but did not
receive preferential treatment or assistance from the government.
All of the arguments outlined below elided the central role of the stratified postNew Deal welfare state in creating the postwar white middle class, as well as the
assistance that white worker-actors received from government since the 1960s.654
Homeownership is historically the chief means by which working class people can build
wealth. Under the New Deal Democrats, government-backed Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) and Veterans Affairs (VA) mortgage programs excluded people of
color but allowed whites of modest means to buy homes at low interest rates and with
little money up front. The GI Bill’s higher education benefits vastly increased the size of
the professional class by allowing scores of working class servicemen, disproportionately
white, to attend college. The Wagner Act, the law most crucial in the growth of unions
after the 1930s, did not exclude from government protection unions that kept out African
Americans or permitted them only in the worst jobs. Despite the prevailing caricature of
1960s liberalism as a set of programs with “no appeal” for “ordinary whites,” whites
(especially senior citizens) benefited considerably from Great Society programs,
including Medicare, Medicaid, and federal money for education. The extent to which
white worker-actors benefited from government intervention was not only invisible to
worker-actors—it was mostly invisible within elite public discourse as well. Elite-level
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arguments figuring white workers as victims of welfare and affirmative action relied on
that invisibility.
Affirmative action and the white working class
When contemporaries argued that race-based affirmative action programs were
particularly unfair to working class whites, they made two primary claims, focused on
affirmative action in stable working class trades (construction, police and fire
departments) and college admissions, respectively. In the former case, arguments
followed on the “burden of integration” pattern detailed above—those whites who had
the least were asked to sacrifice the most. White professionals were insulated from job
competition, in this view, and as a result did not “have much to lose from black demands
for equity in hiring. Most blacks had no hope of finding a place in the executive suites or
faculty lounges; they were aspiring to blue-collar jobs, such as in the building trades,
where color-blind hiring would have meant, among other things, that a white worker
could no longer expect to pass his job along to his son.”655 As one white worker-actor
wrote to the New York Times in defense of nepotism within unions, “Some men leave
655
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their sons money, some large investments, some business connections and some a
profession. I have none of these to bequeath to my sons. I have only one worthwhile
thing to give: my trade…For this simple father’s wish it is said that I discriminate against
Negroes.”656 Historically, family and community connections have been a significant
source of cultural capital for white worker-actor men in particular, allowing them to
access better-paying and more stable work. Personalizing this system through the
example of a (white) father wishing to pass his trade on to his son framed it in the most
sympathetic and innocuous terms possible.
The new liberalism’s critics also contended that race-based preferences for
college admission placed white working class students at an unfair disadvantage. They
too faced obstacles that professional-class whites did not face, in this view, but did not
receive recognition or dispensation for them. The 1980s and 1990s in particular saw a
number of calls from both progressives and conservatives to increase class-based
affirmative action measures. Significantly, these arguments often came in the context of
staunch opposition to race-based affirmative action. Toward the end of a polemical 1979
article identifying race-based affirmative action as unlawful racial discrimination, thenUniversity of Chicago professor Antonin Scalia emphasized his support for preferential
measures for the “poor and disadvantaged”: “I am not willing to prefer the son of a
prosperous and well-educated black doctor or lawyer—solely because of his race—to the
son of a recent refugee from Eastern Europe who is working as a manual laborer to get
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his family ahead.”657 This frequent device also appears, for instance, in Dinesh
D’Souza’s 1991 book Illiberal Education, which compares “a black or Hispanic doctor’s
son, who has enjoyed the advantages of comfort and affluence” to “the daughter of an
Appalachian coal miner.”658 These arguments reflect an either-or, zero-sum frame
consistently present on issues of race and class in this period. The objective for a Scalia
or D’Souza was not so much to call for more preferences for all disadvantaged
applicants—affirmative action on the basis of class and race—as to undermine the claim
that affirmative action programs should benefit prospective students of color, regardless
of class.
Criticism of affirmative action also provides further evidence of the consistent
slippage between “white working class” and white working class men. In order for the
claim that affirmative action was harmful to the white working class to make sense, the
benefits white worker-actor women drew from it had to go unmentioned. Frederick
Lynch, a conservative intellectual who helped to popularize the concept of “reverse
discrimination,” derided new liberal understandings of power and disadvantage as a “a
colorized version of Marx’s class struggle,” in which “white men (regardless of
individual backgrounds) are regarded as a privileged modern-day ‘bourgeoisie,’ while
women and people of color…are the oppressed ‘proletariat.’ Any mention of a white
working class—once prominently represented in labor histories—is simply met with
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more rationalizations or with awkward silence.”659 In this formulation, “white working
class” and “white men” seem to be synonymous; “women” are a distinct group. (Lynch’s
reference to a white working class “once prominently represented in labor histories” is
also suggestive—the fact that liberals had once been greatly invested in the welfare of a
group they now derided, critics often noted, was further evidence that the new liberalism
had lost its way.)
Welfare and the white working class
In the Trump era, there has been considerable attention paid to white working
class people who depend on welfare and disability to support themselves. Those working
class white people who are in the labor force, some have suggested, are not angered only
by distant others of color; their anti-government sentiment stems from direct experiences
with whites in their community whom they perceive as undeserving and irresponsible.
That hypothesis is mostly absent in late twentieth century discourse on welfare, which
hewed almost universally to a black welfare recipient/white taxpayer binary.660 Since the
mid-1960s, the dominant understanding in elite discourse had framed poverty and
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government poverty programming as concentrated among African Americans in Northern
cities.661 (“Welfare” in this context means Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or
AFDC, the much-stigmatized program that provided cash assistance to low-income
parents and was ended after Congress passed welfare reform in 1996.) The chief
objection to status quo welfare policy held that it incentivized immoral and irresponsible
behavior (children born out of wedlock, single-parent families, drug use, criminal
activity, able-bodied adults dropping out of the labor force) and allowed that behavior to
continue indefinitely. Longstanding anti-black racist tropes were the central component
of anti-welfare discourse. The white working class, though, often played a supporting
symbolic role.
For contemporary elites, working class whites were deeply angered by welfare
because they themselves worked hard for modest rewards, paid taxes, and did not take
welfare. What they had, they had earned themselves, in this framework. For journalist
Pete Hamill, “the working class earns its living with its hands or its backs; its members
do not exist on welfare payments…Taxes and the rising cost of living keep [the working
class white man] broke, and he sees nothing in return for the taxes he pays.”662 “Working
class” people, sociologist Lillian Rubin wrote, were mainly “steady workers living in
stable families; most of them asking nothing and getting nothing from the government
programs that give welfare to the rich and the poor.”663 For critics of the new liberalism,
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“work” above all defined the political identity of middle-income white workers. Pollsters
called them “working Americans,” the “working middle class,” or “the people who
work.” The concept of “work” was so heavily racialized that any individual associated
with “work,” “working,” or “hard work” was assumed to be nonblack.
The central villain in anti-welfare discourse was the black welfare recipient who
took advantage of government largesse to live a luxurious lifestyle. This figure was often
opposed to a white worker. One strident 1991 book included a sympathetic portrayal of a
white public school teacher infuriated by her experience teaching in a predominantly
African American school: “I would see the kids, whose families were on AFDC, walking
around in designer jeans, silk shirts, alligator shoes. And I’m breaking my buns.”664 In
national politics, Ronald Reagan provided the two most famous examples of the
exploitative welfare recipient trope. During his 1976 presidential campaign, he featured
in his stump speech the story of a Chicago “welfare queen” with “eighty names, thirty
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addresses, twelve Social Security cards…She’s on Medicaid, getting food stamps,
and…collecting welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free cash income is over
$150,000.” In another recurring story, he framed the food stamp program as enabling
“some young fellow ahead of you to buy T-bone steak” while “you were standing in a
checkout line with your package of hamburger.”665
All of these anecdotes work by opposing mythic welfare privilege to real class
disadvantage. In this framework, the injustice done to the white worker is twofold—
moral and economic. Most simply, the white worker faces financial hardship as a direct
result of shouldering the tax burden for welfare programming. New Right activist Bob
Whitaker riffed on the Marxian concept of “exploitation” in framing “today’s worker” as
“exploited more by the welfare class than by the upper class.”666 More broadly, though,
the framework turns on an understanding of morally right and morally wrong responses
to economic hardship. The proper response is to work hard (“breaking my buns”) and be
disciplined in one’s spending (buying hamburger rather than T-bone steak). The
improper response is to exploit the system and spend extravagantly (“designer jeans, silk
shirts, alligator shoes”). For government to encourage immoral behavior is hurtful to
those who follow the proper behavior, in this view. A journalistic profile of one voter
framed the welfare system as “an insult to her parents’ work ethic.”667 For the “middle
class,” Stan Greenberg argued, “the government’s sending its money to the undeserving
was just a slap in the face.” This language of physical harm (“slap in the face”) is
suggestive; the “middle class,” in this framework, experiences a visceral wounding
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because it perceives that its virtue and hard work go unrecognized and unrewarded by the
wider society. Work, in this context, is not just any remunerative employment. It is hard,
physical, boring, dangerous, low-paid. The fact that a person continues to work despite
limited material rewards is proof of virtue and perseverance. Critics of the new
liberalism placed the focus not on the causes of precarity but on the distinction between
“deserving” and “undeserving” workers.
Running through discourse on welfare, affirmative action, and the white working
class are large and contentious questions about privilege, suffering, and restitution. For
critics of the new liberalism, liberals understood privilege and disadvantage in a way that
elided the experience of white workers. The white coal miner’s daughter D’Souza
opposed to the black doctor’s son; the worker with nothing but his trade to pass on to his
sons; the worker standing in line to buy hamburger instead of T-bone steak—for the new
liberalism’s critics, these figures suggested that efforts to redress historic inequalities
based on race and gender directly victimized struggling whites who had not derived much
privilege from the existing system.

Conclusion
One of the highest-profile speeches of the 2008 election cycle was Barack
Obama’s “A More Perfect Union,” delivered in Philadelphia in March 2008. “A More
Perfect Union” was a major address on race in America, written as controversy around
incendiary sermons given by Obama’s former pastor Jeremiah Wright threatened to derail
his candidacy. In one of the central devices in the speech, Obama describes in parallel
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terms the anger and resentment held by both blacks and whites and typically only
expressed in private; in each case, he suggests, the resentments are legitimate but
ultimately limiting and counterproductive. The primary argument in Obama’s discussion
of white resentment reads as follows:
Most working- and middle-class white Americans don’t feel that they’ve been
particularly privileged by their race. Their experience is the immigrant
experience—as far as they’re concerned, no one handed them anything; they’ve
built it from scratch. They’ve worked hard all their lives—many times only to see
their jobs shipped overseas or their pensions dumped after a lifetime of labor.
They’re anxious about their futures, and they feel their dreams slipping away, and
in an era of stagnant wages and global competition, opportunity comes to be seen
as a zero-sum game, in which your dreams come at my expense. So when they are
told to bus their children to a school across town; when they hear an African
American is getting an advantage in landing a good job or a spot in a good college
because of an injustice that they themselves never committed; when they’re told
that their fears about crime in urban neighborhoods are somehow prejudice,
resentment builds over time.668
Most immediately, the speech suggests Obama’s familiarity with the discourse outlined
in this chapter. More broadly, it suggests the major imprint that the critique of the new
liberalism’s treatment of the white working class continued to exert decades later.
Busing had not been a major national political issue since the 1980s. The 2000s saw
considerably less emphasis than earlier decades on ethnic whites’ immigrant history.
However, when the politician who would become the first African American president
sought to frame “the resentments of white Americans” as “grounded in legitimate
concerns,” he turned to these former mainstays.
In this speech, as he has elsewhere, Obama made the standard progressive
argument that white working class anger is mistakenly focused towards people of color
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rather than corporate elites (“justified, but just misdirected,” as phrased in a more recent
interview). Exploited by conservative politicians, he argued in the Philadelphia speech,
“these white resentments distracted attention from the real culprits of the middle-class
squeeze,” including “a Washington dominated by lobbyists and special interests” and
“economic policies that favor the few over the many.” The history detailed in this
chapter suggests that the problem of misdirection (“distract[ing] attention from the real
culprits”) is not only a product of white worker-actor racism and nativism and the
conservative elites who exploited it. It is deeply embedded in a longstanding elite-level
critique of the new liberalism’s relationship to the white working class.
First, perhaps the most significant recurring pattern in this discourse centers on
political actors deploying white disadvantage to undercut claims made by or on behalf of
marginalized groups. Arguments against race-based affirmative action programs
identified them as unfair to working class white students. Because professional-class
women benefited more than working class women from efforts to bring about workplace
equality, in this framework, those efforts were actively harmful to non-elite women.
Cash welfare for low-income parents was unjust because those with slightly higher
incomes struggled to make a good living working full time.
Second, while (white) working class disadvantage was very prominent in this
discourse, there was considerably less focus on its causes. Employers and workplace
issues rarely appeared. In anti-welfare discourse, taxes were more prominent than wages
as a source of financial hardship. In some cases, the de-emphasis of workplace issues
reflects the belief that unionized (white) workers no longer faced significant injustice at
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work—it was at home and in the neighborhood where they had no agency. In other cases
(as with socially conservative critics of the feminist movement), critics implied that bluecollar workers could not expect to find agency or fulfillment at work, so home life was
most important to them.
Ultimately, though, it is essential to stress that all the common arguments
positioning working class whites as victims of liberalism play on real disadvantage. Not
all whites were (or are) uniformly powerful. European immigrants faced discrimination
and greater class disadvantage than native-born whites. Lower-income white students
faced disadvantages in accessing elite colleges. Working class Americans of all
backgrounds worked long hours at multiple jobs and wound up with incomes marginally
higher than the poverty level. The challenge for progressives is to mainstream a
framework for talking about these issues that does not invoke resentment of “identity
politics,” welfare, or the attention paid to other people’s pain.
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Concluding Chapter
In a 2015 piece framing “America’s white working class” as “a dying breed,”
Washington Post columnist Harold Meyerson recalled “a time when the white working
class was the subject of happier tales.” The “white worker of the mid-20th century was
the protagonist of the American saga,” he reminded readers. White working class people
“were the linchpin of the New Deal coalition” and made up “the world’s most affluent
and economically secure working class from the 1950s through the 1970s.” It was in
more recent decades that the story of the white working class had “grown relentlessly
grimmer,” with Donald Trump’s candidacy the ultimate manifestation of its sense of
“abandonment, betrayal, and misdirected rage.”669
During and after the 2016 election, the white working class has once again moved
to the center of the elite political imagination. The reason is straightforward: for most
professional political observers, especially those who lean liberal, Donald Trump’s
success was a shock. Because it ran counter to nearly all the conventional wisdom
guiding political analysis, Trump’s rise prompted urgent elite efforts to understand and
portray the motivations of his voters. Those efforts have focused heavily on the white
working class—a group once numerous, valued, and strong, for Meyerson and many
others, but now bitter and marginal. As this dissertation has stressed, elite engagement
with the white working class as a social and cultural category has a history that is
important to understand for its own sake. White working class representation in the postTrump era provides further evidence for that claim.
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This concluding chapter is divided into two parts. The first follows the approach
of a conventional conclusion, summarizing the major findings of the study and the major
threads running through the narrative. Placing issues of mediation and representation at
the center of analysis opens up new ground for the study of white working class politics,
this project has argued, and calls attention to the importance of understanding the white
working class as a political symbol in the context of elite-level politics. Part Two
integrates points of emphasis from the study with new material in order to more directly
address white working class representation in the era of Trump. Both Trump supporters
and Trump opponents are recognizably part of a pattern that has recurred consistently
since the 1960s, in which the white working class represents rightful (for some) or
illegitimate (for others) opposition to liberal values. Important distinctions are apparent,
however: trade, immigration, and globalization have changed elite perceptions of white
working class grievances in important ways; the economic nationalism Trump has
mainstreamed leverages the white working class against establishment Republicans as
well as liberals; demographic change and the experience of the Obama presidency have
altered how Democrats view the political importance of the white working class.

I. Summary of Analysis
The dominant approach in existing literature on white working class politics
focuses on understanding the culture, identity, or political views of the white working
class, too often understood as a homogenous group. This project has sought to intervene
in existing literature by stressing themes of representation and mediation: how elites have
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studied and talked about the white working class, especially through the news media, and
why that work has mattered. It retells a familiar historical narrative, the rise and fall of
New Deal liberalism, putting the representation of the white working class at the center
of the analysis.
The white working class as a foil
This dissertation has stressed the importance of analyzing claims made about
white workers in relation to the intellectual influences and strategic objectives that bear
on elite political contestation. Perhaps the clearest takeaway from the project is that,
crudely put, the white working class as a political symbol is or can be what elites want or
need it to be in a given period. The white working class has served as a ready foil or
symbol for a wide range of political claims on the right, the left, and the center; it has
been positioned as a champion of progressive and reactionary views, a foil to corporate
elites and liberal elites. Because the white working class is such a ready foil, the texts
produced by journalists, pollsters, and others characterizing the politics of white workers
often say as much, if not more, about the political aims and cultural contexts of their
authors as they do about the people being studied.
The significant changes in the symbolic role played by the white working class
reflect broader shifts in elite public discourse and political contestation. In the 1930s,
when the (white) worker appeared as a central symbol of the need for economic reform,
the Depression exerted a major imprint on elite public discourse, with business leadership
discredited and Marxian ideas respectable. In the 1950s, when Cold War-era political
imperatives encouraged an emphasis on mass prosperity and the superiority of the
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American economic system, the (white, male) worker predominantly appeared in elite
public discourse as proof of that system’s success. The still-powerful image of the
secure, affluent mid-century (white) worker cannot be understood outside that Cold War
context, which rendered class politics deeply dangerous and pushed contemporaries
towards glowing assessments of the economic status quo. The transition of the (white)
worker from a predominantly liberal to a predominantly conservative symbol is rooted in
changing understandings of what these terms meant, as defending a set of moral and
racial norms once taken for granted by many “liberals” became marked as
“conservative.”
The importance of elite public discourse
This project has sought to stress the importance, for analysis of white working
class politics, of looking at contestation within media and public discourse. In particular,
I have emphasized the dynamics through which competing elites’ claims coexist,
intersect, and reinforce one another, how the same basic frame can support competing
claims. That dynamic is particularly evident in the decades after the 1960s, when both
liberals and conservatives consistently drew on the conservative (white) majority/liberal
(white) elite frame in their analysis. It is also evident in the 1950s, when both organized
labor and organized business emphasized the secure middle-income lifestyles of (white,
male) workers and their families. Elites have often held to shared views of the political
world that cut across conventional ideological distinctions, the chapters suggest. When
competing elites’ claims have overlapped, alternative understandings of white working
class politics have gained less visibility.
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Similarly, in understanding elite-level political discourse about the white working
class, it matters very much which elites have become broadly recognized as
representatives of white workers. Bourdieu’s concept of the spokesperson suggests that a
non-elite group can only speak in a dominant political space through agents who can
believably claim to represent it. Looking at the changing characteristics of elite voices
understood to be speaking for white workers in national politics provides a useful twist
on the familiar story of white workers’ turn from liberalism toward conservatism. The
history of the American white working class and the history of organized labor in
America are intertwined in many ways; one noted relatively infrequently is the
importance of organized labor in speaking for (white) workers in elite public discourse.
From the mid-1930s to at least the mid-1960s, most elites regarded labor officials as the
preeminent voices for the group contemporaries called “workers” or “the workingman.”
Since the 1960s, conservative politicians—especially Richard Nixon, George Wallace,
Ronald Reagan, and Donald Trump—have taken that role. In recent decades, unions’
influence in elite public discourse has declined substantially, and no left-of-center force
has replaced them, leaving conservatives relatively uncontested in their claims to speak
for white workers.
Speaking about and for unitary groups is a key part of democratic politics; as
Bourdieu notes, it invests political claims with the power that comes from clarity and
simplicity. Claims to speak for white workers have been consistently bolstered by the
specter of essentialism haunting the discourse on white working class politics. Over many
years, in liberal, left, and conservative writing, journalistic writing and academic writing,
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there has been a consistent tendency to identify the white working class as a more or less
homogenous group with uniform political views. During the New Deal era, the tendency
to view (white) workers as a unitary group helped to obscure their nonliberal views; since
the 1960s, it has worked to obscure liberal views. Pointing out the essentialism
characteristic of elite discourse about white working class people does not mean denying
the prominence of conservative, anti-liberal, nativist, racist, sexist views within the
group, and it cannot be an excuse to soft-pedal the consequences of those views. What is
needed is a language that recognizes their prominence and power but does not rely on
rigid understandings of an exceptional white working class to explain them.
The tensions embedded in a (white, male) working class
One of the basic tensions in a history of white working class representation
centers on the conflicting work done by a class category marked as white, and often as
male. Dominant views of white working class masculinity and white working class
femininity have overlapped substantially; both have centered on the home, the close-knit
family, and distrust of the outside world. However, white working class women have
been significantly less central to the discourse than men, and they have often been
defined within it through their relationship with men—not as workers so much as
workers’ spouses or daughters. In the midcentury period in which the (white) worker
stood closest to the symbolic center of society, the triumphalist tenor that marked much
discussion of labor relations was based on an image of the “worker” as a white male
breadwinner whose wages allowed his wife to stay at home, while one of the period’s
prominent studies of (white) working class women was titled Workingman’s Wife.
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Because white working class-ness has been strongly associated with traditional
masculinity and femininity, racial grievance, and economic liberalism, the (white) worker
cannot be read as an unproblematic symbol for either liberals or conservatives. The
(white) worker was most prominent as a liberal symbol in a period where the problem of
industrial modernity—how economic security could be maintained in an industrial
society—was the central theme in elite public discourse. For left-of-center
contemporaries, this problem was by no means unique to or limited to white workers; it
touched the lives of all Americans, especially the vast majority who lacked power or
wealth. However, the dominant liberal understanding of the history of US capitalism
focused on the predominantly male and European-descended urban industrial workforce,
without integrating slavery, settler colonialism, or segregation. Liberals placed the
(white, male) industrial worker at the center of their vision of society in part because
urban wage workers exemplified the conditions of instability endemic to the modern age,
in part because their political economic position accorded them potentially vast economic
power, and in part because they could be positioned as deserving, ordinary Americans
who sought the economic gains necessary to achieve normative family life. The (white)
worker conveyed the need for change, but also respect for and continuity with past
American ways.
In and after the 1960s, increasing numbers of professionals framed what had been
viewed as normative, middle class American ways of life as narrow and harmful,
especially for women and children. That white workers continued to prize those ways of
life could now be read as a sign of inferiority. In the same period, white workers were
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explicitly defined against African Americans, understood as threatened by additional
change and most concerned with defending the tidy houses and secure middle-income
lifestyles they had gained since the Depression. However, even as the white working
class became a predominant symbol of cultural traditionalism and anti-black backlash,
the dominant understanding of white working class identity remained grounded in
economic liberalism. The period in the late 1960s in which the alienation of the white
working class became a central theme in elite discourse (Chapter 3) saw explicit criticism
of the economic order rarely seen since the 1940s. For decades, conventional wisdom
among conservative political operatives prescribed emphasizing cultural issues and
minimizing the natural liberal advantage on economics. As conservatives have gained
the benefits (electoral and symbolic) of white worker-actors’ votes, they have
increasingly had to answer for their economic wellbeing—a reckoning made clear in the
Donald Trump candidacy.
The thin line between normativity and inferiority
Perhaps most of all, the white working class’s utility and flexibility as a political
symbol can be attributed to the intersection of white and working class, subordinate class
status and membership in the dominant racial group. Whiteness conveys a sense of
power, privilege, normativity, and averageness; working class can convey an underdog
positioning and a salt-of-the-earth authenticity as well as cultural or intellectual
inferiority. Over the period between the 1930s and 1990s, elite representations of the
white working class have been marked by both normativity and inferiority, with the
boundaries between the two porous and neither far from view at any given time. Even as
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1930s and 1940s leftists placed a great deal of hope in (white) workers as a force for a
more progressive future, they retained serious concerns about these workers’
susceptibility to misinformation and demagoguery. The striking workers praised by
leftists were not unique or intellectually gifted; they were numerous, brave, and dedicated
to their cause. In the post-civil rights era, as Chapters 3 and 4 argued, the same basic
understanding of the politics and culture of Middle America can support inflections
appealing to multiple political perspectives—an anxious, narrow-minded majority
holding back needed change; a majority committed to rightful traditions abandoned by a
misguided elite. Ordinariness and majority status invite everything from praise to
condemnation to indifference, depending on the context.
This thin line between normativity and inferiority continues to be apparent in
post-Trump white working class representation. Trump’s praise for white working class
people as America’s best citizens is profoundly patronizing (“I love the poorly
educated”…“the smart, smart, smart people that don’t have the big education”).
Meanwhile, condescension is often embedded in calls for liberals to stop condescending
to the white working class. For Joan Williams, a law professor whose 2017 book White
Working Class is dedicated to combatting “class cluelessness in America,” “many habits
of the professional elite—from artisanal religion to a life of self-actualization—require a
college education. America doesn’t provide that, so we need to take the working class as
we find them…Many of our truths just don’t make sense in the context of their lives.”670
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The claim that “a life of self-actualization” is only possible with a college education is a
particularly egregious manifestation of “class cluelessness.”
Recent elite analysis of the white working class—like Williams’, for instance—is
generally marked by a sense of immediacy, of scoping out an uncharted political world.
However, many of the patterns evident in the post-Trump period (the period beginning in
late 2015 when it became clear that Trump had a real chance to win the Republican
nomination) are evident in the history of white working class representation from the
1930s to the 1990s. It is important to understand the rise of Trump and the conversations
around it in that context.

II. Situating the Trump Voter
Throughout Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign and presidency, the dominant elitelevel view has understood support for Trump as concentrated within the white working
class. The least nuanced versions of the argument have implicated a homogenous white
working class viscerally drawn to Trump’s rhetoric and willing to follow him anywhere.
More nuanced versions (relatively speaking) have understood alienated white working
class people as his core supporters, those most moved by his campaign. “At the core of
Donald Trump’s political success this year are the grievances of a sizable and now vocal
block of disaffected voters, many of them white and working-class,” Dan Balz of the
Washington Post wrote in March of 2016. For Balz, Trump “and so-called Trumpism
represent an amalgam of long-festering economic, cultural and racial dissatisfaction
among a swath of left-out Americans who do not fit easily into the ideological
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pigeonholes of red and blue, right and left.”671 For a Columbia Journalism Review
contributor writing shortly after the 2016 election, “the revolt of the white working class
that ushered in the Age of Trump” was “the biggest political story of our lifetimes.”672
Elite public discourse of the period has evinced an intense interest in intellectual
work portraying the pain of the white working class. Perhaps the highest-profile account
of white rural poverty in the post-Trump period, J.D. Vance’s Hillbilly Elegy, has been
optioned for a Hollywood movie, with Ron Howard attached to direct. Journalistic
portrayals of Trump voters, especially white working class people living in depressed
small cities and towns, appeared consistently throughout Trump’s candidacy. The
pervasiveness of the genre is aptly captured in a Washington Post contributor’s parody of
“the flood of journalists who went to Real America to see how the Trump supporters are
getting along”: “In the shadow of the old flag factory, Craig Slabornik sits whittling away
on a rusty nail, his only hobby since the plant shut down…Lydia Borkle lives in an old
shoe in the tiny town of Tempe Work Only, Ariz., where the factory has just rusted away
into a pile of gears and dust.”673 Journalistic explorations of white working class Trump
supporters do conflicting work—they suggest that journalists and elites are bound by
their professional and democratic duty to sympathetically portray Trump voters’ concerns
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(to a degree that they have rarely done with working class voters of color); they imply
that Trump support and American racism live in spaces utterly foreign to professionalclass urbanites.
Attributing Trump’s rise to a “revolt of the white working class” has been the
clear dominant interpretation throughout the period. However, several studies and
multiple articles in political media have pushed back on this argument. A fivethirtyeight
analysis of exit polling in Republican primaries found that Trump supporters had a
median income of $72,000, above the national median income of $56,000 and the figure
for Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders voters (around $61,000).674 Two Gallup
researchers (drawing on data from roughly 125,000 Gallup interviews) found a mean
household income of $81,898 for voters viewing Trump favorably and $77,046 for those
who did not. In this study, higher incomes predicted support for Trump even among nonHispanic whites; education and occupation-based variables were more supportive of the
conventional wisdom, with workers in skilled blue-collar occupations more likely to
favor Trump and college-educated voters and professionals less likely.675 According to
Edison Research general election exit polling, Trump won nearly every subcategory of
white voters: 62% of white men (+31% over Clinton), 52% of white women (+9), 48% of
674
Nate Silver, “The Mythology of Trump’s ‘Working Class’ Support,” fivethirtyeight, May 3, 2016. For
additional articles in political media on this theme, see e.g. Jesse Myerson, “Trumpism: It’s Coming from
the Suburbs,” The Nation, May 8, 2017; Abdullah Shihipar, “Why Americans Must Stop Talking About
Trump’s Mythical ‘White Working Class’ Voters,” Quartz, July 4, 2017; Jack Metzgar, “How the Media
Gets the Narrative on the White Working Class Totally Wrong,” In These Times, March 15, 2016; Eric
Sasson, “Blame Trump’s Victory on College-Educated Whites, Not the Working Class,” New Republic,
November 15, 2016.
675
Jonathan Rothwell and Pablo Diego-Rosell, “Explaining Nationalist Political Views: The Case of
Donald Trump,” November 6, 2016, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2822059. Business owners,
notably, were also more likely to support Trump. 26% of Trump supporters had bachelors’ or postgraduate
degrees, as compared with 35% of non-supporters. 17% of those favorable to Trump were professionals, as
compared with 23% of those not favorable.

378

whites with a college degree (+3; Trump was +14 among men in this category and -7
among women), and 66% of whites without a college degree (+37).676 These results are
consistent with the existing quantitative literature on white working class politics, in
which income consistently shows the most liberal “white working class” and education
the most conservative.
The clearest takeaway from this data is that attributing Trump’s rise to the white
working class is at best an incomplete interpretation. Certainly some evidence supports
the conventional wisdom. Democrats did somewhat better among whites with a college
degree than they generally have, while Trump outperformed his recent predecessors
among whites without a college degree.677 Though nonvoters and the minority of voters
who opposed him should not be overlooked, by any reasonable measure, the majority of
white working class voter-actors who voted in the 2016 election voted for Trump.
However, in the case of Trump (as it does more generally), the frame of white working
class exceptionalism works to obscure the continuity and consistency of whites’ attitudes
across the sociocultural distinctions so often emphasized in elite public discourse. Trump
enjoyed broad-based support among white voters across income groups, regions, and
educational categories. Any argument that Trump was the choice of “working class,”
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“lower-income” or “struggling” Americans requires excluding all nonwhite voters from
those categories; even when analysis is confined to whites, it is not clear that his voters
struggled more economically or suffered more from deindustrialization.
The key question, then, is why the “white working class revolt” frame remains
dominant even though easily available data undermines or nuances it. Many of the
reasons are deeply rooted in a longer history of white working class representation: sixty
years of similar constructions of the white working class have left a heavy imprint on
elite-level political analysis; many of the people attending Trump rallies manifested in
their speech, dress, and self-presentation what professionals easily identify as low
cultural taste; racialized and gendered understandings of class identify as typical
“workers” those working class people most likely to support Trump, white men. From a
more present-oriented perspective, the dominant elite-level view of the Trump voter can
be usefully understood (drawing on the elite consensus frame developed in Chapters 3
and 4) by looking at the intersection of conservative claims on behalf of white workers
and liberal efforts to understand and respond to Trumpism. Trump has placed the white
working class at the symbolic center of his appeal to a degree not seen in decades,
adopting an oppositional, underdog positioning that differs significantly from
conventional conservatism. Liberals differ most substantially on whether or not they can
or should work to win the white working class back to their side; much as they did in the
1960s and after, liberals have found populist conservatives’ claims to speak for white
workers persuasive.
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Conservatives and the white working class in the Trump era
The ideology that has come to be called “Trumpism” differs from recent
conventional Republican and conservative politics in its pessimistic tenor, the
oppositional posture it takes towards establishment Republicans as well as liberals, and
its emphasis on nationalist over libertarian principles. Crucial in all of these respects is
the central symbolic position it accords to the “American worker,” the “working class,”
and the “middle class”—all ostensibly race-neutral terms consistently used (as this study
and others stress) to describe blue-collar whites.
Since at least the Reagan presidency, white working class voters have made up an
increasing share of the Republican base, but Republicans and conservatives have seldom
placed (white) workers at the center of their economic vision of America. To be sure,
some conservatives have pushed back on messaging that comes across to non-elite
Americans as exclusive; some have also contended that the party elite’s favored
economic policies skew to the wealthy. Since 2000, Tim Pawlenty has championed
“Sam’s Club” (as opposed to “country club”) Republicans; Rick Santorum, Mike
Huckabee, and columnists Ross Douthat & Reihan Salam have called for conservative
policy geared more explicitly around the needs of the white working class.678 The 1990s
saw considerable opposition in elite-level politics to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and trade liberalization generally. Opponents—ranging from the
AFL-CIO and labor-liberal legislators to dissident conservatives like Ross Perot and Pat
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Buchanan—argued that free trade advantaged corporations and highly educated workers
but harmed less skilled workers, further incentivizing corporations to disinvest in
domestic production and move domestic manufacturing jobs to low-wage countries. The
most obvious forerunner to Trump at the presidential level is Buchanan, a longtime
political commentator and former Nixon and Reagan aide who ran for president in 1992,
1996, and 2000. Buchanan’s runs paired hardline cultural conservatism with an emphasis
on “looking out for America first”; like Trump, he emphasized the suffering of displaced
(white) workers, the “forgotten men and women who work in the forges and factories and
plants and businesses” of the nation.679
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, however, the dominant view in both major
parties—advocated by Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, both Bushes, Alan Greenspan, and
nearly every White House economic advisor—held that trade liberalization was good for
the country. More measured arguments generally stressed that globalization was an
inexorable force and that the United States would fare worse by disengaging with the
world; the new economy would disrupt industries and disadvantage some workers, but
the majority would benefit from cheaper goods made possible by imports and job
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opportunities made possible by exports. Less measured arguments recalled the
triumphalism of the post-World War II period in suggesting that the new economy
promised near-universal gains. Generally, when white workers have appeared as a
central political symbol for conservatives since the Reagan era, they have been positioned
within a broadly drawn cultural mainstream—“Middle America,” “real America,” or
Sarah Palin’s “small town America”—identified as the moral core of the nation. These
tropes imply authenticity and superiority over coastal liberals, but not a sense of
economic dislocation. The dismal view of modern America central to the 2016 Trump
campaign presented a deep disjuncture from conventional politics in both major parties.
The nationalist/populist conservatism advocated by the strategists and
intellectuals gathered around Trump is distinctive in part because it centers an
unambiguously white working class more explicitly than any dominant ideology in recent
American politics. In the narrative of recent history that undergirded Trump’s 2016
campaign, particularly as put forward by former Trump administration chief strategist
Steve Bannon, the position of the (white) working class exemplifies what has gone wrong
in America in recent decades. Power has been held by an economic elite—represented in
the establishments of both major parties—unconcerned with the wellbeing of fellow
citizens and entirely disconnected from life as lived by the majority. Deindustrialization,
in Trumpism’s narrative of recent American history, is most emblematic of the deep
injustice that resulted. “One by one, the factories shuttered and left our shores, with not
even a thought about the millions upon millions of American workers left behind,”
Trump stated in his inaugural address. “The wealth of our middle class has been ripped
383

from their homes and then redistributed across the entire world.”680 For Bannon, the way
“the industrial base in this country has been eviscerated” amounts to “an economic hate
crime on the working class people in this country,” perpetrated by and for the benefit of
“the elites in the ascendant economy in Silicon Valley, Wall Street, Hollywood, and
Washington, DC.”681
The economic nationalism Trump has mainstreamed champions white workers in
a way that blurs the economics/culture binary central to elite analysis of white working
class politics since the 1960s. In a longstanding analysis shared by figures from Richard
Nixon to Thomas Frank, conservatives win when they convince white working class
voters to put their cultural grievances above their economic interests, and liberals win
when they bring economic issues to the forefront. This conventional model does not
apply when, as advocates of Trumpism argue, the dominant liberal and conservative
politics are intertwined and have both consigned America’s most deserving citizens to
economic and cultural marginalization. Put differently, anti-libertarian and nativist
elements are both central to Trumpism, and they are inseparable.
First, central to economic nationalism’s critique of libertarianism is the stress it
places on the importance of national identity and borders. In Buchanan’s framework,
“the country comes before the economy, and the economy exists for the people…In the
proper hierarchy of things, it is the market that must be harnessed to work for man and
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not the other way around.”682 The argument here is not simply that an economy exists to
serve human needs, but that libertarianism subordinates cultural cohesion and identity to
the dictates of the market. Globalization and immigration harm the economic prospects
of native-born workers, in this view; they also introduce difference and hybridity into the
nation, which only functions as it should in a climate of cultural homogeneity. For
Buchanan, “A nation is more than a consumer cooperative; it is a people, separate and
apart, with its own destiny and history, language and faith, institutions and culture.”683
Similarly, for Steve Bannon, “A country is more than an economy. We’re a civic
society”…“We are a nation with a culture…and a reason for being.”684
Economic nationalism appeals to white supremacists because it valorizes
homogenous constructions of identity and culture defined against a corrupt
internationalism. Many of its advocates have expressed explicit concern about threats
posed to American identity and sovereignty by the shrinking of the white majority and
Latin American immigration; discussions of shadowy networks of “globalist”
international elites evoke longstanding anti-Semitic tropes.685 Crucially, though,
economic nationalism also draws respectability from the basic democratic or populist
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frame stressing that the needs of the “people” come before the needs of elites. The claim
that “the economy exists for the people” has been the basis of liberal argumentation for
decades (the tension, obviously, lies in how “the people” are understood), and some
liberals have interpreted Trump’s victory as a repudiation of neoliberalism and a
vindication of their own views. Part of the danger and power of populism lies in that
tension—because the underdog-populist frame is so flexible and familiar, it offers white
nationalists and their apologists an opportunity to mainstream their claims. In a striking
and now-infamous article dedicated to introducing “establishment conservative[s]” to the
alt-right, Milo Yiannopoulos and his co-author frame alt-right thought (in which “culture,
not economic efficiency, is the paramount value”), as a useful and legitimate corrective to
conservatism chiefly focused on open markets and economic growth.686 Nativist or antiimmigrant claims are typically framed in a way that emphasizes the victimization of
vulnerable native-born Americans. In a prominent narrative on the right, capitalists
seeking cheap labor and liberal politicians seeking easy votes pursue a loose immigration
policy at the expense of lower-skilled native-born workers, who face fewer job
opportunities and depressed wages as a result.687
Second, in economic nationalist discourse, the same complex of elites is held
responsible for both the economic and the cultural dislocation suffered by (white)
workers. The economics/culture binary depends on an opposition between
liberal/cultural (journalists, professors) and conservative/economic elites (Wall Street and
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employers). That opposition has blurred, however, as constructions of the economic elite
shift toward a more urban, cosmopolitan, global-oriented image. In a 1996 article,
conservative columnist Samuel Francis argued that globalization would render
conventional distinctions between “right” and “left” irrelevant. “The fundamental
polarity in American politics and culture today,” Francis claimed, pitted “a deracinated
and self-serving Ruling Class” against “Middle American groups…constituting both the
economic core of the nation through their labor and productive skills as well as the
culturally defining core that sustains the identity of the nation itself.” As corporations
disinvested in rural America, moved manufacturing overseas, and did business across
borders, rootedness in the local community and the nation became a threat, in this view;
the “economic interests as well as the cultural habits and ideologies of the Ruling Class
drive it toward globalization—the managed destruction of the nation, its sovereignty, its
culture, and its people.”688 These elites—for Bannon, “people in New York that feel
closer to people in London and in Berlin than they do to people in Kansas and in
Colorado”—have no sense of social responsibility or affinity with the nation and its nonelite citizens.689
The blurring of the economic and cultural elite also manifests in the argument that
conventional distinctions between Republican and Democratic politicians are
unimportant when all have interests tied up in the same insiders’ game. The
mainstreaming of this view poses a serious challenge for Republicans identified with the
“establishment.” In an emerging frame, populist conservative outsiders seek real reform
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on behalf of the struggling (white) working class, while the party establishment is
beholden to the Republican donor class and the interests of the Washington, D.C.
“swamp.” Steve Bannon, campaigning for the populist primary challenger of a sitting
Alabama Republican senator, framed the race as a test of “who is sovereign—the people
or the money.” “They think you’re a pack of morons,” he told an Alabama audience.
“They think you’re nothing but rubes. They have no interest at all in what you have to
say, what you have to think or what you want to do.”690 Alabama, of course, is the home
state of Bannon’s forerunner George Wallace, whose stump speeches consistently
stressed the disdain elites held for his supporters: “They have looked down their noses at
the average man on the street too long”…“They look down their noses and call us pea
pickers and peckerwoods and lint heads and rednecks”…“Your thoughts are just as good
as theirs.”691 By “they,” Wallace meant liberals, intellectuals, “pointy-headed
professors”; Bannon meant Republicans as well.
***
Republicans and conservatives who support Trump gain from the perception that
they represent the (white) working class, the “American worker,” the “forgotten people.”
Like generations of conservatives before them, they can claim to represent an underdog
group against an elite. That benefit comes at the cost of being repeatedly forced to defend
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themselves against charges of racism (at least for those who do not welcome those
charges) and of enabling an unqualified misogynist and bigot. For many of the elites who
oppose Trump, framing his rise as a “revolt of the white working class” makes strategic
sense as well. Populist liberals who hope to see fundamental economic reform point to
Trump’s victory as evidence that the electorate has rejected the power structure, that
white working class voters will choose liberal populism if Democrats offer it. Other
liberals see Trump as evidence that Democrats should devote their resources to more
progressive constituencies, voters of color and college-educated whites; in this view,
efforts to regain white workers will push the party to the right, not the left. In the present
day, as has generally been the case for many years, prevailing symbolic constructions of
the white working class are problematic and disadvantageous for liberals.

Liberals and the white working class in the Trump era
Among liberals, two predominant lines of argumentation emerged to explain
Trump’s victory. Distilled into a few words, they centered on neoliberalism and white
supremacy, respectively. Many observers integrated the two into one narrative, in which
economic deprivation and racial/cultural grievance were interlocking forces driving white
workers (especially in depressed rural areas) to Trump. Consistently, though,
racism/sexism and “economic anxiety” (a phrase so common one columnist described
Trump voters as “Economically Anxious™”692) were framed as competing explanations.
From one perspective, Trump’s white working class supporters were primarily motivated
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by legitimate anger at Wall Street, the political establishment, and the trade deals that had
gutted their communities. “Millions of Americans registered a protest vote…expressing
their fierce opposition to an economic and political system that puts wealthy and
corporate interests over their own,” Vermont senator Bernie Sanders contended. Trump
“won the White House because his campaign rhetoric successfully tapped into a very real
and justified anger.”693 Other liberals criticized this perspective for overlooking or
excusing the rank bigotry that had undergirded Trump’s rise. Trump supporters were
certainly angry, in this second view, but their anger was not legitimate and should not be
legitimated. For Salon’s Amanda Marcotte: “The Trump revolution was driven by white
men who are watching women and people of color making gains that put them closer to
equality. They are rebelling at the erosion of the sense that white men are better and more
important than everyone else, simply because they exist.”694
Conflicting views of Trump voters’ motivations have shaped liberals’ arguments
about how best to move forward in the aftermath of Trump’s victory. Some have
advocated bringing the white working class closer to the liberal vision of America; others
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have advocated the opposite. The debate liberals have had in the wake of the 2016
election can be understood as the latest manifestation of a recurring debate they have
been having since the late 1960s: how to address what Chapter 3 called the “problem of
the white working class,” the political challenges posed by white working class voters’
support for race-baiting conservative candidates. Since the late 1960s, liberals have put
forward three basic prescriptions: 1) move to the left on economic issues, 2) move to the
center/right on cultural issues, or 3) build the coalition around groups other than the white
working class. The developments of the last ten years have seen an increase in the
influence of arguments #1 and #3 and a decrease in the influence of #2.
The primary path advocated by Bill Clinton and the New Democratic movement
(#2) centered on tempering the party’s association with cultural liberalism, “big
government,” and “special interests”—feminists, African Americans, LGBTQ people—in
order to regain the alienated white voters key to any conceivable electoral majority.695
Through the 1990s, this approach was dominant in the party, credited by its advocates for
Clinton’s 1992 and 1996 victories. In recent years, however, Black Lives Matter,
Occupy Wall Street, and other liberals and leftists have been heavily critical of many of
the signature achievements once touted by the Clinton administration, particularly
NAFTA, Wall Street deregulation, welfare reform, and punitive criminal justice policy.
New Democrats’ influence within the party has dwindled significantly. Notably,
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advocates of both of the predominant post-Trump responses to the problem of the white
working class define themselves against the Clinton years.696
#1: Move left on economic issues
In one perspective prominent in post-Trump analysis, Democrats can succeed
with white working class voters (and other non-elite voters as well) by developing a
stronger economic program. Some who make this argument assume that what is needed is
simply a shift in messaging or emphasis, while others have called for a substantial
departure from existing economic policy. Particularly in the aftermath of the netroots
movement, the Great Recession, and Occupy Wall Street, the Democratic Party has seen
the rise of an increasingly vocal populist left-liberal wing critical of the party’s turn
towards neoliberalism since the 1970s and calling for serious reform on financial
regulation, consumer protection, and trade policy. For these Democrats (most notably
represented in national politics by Bernie Sanders and Massachusetts senator Elizabeth
Warren), the Democratic Party’s failure to strongly champion the interests of workers
against the economic elite is partly to blame for Trump’s rise, and the party must respond
by changing how it operates. For Elizabeth Warren, “We should hear the message loud
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and clear that the American people want Washington to change...The entire electorate
embraced deep, fundamental reform of our economic system and our political system.”697
For liberals in this camp, Trump’s victory can be very easily read as vindication.
This is partly because an outsider candidate promising to upend the system foregrounded
issues—particularly trade and campaign finance—that these liberals have urged the
Democratic Party to address for years. It is important to note, though, that there is a
degree of overlap in how liberals and populist conservatives have understood the story of
the white working class in postindustrial America. Many liberals share with populist
conservatives a basic frame of decline from a mid-twentieth-century apex, and that
overlap should encourage some pause and reflection.
One of the predominant narratives in contemporary liberal politics centers on
what might be called “the decline of the middle class.” “From the end of the Great
Depression to about 1980,” in a typical account, “America built a middle class unlike
anything known on earth,” with organized labor strong and business guided by a sense of
social responsibility. Beginning in the late 1970s, however, economic elites went back
on the basic bargain they had made with workers. “Productivity kept going up,” but as
“corporate executives and stockholders began taking greater shares of the gains,”
“workers…[were] left behind as wages stagnated.”698
This narrative situates the insecurity and inequality of the present day against the
backdrop of a more egalitarian past—most often the world of the midcentury blue-collar
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middle class. A recent account of deindustrialization’s impact on Lancaster, a small Ohio
city heavily dependent on the glass industry, includes this representative treatment:
People worked hard, but most believed they’d made a fair deal. You could walk
off the high school graduation stage on Saturday and walk into a plant on
Monday, where you could stay for the next forty years. The company would
make you a mechanic, a millwright, an electrician, a machine operator, a mold
maker, a salesman. You’d do bone-wearying work, but there were the perks, too,
like the company softball, baseball, golf, and bowling teams; the company choir
and drama clubs; the insurance and pension. You’d never get rich, and you’d
bitch about management and fat cats, but you could buy a little house on the west
side, then maybe over on the east side or out in the country, and maybe a boat to
fish from on Buckeye Lake. You could get married. You could pay for your kids
to attend decent state universities. Best of all, you could stay in the town where
your kid’s fourth-grade teacher had taught you, too. If you bought in, obeyed the
rules—spoken and unspoken—paid your taxes, loved your town and your
country, that was the bargain on offer.699
When elites in the late 1940s and 1950s put forward a similar vision of the good life for
workers, they saw that lifestyle as evidence that Americans had found an equitable
resolution to the pressing problems of industrial society. For present-day liberals, the
same imagery now serves as a testament to the greed of those who left that equitable
resolution behind in pursuit of selfish gains.
It is not difficult to understand the appeal of the “decline of the middle class”
narrative: it suggests a better America, within living memory, undone by a clearly
identifiable set of antagonists. In twenty-first century politics, however, an unmarked
“middle class” in decline cannot be an unproblematic symbol for liberals. The
midcentury period’s growing middle class was built on the back of the New Deal’s
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stratified welfare state700, with the “bargain” promised to workers only available to
whites (to some degree, only white men, and in their case the benefits were often
overstated, as Chapter 2 argued). The “decline of the middle class” narrative struggles to
integrate Americans whose families were held out of the middle class, and any declension
narrative where relative equality erodes after the 1970s inevitably runs up against other
narratives of twentieth-century America that center women and people of color more
explicitly. Nostalgic evocations of the 1950s in particular can suggest many things, often
simultaneously: common purpose; union strength and respect for workers; relative
equality; cultural traditionalism, homogeneity, or cohesion; segregation; single-income
households with breadwinning fathers and stay-at-home mothers; Judeo-Christian values;
close-knit neighborhoods, well-behaved children, and tidy streets; discreet public
discourse free of sustained conflict and controversy. Certainly this history is not lost on
liberals who invoke the cultural memory of the midcentury period. It is important,
though, to grapple with the question of how and to what extent the period can serve as a
model (and, perhaps simultaneously, a cautionary tale) for twenty-first century politics.
#3: Leave the white working class in the past
At the other end of the spectrum is the view that white working class voters are
unwinnable for Democrats and liberals. In this view, white workers’ drift to the right has
been congealing for decades, and they are opposed to or lukewarm toward crucial liberal
700
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values; efforts to pursue them will harm Democrats’ core constituencies, with issues like
criminal justice reform, abortion rights, and immigration reform tossed aside in the
pursuit of the Democrats’ white whale, the elusive white swing voter. Instead, for many
liberals, Democrats should build their coalition around the “people of color and
progressive Whites” who “comprised the Obama coalition”701, especially the
communities of color who make up the staunchest Democratic voters.
It is important to stress that decentering white workers in the progressive coalition
has only appeared politically feasible for a short time. The argument appeared in the late
1960s and early 1970s among Democrats tied to the New Politics movement but did not
survive George McGovern’s drubbing at the hands of Nixon in 1972. Through the mid2000s, the dominant view held that Democrats could not win at the national level without
support from moderate and blue-collar whites. In the final months of the 2008
Democratic presidential primaries, Hillary Clinton argued explicitly that she would be a
stronger nominee than Barack Obama because Obama did not have the necessary support
among “working, hard-working Americans, white Americans,” by which she meant
whites without a four-year college degree, the group pollsters call the “white working
class.” When the remark proved controversial, Clinton defended herself by referencing
the conventional wisdom that “these are the people you have to win if you’re a Democrat
in sufficient numbers to actually win the election. Everybody knows that.”702
For many liberal observers, the Obama presidency dethroned this truism.
Although the “Democratic decline among older and blue-collar whites has continued,”
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journalist Ronald Brownstein argued in 2015, Obama “triumphed twice anyway by
assembling a more consistently left-leaning coalition centered on millennials, minorities,
and socially liberal whites, especially college-educated and single women.”703 This
“Obama coalition,” understood as an outgrowth of fundamental demographic change, has
also been called the “coalition of the ascendant” or the “rising American electorate”—
meaning its constituencies, unlike the white working class, are growing as a share of the
broader electorate. In more measured versions of the argument, the growing percentage
of voters of color augurs well for Democrats and poorly for Republicans, but Democrats’
weaknesses among working class whites will leave them vulnerable in the near future,
especially at the state and local level. In the least measured versions, Democrats’
advantage with “rising” constituencies will simply make them the dominant party.
In this framework, the white working class often serves as a receding reactionary
backdrop to emerging, forward-looking groups: “a more highly educated and diverse
constituency,” “a coalition of transformation…comfortable with demographic and
cultural change,”704 valuing “multiculturalism,” “inclusion,” and “openness.” Though
Trump’s victory put a crimp in the triumphalist tenor of the “coalition of the ascendant”
narrative (pushing Democrats to recognize that long-term demographic change does not
prevent short-term catastrophe), it also reinforced an understanding of the white working
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class as hostile to change, “dreaming of a past that no longer exists.”705 For nearly all
observers, Trump has only sharpened the cultural divide wracking the country. As New
York Times columnist Michelle Goldberg argues: “America is now two countries, eyeing
each other across a chasm of distrust and contempt. One is urban, diverse and outwardlooking. This is the America that’s growing. The other is white, provincial and culturally
revanchist. This is the America that’s in charge.”706
Concerns about Democrats centering white working class voters are well founded,
especially given the connection between the pursuit of “Reagan Democrats” and the
party’s move to the right in the 1980s and 1990s. The prospect of writing off the white
working class should also raise concern. Neoliberal policy can be advocated through the
language of social conservatism, as in welfare reform; it can also be legitimated through
the language of multiculturalism, diversity, and change. Certainly many liberals skeptical
of the white working class are well aware of this and have opposed the neoliberal turn
within the party; what follows should be read as a general argument about the pitfalls of a
common way of seeing white workers. First, some formulations of the “rising” America
(like Goldberg’s above) flatten the power differentials within the urban liberal coalition.
The “provincial” common adversary works to blur together the interests of working class
people of color and the interests of urban professionals, without bringing up jobs, wages,
affordable housing, or any of the fundamental sticking points in urban politics. This
works in part because the interests of voters of color can be much more easily read as
noneconomic than the interests of the white working class. Working class whites are
705
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likely lost to Democrats, one 2017 New Republic contributor contends, and the party
should respond not by “emphasizing class over culture” but by “playing on the turf of
culture and identity” to appeal to “low-income minorities”—whose concerns in this
account center on “culture and identity,” not “class.”707
It’s also important to stress that the left-behind white worker makes for an ideal
failed neoliberal subject—too stupid, racist, and shortsighted to adapt and succeed in the
modern economy. The firm association between white workers and backlash politics
makes their discontent with the status quo easiest to dismiss as a bigoted aversion to
“change.”708 Rather than “accepting some ‘personal responsibility’…for their low
standard of living and destructive lifestyle,” one liberal contends, “the wrongly
romanticized white working class is flocking to a candidate who allows them to blame
other people for their problems.” The fact that “high school dropouts who have stopped
filling out job applications” faced poor economic prospects should not, in this view,
obscure the reality that “the American economy is doing rather well.”709 The liberal gibe
that prosperous blue states’ taxes subsidize social services for poorer red states is
intended as a rebuke to conservatives who define “makers” against “takers,” “taxpayers”
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against “tax eaters”; instead, it replicates exactly the same logic.710 In the discourse
detailed in this project, white workers’ happiness and wellbeing has frequently been
employed as a primary yardstick for the health of the society as a whole. That practice is
symptomatic of the imbrication of whiteness and understandings of the democratic
public. Without losing sight of that history, it is essential to recognize the clear danger in
suggesting that white workers’ disadvantage does not primarily reflect societal injustice,
that it is primarily an indictment of white workers themselves.

Elite talk about the white working class: Moving the conversation forward
The issues most often raised in elite discourse about the white working class—in
recent months and for decades prior—go to the heart of American political economy and
Americans’ political consciousness. They far exceed the agency of any single actor, no
matter how powerful. A better public discourse is only a very small corner of the vast
structural and ideological problems elites grapple with through talk about the white
working class; it is naïve to suggest otherwise. With that said, it is possible to identify a
few consistent sticking points that consistently militate against a more nuanced
discussion of the role of the white working class in American politics.
First, the narrow understanding of class that has long informed US politics makes
it more difficult for elites to see women and people of color as class subjects and to
understand their political claims as “economic”; it also makes it difficult for elites to see
white working class people as having “cultural” concerns. When pundits describe the
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political views of white working class voters, “cultural” or “social” issues often serve as
euphemisms for racism, sexism, or nativism; in a common left-of-center line of
reasoning, “culture” is the sphere owned by the right, and a “cultural” appeal to white
working class people is synonymous with the racialized populism of Donald Trump and
his forebears. This understanding of “culture” is unnecessarily limiting. If class is
understood as about cultural identity as well as economic position, recognition as well as
redistribution—and it should be—the discussion can be broadened considerably. As Lisa
Henderson argues, “the practice of class recognition…matters in the formation of selves
and solidarity in ways that an analytic emphasis on redistribution alone cannot
capture.”711 The argument that liberals have historically succeeded by “encouraging
white workers to vote their wallets” is a limiting reading; it misses the importance of a
sense of solidarity, of being treated like a human being, of a sense of being understood
and valued. Rather than looking to economics to trump culture, it is important to
consider the many ways culture does, can, and/or should shape politics.
Also limiting is the enduring critique of “identity politics” that has often
accompanied criticism of liberals’ neglect of the white working class. In a controversial
2016 New York Times piece and an ensuing book, Columbia University professor Mark
Lilla called for “The End of Identity Liberalism,” which he deemed a divisive politics
rejected by the “demos,” particularly those voters “living between the coasts.” For Lilla,
“liberals…threw themselves into the movement politics of identity,” in the process
“losing a sense of what we share as citizens and what binds us as a nation”—in other
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words, a shared identity.712 For the argument that liberals need to “go beyond identity
politics” to make any sense at all, the term “identity” must be restricted to those forms of
affiliation the critic finds problematic. Often, the fundamental argument is that liberals
turned off white workers by appealing too narrowly to minority constituencies.
“Republicans have been trying to divide us, and we as Democrats came along and
affirmed their divisions,” Ohio congressman Tim Ryan alleged in a 2017 speech. “We
said, ‘If you’re African American, I’m going to talk to you about voting rights. If you’re
a Latino, I’m going to talk to you about immigration. If you’re a woman, I talk to you
about choice. If you’re gay, I talk to you about LGBT rights.’” In the same speech, Ryan
called on Democrats to “focus like a laser beam on the waitress with two kids. On the
factory worker. We lost them to Trump”713—in other words, make specific appeals to
working people (whom Ryan implicitly renders as white Trump supporters) as a group.
The question is not whether identity should figure in politics—it will no matter
what—but which identities should be put forward. The challenge for (white) workers’
liberal advocates is to articulate their claims in a way that supports other coalition
members’ claims instead of undermining them. Criticism of “identity politics” does the
opposite, relegating issues of race, gender, and sexuality to the ostensibly superficial
realm of “identity.” Calls for Democrats to respond to an explicitly white working class
tend to steer all involved toward emphasizing white over working class. However, it is
possible to bring workers, including white workers, closer to the symbolic center of elite
712
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discourse without stepping into the well-trod territory of white (working class)
victimization. Calls for elites to respond to an explicitly multiracial, multiethnic working
class—in other words, the actually existing working class—are comparatively rare in
elite discourse. While the racialization of terms like “worker,” “work” and even “hard
work” (see Hillary Clinton’s “working, hardworking Americans, white Americans”)
certainly presents a steep challenge, more clearly articulating a progressive working class
identity inclusive of white workers and working class people of color is an essential step
in bringing about a better elite public discourse.
Since the 1960s, liberal discourse on white working class politics has frequently
been characterized by “either-or” frames and false binaries that imply liberals must
choose class or race, class or gender, white workers or the “Obama coalition,” the white
working class or Black Lives Matter. These zero-sum frames reflect the history of white
working class representation more than the needs and views of worker-actors. To be
clear, it is naïve to suggest that real tension and friction do not exist; nor am I making the
argument that all workers have identical interests. As Stuart Hall concisely put it, “social
collectivities have more than one set of interests; and interests can be and frequently are
contradictory, even mutually exclusive. Workers in a social system have both the interest
of advancing and improving their position and advantages within it and of not losing their
place.”714 The “either-or” frames that recur in analysis of white working class politics
rely instead on a view of groups as separate entities with opposing interests and views.
Conventional analysis does not provide a discursive place for the Democrats and liberal714
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leaning people who make up a sizable percentage of the white working class, the LGBTQ
white working class people who make up a sizable part of the LGBTQ population, even
the women who make up the majority of white workers. A better elite public discourse
on white working class politics must recognize actually existing heterogeneity and
include seemingly “out-of-place” people in the picture along with conservative men.
Finally, present-day elite discourse evinces a clear and profound difficulty seeing
or positioning white working class people as part of the American future. In both liberal
and conservative discourse, the white working class is almost always positioned as
symbolic of a past that contemporaries hope to recapture or move beyond. Promises to
“Make America Great Again” are only the most obvious example. A consistent
narrative, especially among liberals, holds that the white working class is effectively
“dying out.” “The only way of addressing their plight is a form of political hospice care,”
one scholar argues. “These are communities that are on the paths to death. And the
question is: How can we make that as comfortable as possible?”715 Whatever happens in
the coming decades, the United States will still have a working class majority, and white
workers will comprise a sizable segment of that working class. Generations of elites
have employed the white working class as political symbol, and that history has
privileged the political use of the subject over the subject itself. It is time for elites to
take stock of the history of white working class representation and move beyond it, to
engage with working class people of all backgrounds as people with opinions and
experiences rather than as political backdrops or foils.
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